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PREFACE
In 1827 L. G. de Beaupoil, the comte de Sainte-Aulaire, produced 
his Hlstoire de la Fronde, the first scholarly work on the Fronde, 
that curious mid-century outburst of unrest touched off by the 
leadership of the Parlement of Paris in 1648. Sainte-Aulaire 
recognized that the Fronde had been a long time coming, and he 
sought its immediate origins in the regency of Anne and Mazarin 
for the young Louis XIV. In the Introduction to the second edition, 
however, Sainte-Aulaire wrote that Richelieu, as well as the regency 
government of Anne and Mazarin, had been responsible for abusive 
treatment of the sovereign courts. The author went on to note 
that as early as the 1630's the magistrates in the high courts had 
been subjected to excesses at the hands of lntendants. commissaires 
extraordinaires. and councilliar power, as well as affronted by 
numerous llts de justice and even arrests of radical judges. These 
early manifestations of absolutistic governmental practices, had 
continued to expand during the regency and had eventually culminated 
in the Fronde -parlementalre of 1648.
Since Sainte-Aulaire's tfistolre de la Fronde more than a half- 
dozen major works and several times as many significant articles 
have treated the events of the Fronde. No history was dedicated to 
Louis XIII1s Parlement, however, and not until recently did any 
historian return to Sainte-Aulaire's thesis that some of the Fronde's 
iii
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origins might lie in Richelieu’s ministry. In 1972 A. Lloyd Moote 
dedicated an introductory chapter to that possibility in his Revolt 
of the Judges. The answers and the thesis of "governmental revo­
lution" provided there were tantalizing— and led to more questions 
concerning the mechanisms of absolutism under the first Cardinal. In 
particular, could Richelieu's parlementaire policy properly be con­
sidered part of a general "governmental revolution," or was it more 
in keeping with past centuries of Crown-Parlement relations? What 
was the impact of Richelieu's reason of State philosophy on the Parle­
ment? Was the Parlement's reaction chiefly motivated by the values 
of a limited, harmonious, constitutional, and "traditional” monarchy, 
or was it spurred on by defense of its own selfish interests in office 
holding? Finally, how did the issues that arose during Richelieu’s 
ministry compare with those which appeared in the Chambre de St.
Louis in the summer of 1648?
This study seeks to define an answer to these questions and 
others surrounding the Parlement's role in the growth of French abso­
lutism under Cardinal Richelieu. Its chronological scope was dictated 
by the limits of Richelieu's ministry, but it has been necessary to 
violate these limits on occasion, particularly in tracing the devel­
opment of the Parlement's political role through the fourteenth, 
fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries. The essay naturally organized 
itself into two large parts, a three chapter narrative of the parle­
mentaire politics of Richelieu’s ministry and several supportative 
essays bearing on the events of the years 1624-1642. The first 
iv
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two chapters furnish an introduction to the history of the Parlement, 
the practices of French office holding in the seventeenth century, 
the nature of French law, and the role of the Parlement in making 
and keeping that law. The third chapter is dedicated to the general 
seventeenth century crisis which pervaded Louis XIII's reign and to 
a brief outline of the Parlement's part in that crisis. The fourth 
chapter is devoted to Richelieu’s philosophy of government and justice; 
the fifth seeks to how the application of that philosophy through the 
practices of absolutism was related to the history of justice in the 
monarchy.
If the resulting essay seems narrowly legalistic and insti­
tutional, it is because I have believed that ultimately the nexus 
of absolute monarchy could be defined only in these terms. Though 
the phenomena of absolutism had cultural, religious, and social 
parallels, the final definition of the term must take on a consti­
tutional expression, inasmuch as this could be applied to the broad 
and diffuse content of French public law in the l600's. Then, as 
for a millenium past, the Crown's power was expressed largely in 
judicial ways; contemporaries as different as LeBret and La Roche- 
Flavin recognized that the right and proper uses of power depended 
on legal checks as well as moral principle.
Conversely, this is not an exercise in social history which 
finds so much favor today. In the l600’s the Parlement counted more 
than 200 judges, with an annual turnover of ten or more. A thorough 
study of these men such as that prepared by Frangois Bluche for the 
v
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eighteenth century would undoubtedly be revealing, but it was 
clearly beyond my resources. In any case, with the possible ex­
ception of the First President, it was the Parlement as an insti­
tution, rather than individuals within the court, which shaped the 
play of tensions characterizing the eighteen years of Richelieu's 
ministry.
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ABSTRACT
In the early seventeenth century, the place of the Parlement of 
Paris in the French kingdom was easy to define: it was the most 
politically powerful and socially prestigious institution outside 
the royal council. Having split off from the curia reals in the early 
part of the fourteenth century as a sovereign court of justice, the 
Parlement had rapidly developed administrative and political qualities 
in addition to its primary judicial functions. The Parlement, for 
example, played a major part in the municipal affairs of the city of 
Paris. Even more importantly, hy the fifteenth century the court had 
assumed an important role in the political life of the monarchy. Early 
on French kings sent copies of ordinances to their judges to be veri­
fied and registered; out of this practice had arisen the right to 
remonstrate on the content, as well as the form, of legislation. By 
the seventeenth century the right to remonstrance was an accepted, if 
undefined, part of French government, and it gave the Parlement a 
significant ability to remind kings of their obligations before the 
law, be it written or customary. The demise of the Estates General 
after l6l*+ sharpened this responsibility, so that when Richelieu 
entered Louis XUI's council in 162*+, the Parlement was the only 
national body in France with the capacity to moderate the abuses of 
absolute government.
A collision between the Parlement's values of legal, limited, and 
viii
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traditional monarchy and the absolute royal power envisioned by
Richelieu became evident as the Cardinal’s ministry progressed during..
the 1620’s. The court had few objections to the Crown's suppression 
of the Huguenots, the reduction of dueling, or development of a 
unified ministry of marine, but issues such as the trial of the due 
de Rohan, deemed necessary for reasons of State, began to produce 
friction as the 1620's wore on. In 1629 the court managed to delay 
acceptance of the Code Michaud for eight months, even though it had 
been personally presented by the king in a lit de justice.
The frictions of the 1630's flowered into an open contest after 
Richelieu's full assumption of power after the Day of Dupes (November 
10, 1630). Punishment of the defeated Marillac faction required the 
death of marSschal Louis de Marillac for political reasons of State; 
during the spring of 1631 the Parlement tried to block the employment 
of fiommlssalres in the trial. Just as tensions crested in this affair, 
the court became enmeshed in Richelieu’s attempts to deal with the 
treasonous followers of the King's brother, Gaston d'Orleans. No 
sooner were these issues resolved than the issue of commissalres. 
this time in the Chambre de 1*Arsenal, reared its head. On the last 
day of January, 1632, the court was humiliated in a dramatic meeting 
at Metz, and its objections to commissioned justice were permanently 
ended. This very important victory— meaningful because it indicated 
the council's increased powers— did not mark the end of troubles with 
the Parlement. In 1635 the Parlement steadfastly resisted the creation 
of offices for financial ends; resistance to financial measures in one
ix
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form or the other went on throughout the rest of the 1630’s. In 
February, 1641, with the shadow of a regency looming, Richelieu 
acted in a lit de .justice to permanently restrict the court's rights 
in matters of State. Thus, by the end of the Cardinal's ministry, 
the Parlement's political pretensions had been considerably reduced. 
The regency of Anne of Austria and the Fronde of 1648-1652, however, 
would show this reduction to be shortlived.
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CHAPTER I
THE MEDIEVAL AMD RENAISSANCE PARLEMENT
Until the thirteenth century, the kings of Prance, aided by 
their advisers in the royal entourage, personally handled every 
aspect of French government. Moving about the realm from one royal 
residence to the next, the king dealt out royal justice in ad hoc 
fashion, guided by the precepts of feudal law and the counsel of a 
few trusted officials in his court. These officials— the chancellor, 
constable, chamberlain, and butler— were often joined once or twice 
a year by other great lords to form a plenary meeting of the curia 
regis. These meetings of the king's court were held wherever the 
king happened to be, and assemblies of the curia regis considered 
all sorts of infractions of feudal law brought before it by the king's 
vassals, as well as administrative questions arising out of the royal 
domain.
By the thirteenth century the growing complexity of central 
government and the increasing need for specialization of functions 
within the court had brought about substantial changes in the admin­
istration of royal justice. Justice was no longer merely the simple 
process of determining guilt or innocence of persons; it was becoming 
a technical field of knowledge with its own vocabulary and procedure. 
This process was stimulated by the revival of Roman law which filtered 
out of Italian universities during the course of the thirteenth 
1
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2century; at the same time the volume of royal judicial business in 
Prance increased appreciably after the annexation of former Angevin 
lands by Philip Augustus.'1' Not only did Philip increase the size of 
the royal domain, but he also instituted the first baillis and 
sgngchaux in the countryside.2 Baillis were powerful agents of 
royal authority and administration, and appeal from their decisions 
could be carried only to the curia regis itself. The great lords of 
the council, however, had neither time nor inclination to deal with 
the increased volume of affairs presented to them. Often, too, they 
lacked the capacity and training to cope with the intricacies of 
oral and written evidence which were replacing the crude and unsatis­
factory trial by ordeal or combat.
By the time of Louis IX’s accession in 1226, the curia regis 
began to take on a dual nature in its judicial aspect. Great officers
1For developments in judicial procedure during the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries, see A. Esmein, Cours Sl&nentaire d'hlstoire 
du droit francals (15th ed.; Paris, 1925), pp. 723-35.
2Before Philip's time, the only royal agents in the countryside 
were a few prgvots royaux charged with administration and adjudi­
cation within the royal domain. The appearance of the baillis. or 
sSnSchaux as the same officers were known in southern Prance, marks 
the creation of the first intermediate level in medieval French 
administration. The baillis were commissioned to supervise the 
•prgvots and were often used to extend the royal presence into newly 
acquired areas of the domain. At first, the powers of the baillis 
were tiniversal, including competence over financial, judicial, 
military, and administrative matters within their bailllage. a dis­
trict comprising perhaps one-third of a province. In the seven­
teenth century the baillis were more numerous and their duties con­
siderably restricted by the appearance of superior royal officers.
For a discussion of the prSvots. baillis. and other facets of medieval 
administration, see Robert Fawtier and Ferdinand Lot, Hlstolre des 
institutions francals au Woven Age. Vol. II: Institutions royales 
(Paris, 1958). Henceforth cited as Fawtier and Lot, Institutions 
royales.
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3of the Crown, magnates, and important prelates continued to pro­
nounce judgments, but the real work of legal business was increasingly 
assumed by lesser men, mostly clerks trained in law, who formed a 
kind of permanent commission at court. These legalists, the maglstrl 
curiae, worked throughout the year and were always in attendance on 
the king. Even though the king himself continued to render justice 
personally, and although the great barons continued to participate 
in judicial affairs, the professional lawyers steadily enlarged their 
sphere of influence. By the middle of the thirteenth century, devel­
opments within the curia regis coupled with increasing demand for 
sovereign justice would bring a radical revision in the organization 
of the judicial activities associated with the king's court.
As the most recent historian of the Parlement has noted, the 
exact circumstances surrounding the separation of the Parlement of 
Paris from the curia regis remain uncertain. The word parlement.
J^. H. Shennan, The Parlement of Paris (Ithaca, New York, 1968), 
p. 14. A good summary of what is known of the origins of the Parie- 
ment can be found in C. V. Langlois, "Les Origines du Parlement de 
Paris,” Revue historicue. XLII (1890), 74-114, and in Fawtier and Lot, 
Les Institutions royales, pp. 332-71. Of the literature covering the 
entire history of the court, Shennan’s book is outstanding. The 
author drew heavily from an earlier two volume work by the French 
legal historian Ernest Glasson, Le Parlement de Paris, son role 
•politique depuis le rfegne de Charles VII jusqu'i. la RSvolutlon 
(2 vols.; Paris, 1901).Despite its age and often superficial 
approach, Glasson*s account remains useful for its reign-by-reign 
analysis of the court's role in affairs of State. Glasson in turn 
built upon E. Fayard, Apercu hlstorique sur le Parlement de Paris 
(3 vols.; Paris, 1876-1878)7 a pioneering work which covered the 
entire history of the court. Neither Shennan nor Glasson nor Fayard 
utilized manuscript sources. The best survey of the Parlement's 
early existence is Edouard Maugis’ magisterial Hlstolre du Parle­
ment de Paris de l'avSnement des rois Valois & la mort d*Henri IV
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4a derivative of the Latin pallamentum. was used in both England and
Prance at this time to describe a general conference or discussion
between sovereign and councillors. In England the term came to denote
the familiar representative institution; in France, through a process
badly defined by surviving documents, the word -parlement came to be
associated with assemblies of judiciary specialists which from the end
of the thirteenth century were called mattres tenant le Parlement
(maglstrl tenentes parlementurn). It seems likely that these early
parlements were summoned more or less regularly, perhaps once or
twice a year. Participation was by royal invitation and varied from
meeting to meeting, but most parlements included regular members of
the curia regis who were joined by learned clerics and a few maglstrl
4having degrees in Roman and canon law.
The outlines of the emerging court become much clearer during 
the reign of Philip the Bold (1270-1285). Not only do the court's 
first registers record the more important pleas and decisions of the 
period, but from the reign of Philip comes the first surviving royal
(3 vols.; Paris, 1913-1916). Maugis’ account is based on solid 
exploitation of the manuscript registers of the Parlement, but 
apparently other manuscript or secondary sources were not consulted.
I have used Maugis in preference to FelixAubert, Hlstolre du Parle­
ment de Paris, de I'orlgine & Franyols I : 1250-1515 (2 vols.;
Paris, 1894).
^Except for the absence of secular noblemen, a parlement called 
in 1253 was probably fairly typical. It included the Archbishop of 
Bourges; the Bishops of Paris and of Evreux; the Dean of Saint-Aignan 
of Orleans; the chevecier of Angers; three clerks designated as 
maitres: the baillis of Caen, Etampes, and Orleans; the two prgvots 
of Paris; and Geoffroi de la Chapelle, chevalier, who pronounced the 
decision. Langlois, "Les Origines du Parlement de Paris," p. 89.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5regulation governing the procedures of the Parlement.*’ From the 
Ordinance of 1278 it becomes obvious that the court had now ceased to 
accompany the king in his travels about the kingdom. In fact, by this 
time the court had acquired its permanent home in the royal palace on 
the Ile-de-la-C it§. It would not move from this location, later 
called the Palais de Justice, until the dissolution of the Parle­
ment in 1790.6
From the regulation of 1278 and subsequent ordinances issued in 
1291 and 1296 by Philip the Fair, it is possible to see the shadowy 
outline of the Parlement's future organization. For example, with the
-These records, commonly referred to as the Olim. can be called 
the first in what would become an entire series of registers. Unfor­
tunately, only four of seven original 011m have survived the ravages 
of time, and even these four books seem to have been selectively 
edited from original rolls. An excellent commentary on the 011m 
and later parlementalre records can be found in E. Boutaric, ed., 
Actes du Parlement de P&ris, with an Introduction by A. Grun 
(2 vols.; Paris, 1853-1867), I, i-ccxcvi.
^In the thirteenth century, the Palais de la GitS contained the 
royal apartments as well as all administrative offices of the Crown. 
During the fourteenth century, the need for administrative office 
space came to prevail over considerations of royal housing; in 1360 
the Dauphin Charles moved his court and the council into the Saint- 
Pol Quarter on the right bank of the Seine. The royal household 
would never again return to the island on a permanent basis, and by 
the time of Francis I the Louvre had become the principal residence 
of the king when he was In Paris. The space vacated in the Palais 
de la CitS was taken over by expanding financial and judicial insti­
tutions; by the seventeenth century the Palais housed the Parlement, 
the Chambre des comutes, the Cour des aides, the Grand Consell, and 
several lesser courts. By the seventeenth century, too, the home 
of the Parlement had acquired the informal designation of "Palais 
de Justice," or simply "the Palais." For a brief history of the 
Palais and its role in the political life of Paris, see Roland 
Mousnier, "Paris, capltale politique," in La Plume, la faucille 
et le marteau (Paris, 1970), pp. 95-139.
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Ordinance of 1278 comes the first allusion to the Chambre pour pledier. 
a special chamber dedicated to the hearing of pleas. During the reign 
of Philip the Pair, the Palais de la Cit€ was enlarged and a more 
spacious meeting place was provided for the presentation of cases.
This room, the so-called Grand'Chambre, soon lent its name to the 
organizational heart of the Parlement. Despite many additions to 
the court over the next three centuries, the judges assembled in the 
Grand'Chambre remained the essential nuclear component of the Parle­
ment o However, the ordinances of Philip make it clear that plenary 
sessions of the Parlement in the Grand'Chambre were incapable of 
dealing with cases of appeal presented to them unless all parties 
could be present. Judgments involving extensive enouetes (investi­
gations) in the countryside and the lengthy evaluation of written 
evidence began to be considered by special commissions detached from 
the Grand'Chambre. The commissions for written inquests were formally 
organized into a separate Chambre des enouetes with eight members 
by a royal ordinance of 130?. These eight members of the Enouetes 
had grown to fifty-six by 1336; clearly the number of appeals accepted 
was rapidly growing. About the same time and for similar reasons the 
Grand'Chambre spawned another special chamber to handle oral requests 
for justice from the Parlement. It was the duty of judges assigned 
to this Chambre des reouetes to sort through plaintiffs appearing 
before the court, hear their cases, and decide if they merited a 
hearing before the Grand'Chambre. By the beginning of the fourteenth 
century, then, the basic form of the court can be seen, even though 
considerable degree of plasticity would characterize the Parlement
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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for the next fifty years.'
Personnel and procedure in the early Parlement show much flu­
idity and irregularity of method. All during the fourteenth century, 
assemblies of the Parlement would represent heterogeneous gatherings 
of nobles, prelates, clerics, and lawyers. By the time of Charles 
V (1364-1380), however, a certain defivAtion appeared among those 
to be found sitting in the court. Two ongoing tendencies can be 
seen in the displacement of prelates and barons by the maglstrl. 
most often men of non-noble origin, and in the displacement of clerics 
by laymen. Of these two trends, the ever-growing dominance of the 
professional lawyers was of utmost consequence for both king and 
Parlement. After 1291 the maglstrl or maitres were named by the 
king as .judges rapporteurs and .juges enoueteurs. giving them a func­
tional status equal to that of their more distinguished colleagues 
the prelates and barons. Prom this position they made themselves 
the masters of the Parlement. Imbued with the principles of Homan 
law, they worked tirelessly to establish it over customary law in 
order to unite a divided feudal sovereignty and to have the ideas 
of equality under royal law triumph. To this end they distinguished 
two different qualities in the person of the prince: that of the king 
and that of suzerain seigneur. They slowly established that the 
authority of the king as seigneur, and hence that of his law, extended 
not only over vassals but over all inhabitants of the kingdom without 
division or limit. The mattres wanted to see in the monarch a
7
Langlois, "Les Origlnes du Parlement de Paris," 94-101;
Shennan, Parlement of Paris, pp. 17-20; Fawtier and Lot, Institutions 
royales. pp. 333-48, 410-13.
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successor to the ancient Roman emperors, and they translated the 
imperial maxim Quid orincini -placult legis hahet vigorem into the 
French catch-phrase Si veut le roi. si veut la loi. The eventual 
result of their labors and decisions was a fortification of the royal 
authority over all the realm, a strengthening which worked in the 
interests of ruler and ruled alike.®
Not only was the composition of the court shifting during the
fourteenth century, but restrictions were being made on those entitled
to participate in its meetings. By 1296, for example, the baillis
and sSnSchaux were banned from participation on the grounds that they
should not sit in judgment on their own earlier verdicts which had
been appealed to the Parlement. In 1319 a royal ordinance ordered
"that there should be no prelates in the Parlement," although the
ruling remained limited in effect since the king was obliged to
respect the right of lords to attend what was still thought of as 
9
the judicial section of the council. Gradually, too, the king ceased 
to appear personally, except to open the court’s sessions and to 
preside over cases of unusual interest to the Crown. Even though 
royal absences in no way affected the sovereign authority of the 
court, they did create a need for a presiding officer. The chan­
cellor presided by right after the king, but increasingly the magis­
F^ayard, Anercu historique. I, 90-91.
9
Fawtier and Lot, Institutions royales. p. 337.
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9trates themselves directed the court's business.1^ By the 1300’s 
a distinction was being made between those nominated to preside over 
sessions— the -presidents— and other ordinary conseillers of the 
court. By 1333 there would be three such presidents in charge of 
debates and the pronunciation of decisions. Despite the above devel­
opments, however, the Parlement was not yet fully institutionalized. 
Each session of the court required an act of royal convocation, and 
the number of judges convoked varied from year to year.11
Transformation of the Parlement of Paris into a permanent insti­
tution of French government was completed by two important devel­
opments of the mid-fourteenth century. The structure, organization, 
and procedures of the court were fixed in a great ordinance issued 
by Philip VI in March, 13^5*12 This ordinance may be considered as 
the birth certificate of the Parlement; looking back from the six­
teenth and seventeenth centuries, the magistrates of the court often
13saw the independence of their body in this legislation. Among
chancellor continued to be considered the chief of justice 
and could preside over the rarlement at any time. Was this also true 
of the garde des sceaux? The court believed that the garde des sceaux 
could preside but could not receive the same honors as the chancellor. 
See Bernard de la Roche-Flavin, Treze f sic~j livres des parlemens de 
France (Bordeaux, 1617), Bk. VII, Ch. I, No. 11.
11In June, 1316, the king called together twenty-nine judges 
to constitute his Chambre des plaids: in December of the same year 
thirty-five were summoned; three years later, in December, 1319» the 
number fell to twenty-two. Shennan, Parlement of Paris, p. 25.
124he essential provisions are given in Fawtier and Lot, Insti­
tutions royales. p. 3^ 3*
^See, for example, the speech of Chancellor and former president 
Frarigois Ollivier before Henry II in the first royal session of his 
reign in 15^ 7* Maugis, Hlstolre du Parlement. I, 518-19.
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its many provisions, the ordinance confirmed the divisions of the
court into the Grand'Chambre. a Chambre des enquetes. and a Chajnbrp
des requetes. Each chamber was given a fixed number of juges, the
Grand'Chambre being constituted, with fifteen clerics, fifteen laymen,
and three presidents, while the number of Enquetes was fixed at forty
and of Requetes at eight. Hours of daily sessions, salary arrange-
14ments, and comportment of the judges were all regulated in detail.
Despite progressive development of the Parlement during the 
fourteenth century, the court was still held to be an assembly 
existing for one year only. Each session of the court required a 
royal act of convocation, and on the first day of each session, every 
magistrate took an oath promising to obey the regulations of the 
court as read out by the chief clerk. During the fourteenth century, 
however, the act of convocation became a formality, and by the 
accession of Charles V in 1364, the practice of yearly royal con­
vocation was abandoned altogether in favor of a simple act confirming 
the previous year's membership rolls. Members now had to swear 
obedience only once, when they were first mantled with the dignity 
of magistrate. The practice of confirmation lasted throughout the 
fifteenth century, with the ceremony becoming part of the inaugural
14Members of the court were expected to assemble after Easter 
and remain in Paris until the feast of St. Michel on September 29. 
Daily sessions of the court were to begin with a mass at six 
o'clock in the morning and continue until the ringing of the angelus 
indicated the noon hour. In court magistrates were expected to ex­
cuse themselves from cases which related to their family or to 
friends; outside the Palais the judges were not to fraternize with 
parties involved in litigation. Shennan, Parlement of Paris, pp. 
24-27.
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act of each reign. ^  The disappearance of the necessity for con­
vocation marks the final step in the establishment of the Parlement 
as an institution; however unconsciously or hesitantly the path was 
travelled, the Parlement had finally achieved autonomy from the royal
council.1^
/
The maturation of the Parlement from 1350 to 1600 is in one 
respect the elaboration of an organization already well founded in 
its basic structure. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries 
the Parlement continued to perfect its internal workings, to spin 
off additional chambers, to increase its complement of personnel.
The court came to possess a distinct hierarchy within its ranks, and 
at the same time it strengthened its identity as a corporation made 
up of the Crown’s most elevated officers. By the reign of Louis XIII, 
the Parlement had virtually achieved the form it would have in 1789* 
with a large and diverse staff of 200 judges organized into twelve 
chambers, the ensemble very much resembling a Baroque variation on a
At each change of monarch, the magistrates lost the power 
delegated to them by the deceased king and had to receive a con­
firmation of authority from the new sovereign. This act became pure 
form, but it never disappeared. See the letters of confirmation 
for the reign of Louis XVI in F.-A. Isambert et al., eds., Recueil 
g€n6ral des anciennes lois frany'aises (29 vols.; Paris, 1822-1833), 
XXIII, 2. Henceforth cited as Isambert, Anciennes lois franyalses.
^Maugis, Histoire du Parlement. I, 2-3. The old rule of 
annual convocation was never formally proscribed; Francis I recalled 
it in a moment of rage and even had it revived in the text of an 
ordinance. The oath of allegiance to the royal ordinances bound the 
member for life. It was not renewed for judges as was done for 
bailiffs and lawyers twice each year at the opening of the Parle­
ment, even though these also took an oath at their reception.
For example, when on August 28, 1550, the king requested the court 
to swear loyalty to a new edict of pacification, the First President 
answered that the pgfeidents and conseillers swore to obey the 
ordinances only at their reception. Ibid.. 271-72.
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17medieval theme.
Nowhere was the medieval ancestry of the Parlement more evident 
than in the Grand*Chambre. In the seventeenth century, as in the 
fourteenth, the Grand*Chambre was the most prestigious and pre­
eminent part of the court. It had been the heart of the early 
Parlement, the original chamber of pleas, and it continued to be the 
hub around which the other chambers revolved, fulfilling their lesser 
yet complementary roles. Whenever the entire court assembled in 
plenary session, be it for a lit de .justice, to consider extra­
judicial matters, or simply in the normal course of business, the 
meetings had to be convened by the Grand’Chambre and held in its
17'It is extremely difficult to ascertain the exact complement 
of the court or of any single chamber in the early l600's. Few 
complete rolls have survived, and these often contradict each other. 
The problem is complicated by the fact that the conseillers are 
sometimes listed according to their clerical or lay status, then 
in order of seniority, rather than by their respective chambers.
A compilation for 1621 in B.N. Ms. fr. 32140, "Recueil de listes 
des presidents, conseillers, et officiers du Parlement de Paris 
(XIII -XVH siecles),” fols. 561-65, lists 212 magistrates. This 
manuscript represents an eighteenth century copy made from the salary 
records of the Chambre des comptes. The lists in this manuscript end 
with a fragment for 1622, and the last entries are for 1686. A role 
of the Parlement drawn up after that of the chief clerk and dated 
November 21, 1629, lists 199 judges. B.N. Ms. Cinq.-cents de Colbert 
212, fols. 78-81. The most recent historian of the Fronde parle- 
mentalre of 1648, A. Lloyd Moote, exaggerates but little in main­
taining that "the only way to understand the Parlement’s organi­
zation is to read its records.” A. Lloyd Moote, Revolt of the 
Judges (Princeton, New Jersey, 1971), p. 20, n. 32. Moote has a 
good, if brief, description of the Parlemenk’s organization and 
operations and its relationship with other royal officers in the 
seventeenth century. The most detailed information on the devel­
opment of the court and its procedures may be found in the first 
two volumes of Maugis, Histolre du Parlement.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
13
18presence.
The total complement of the Grand'Chamhre had changed little 
since Philip VI had fixed it at thirty-three, hut the proportion of 
presidents to conseillers had shifted markedly. During the 1620's and 
1630’s the chamber usually included seven prgsidents 2L mortier. the 
senior judges in the court who were readily identifiable by 
distinctive square headgear and ermine bordered robes, black for 
workaday affairs and red for occasions of grandeur. Below the 
presidents i mortier but elevated in prestige above the other judges
A lit de .justice was a ceremonial visit of the king to the 
Parlement. The term originated in the medieval period when the king 
was literally carried into the coi’rt to hold a "bed of justice” with 
his councillors. The lit de .justice represented in ceremonial form 
a reunion of the full curia regis. since with the king came the chan­
cellor, the garde des sceaux, the royal councillors, and any dukes 
or peers who were able to attend. The powerful legal meaning of the 
lit de .justice stemmed from this symbolic reunion of the source of all 
justice with those who advised on its administration. Following the 
principle adveniete prlnclpe. cessat magistratus (with the coming of 
the prince, magisterial functions cease), the will of the king as 
rendered in a lit de .justice could not be questioned either during 
or after the ceremony. Early llts were formal judicial hearings in 
which the king returned to his Parlement to personally hear a plea 
or to be advised by his judges. These early assemblies had no over­
tones other than solemnity and grandeur of occasion. As the Parlement 
assumed an increasing political role during the sixteenth century, 
kings found the finality of the lit de .justice a useful instrument 
in impressing their will on the court when it refused to verify or 
register royal letters and edicts. During the sixteenth century the 
lit de .justice increasingly became a terminal disciplinary measure 
associated with the imposition of royal authority on recalcitrant 
magistrates, though for a long time other important matters of State, 
such as the declaration of regencies, were celebrated in lits de 
justice. Descriptions of llts de justice are numerous. See La Roche- 
Flavin, Treze llvres des parlemens. Bk. IV, Ch. I, 283 et seq.. 38^ ; 
official accounts of llts de justice may be found in Isambert, 
Anciennes lois franqalses. For the llts of July Zk and December 16, 
1527, see XII, 275 and 285; for that of September 7, 1651, declaring 
the majority of Louis XIV, see XVII, 258.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
of the court were about twenty-five clerical and lay conseillers.^
Access to the dignity of a Grand'Chamhrier was highly restricted,
promotions being reserved for the deans of the Chambres des enquetes
according to the lay or clerical quality of the vacant seat.2** Even
after obtaining a seat in the Grand'Chambre as conseiller, aspirants
to a presidency had to serve at least ten years and await the age of
forty before being considered qualified. These restrictions ensured
that the chamber would remain an experienced and relatively couser- 
21vative body of men.
The chief figure in the hierarchy of the Grand'Chambre. and thus 
of the Parlement, was the First President. As head of the entire court 
and its official representative on ceremonial occasions, he was one of 
the greatest figures in the kingdom. Inside the court he ceded place 
only to the chancellor and king; outside the court the First President 
marched in precedence just behind the grand chambellan. During the 
sixteenth century the First President became a member of the royal
^B.N. Ms. fr. 3214-0, fol. 561, lists seven presidents and 
twenty-three conseillers in the Grand'Chambre in lo21. Thelist 
does not discriminate between lay and clerical conseillers.
20 *Curiously, members of the Reouetes could not be promoted into
the Grand'Chambre. To avoid this regulation, which was shrouded in
controversy, some Requetes passed first into the Enquetes and then
tinto the Grand'Chambre. Maugis, Hlstolre du Parlement. II, 230-31.
The entire question of accessability to the chambers of the court must
always be considered in the light of the practices of purchase and
heredity in office holding discussed below.
21Maugis, Hlstolre du Parlement. II, 230; Shennan, Parlement of 
Paris, p. 135.
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council, along with his fellow -presidents a mortier.22 The First 
President, or his authorized substitute, had to convene all plenary 
sessions of the court, and during such sessions he directed discussions 
and in large measure controlled debates and voting procedures. In 
light of these broad powers and responsibilities, it is not surprising 
that the Crown had been careful to retain the prerogative of 
appointing the First President, rather than permitting the office to 
become venal. The men commissioned with the office were usually out­
standing magistrates and often chancellors in the making; such was the 
case with Frangois Ollivier and Antoine Duprat under Francis I.2^
The Grand*Chambre remained unique throughout the history of the 
Parlement, but the chambers of Enquetes and Requetes had been forced 
to absorb a considerable expansion of the court during the sixteenth 
century. As late as the accession of Francis I, there were only two 
chambers of Enquetes and one of Requetes: the total membership of the 
court, including the Grand'Chambre. numbered only 100 in 1515. This 
number began to swell during Francis I's reign, and the multiplication 
of chambers and places in them continued under the last Valois. In
dignity of royal councillor was spread far and wide during 
the sixteenth century, and in 1605 the Venetian ambassador remarked 
that the number of members of the royal council was "infinite." Thus 
the right to sit in council was little more than sin honorific dis­
tinction for the judges. Roger Doucet, Les Institutions de la France 
au m  slecle (2 vols.; Paris, 19W), I, 138-39.
2^ Usualiy the First President was the most senior of all the 
prSsldents a mortier. but this rule was sometimes violated. Nicolas 
Le Jay, named First President in 1630, was at the top of the list of 
-prSsldents a mortier when he was named First President, but Mathieu 
MolS, Le Jay’s successor in 1641, had been procureur gSnSral and had 
never held a presidency a mortier. For the duties of the First 
President, see La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des -parlemens. Bk. II,
Ch. I, Section XIV, Nos. 9-19.
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1522 Francis created a third chamber of Enquetes with twenty-two 
conseillers. despite the vigorous and prolonged resistance of the 
court which lasted until 1531- A fourth chamber of Enquetes was 
added in 15^3 and a fifth in 1567. A second chamber of Requetes
Oh
further enlarged the court after 1580.
The functions of the Enquetes and Requetes had scarcely altered 
since the appearance of the first chambers under Philip the Fair. In 
the seventeenth century the Enquetes judged written appeals for civil 
and criminal justice arising out of lower courts; the Requetes still 
considered the merits of requests for justice from the Parlement in 
first instance. At one time these requests had been delivered orally, 
but by the sixteenth century most petitions took the form of lettres 
de commlttlmus. royal letters committing an individual's case 
directly to the court.
Proliferation of the Enquetes and Requetes had increased the 
number of these chambers without erecting any sort of hierarchy among 
them. Regardless of its anciennetg. no one of the five Enquetes or 
two Requetes stood above the others in prestige. Within each chamber
2bThe Parlement firmly resisted each new creation of office made 
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; this resistance usually 
occurred in two stages. The court delayed its approval of the legis­
lation of creation as long as possible, then it refused to receive the 
new officers on a footing equal with that of older posts. A typical 
example of refusal to accept new men came in 1597 when one August 
Banin purchased one of ten new conselllershlps created by edict of 
May 21, 1597* He presented his credentials to the court on August 31 
and was refused; the same thing happened on September 1 and December 
5; Banin was finally received on the 15th of December. Even after 
formal reception, new men were by no means assured of receiving an 
equitable share of cases and the fees accompanying them. Maugls, 
Hlstolre du Parlement. II, 225-26.
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one or two judges enjoyed a commission to preside over their fellow 
conseillers. "but these presidents des Enquetes or Requetes should not 
be confused with the presidents ]fc mortier of the Grand'Chambre. the 
original and only true presidents of the entire Parlement.
Besides the regular chambers of the Parlement, mention should
be made of four auxiliary chambers. Until the fifteenth century, the
Grand*Chambre alone exercised high criminal jurisdiction. A problem
arose, however, in cases involving bloodshed, for the canon law of the
Church prohibited conseillers clercs from hearing such cases. It
became necessary to detach benches of non-Churchmen from the Grand'
Chambre to hear crimes of violence. When Charles VII reunited the
Parlements of Paris and Poitiers in 1^ 36, royal instructions decreed
that a commission of lay conseillers should be sent periodically to
the tower of Saint-Louis just behind the Grand'Chambre to judge
criminal cases requiring la question and'capital punishment. In 1515
Francis I transformed the commission into a permanent Chambre de la
tournelle crlminelle which was served in semestrial rotation by the
five lowest ranking presidents a mortier. ten conseillers laloues.
and, by trimester, two conseillers from each Chambre des enquetes.
In the seventeenth century, the competence and composition of the
Tournelle had changed little from Francis' time. Ecclesiastics, nobles,
and numerous royal officers maintained their ancient rights to trial by
the entire Grand' Chambre. but capital crimes committed by those of low 
2*5estate went before the Tournelle. Since the fourteenth century the
historians cannot agree whether the name Tournelle accrued to 
the chamber because it met in the Tour Saint-Louis or because of the 
system of semestrial rotation. On the Tournelle see Fawtier and Lot,
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Chambre de la mar€e possessed a rather peculiar cognizance over all 
litigation arising out of the supply and sale of fish to Paris and its 
banlleu. The constitution of this chamber was remodelled in 1601,
giving it a president J. mortier and two conseillers from the Grand*
26Chambre. While the Parlement was in recess from September 7 until
November 12, pressing business was conducted before the Chambre des
vacations. a panel composed of a president a mortier. who was rotated
27every fifteen days, and twelve or thirteen conseillers. The Chambre 
de l1Edit was a result of Articles 30 and 31 of the Edict of Nantes, 
which lent its name to a special bench of judges having competence 
over all cases invovlving Huguenots. The Edict had provided for a 
chamber of ten Catholics and six Protestants, but in the event, only 
two Huguenots were allowed among the sixteen magistrates in the 
chamber.2®
Institutions royales, p. 3^ 5* La Roche-Flavin, Treze llvres des parle- 
mens. Bk. I, Ch. XV, No. 6; Ch. XVI, No. 2; Ch. XVII, Nos. 1-2;
J. Declarueil, Hlstolre gSnSrale du droit franyals des orlgines a 1789 
(Paris, 1925)» pp. £>18-19; Marcel Marion, Dlctionnaire des institutions 
de la France aux XVIIe et XVIII8 silcles (Paris, 1923), p. *4-26.
2®Declarueil, Histoire gSnSrale du droit, p. 619; Marion, 
Dictionnaire des institutions, p. ^26.
27Declarueil, Histoire generale du droit, p. 619; Marion, 
Dlctionnaire des institutions, p. 7^7; La Roche-Flavin, Treze llvres 
des parlemens. Bk. I, Ch. XX.
2®0n the creation of the Chambre de l'Edit and ensuing diffi­
culties with its establishment, see Glasson, Le Parlement de Paris.
I, 95-99• During the religious uneasiness of the 1620’s and 1630’s, 
the staffing of the Chambre de l'Edit was a politically sensitive
issue, so sensitive, in fact, that selection of its members had to be 
approved by the Crown every other year. The procedure began about the 
middle of October when the procureur g6n€ral remitted a list of recom­
mended candidates to the chancellor or garde des sceaux. The chan­
cellor or garde des sceaux then made a selection of those thought
suitable and had the list reviewed by the king. After royal review, a
final list of judges was sent back to the procureur ggnSral for
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In addition to the regular judges of the court, there were three 
magistrates who did not occupy a bench, yet whose participation was 
vital to the life of the Parlement. The royal attorneys, a -procureur 
gSnSral and two avocats gSnSraux. were charged with maintaining royal 
interests in the court. In this capacity the gens du roi, or King's 
Men, communicated royal documents to the court and presented their 
conclusions concerning possible legal courses of action. The attorneys 
were excused from participation in ensuing deliberations and retreated
presentation to, and registration by, the Parlement. For letters 
indicating the above procedure, see Mathieu MolS, MSmoires. ed. AimS 
Champolllon-Figeac (4 vols.; Paris, 1855)» I. 217 . 250 , 281. MolS 
was procureur ggnSral in the Parlement from 1614 until 1641, when he 
became First President. His MSmoires are actually a collection of 
official documents, such as lettres de cachet. extracts from court 
registers, and correspondence with government figures, drawn from 
B.N. Ms. Cinq-cents de Colbert 5. 8, and 212-215* Interesting 
insights into the selection of the Chambre de l'Edit can be found 
in a letter of 1633 in which procureur gSnSral Mole explained the 
process of selection to the new garde des sceaux, Pierre SSguier:
"I have not pursued registration of the Chambre de l'Edit. foreseeing 
opposition and knowing well the speeches that will be made. The Edict
of Nantes provided for the establishment of the Chambre, but since 
that time, the practice of putting two conseillers of each chamber
there has been observed, and the remaining number of conseillers has 
been taken as it pleased the chancellors and gardes des sceaux. to
serve there two years only. And when they have sent commissions
contrary to this order, it has given subject for debate, as you see
by a decision given in 162^ . In this one, there are eight from the
fourth chamber [of Enauetes~| and none from the fifth; you could
provide there if you please, seeing that the king can do all out of his
absolute authority, but he should avail himself of it only in pressing
circumstances. I venture to promise myself the honor of your review
before executing this which the paper cannot bear." The garde des
sceaux apparently refused to modify the composition of the chamber
as MolS requested; there followed opposition from the court to the
king's lettres de provision. The Parlement agreed to register only
upon the declaration of MolS that he had made known to SSguier the
irregularities in the Chambre de l'Edit for 163^ , and that SSguier
had promised to observe the accustomed forms in the future. This
promise was duly noted in the court’s registers for November 1^ , 1633*
MolS, MSmoires. II, 178-79*
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to the floor, or -parquet, which lent its name to those standing there. 
The gens du roi were charged with carrying the Parlement's decisions 
hack to the royal council, the chancellor, or the king himself. The 
gens du roi thus acted as a human interface between court and Crown, 
a role which often placed these magistrates in a delicate and con­
flicting position somewhere between loyalty to the court and to the 
king.29
PrSsidents, conseillers. and the royal attorneys made up the 
working judicial section of the court, but their activities would soon 
have ground to a halt without the services of many auxiliaries 
attached to the court. Official records were kept by three chief 
greffiers (clerks of court), of whom the greffler civil was the most 
important. Although without a seat on the court's benches, the chief 
clerks enjoyed all the honors and privileges of the Parlement, 
including the right to red robes, transmissible nobility, and the 
right to trial by the court itself. Discipline within the court was 
maintained by a corps of twenty-five hulssiers (bailiffs), the first 
of whom enjoyed most of the privileges of the chief clerks. The 
hulssiers had important duties outside the confines of the Palais, 
for they were charged with the collection of fines, enforcement of 
parlementalre decrees, and the seizure of wanted men and confiscated 
property. In addition, since the basic function of the Parlement 
always remained the hearing of litigation, there were several hundred 
barristers and solicitors swarming in or near the halls and chambers
29Franjois Olivier-Martin, Histoire du droit francais des 
orlglnes a la RSvolution (Paris, 1951). PP. 535-36.
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of the Palais. Both kinds of lawyers, like the huissiers and
greffiers, had purchased the right to practice before the Parlement,
30but unlike the clerks and bailiffs, they were not royal officers.
In the course of the long history of the Parlement, a number of 
groups and individuals came to possess the right to sit in the 
sessions of the court on an honorific basis, and still others exer­
cised ancient rights only on an irregular basis. During the sixteenth 
century, for example, all retired conseillers and nrSsidents received 
honorific membership. The dukes and peers of France could assume 
their places at any time, though in the l600's this practice was 
decidely anachronistic. As the titular head of justice, the chan­
cellor might assert his right to preside over the court at any time, 
although most chose to avoid all but ceremonial occasions. The 
question of whether the garde des sceaux. who exercised the cham-
cell or's functions if he were disgraced, had this prerogative was
31still a moot one in the seventeenth century.
There remains one important group associated with the court 
which resists firm categorization. The maitres des requetes were 
part of the milieu of the high robe which included the sovereign 
courts and the personnel of the royal council. As their full and 
proper title of mattres des requetes de 1*hotel du roi suggests, the 
mattres had originally received petitions directed to the king’s 
council, studied them, and reported the pertinent information during
■^ Doucet, Les Institutions de la France. I, 173-7^» Shennan, 
Parlement of Paris, pp. k5-k8; Marion, Dictionnaire des institutions.
pp. 268-69.
31Maugis, Histoire du Parlement. I, 273-75*
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meetings. Much councilliar business was expressed in legal terms, 
hence the maitres were expected to show proficiency in the law as 
well as a broad and flexible knowledge of administrative procedures.
As the Parlement and the royal council separated during the fourteenth 
century, the maitres des requetes continued to freely attend both 
bodies. In the early seventeenth century, four maitres retained the 
privilege of sitting in the Parlement, and all could claim judgment 
before it, but their offices were still functionally tied to the royal 
councils. Therefore, in theory the maitres were considered as members 
of the court but not as judges, being listed in precedence before all 
the conseillers and enjoying the honors and privileges extended to 
other magistrates.^ The maitres also had strong professional and 
social links with the Parlement. Many of them were former conseillers 
of the court, and in 1598 Henry IV established that each maitre des 
requetes had to serve at least six years as a conselller in a 
sovereign court or twelve years as a lawyer pleading before such a 
court. The ruling reflected the historic function of the Parlement 
as the training ground for future administrators, for of thirty-five
maitres studied by Roland Mousnler, twenty-four had been former 
33conseillers in the Parlement. However close their ties with the 
Parlement, the maitres were even more closely associated with the
^B.N. Ms. fr. 32140, fols. 56lv°-562. lists sixty-one maitres 
des requetes in 1621. In precedence the maitres in this list are 
given after conseillers of the Grand*Chambre but before other 
conseillers of the court.
^^Roland Mousnler, Lettres et mSmolres adressis au chanceller 
SSguier (2 vols.; Paris, 1964), I, $6.
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royal councils which they served, and by the reign of Louis XIII, at
least, the maitres should he considered as attached to the king's 
34council.
Particularly after the time of Henry II, French kings came to 
appreciate the potential utility of the maitres des requetes as 
instruments of royal policy and began to detach some of them from 
the routine of councilliar business in favor of temporary tours of 
inspection, or chevauchges. through the provinces. For these tours 
the maitres were armed with royal letters commissioning them with 
immediate and final authority over an immense range of administrative, 
financial, and judicial problems discovered in the course of their 
circuits. In many cases these commissalres extraordinalres received 
royal sanction to hear individual complaints and to judge them over 
all lesser authorities. If the commissalre was sent to a particular 
locality to superintend the functions of justice, he frequently 
carried the title of intendant de justice. The distinction between 
simple commissalres and intendants was never very clear, with the 
latter term only gradually coming to prevail during the reign of Louis
In addition to their tasks with the councils, the maitres had 
a host of diverse functions and jurisdictions assigned to them both by 
the ordinances and by direction of the council or chancellor. To cite 
but one example, the maitres could judge finally and sovereignly all 
sorts of cases sent to them by decision of the council; to do so 
required a panel of at least seven. The maitres also had important 
jurisdictions over the right of commlttimus by which the king could 
direct contentious issues into or out of certain jurisdictions. In 
this regard they should not be confused with the Requetes of the 
Parlement, who also possessed petitions for justice. Mousnler,
Lettres et mgmoires adressgs au chancelier SSguier. I, 43-44; Marion, 
Dlctionnaire des institutions, pp. 358-59*
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XIII. Whether called commlssalre or intendant. these extraordinary 
agents represented one of the hallmarks of the processes of abso­
lutism and centralization. The relationship between these new 
arrivals on the administrative scene and older regular officers 
would represent one of the essential issues to be resolved in the 
strengthening of royal authority that took place during Louis XIII’s 
rule.35
The recruitment of members into the medieval Parlement was as 
rudimentary as the structure of the court. During the latter part of 
the fourteenth century the rolls of the court were simply confirmed 
at the beginning of each reign, and magistrates served renewable terms 
of one year. By the fifteenth century many judges were spending a 
lifetime in the Parlement, and in 1467 Louis XI, ceding to the 
insistence of his judges, decided that the magistrates in general 
would be irremovable."^ Upon the death or resignation of a judge,
M^ousnler, Lettres et mSmoires adressgs au chancelier SSguier. 
I, 44-45; Gaston Zeller, Les Institutions de la France au XVI siecle 
(Paris, 1948), pp. 115-17; Georges Pages, Les Institutions 
monarchlques sous Louis XIII et Louis XIV (Paris, 1937). PP« 78-85.
•^Irremovability was proclaimed in the edict of October 21, 
1467, which declared that "in the future judges can be removed or 
deprived of their charges only for official misbehavior, previously 
judged and judicially declared according to the terms of justice by 
competent judges." Isambert, Anciennes lols francalses. X, 511;
B.N. Ms. fr. 7549i fol. 26. Irremovability was applied only to 
magistrates in royal seats, those of seigneurial benches always 
being subject to removal by seigneurs at their pleasure and will. 
Louis XI did not always obey his own ordinance. In spite of the 
ordinance of 1467, shortly after the trial of the due de Nemours 
in 1476, three conseillers were removed from the Parlement because 
their decisions had run contrary to Louis' will. Fayard, Aperyu 
historique. I, 241. Despite this incident, however, the principle 
of irremovability soon came to be regarded as inviolable.
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the king simply appointed a replacement of his choosing, often 
selecting from among three candidates proposed by the court itself. 
Gradually the court was allowed not only to present candidates but 
also to elect them with royal approval. This system of election 
survived the troubled Anglo-Burgundian period and was confirmed by 
ordinance in 1443* Louis XI, however, exercised the most authori­
tative control over the court since the Gapetian era and installed 
his own appointees in direct fashion without regard to the 
magistrates' wishes. Under Charles VIII and Louis XII, the principle 
of election made a partial recovery but never completely supplanted 
royal nomination. Of the conseillers appointed during the 
reign of Louis XII, for example, thirty-two were selected through 
the court’s election and twenty-seven appointed by royal command.^
By the accession of Francis I, a third method of recruitment 
through resignation enjoyed considerable favor within the court; 
during the sixteenth century this practice would come to triumph over 
all others. The consequences would be of considerable import to the 
Parlement of the seventeenth century, for in the train of resignations 
came acceptance of the principle of survivance. which in turn led to 
hereditary succession in judicial offices. By the seventeenth century 
the Renaissance practices of confirmation, election, and bonafide 
royal appointments had been scrapped in favor of systematized venality 
of office. Venality, in its turn, made its effects felt in the com­
position of the court and created a special set of political and
■^Shennan, Parlement of Paris, pp. 113-14; Maugis, Histoire du 
Parlement. I, 3-9.
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financial circumstances essential to the court of Louis XHI’s era.
The practice of resignations in favor of a designated successor 
(resignatio in favorem) probably began early in the history of the 
Parlement. It is not difficult to envision how the embryonic process 
operated. A magistrate seeking to resign his office would announce 
his intention to colleagues and suggest a worthy successor. After 
investigating the candidate's qualifications, the court would usually 
confirm the newcomer, who had to swear the succession was untained by 
outside considerations. The number of resignations increased steadily 
during the fifteenth century, and by the reign of Charles VIII, the 
practice was well established and rivaling election or appointment 
in popularity.-^
Growth in the number of resignations brought with it abuses of
survivance. or the privilege of resignation in favor of a close
relative, son, brother, or nephew. It was only natural that some
magistrates desired that their office remain within the family.
In order to ensure this continuous familial possession, judges began
to resign in favor of their kin but with royal dispensation to hold
the office jointly until the successor came into possession. In
theory the king continued to maintain his royal rights of appointment,
the privilege of survivance always hinging upon royal acquiesence to 
39such transactions.
38Shennan, Parlement of Paris, pp. 115-16.
39-
lbid.; Maugis, Histoire du Parlement. I, 1-133, passim.
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But royal acquiesence was easy to acquire when the royal 
treasury was empty, and it was almost always empty during the six­
teenth century. The critical element in the transmutation of 
survivances into a systematized exploitation of office holding was, 
then, the exigency of Crown finances. After raising old taxes, 
imposing new ones, debasing the coinage, floating huge loans, and 
alienating the royal domain, French kings still found themselves 
wanting. To ease the financial millstone of constant warfare in 
Italy and the Low Countries, the Crown turned to commercial traffic 
in royal offices. Once established, expediency was soon transformed 
into a permanent fixture of bureaucratic life, for both the treasury 
and the officers benefitted from venality. The traffic grew more 
complex and attractive as it grew more profitable, and by the l600's 
the Bourbons found themselves inextricably enmeshed in a net of 
practices which seriously affected relations between the Crown and 
its officers.^
The sale of survivances certainly antidated the reign of 
Francis I, but it was Francis who, under the burden of the Italian 
Wars, made venality a Crown monopoly. He changed the practices of
The standard work on sale of office under the Old Regime is 
Roland Mousnier's magisterial treatise La Vgnalltg des offices sous 
Henri IV et Louis XIII. The first edition appeared at Rouen in 1945; 
the second, revised and augmented, appeared at Paris in 1971. Inex­
plicably, certain tabular material present in the first edition has 
been omitted from the second; hence, it has been necessary to refer to 
both editions. Unless otherwise noted, all references are to the 
second edition. An old but provocative article on the same subject is 
Georges Pages' "La VSnalit§ des offices dans l’ancienne France," Revue 
hlstorlque, CLXIX (1932), 477-95. Pages’ article remains of interest 
for its thesis that the royal bureaucracy partially developed its 
characteristic layered quality through the continued imposition of 
new extraordinary agents on top of old regular officials.
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private venality, which had existed between private individuals
since the medieval period, into a public and bureaucratic operation.
As early as the fifteenth century, royal lettres de provision for
almost any sort of office or resignation could be had upon suitable
41payment; Charles VII had admitted as much in an ordinance of 1453* 
The outright sale of such rights appeared more and more often under 
Charles VIII and Louis XU, extending to even the highest offices of 
judicature. Francis I simply expanded previous practices of 
survivances to cover most offices in the bureaucracy and established 
a special treasury bureau, the Parties casuelles. to receive the
^^The admission can be found in Article 84 of the Ordinance of 
Montils-les-Tours, issued in April, 1453. The prohibitions in this 
ordinance are worth examining in detail, as they were to be repeated 
in virtually the same form during the sixteenth century. Article 84 
began with the admission that "we [Charles VII] understand that 
several have, in times past, during war and dissension, offered and 
paid several sums to several of our officers and councillors, and by 
this means have obtained the said offices, from which many evils and 
improprieties have come to our laws, our subjects, and to the public 
affairs of our kingdom. We, in following the ordinances of our prede­
cessors the kings of France, prohibit and restrain all our officers 
and councillors from receiving any promise or gift of anything to 
have or to obtain any of the said offices from us, under penalty to 
our officers and councillors of paying to us four times as much as has 
been promised, given, or lent, and of incurring our indignation, and 
of being punished severely for it. And to our subjects, under penalty 
of losing the office that they have obtained, and of being forever 
deprived of all royal offices, and of paying us similarly four times 
that which they have promised, given, or lent to have the office." 
Isambert, Anciennes lois franjaises, IX, 237-38. The same prohi­
bitions were continued throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth cen­
turies. The ordinances of 1493 and 1499 forbade any traffic in 
elections. The great Ordinance of Origans in 1560 continued to main­
tain the principle of free election in the sovereign courts, and 
Article 100 of the Ordinance of Blois (1579) expressly prohibited the 
practice of venality. See Isambert, Anciennes lois framgalses. XI, 
238, 343, 350, 477; XIV, 74, 205.
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revenues and to administer the transactions. Requirements for
obtaining the right of survivance were liberalized, and the privilege
came to turn solely about the ability of the parties involved to
finance the transaction. Usually the beneficiary was taxed for a
tenth or a twelfth of the office's estimated value; the payment took
the form of a forced loan to the Grown to avoid direct contravention
of the ordinances. In addition, officers quitting a post were freely
permitted to accept money from their successors. These measures
proved immensely popular with royal officers, but Francis soon came
to see that royal rights were slipping away too freely. To further
squeeze the officers after 1534 the famous clause of "forty days"
was inserted into royal lettres de provision. It was stipulated that
if the resigning party died within forty days of the agreement, his
office would revert to the king who could then resell it at full cash
value instead of receiving merely the one-tenth or one-twelfth
survivance tax. Exemptions from the "forty days" clause could be had, 
h.9
but at a price. The results were gratifying, but Francis was not 
43satisfied. He proceeded to take the trends of the past to their
Mousnler, La VSnalitS des offices, pp. 35-92. In the time of 
Henry IV, who was very miserly with exemptions, dispensations from the 
clause of forty days could be had for some offices for 800 Sc us. or 
2000 livres. See Maugis, Histoire du Parlement. II, 215.
Parties casuelles early became an important, perhaps an 
indispensable, source of royal revenues. During the first half of 
1524, the Parties produced 88,594 llvres toumois for the treasury. 
This had risen to 464,803 llvres toumois for the entire year of 1527. 
Marino Cavalli, Venetian ambassador to Francis I, estimated that the 
creation of offices alone brought the king about 400,000 Scus, or
900,000 llvres a year, at a time when Francis' budget totalled ten to 
twelve million livres. By 1581 the total budget of the Crown (reve­
nues clear at the treasury) amounted to 10,561,488 6cus; of this
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logical conclusion by openly creating new offices for public sale.
As has been seen above, the Parlement of Paris alone was forced to
hit
accept 101 of these creations of office during the sixteenth century.
The practices initiated by Francis proved far too profitable to
be abandoned by the later Valois, even though they were constantly
45
denounced by public bodies, the law, and by kings themselves. In 
fact, earlier practices were continuously refined and expanded as the 
century passed. Koyal offices of the domain were openly declared 
hereditary in 1580, and positions in the administration of the Eaux
amount, the Parties casuelles furnished 3,545,885 Scus. or one-third. 
Mousnier, La VgnalitS des offices, pp. 67-68, citing figures from 
A.N. KK 351, KK 352, and B.N. Ms. Dupuy 958, fol. 85.
44
According to the opinion of Edouard Maugis, most of the growth 
of the Parlement during the sixteenth century can be attributed to 
the financial demands of the monarchy rather than to any greatly 
increased volume of judicial affairs. In Maugis' words, "If one 
excepts the great work of reconstitution [of the court] by Charles 
VII, which filled the years 1439-1454, the various alternatives of 
growth or reduction were always determined by considerations of 
money, not of service, which the court saw, with reason, as a most 
direct affront to its dignity and its prerogative of co-optation." 
Histoire du Parlement. I, 4-5.
Mousnier, La VfinalitS des offices, pp. 35-36. The great 
Ordinances of Orleans (1560)and Moulins (1566) plainly decreed the 
abolition of all offices created since the fifteenth century, but the 
abolitions remained a dead letter, as did Article 100 of the Ordi­
nance of Blois (1579)* "We wish and intend that the said officers 
[of judicature] should remain suppressed, until they have been reduced 
to their former number . . . and that in the future only persons of 
requisite quality will be provided without paying any tax: declaring 
that our intention is of ending all venality of the said offices, 
which to our very great regret has been suffered by the extreme 
necessity of the affairs of our kingdom: wishing and ordering that 
those who in the future should sell offices of judicature directly 
or indirectly should lose the price and moreover should be fined 
double." Isambert, Anciennes lois franqaises. XIV, 405-06.
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et forets followed in 1583. Offices hitherto immune from venality
succumbed one after the other, including important posts in the army,
the household of the king, and even the governorship of provinces.
By the "beginning of the seventeenth century, venality and heredity
LA
were established fact in the vast majority of royal posts.
The only threat to the security of officers, the Damocles-like
clause of forty days, was removed when the hereditary principle was
given its final form in 1604. All previous practices, provisions,
and payments were standardized in a general uniform arrangement called
the paulette after tax farmer Charles Paulet who suggested it to 
Ln
Henry IV. The provisions of the -paulette were landmark ones, for 
the edict acknowledged the virtual independence of royal officers 
from the king in exchange for financial considerations. Any royal 
office holder might freely transmit his office to heirs or to other
46Zeller, Les Institutions de la France, p. 37; Mousnier, La 
Vgnalltg des offices, pp. 37-38.
47The establishment of the paulette was accompanied by peculiar 
circumstances which are described in Mousnier, La VSnalltg des 
offices. pp. 237» 240. The -paulette was drawn up in the form of an 
arret du Consell which outlined the complete terms of the agreement 
with Paulet on December 7. 1604. The first nine articles of the 
contract were contained in a declaration dated December 12. The 
complete edict was never sent to the sovereign courts for verification. 
Mousnier asked if this might be because a verified edict could only be 
abolished by another verified edict which would very likely be rejected. 
To change the provisions of an arret or declaration not registered 
would have required only the issuance of another arret or declaration 
in the chancellery, and the king could be sure of his council and his 
chancellor. The annuel could then be suppressed after the six years 
of the contract had passed if the results were bad. The arrets 
establishing the paulette were registered by the Chambre des comptes 
in 1606 for reasons of fiscal control, although the farm had been 
functioning for over a year.
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parties without the forty day reservation if he paid, an annual tax to
the Crown (the droit annuel) amounting to one-sixtieth of the value
of the office at purchase. The arrangement was instituted for nine
years and had to he renewed after that period. Thus the Crown might
always suppress the paulette; it might also suppress individual
offices or redeem its rights by buying the office back, but it seldom
found the means or the will to do either. The alienation of royal
rights over Crown offices was now complete, and all future attempts
to alter the situation foundered on the unified resistance of the
48bureaucracy and upon the financial impecunity of the Crown.
The Parlement felt itself directly affected by the development
of venality in a number of ways, though the practice did not alter
the nature of the public function of the offices. The court began the
sixteenth century by firmly denouncing survivance and associated
Ilq
practices as detrimental to judicial standards. 7 At that time, too, 
there had been some fear that venality would overcome the cherished 
rights of hereditary succession, that offices might come to be sold 
to the highest bidder rather than remaining within family groups.
As the sixteenth century wore on, these fears proved groundless.
Venality proved to be the natural ally of heredity rather than its 
antagonist, and as the magistrates came to realize the massive 
benefits accruing to the, they became staunch, if sub rosa. supporters 
of venality in all its aspects. Recognition of the inherent evils
^^ousnier, La VSnalltS des offices, passim.
49See, for example, the denunciation presented in Articles 9,
10, and 11 of the remonstrances offered to Louise of Savoy in 1525.
Maugis, Hlstolre du Parlement. I, 562-63.
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never died out— reformers continuously demonstrated all the argu­
ments against the system— hut magisterial, resistance assumed a low 
key when confronted with the patent material security of office 
holding.
The growth of venality and heredity was accompanied by a 
gradual abandonment of the last trappings of free royal appointment, 
disappearance of the oath of untainted interest upon assuming office, 
and a decline in attention to the qualifications of membership. The 
decline of the act of confirmation of the court's rolls at each 
accession shows well both the influence of heredity and the growing 
independence it produced among the judges. Until the reign of 
Francis I inclusively, royal letters confirmed the magistrates in 
their functions upon renewal of their oath of allegiance to the royal 
ordinances and regulations of the court. Henry II, Charles IX,
Henry III, and Henry IV simply rendered letters of confirmation 
without requiring an oath. At the accession of Louis XIV in 1&+3, 
however, the letters of confirmation demanded a new oath from the 
judges.The Parlement refused to comply, and when Chancellor 
SSguier observed that the letters were the same as those delivered 
at the death of Francis I in 15^ 7. the parlementalres retorted
5QThi s demand may well have been provoked out of remembrance 
of the continued troubles which characterized relations between the 
Crown and the Parlement during the reign of Louis XIII. As events 
turned out, the formality of the oath made little difference to the 
course of parlementaire behavior either during the regency of Anne 
of Austria or later during the reign. The lettres de cachet 
renewing the magistrates's functions and demanding the oath are in 
Isambert, Anciennes lois francaises. XVII, 1-2.
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with a vigorous statement of their independences
"Since this time [of Francis I's death], which has been almost 
one hundred years, the face of public affairs had changed a 
great deal; that kings had authorized the disposition of 
offices, even those of judicature, and that the establishment 
of the droit annuel was a variety of public heredity which 
rendered the condition of the officers assured. This was not 
[said] in order to dispense themselves from the respect, 
obedience, and submission that they owed the king, contrary to 
which they could not and would not prescribe, but in order to 
dispense themselves from these ancient formalites which were 
observed when offices were simple commissions."
In light of the attention paid to symbolic formalities and forms in
the Old Regime, the regent, Anne of Austria, created a dangerous
precedent by ceding to the wishes of the magistrates. Letters
rendered in 1715 upon the accession of Louis XV did not mention the 
52obligation of an oath.
The same diminution of old forms could be observed in other 
ways, too. On May 29, 1586, the judges themselves asked the king to 
cease requiring an oath of monetary disinterest from candidates to 
office because the practice contributed to perjury. Age requirements 
and inquiries into educational qualifications were increasingly 
disregarded as the 1500*s passed. On January 1^ , 1605, for example, 
Nicolas de Bellievre, son of Chancellor Pomponne de Bellievre, was 
received into the Parlement at less than twenty-two. In 1602 Pierre 
V SSguier, a son and grandson of presidents, was received at less
^Tsambert, Anciennes lois fTan9aises. XVII, 1-2, quoting 
registers of the Parlement.
•■^Emest Glasson, "Le Roi, grand justicier," Pt. I, Nouvelle 
revue hlstorlque du droit francals et Stranger. XXVI (1902), 725. 
The second part of this article appeared in the same publication, 
XXVII (1903), 76-9^ . These parts are henceforth cited as Glasson, 
"Le Roi, grand justicier," I-H.
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than twenty-five; in 1606 Mathieu MolS, future -procureur gSnSral and 
First President, was received at less than legal age. These dispen­
sations tended to become commonplace during the seventeenth century,
spreading out from distinguished candidates to be applied to the most 
53mediocre of applicants.
The long term effects of venality on the Parlement worked them­
selves out through two associated tendencies. The prices, and thus 
the property value, of offices in the Parlement rose continuously 
during the sixteenth century, and they reached enormous figures in 
the early seventeenth century. Each of the twenty conseillerships 
created by Francis in 1522 to constitute a third Chambre des enquetes 
was assigned an official value of 6,000 livres. By 1597 the value 
of these conseillerships had reached 11,000 livres; the figure 
reached 120,000 llvres in 1 6 3 5 In 1627 a presidency a mortier 
cost between 300,000 and 400,000 llvres if, indeed, a free market 
value could be put on these offices which were accessible to so few.^ 
Higher offices in the Parlement were touched before others by a 
second tendency which also became plain by the reign of Louis XIII,
-^ Maugis, Histoire du Parlement. I, 3-4, 264; II, 213-15•
- D^oucet, Les Institutions de la France. I, 177; Mousnier, La 
VSnalit§ des offices, pp. 361-62. Mousnier gives figures for the rise 
in price of a conseiller's office in the Parlement of Paris ass 
1597, 11.000 llvres; 1600. 21.000 livres: 1606, 36.000 livres; 1614,
55.000 livres; l6l6, 60,000 llvres; 1&L7. 67,500 livres: 1635,
120.000 llvres; 1637, 120,000 livres. From 1597 to 1635 the value 
of offices of conselller increased by a factor of 12.23.
^At the death of prSsident a mortier JSrome de Hacqueville 
in 1627 his office was sold to Nicolas de Bailleul for 420,000 llvres. 
Robert Arnauld d'Andilly, Journal inSdit, ed. Eugene and Jules 
Halphen (10 vols.; Paris, I888-I909), VIII, 12.
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A tendency to form lines of heredity succession within the court 
was probably as old as the institution itself, but the developments 
of the sixteenth century certainly accelerated the process, so that 
by the 1620*s the formation of -parlementaire castes could be dis­
cerned, especially among the higher offices of the court.^
The social origins and standing of men holding office in the 
sixteenth century do not appear to be greatly different from those 
named to the court by the early Valois. From its inception, the 
Parlement had been an aristocratic body, and though the great barons 
and ecclesiastics ceased to attend after the fifteenth century, it 
seems that the once relatively humble magistri managed to assimilate 
the reputation, if not the strict title, of nobility. Nominally, the 
non-noble lawyers were considered members of the robe longue and thus
in the pecking order of Renaissance society fell into the Third 
97Estate. The Parlement, however, was the court of the highest 
nobility in France, and feudal law upheld the principle of trial by 
peers. Many early magistrates, too, were both of noble birth and 
trained in the law. By inference, then, the seats in the court con-
^Shennan, Parlement of Paris, pp. 117-18; Maugis, Histoire du 
Parlement. Ill, "Role de la cour par regnes, 13^ +5-1610: presidents, 
conseillers, gens du roi," passim.
^In the early l600's the profession of the robe, or magis- 
trature, was broadly divided into the robe courte. which included 
clerks and ordinary lawyers, and those of the robe longue, which 
took in members of the sovereign courts, the maitres des requetes. 
the conseillers d’Etat, and the trSsorlers de France. In the early 
seventeenth century there were probably about 1,500 men qualified as 
of the high robe. As a general expression la robe, or its pejo­
rative form les robins, took in all those pursuing a career in 
judicial administration.
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ferred a certain elevated standing usually described as gradual or 
customary nobility. To acquire this status in the sixteenth century 
it was sufficient for a son to follow in his father's office according 
to the formulary a patre et avo consulibus. The requisite duration 
of such conditions were not clearly specified but were assumed to be 
about twenty years. The social status so gained was perhaps undefined 
but was widely considered to be on an equal basis with the prestige 
and privileges accruing to members of the noblesse de race. This 
situation was given legal recognition in Article 25 of Henry IV's 
edict on the taille of March, 1600, where exemption from the taille 
was granted to the issue of fathers and grandfathers who had served 
the public in an honorable charge.^ To reinforce their claims to 
true nobility, many magistrates purchased letters of nobility and 
acquired a fief. The growth of heredity and venality did nothing 
but strengthen a traditional view that the judges of the Parlement 
were vested with some degree of nobility by virtue of their offices.
In the seventeenth century, only the exact quality of the noblesse 
of the magistrates was still being debated, and the question was 
resolved for members of the Paris Parlement when a royal declaration 
of 1644 granted all members of the court, including the gens du roi 
and the greffier civil, full nobility transmissible to their heirs 
59upon reception into the court.
'^Franjois Bluche and Pierre Durye, L'Anoblissement par charges 
avant 1789. Les Cahiers nobles, nos. 23-24 (2 vols.; Paris, 1962-63),
II, 15-17, 23-24.
59The question of the nobility of the robe and the parity of its 
prestige with the noblesse de race is uncertain and complex in the 
extreme. Variable factors include the lineage of family, mode of 
living, status of the office held, and length of service within the
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Three centuries of evolutionary development had "brought the 
Parlement of Louis XHE's era to full institutional maturity; with 
only a few minor marks of further organizational ageing, the Parle­
ment of the early seventeenth century would essentially be the Parle­
ment disbanded in 1790. To the casual observer, the organization of 
the adult court might seem chaotic and even unworkable. Complex and 
specialized the Parlement was in the seventeenth century, but the 
entire structure of the court followed a highly functional pattern 
conforming to the needs of the kingdom and the law it administered. 
Considering the Old Regime's occupation with social distinctions and 
dignities, it would be surprising not to find considerable differen­
tiation accompanying the diversity of chambers and personnel; in 
reality the growth of the court had meant the rise of a hierarchy 
of prestige and status among the judges. This development might have 
boded badly for the court's unity had not parallel developments of
Parlement or other institution. The diffuse and uncertain social 
situation of the high magistrature is well summarized by Lloyd Mootes 
"In 1610, the judicial and financial officials were neither truly 
nobles nor commoners, but rather most often bourgeois in background 
and noble in aspiration. In the Estates General, they sat with 
commoners as the Third Estate, yet the members of the sovereign courts 
and the bureaus of tr€soriers had the privileges of noblemen by virtue 
of their offices (and in some cases by noble birth or acquisition 
of noble lands). Contemporary writers on officeholding, such as 
Charles Loyseau, also asserted that after two generations in the 
same office in one of these high corporations, this 'personal 
nobility' became hereditary or true nobility. By the 1640's, the 
monarchy was actually conferring hereditary nobility on first- 
generation members of the parlements of Grenoble and Paris, and on 
officials in some chambres des comptes and bureaus of trfsoriers." 
Moote, Revolt of the Judges, pp. 26-27. The question of the status 
of the high robe has been studied in an unpublished doctoral 
dissertation by Cornelius Sippel, III, entitled "The Noblesse 
de la robe in Early Seventeenth-Century France: A Study in Social 
Mobility" (University of Michigan, 1963).
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venality and heredity strongly reinforced a pre-existing corporate 
sense of being the foremost judicial institution of the monarchy.
By the seventeenth century, then, the Parlement had travelled a long 
path to secure an exalted niche in the kingdom's government and society. 
It remains to be seen how the court's elevated socio-political place 
related to other monarchical institutions and to the Crown itself.
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CHAPTER II
THE PARLEMENT AND THE LAW
The jurisdictions and functions of Louis XIII's Parlement 
reflected the evolutionary developments brought by 300 years of 
separation from the curia regis. The court had sprung from the 
king’s council to fulfill the demands of judicial specialization, 
and the Parlement had remained indelibly stamped as a judicial body, 
staffed by legalists dispensing justice in the name of the king. In 
the seventeenth century the quality and nature of royal justice dis­
pensed by the Parlement were much the same as they had been in the 
thirteenth century, but the Parlement's jurisdictions in criminal 
and civil matters had been limited and delineated by the creation 
of other judicial institutions and by the rise of an elaborate 
hierarchy of royal bureaucrats and corporations.
The judicial authority of the Parlement cannot be separated 
from the theoretical foundations of feudal sovereignty and from the 
historical actualities of the monarchy. In theory the justice pro­
vided by the Parlement of Paris was grounded in the basic principles 
of feudalism, which considered justice to be a quality emanating 
from the person of the lord. Above all the king was regarded as a 
supreme judge, not as a warrior as might be expected. Early 
Capetian coinage depicted the king as a judge; hundreds of years 
later, the same tradition was expressed by Chancellor Michel de 
40
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L*Hospital when addressing the Estates General of 1560:
Kings have been elected fslc~| primarily to render justice, 
and the act of making war is not as royal as that of judg­
ment because tyrants and oppressors make war as much as 
kings and very often the evil do it better than the good.
Thus, the seal of France is not stamped with the figure of 
the king armed and on horseback, as in many other places, 
but seated on his royal throne, rendering and administering 
justice. Because of this, the good woman who petitioned 
King Philip for justice and was told by him that he had not 
the time to hear had good reason to reply to him: You should 
not be king!
The king, as primus inter pares, enjoyed sovereign rights over his 
vassals, who in turn exercised feudal rights of their own. Justice 
was early considered a quality both personal and dispensable, the 
rights of which usually accompanied the grant of any beneflcium. be 
it land or office. Thus in the early Gapetian period the number of 
cases subject to royal justice was very small, being generally limited 
to issues arising out of the royal domain and all infractions of 
feudal law involving the king's vassals. Other cases went to ecclesi­
astical, seigneurial, or municipal courts. The passage of time and 
of feudal conditions, however, encouraged a steady broadening of the 
definition of royal cases to include many types of major crimes 
occurring within and without the royal domain proper. The reclamation 
of the Angevin lands and the activities of baillls and s6n§chaux were, 
as noted above, substantial factors in accelerating the growth of 
2
royal judicial competence.
^Michel de L*Hospital, Oeuvres completes (5 vols.; Paris, 
1824-1826), I, 380-81.
^Esmein, Cours Slementaire d'histoire du droit franqais. 
pp. 254-61, 330-38; Pages, Les Institutions monarchiques, pp. 5-6; 
Shennan, Parlement of Paris, pp. 50-55.
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By the thirteenth century, royal justice was assuming a dichot- 
omous nature. Theoretically, the king continued to retain all rights 
of sovereign justice, but in fact necessity demanded that justice 
should be delegated to specific persons to be exercised in the king's 
name. Thus was introduced at an early date the distinction between 
justice retenue and justice dSlgguee. between justice retained in the 
king's hands and that delegated to his officers.^
The first institution to which kings delegated their judicial 
rights was the Parlement of Paris. Since the king had chosen to dele­
gate part of his sovereignty directly to his court, the Parlement 
became the first "sovereign court" of France, and in this capacity 
the court claimed both appellate and first instance jurisdiction over 
all the medieval realm.^ By the l600’s the jurisdiction, or ressort,
3
The relationship between delegated and retained justice is 
examined in the little known article by Glasson, "Le Roi, grand 
justicier," I-II. It is important to note that in theory the rights 
of justice freely delegated by the king could be freely reclaimed by 
him; in practice, however, long usage and tradition tended to negate 
the possibility of reclamation of rights once delegated and institu­
tionalized. In the words of Olivier-Martin, "This delegation was 
not an alienation. Tribunals did not constitute a 'judicial power' 
in the modem sense of law, distinct and independent of the king.
They rendered the justice of the king ’as the discharge of his con­
science,’ but the king remained personally responsible. He could 
always judge himself no matter what affair, be it that retained in 
his possession, be it that handed over to a competent tribunal. []ln 
so doing]] he committed no abuse of authority; he only returned to his 
general function of justiciar." Olivier-Martin, Histoire du droit 
fratals, p. 519.
The term "sovereign court" was never formalized; it seems to 
have been first employed by Louis XI during the decade of the 1470's 
and was frequently, though unofficially, utilized after this time to 
designate the Parlement, provincial parlements. the Chambre des comptes, 
and other supreme juridical institutions. Olivier-Martin, Histoire 
du droit francais. p. 528.
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of the Parlement of Paris had "been pared down by the creation of other 
provincial -parlements, but it remained far and away the superior court 
of the land.'’ Its appellate jurisdiction extended over all of central 
Prance and included the right to hear cases on appeal from lower courts 
in both civil and criminal matters. As a court of first instance, the 
competence of the Parlement was wide and diverse. All crimes committed 
against the king and the kingdom— the so-called cas royaux— went 
directly to the court unless other arrangements were made. This most 
important category of offenses included violations of royal safe con­
duct, illicit bearing of arms, treason, lese-majestf, rebellion, and 
counterfeiting.^ Certain, persons were privileged by birth or by virtue
. ^In the early seventeenth century, the jurisdiction of the Parle­
ment of Paris extended over Champagne, Brie, the Ile-de-France,
Picardy, Maine, Anjou, Touraine, Poitou, Aunis, Angoumois, the Beauce, 
Orleanais and Salogne, Berry, Lyonnais and Forez, Bourbonnals, Morvain, 
and the Magonnais, or more than one-third of the kingdom. In terms of 
lesser jurisdictions, this territory included the gouvemement of the 
Somme towns and the ballllage of Vermandois; the ballllages of Senlis, 
Valois, Nantes, and Montfort-l'Amaury; the prSvot§ of Paris (bail- 
liages of Poissy, Montlhgry, -pr&votS royale of Villeneuve, bailliage 
of the Palais); the bailllages of Sens, Auxerre, Meaux, and Melun, 
in Champagne; those of Touraine, Maine, Anjou, s€n€chauss6e of Poitou; 
the comtg of La Marche; the sSngchaussSes of Lyon, Moulins, and 
Auvergne (with the mountains of Auvergne); the bailliage of Magon; the 
ha-^niages of Orleans, Chartres, and Blois; of Bourges, Saint-Pierre- 
le-Moutier, and the gouvernement of La Rochelle; Angoumois. F. Aubert, 
"Le Parlement de Paris au XVI siecle," Pt. I, Nouvelle revue his- 
torlaue du droit francals et Stranger. XXIX (1905), 753-54. Pts.
II and III of this article appeared in XXX (1906). Henceforth cited 
as Aubert, "Le Parlement de Paris," I, II, III.
^Aubert, "Le Parlement de Paris," I, 744-4-5. In a situation 
where personal sovereignty and the sovereignty of the State were unsep­
arated, or poorly distinguished, the term lese-majestS encompassed 
both crimes of personal offense against royalty and crimes against the 
public function of royalty (la chose publique). that is, against State, 
commonwealth, or kingdom. Until the seventeenth century, at least, the 
basic definition of lese-majestf consisted of any violation of the five 
universally recognized powers of the king: making law, creating offi-
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of their office to take their case directly to the Grand'Chambre: the 
great officers of the Grown, all officers of the Parlement, and 
faculty members of the University of Paris, among others, enjoyed this 
cherished right of committlmus.^  A large body of other persons could 
claim the right to be judged immediately by the Grand' Chamfare. 
including ecclesiastics and members of charitable instil tions, all 
gentlemen, royal secretaries, and magistrates in lesser jurisdictions 
directly under the Parlement. The Parlement, with the assistance of 
the peers, constituted the Court of Peers, competent to judge all 
causes, civil or criminal, which concerned them. Finally, the Parle­
ment might hear any ordinary case committed 6r evoked to it through 
royal orders. ^
cers, making peace or war, having the last ressort in justice, and 
striking money. La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des parlemens. Bk. 
XIII, Ch. XXIII, No. 1. Richelieu would considerably expand the 
definition of crimes of lese-majest§ to include pamphleteering, 
military failure, and conspiracy. For a general description of 
lese-ma.iest€ as it was in the early l600's and the changes wrought 
in its definition by Richelieu see W. F. Church, Richelieu and Reason 
of State (Princeton, New Jersey, 1972), pp. 178-79.
n
Those permanently privileged with the right of committlmus 
were ennumerated in Article 56 of the Ordinance of Moulins (1566). 
These categories were flexible, and the passage of time brought a 
steady expansion of the privilege. Isambert, Anclennes lois fran- 
calses. XIV, 203-04; Marion, Dictionnalre des institutions, p. 122.
®The king could freely modify the competence of any tribunal 
in any case by authorizing the issuance of lettres de committlmus 
which removed, or evoked, contention from the competence of one 
tribunal and shifted it to another, to the Requetes in the Parle­
ment, or to the royal council. The opportunities for abuse should 
be manifest, and in fact the inability of monarchs to resist the 
practice of evocations to the royal council was evident throughout 
the Old Regime. During the period of Richelieu's administration, 
Chancellor Siguier was known to expedite evocations for those 
procuring manuscripts for him. Olivier-Martin, Histoire du droit 
franyalse. pp. 523. 526.
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Over the course of centuries, the kings of Prance continued to 
delegate their judicial rights by creating a wide range of judicial and 
quasi-judicial organs. These institutions tended to appear and multi­
ply in keeping with the demands of the moment rather than through any 
coherent plan: almost never were the relations of newer bodies with 
older ones plainly set out by a single act of legislation specifically 
shaping their final organization and ultimate competence. Presumably, 
therefore, the judicial structure of seventeenth century Prance was a
simple emanation of royal will, but in reality it was a maze of over-
q
lapping and often contradictory jurisdictions. This specialization 
and complexity which accompanied the growth of the Renaissance mon­
archy would be reflected in the multiplication of sovereign courts at 
the top of an ever proliferating bureaucracy of royal officers. To 
cite '. it one example out of many, in 1*&3 Charles VII, wishing to 
re'.:;:$nize provincial rights in Languedoc, elevated the court of the
*The institutions of French society and government in the seven- 
te^.ih century can be studied in a broad selection of literature, and 
only the most applicable works will be pointed out here. Institutions 
as they existed in the sixteenth century are delineated in Doucet,
Les Institutions de la France, and in Zeller, Les Institutions de la 
France. For the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, one should 
consult the authoritative dictionary compiled by Marion, Dictionnalre 
des institutions de la France aux XVII et XVIII slecles. An old 
but still very useful work dealing with the early seventeenth century 
is Jules Caillet's De 1* administration en France sous le minlstere du 
f»a.rdlna1 Richelieu X?aris, 1857). Three distinguished historians of 
the Old Regime have also contributed authoritative works on adminis­
trative history. See in particular Plre Adolphe ChSruel, Dictionnalre 
historicue des institutions, moeurs et coutumes de la France (2 vols.; 
Paris, 1910) and Histoire de 1 ’administration monarchicue en France 
depuls l'avenement de Philippe-Auguste .jusqu'a la mort de Louis XIV 
(2 vols.; Paris, 1855)» Pages, Les Institutions monarchiques; Vieomte 
Georges d'Avenel, Richelieu et la monarchie absolue (4 vols.; Paris, 
188^-1895).
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comte de Toulouse into the status of a royal -parlement to serve the 
south of Prance. Other creations and elevations followed., and by the 
end of Louis XHI*s reign there would be no less than nine provincial 
parlements.1^
The creation of other provincial parlements actually reduced 
the jurisdiction of the Parisian court only slightly. The provincial 
parlements were presumed to offer a court of final resort in criminal 
and civil matters within their province, and they sometimes claimed 
that their title of parlement and their attributions as sovereign 
courts equated them with the Paris Parlement in a kind of corps. The 
Parlement of Toulouse, especially, maintained a theory of "union and 
classes," according to which the various parlements were united as 
one sovereign body divided into several classes for commodity of 
justice in distant parts of the realm.11 At opportune moments, the
T?he other provincial parlements and their dates of creation 
were: Grenoble (l453)» for DauphinS; Bordeaux (1462), for Guyenne, 
Gascony, PSrigord, Limousin, and Saintogne; Dijon (147?), for most 
of Burgundy; Rouen (1499), for Normandv; Aix (1510), for Provence; 
Rennes (1553), for Brittany; Pau (1620), for B€am and Navarre;
Metz (1633), for Metz, Toul, and Verdun. The organization of these 
provincial parlements imitated on a lesser scale the structure of 
the Parlement of Paris. A great historian of French institutions, 
Marcel Marion, has noted the contradictory nature of these provincial 
parlemehts. "They are," he wrote in 1923, "something like a trans­
action between the provincial spirit and royal power; they are an 
inextricable m&lange of the spirit of decentralization and the spirit 
of centralization." Dictionnalre des institutions. p. 427. Excellent 
detail on the origin and transformation of the provincial courts may 
be found in Oliver-Martin, Histoire du droit franqals, pp. 530-31; 
Baein, Cours glgmentalre d*histoire du droit framgals, pp. 377-83; 
and Fawtier and Lot, Les Institutions royales. pp. 472-502.
“ The principal exponent of this idea in the seventeenth century 
was Bernard de la Roche-Flavin, conselller in the parlements of 
Toulouse and Paris. His Treze livres des parlemens de France 
represents a vast collection of data on the theory and practice of
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Crown recognized the supposed equality and unity of royal parlements. 
Thus, Chancellor Michel de L'Hospital could say "before the Parlement 
of Paris in 1560 that "if a king could, as has "been done at other 
times, administer sovereign justice through a single parlement. he 
would do it. The diverse parlements are only diverse classes of the 
parlement of the king."^ In reality the equality and unity of the
the parlements in the early l600's; modem historians generally 
regard the Treze llvres des parlemens as a standard reference on the 
sovereign courts. Bom in Saint Cemin in 1552, La Roche-Flavin 
became a doctor in law at Toulouse at eighteen and a lawyer at nine­
teen. He was received as a conseiller in the PrSsidlal of Toulouse 
on September 1, 1574, "under a false certificate of age." He was 
received as a president in the Requetes of the Parlement of Toulouse 
on January 19, 1581, but the second president of the chamber con­
tested his right to the seat. The case having been remitted to the 
royal council, La Roche-Flavin went to Paris, where he was located in 
1583. About this time he bought one of twenty offices of conseiller 
in the Parlement of Paris created by edict of May, 1581, to make up a 
sixth Chambre des enquetes. The sixth chamber never materialized, 
but the twenty new offices were distributed among the other five 
chambers. La Roche-Flavin was received into the first Chambre des 
enquetes on February 8, 1583. In the meantime, having won his case 
before the council, he returned to Toulouse where he stayed until his 
death in 1627. Henry III made him a conseiller d'Etat. He had printed 
at Bordeaux in 1617 his Treze llvres des parlemens de France, which 
was badly received by the Parlement of Toulouse in spite of the au­
thor' s. tendency to equate the court with that of Paris. By decision 
of June 12, 1617, the Toulouse court ordered his book destroyed in his 
presence as "containing facts contrary to the parlements and several 
officers therein." He was also fined 3,000 livres and suspended from 
his office for a year. B.N. Ms. fr. 7555bis. fols. 374-76. Having 
been a conseiller at both Toulouse and Paris, it is not surprising 
that La Roche-Flavin found both courts equal in standings "The parle­
ments of France are all equal in authority in jurisdiction. . . .  I 
have often seen [the Parlement of Toulouse]] refuse several edicts, in 
number more than eighty, received from the Parlement of Paris, al­
though there were up to six or seven .iussions." Treze llvres des 
parlemens, Bk. XIII, Ch. VIII, Nos. 1-2.
12De L’Hospital, Oeuvres completes. I, 36O. Also cited in 
Maugis, Histoire du Parlement. I, 418, after registers of the Parle­
ment for September 7, 1560.
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parlements was ephemeral in the seventeenth century. The Parisian 
court, considering itself to possess a jurisdiction of universal 
appeal over all the kingdom, often solicited, and won, appeals 
against the other parlements. The provincial courts' pretensions 
were further punctured by the historical circumstances surrounding 
the foundation of the Parlement of Paris, which was older, which 
remained the original Court of Peers, and which enjoyed an infi­
nitely greater role in affairs of State.
At the time the Parlement was assuming most of the judiciary 
functions of the curia regls. a Chambre des comptes was undertaking 
supervision of the royal finances. The origins of the Chambre des 
comptes are as ill-defined as those of the Parlement, but it seems 
that the Chambre. like the Parlement, was a product of functional 
specialization within the council. Definitively constituted in 
1320, the Chambre came to be charged with maintenance of the royal 
bookkeeping and exploitation of the domain. It was also given the 
right to hear and adjudicate disputes arising out of its adminis­
tration. The auditors found judicial fees more alluring than 
checking rows of figures, and by the seventeenth century the Chambre 
was much more a judicial than an administrative agency. It exercised 
sovereign jurisdiction over disputes arising out of the royal accounts
13A. Lloyd Moote, "The Parlementary Fronde and Seventeenth 
Century Robe Solidarity," French Historical Studies. II (1962),
330-48. Moote concluded that even during the crisis of the Fronde 
cooperation between the Parlement of Paris and other sovereign courts 
outside the capital was minimal. The actual course of events, however, 
in no way lessened the possibility that the high robe officers might 
put away their differences when confronted with issues affecting them 
all, such as renewed, of the paulette.
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or administration of the domain. The Chambre also registered and 
recorded bursal legislation bearing on its jurisdiction. To the 
Chambre went all lists of salaries, pensions, and gratuities; all 
declarations of homage and fealty; letters of ennoblement, legiti­
mation, and naturalization; and concessions for fairs and markets. 
The Chambre des comptes was additionally expected to register docu­
ments which were sent to the other sovereign courts, such as 
treaties of peace and royal marriage contracts. Like the parlements. 
the number of chambres des comptes tended to increase, so that by
the beginning of the seventeenth century, there was a total of eight 
14chambres scattered over the kingdom.
14The Chambre des comptes of Paris pretended to be older than 
the Parlement and prided itself on being the oldest sovereign court 
of the realm, having split off from the council even before the Parle­
ment. None of the pretensions of the Chambre. however, affected the 
supremacy of the Parlement as the foremost sovereign court, a situ­
ation which was conclusively confirmed by the reign of Louis XIII.
In the seventeenth century, the prestige and social standing of men 
and corporations, and thus very often their actual authority, could 
be read in the precedence exhibited on formal public occasions. A 
complete list of the precedence of personnages from the king down to 
provincial notaries is given in D'Avenel, Richelieu et la monarchic 
absolue. I, Appendix I, "La PrSseance,” kz6-Jl• According to this 
listing, the First President of the Parlement immediately followed 
the grand maitre de France, a high honorary Crown officer who followed 
the Chancellor, cardinals, princes of the blood, and dukes and peers. 
The First President was thus the highest ranking member of the bureau­
cracy. Next came the chambellan de France, the First President of 
the Cham'hrft des comntes, three officials of the royal household, and 
then the presidents a mortler of the Parlement. This elaborate and 
highly formalized ordering procedure by no means prevented recurrent 
contention. A fine example of this struggle for recognition may be 
found in an altercation which took place on August 15, 1638, in Notre 
Dame de Paris cathedral. After completion of the services celebrating 
the Feast of the Assumption, as the Parlement and the Chambre des 
comutes prepared to leave in procession, there was a dramatic con­
frontation over precedence. The First President of the Chambre 
insisted on marching at the left of the First President of the Parle­
ment, only to be told that he must follow behind the other presidents
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The Chamhre des comptes of Paris was forced to share its 
competence over financial matters with the Parisian Cour des aides. 
Unlike the Chambre des comptes or the Parlement, the Cour des aides 
could not claim to be descended from the royal council; its prestige, 
matching its pedigree, was therefore something less than that of the 
capital's other sovereign courts. This court was actually an out­
growth of the needs of the Hundred Years' War. The Estates General
1 mortler. The First President of the Chambre replied that he would 
take his accustomed place, and within the confines of the church the 
heads of the two courts squared off against each other. The First 
President of the Parlement seized his rival by the collar and repeated 
his injunction to fall into line behind the other presidents: the 
First President of the Chambre refused and answered with his fists.
The First President of the Parlement went so far as to seize a halberd 
and threatened to ikill his opponent, which he might have done had he 
not been restrained by three or four bystanders. Another conseiller 
in the Parlement drew a sword and yet another produced a baton; 
several in the Parlement ordered the hulssiers to arrest De Marie, 
the First President of the Chambre. De Marie, however, was led away 
before he could be taken into custody and the procession was reorgan­
ized amid considerable confusion. Each side had to present its case 
to the King, who ordered that in the future the Parlement would leave 
Notre Dame by the great door and the Chambre des comptes by the small 
door. An account of this incident, following the records of the 
Chambre des comptes. can be found in D'Avenel's Appendix to Richelieu 
et la monarchle absolue cited above. The registers of the Parlement 
mention nothing of the incident, merely noting that the court attended, 
which evidences that the judges may have been in the wrong. The same 
affair is briefly recounted in Frangois Bluche, Les Magistrats du 
Parlement de Paris au XVIII slecle (Paris, i960),p. 273, and in 
Fayard, Apergu historic: ue, II, 111-12. Bluche continues his account 
by noting that "the innumerable official manifestations, Te Deum. 
baptisms, marriages, or burials of princes are pretexts to mark the 
superiority of the Parlement. The court is obsessed by the game of 
precedences. If the First President accords an audience to the corps 
de ville and to the Chat el et. he is careful to take the right hand to 
that of the prSvot des marchands and to the lieutenant civil."
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of 1355 had granted the Crown certain aides. or subsidies, to wage 
the war, and the court had arisen to adjudicate disputes in the 
collection of these taxes. In the seventeenth century the court was 
still judging extraordinary finances, then generally deemed to include 
the tallle. the gabelle. wine aides, customs duties, and various 
market fees.
The Grand Conseil was the newest and smallest of all the sov­
ereign courts of Paris. It had originated as a specialized branch of 
the royal council which Louis XI had intended should receive all cases 
evoked from other sovereign courts. During the fifteenth and six­
teenth centuries, the Grand Conseil had drifted away from the Conseil 
8troit (the "limited” or inner council) to become the fourth sov­
ereign court in Paris. Because of its potentially superior cogni­
zance, the Grand Conseil might have evolved into an institution 
superior to the Parlement, but development in the direction of su­
perior jurisdiction was frustrated by the continued royal practice 
of committing evocations directly to the Conseil d'Etat, which grad­
ually came to represent an authority higher than the Grand Conseil.
Thus in the seventeenth century the Grand Conseil represented an 
institutional cul-de-sac, a body whose reason for being had been 
rendered obsolete and whose competence reflected its artificially 
prolonged existence. In Louis XIII’s era the Grand Conseil was 
generally charged with cases not suitable to the other sovereign courts 
because of conflict between them or because of suspicions of bias.
Its other jurisdictions were a mishmash of miscellaneous duties, such 
as reception of the oaths of fealty of the bishops and archbishops.
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Beneath the Parlement and other sovereign courts lay a quasi- 
hierarchical jumble of inferior jurisdictions which was much elab­
orated over the simple royal apparatus of the medieval period. At 
the bottom of the judicial ladder were the prgvotSs. a vestige of the 
Capetian era which, except for the prgvotg of Paris, had been reduced 
to insignificance by the seventeenth century.1'* By the reign of 
Louis XTII the bailliage and sgnSchaussSe courts offered the lowest 
effective competence over minor civil and criminal matters. Appeals 
from these lower levels went first to the new prgsidial courts and 
then to the parlements. The prgsidiaux were a product of a mid­
sixteenth century effort to relieve the burden of appeals to the 
parlements by locating intermediate royal courts in all large towns.
By the reign of Louis XIII, there were eighty-eight such prgsidiaux 
offering to hear important civil and criminal cases in first instance 
and having an appellate jurisdiction over baillls and s|nSchaux, 
prSvots. and lesser officials.1^
Jurisdictions under the Old Regime, however, seldom functioned 
according to the comfortably regular patterns established by legal 
historians. Numerous factors conspired to ensure that contention and 
uncertainty were dominant features of legal affairs in general and
^ h e  prSvotg of Paris had become the Chatelet. a significant 
royal court which was the equivalent of the bailliage for the city of 
Paris and its banlleu.
l6For details of the jurisdictions of the above agents, see the 
dictionaries of Fawtier and Lot, Zeller, Doucet, and Marion; 
Declarueil, Histoire ggn&rale du droit francals. pp. 636-42; Esmein, 
Cours glgmentaire d1histoire du droit franqals. pp. 342-429; D'Avenel, 
Richelieu et la monarchle absolue. IV, 1-27, and especially III, 
Appendix IX, "Division judiclaire de la France en 1643," 458-62.
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individual litigation in particular. Geographic boundaries of the 
ressort of courts were never clearly established; the confusion 
brought by diffuse districting was compounded by the attitude of 
the financial agents who jealously guarded their right to adjudicate 
issues involving taxes, financial officers, and royal accounts. The 
administration of the Eaux et forets had its own courts, as did the 
Amlrautg, the rural constabulary, and royal mints, and after 1602 
all cases involving points of honor among the nobility were sup­
posed to be carried to a special Tribunal du point d'honneur. To 
complete the judicial landscape, the jurisdictions of seigneurial
lords, of the Church, and of independent municipal bodies would have
17to be added in overlapping and often contradictory fashion.
For the Parlement of Paris, however, one factor above all 
others created confusion and antagonism and deeply troubled its 
relationship with other royal agents. This was the dichotomous and 
still unresolved nature of sovereign justice at the highest level. 
French kings always insisted that the delegation process was on­
going, that they retained the right to create new courts or to dis-
17'See, for example, the illustration drawn by Marcel Marion; 
"The limits of the competence of ballliages and of prgsidiaux were 
a perpetual subject of conflict between the two sorts of tribunals. 
Even the distinction between one and the other was difficult, the 
prgsidiaux being nothing other than ballliages to which had been 
accorded the quality of prgsldial and which remained ballliages as 
much as being prgsidiaux. The imprecision of limits of ballliages 
and the great inequality of the extent of their jurisdictions was 
the subject of lively complaints. . . .  It happened that villages, 
houses even, were divided into different ballliages. One could 
point out the case of the individual near Valonges [in Normandy] who 
being informed that he had been cited before a bailliage. crossed 
into another room, which was not of that jurisdiction, and from 
there recounted his exploit and put up a denial of competence." 
Marion, Dictionnalre des institutions. pp. 32-33.
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pense justice personally, in council, or "by specially commissioned 
agents of their own choosing. The relationship between justice 
already delegated to officers and that retained by the Crown was 
defined only by precedent, and in the seventeenth century no 
acceptable definition of .justice or^ i re and justice extraor^ -re 
existed in theory or in fact. What was clear was an historical 
tendency for the Crown to intervene in normal processes of justice 
when and if kings saw fit to do so; by the l600’s there existed a 
long series of precedents for these questionable practices. Louis 
m i  and Richelieu, however, would press the uses of extraordinary 
justice beyond the limits of past reigns in fulfillment of cen­
tralization and absolutism. The instruments and agencies of Louis' 
era were no different from those of the past, but the extent and 
ruthlessness of their application increased notably, so notably that 
one modem historian has termed the reign one of "governmental 
revolution."1®
Royal intervention in the normal processes of judicial affairs 
took on a bewildering variety of forms. It has already been seen 
how cases of especial interest to the king, royal family, or private 
parties might be evoked, or transferred by royal letters, to another 
covert, special body, or to the council. A more spectacular practice 
was the establishment of extraordinary commissions for trials of
1®For a development of the thesis of "governmental revolution" 
during the reign of Louis XIII, see Moote, Revolt of the Judges, pp.
36-63, and the same author's article "The French Crown Versus its 
Judicial and Financial Officials, 1615-83," Journal of Modem History.
xxnv (1962), 146-60.
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State. These investigations and trials, often extending over long 
periods of time and involving eminent personages, were frequently- 
entrusted not to the Parlement alone hut to mixed bodies of com­
missioned judges from the Parlement, Grand Conseil. other -parlements. 
and high Crown officers. This practice, one of the most odious of 
the Old Regime by modern standards, had begun as early as the four­
teenth century and persisted throughout the seventeenth century. The 
justification for the constitution of such panels, whether for the 
trial of Jacques Coeur in 1453, for that of marSschal Louis de 
Marillac in 1632, or for that of surintendant des finances Fouquet 
in l66l, remained the same. Nominally intended to hasten the 
processes of justice and to relieve the Parlement of the burden of
lengthy affairs, the Crown in fact habitually resorted to com-
19missalres to obtain amenable decisions.
The formation of chambres de justice was another favorite 
instrument of the monarchy in dealing with corruption and inefficiency 
in royal finances. Such chambers had been put together under Francis 
I from 1527 to 1542, under Henry IV in 1597, 1601, and 1607, and 
they would be resurrected under Louis Xtll in 1624, Many other 
extraordinary matters were considered to fall under the competence 
of irregular chambers* the heretics implicated in the Affair of the 
Placards in 1534 had been dealt with by a specially constituted body,
19Jacques Richou, Histoire des commissions extraordina.1 
sous ltanclen rSgime (Paris, 1905), and G. Dupont-Ferrier, "Le 
Role des commissairgs royaux dans le gouvemement de la France 
spScialement du XIV au XVI8 siecle," in Melanges Paul Fournier. 
Bibliotheque du droit, no. 1 (Paris, 1929), pp. 171-84, are 
essential to any study of commlssalres.
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and similar chambres ardentes were assembled against the Protestants 
between 15^7 and 1560. If the commlssaires were drawn from the
sovereign courts for investigations in a particular locality, the
20proceedings might be called Grands .jours.
Appointment of temporary boards and chambers was closely 
related to the appointment of individual commissaires d&partis who 
operated in cooperation with, or outside of, the normal processes 
of justice and administration. Kings could, and did, invest a 
variety of officials with individual judicial commissions. By the 
end of the 1500's, the maitres des requites were favored for these
commissions, a situation which led them to claim a monopoly on the
21service, but almost any high official might serve. During 
Richelieu's ministry, maitres des reauetes serving with commissioned 
powers increasingly took the title of intendant. though the dis­
tinction between a coamlssaire and an intendant was not always 
clear. Occasionally even the king himself, or his representative 
the chancellor, might administer justice directly, as in the case 
of Siguier's mission to Normandy in 1639 to deal with the revolt 
of the Va-nu-pleds ,2^
20Richou, Histoire des oommlRsj ons extraordlnalres. pp. 97-131; 
Doucet, Les Institutions de la France. I, 175.
“ The claims of the corps of the maitres des reauetes sure set 
forth in Mousnler, Lettres et mSmoires adressls au chaneelier Seguier, 
I, 1*6.
22Even after Louis XEEI's reign, French kings continued to 
render justice personally on diverse occasions. Louis XEV some­
times came to audiences hearing petitions addressed to him and 
judged them himself. The same exercise of royal arbitraire. or 
prerogative, could be found in the use of lettres de cachet. These 
sealed royal letters ordered agents of the Crown to execute all sorts
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Whatever their title or quality, the extraordinary powers 
granted commissalres were hound to alienate regular royal officers 
whose jurisdictions were closely supervised or violated.. This was 
particularly true in the instance of individual commlssaires. whose 
chevauchges sometimes exposed the shortcomings of the officers and 
subjected them to immediate councilliar control from Paris. The 
intrusion of commlssaires into regular jurisdictions also ate into 
the income that judicial officials derived from the gplces. com-
of orders, from imprisoning recalcitrant sons to interning suspicious 
aliens. Popular history usually emphasizes the infamous aspects of 
lettres de cachet, but in the eighteenth century, at least, many of 
than seem to have been issued in the interest of families and at 
their request. In any case, the normal administrative uses of 
lettres de cachet were infinitely greater than their use as puni­
tive instruments. Olivier-Martin, Histoire du droit franqals. 
pp. 519-21. The mission of Chancellor Sgguier to Normandy indi­
cates the severity and magnitude of the Va-nu-pied affair. The 
measures taken by Sgguier were proportional to the threat posed, 
as indicated by the account rendered by a commlssalre accompanying 
himi "'Today, January 7. 16^ 0, began [_the administration of] justice 
in this city of Rouen with the execution of five rebels, of whom 
one named Gorin was broken alive and the other four hung, after 
having had la question ordinaire and extraord 1 naj re in order to 
know their accomplices; they had been condemned to this torture 
by monseigneur the Chancellor alone, without other judges or advisers 
nor formality other than that of information, depositions, and con­
frontations, without having seen or heard the condemned, and without 
having given any decision other than verbal.' Sgguier, docile instru­
ment of the rigors of Richelieu, answered judges who were astonished 
at this violation of forms, 'that he had condemned these unfor­
tunates verbally and militarily; that he considered the thing as 
necessity and that they still had arms in hand, in which case it 
was out of service to the King, his authority, and the public 
good to make some examples and to pass over ordinary forms.’"
Chgruel, Histoire de 1* administration monarchique en France. I,
297. quoting B.N. Ms. Dupuy 5^-550.
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pulsory legal fees paid to judges by the litigants in court actions. 
More subtle but no less real was the long-term threat that the com­
mlssaires might become regularized, thus effectively displacing the 
existing bureaucratic structure. This seems to have happened during 
the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries as the baillis came to be 
permanently located as supervisory agents over the prfvots; the
process was repeating itself during the late sixteenth century as
23the use of intendants became more common. Many officers directed 
their appeals against commlssaires to the parlements. which lent a 
ready ear because they felt affronted by the same financial and 
judicial abuses. Resistance usually took the form of demands that 
the intendants or other commlssaires register their commissions in 
the regular courts before executing them. The relationship of com­
mlssaires with the parlements and other officers grew steadily more 
awkward during the reigns of Henry IV and Louis Xtll, and the 
question of irregular commissions became a critical issue as the 
Crown continued to expand and regularize the use of intendants and 
judicial commissions. In 1600 the Parlement of Paris took a step 
towards formalizing the differences between the maitres des requetes
and other parlementalres by stripping all but four of the maitres of 
214,
their seats in the Parlement. As a concession to the regular 
officers after Henry IV's death in 1610, Marie de Medlcis revoked
^PagSs, "La VSnalitS des offices dans I’anclenne Prance," 
487-79; Roland Mousnier, "Etat et commissaire," in La Plume, la 
faucllle et le marteau. pp. 179-99.
24
Marion, Dictonnalre des institutions. p. 359.
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fourteen extraordinary commissions and fifty-eight that had been 
verified in parlements.2-* Representatives of all the sovereign 
courts in the Assembly of Notables of 1626 complained of the use
of intendants. and by 1648 the issue of commlssaires would be a
26principal one during the Fronde of that year.
The problem of sovereign justice and the jurisdiction of the 
Parlement would have been complex and delicate even if the court 
had been confined to a purely judicial role. But in fact the 
Parlement was never exclusively a judicial body. By 1625 the 
court had been an autonomous institution for nearly 300 years, 
yet even these three centuries of development had not led the court 
into specialization in the judicial role. Indeed, the history of 
the Parlement had always been marked by quite the opposite tendency, 
producing a body which not only adjudicated private disputes but 
which also administered, legislated, and conserved law in a way 
quite unknown to modern governmental institutions.
The diversity of the Parlement's functions was due in part 
to a blending of judicial and police powers which typified most 
administrative agencies of the monarchy. Under conditions of the 
Old Regime, the modem differentiation between the administration
25Armand Jean du Plessis, Cardinal due de Richelieu, M&nolres. 
ed. Petitot and Monmerqiifc (10 vols.} Paris, 1823). I> 75*
2<*Moote, "The French Crown Versus its Judicial and Financial 
Officials," 147-51; Paul Doolin, The Fronde (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
1936), pp. 10-21; Jeanne Petit, L'AssemblSe des notables. 1626-1627 
(Paris, 1937), PP. 256-70.
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of justice and the exercise of police powers was unknown. In the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, even the words police and
administration were used interchangeably to encompass both the
concept of judgment and enforcement of public order; the same
qualities of judgment and administration were vested in one agency
without arousing a concern for human rights so evident today.^
Writing in 1895> Georges d*Avenel described the blurred attributions
of the Old Regime as a "confusion of powers" and noted that
under Richelieu, the administrative attributions of the gens 
de .justice are so multiple that one in truth does not know 
to what areas they do not extend. . . . The Parlement of 
Paris busies itself in detail with the cleaning of streets 
and the collection of trash, forbids Madame Pibracq to 
remarry for the seventh time, and accords to Madame D'Effiat 
the prohibitions she seeksgto prevent her son Cinq-Mars from 
marrying Marion de Lorme.
Confusion of powers meant that the Parlement was charged with a
27'Gaston Zeller poses the question of the relationship between 
police powers and administration in this wayt "Is this to say that we 
should be authorized to translate, on each occasion, nolice for admin­
istration? It is so, and for many reasons. The language of the six­
teenth century is still badly fixed, and the same term often had 
several quite different meanings. This is the case for police." A 
little further Zeller notes "the notion evoked by the word police 
recovers well our modem notion of administration." and he con­
cludes by maintaining that "justice and police find themselves in 
the same hands. Police, although clearly distinct from justice, and 
in a large measure opposed to it, is readily considered as a depen­
dence of it, or at least as an indispensable complement. It bears, in 
fact, a power of execution . . . without which justice is impotent." 
See Gaston Zeller, "L’Administration monarchique avant les intendants," 
Revue historique. CXEVII (l9^ 7)> 181-85. The same problem of 
semantics and its relationship to the attributions of judicial bodies 
is treated in Georges PagSs* "Essai sur Involution des institutions 
administratives en Prance du commencement du XVI siecle a la fin 
du XVH ," Revue d*histoire moderae. new series, I (1932), 8-57.
^^Richelieu et la monarchie absolue. IV, 130-32.
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wide range of administrative functions outside its judicial sphere 
hut within the role of maintaining public order in the kingdom and 
especially in the city of Paris. To carry out its administrative 
and police functions, the Parlement frequently resorted to the arret 
de r&glement. a judicial or administrative decree. Some arrets 
simply covered technicalities and omissions in the law, but others 
closely resembled modem court injunctions in their regulatory 
effects. Whatever their nature, and there were many types, the arrets 
de r£glement gave the Parlement an important legislative power since 
all of them carried the force of the king's law and were enforced by 
officers of the court as well as the police forces of the capital.2  ^
The presence of the Parlement in the capital, representing as it 
did the sovereign authority of the king at the highest level, meant 
that the people of Paris looked to the court to provide leadership 
and guidance in matters that would today be considered the province 
of municipal administration. This was particularly true in an age of 
continued crisis and royal mobility which frequently found the king 
and council out of the city in times of local or national emergency. 
Just such an instance occurred in 1^99 when the Pont Notre-Dame 
linking the Ile-de-la-CitS with the right bank collapsed, pitching 
houses, shops, and occupants into the Seine. To satisfy an outraged 
public opinion the Parlement acted Immediately, imprisoning the 
mayor and most of the town council who seemed to be responsible for
29
Z^eller, HL'Administration monarchique," 185-86; Olivier-Martin, 
Histoire du droit franyals. pp. 538-^1; Aubert, "Le Parlement de 
Paris," II, 58-63.
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the mishap. The court launched an investigation into the disaster, 
then temporarily took over operation of the municipal administration 
pending the outcome of the inquiry. The final decision of the 
court deposed the culpable officials and ordered new elections 
conforming to a special arret issued for the purpose. Prom that 
time forward the court exercised a permanent supervision over all 
details of Parisian elections and found itself qualified to inter­
vene in many aspects of daily administration.^0
At other times of crisis, the court took active charge of 
municipal affairs and sometimes even extended its leadership into 
a considerable political role. In 1512, for example, the court 
directed the city's defenses against the menace of an English 
invasion. Again in 1525* just after the Battle of Pavia, it was 
the Parlement which exercised a preponderant influence in national 
as well as local government. On March 7, immediately after 
receiving news of the catastrophe in Italy and the captivity of 
Francis, the Parlement took steps to direct the defense of the 
country. Under the initiative of the court, a steering committee 
of twenty-three members was formed on March 10* nine members of the 
Parlement, six deputies of the city, three from the Chambre des 
comptes. the Bishop of Paris, a monk, an abbot, and two represen­
tatives from the University. This committee met several times and 
drew up a lengthy list of thirty-three articles which it recommended
30
Zeller, "L*Administration monarchique," 192-93; Shennan, 
Parlement of Paris.86-89. Relations between the court and the city 
of Paris are described in a lengthy article by Felix Aubert, "Le 
Parlement et la ville de Paris au XVI siicle," Revue des Etudes 
historioues. VII (1905), 224-487.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
63
to Louise of Savoy, the regent in Francis’ absence. The regent 
accepted the proposals of the covert and promised to implement as 
many of them as possible.31
On a more mundane, but no less necessary, basis the Parlement 
came to supervise almost every aspect of municipal affairs. All 
during the sixteenth century the court acted as watch-dog over city 
elections, and it closely audited the city's financial affairs, 
particularly scrutinizing the administration of royal rentes, or 
state revenue bonds issued on the credit of the Hotel de ville.
Payment of interest on these rentes was always behind schedule; 
during the ministry of Richelieu the Parlement was compelled to 
intervene in disorders growing out of non-payment of arrears in the 
rentes. The prevention of crime was always of first concern to the 
magistrates who, in the interest of public order, found it necessary 
to regulate hospitals, public lighting, care of the poor, prostitution, 
vagrancy, public spectacles, and any other activity or institution 
connected with public security. Preservation of the physical well­
being of Parisians was also interpreted to Include provisioning of 
the city’s markets, especially the bread market, to ensure a constant 
supply of quality foodstuffs at reasonable prices. Adequate provision 
of bread, however, was but one aspect of the alimentary administration 
undertaken by the Parlement. The commerce in fish and salt was so 
extensive and so important to the city that a special chamber, the
31Zeller, "L 'Administration monarchique,” 19*4-95. Maugis,
Hlstolre du Parlement. I, 555-60.
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Chambre de la mar6e, was set up in the Parlement to regulate the 
fish trade and adjudicate disputes arising out of it.^2 Finally, 
the judges were responsible for the upkeep of Parisian streets, 
bridges, and quays, an obligation which often revolved about the 
seemingly insoluble problem of cleaning the byways of the city.^
The traditional affiliation between the Parlement, the municipal 
government, and the public welfare of Paris continued during the 
ministry of Richelieu much as it had in past years. Always influ­
ential in urban matters, the judges’ patrimonial supervision of 
charity and law enforcement virtually became dictation in times of 
crisis like those which appeared in 1631. The course of that year 
produced an exceptionally tragic combination of plague, vagrancy, 
and violent crime in the Paris basin corresponding with difficult 
times found elsewhere in the kingdom. The registers of the Parle­
ment testify that between January, 1631, and March, 1632, trying 
conditions frequently overwhelmed the resources of the city fathers 
who sought relief in the Parlement's sovereign authority and prestige.
On many other occasions the court seized the initiative, either 
ordering the officials of the Chatelet, Hotel de vllle, and neigh­
borhood quarters to appear before the parquet and account for 
deficiencies in the city's administration, or pursuing independent
32On the Chambre de la marfle see supra, p. 18.
33Shennan, Parlement of Paris, pp. 86-95; Zeller, "L'Adminis­
tration monarchique," 188-97, Aubert, "Le Parlement et la ville de 
Paris," passim.
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courses of corrective action.
A virulent outbreak of violent crime towards the end of January, 
1631, signalled the beginning of that somber year's cheerless court 
calendar of urban affairs. On January 29th officials from the 
Chatelet were hailed into the Parlement to explain an increasing 
number of murders, thefts, and violences that were occurring daily 
in spite of arrets given by the Parlement. The officers from the 
Right Bank countered that the forces provided them were insufficient 
for the job at hand, and the court agreed to ask the King to assist
in erforcing its arrets against vagabonds, gens sans aveu. tobacco
tZl
vendors, pages, and lackeys carrying swords. Five days later, 
a serious Smotion populaire involving several hundred persons
took place in front of the house of one Jean Bryois, a farmer of
35the aides. Once again the lieutenant civil and his assistants 
maintained that they had done everything possible to stop the riot 
and announced that an investigation was underway. The Parlement 
ordered the Chatelet to continue its inquiry and made "express pro­
scriptions and prohibitions against assembling, bearing arms, or 
loitering by the wayside under any pretext at pain of being declared 
criminals of llse-ma.1estg and perturbators of the public repose.
"5I I
B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891» fols. 68-69, January 29, 1631.
■^This riot followed rumors of an impending increase in the aides 
on wine in Paris. Jean Bryois, sieur de Bagnolet, had been a fermler 
ad.iudlcatalre des aides since 1628. On the Bryois Affair, see infra. 
P. 433.
36B.N. Ms . fr. nouv. acq. 9891. fols. 69-70, February k, 1631.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Further, the officials of the Chatelet. the Hotel de ville, and the 
city watch were to patrol the city to enforce justice, putting the 
captains and bourgeois of each quarter under notice to take up their 
arms in prevention of further riots. The decision was to be an­
nounced, as was customary, to the sound of trumpets at the city's 
intersections so that no one could plead ignorance.
As the spring of 1631 progressed, a particularly ^ lastly reason 
for violent crime raised its ugly heal. Paris was infected with the 
plague. On Saturday, May 24, the lieutenants civil and crlmlnel 
appeared before the parquet to present a morbid report on the state 
of affairs at the Ch&telet. where two jailers, the greffler's clerk, 
and others had died of the plague. The officers had come to the 
Parlement to request a mass evacuation of the Grand Chatelet prison. 
Those imprisoned for debts up to 300 livres would simply be released; 
those held for debts in excess of 300 livres would be turned over to
the custody of their creditors if they wanted to take charge of them,
otherwise they, too, would be set free. The officers also wanted 
permission to judge pending criminal affairs immediately and to send 
other prisoners to various prisons until the sickness abated. The 
Parlement agreed on all points.^®
During the summer months the sickness apparently ebbed, only to
•^ B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891# fol. 70, February 4, I63I.
■^ B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fol. 102, May 24, 1631.
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return with a grisly vengeance in September. On the 12th of that
month -procureur ggnSral Mathieu Molg notified the Chambre des
vacations that the Saint Victor and University quarters were "greatly
infected" and that it would be necessary to open the poor house of
Saint Marcel to accommodate the sick from these quarters. The
expense of this operation, together with the rising costs of the
overloaded H8tel Dieu and Hopital Saint Denis, would require new
revenues. The Parlement responded by authorizing a one-year boost
in municipal poor taxes to cover the costs of maintaining the Hopital
Saint Marcel. The court thought some further assistance might be
expected from the Archbishop of Paris and the city's clergy, who
would be asked to solicit voluntary contributions through their 
39sermons. By September 24 conditions in the environs of Paris
had worsened to the point that MolS asked the Parlement to cancel
the annual fair at Saint Denis planned for October 8. The Parlement 
40immediately complied. Still more bad news was announced in the
Palais on October 15 when MolS presented a lettre de cachet officially
reporting grim economic facts that most Parisians already knew: a
poor grain harvest had necessitated a ban on all exports from the 
41kingdom. The short grain supply soon affected city services.
•^ B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891. fol. 147, September 12, 1631.
/lQ
B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891» fol. 150, September 24, I63I. 
4lMol§, MSmolres. II, 74.
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When the Parlement ordered the streets of Paris cleaned on November
17f it also had to order additional supplies of grain for the cart
42horses.
Because of the poor harvest, Paris became a refuge for rural 
ne'er-do-wells seeking jobs or charity in the city. This migration 
occurred every year after the fall harvest, but in 1631 the number 
of wanderers was greater than usual. Together with the plague, the 
influx of these frightened and desperate people drove the incidence 
of crime upward during the late fall and winter of 1631. The Parle­
ment habitually took a simplistic and unimaginative approach to such 
circumstances by berating the Chatelet for its failures instead of 
attempting any lasting reform, without expanding the city's meagre 
force of archers, or even without remonstrating to the King. Instead, 
the court preferred to renew oft-repeated injunctions about public 
safety. On November 17, the officers of the watch were once again 
enjoined to throw vagrants out of the city, to put a stop to thievry, 
and to better care for the poor and plague sick. Next day the 
lieutenant criminal and some conseillers of the Chatelet were back 
before the bar on a rumor that they had made some difficulty over 
sentencing repeat offender vagabonds to the galleys. The parle- 
mentalres decided that all such trials should be carried out summarily 
upon a report from the head of the city watch at eight o'clock each 
morning. First President Le Jay, himself a former lieutenant civil
42
B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq.. 9891, fol. 160, November 17, 1631.
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with three years experience, stiffly reproached the officials before
him, saying "their negligence was the reason why there was no
security in the city either in the morning or the evening because
of thefts" and "that if they did not want to acquit their duties
([in such cases] the court would be constrained to take jurisdiction
over them.” Such admonitions given without adequate social
palliatives were foredoomed to have little lasting effect. Exactly
five months later, on March 17, 1632, MolS presented fresh complaints
about murders, thefts, and assaults which were being committed at
all hours. The Parlement reacted as it had before,
conforming to previous arrets, ordered and orders that all un­
enrolled soldiers, vagabonds, and others who were not domestics 
actually living in the houses of seigneurs should be ousted 
from the city, vicomtS, and ur6vot§ of Paris within twenty- 
four hours after the publication of the present decision, 
permitting the lieutenant civil, lieutenant crlmlnel, lieu­
tenant criminal de robe courte. and prSvot d.ef l’lsle to 
imprison them without heeding their excuses.
Maintenance of public order certainly included the regulation
of ideas, media, and spiritual matters which might disturb the
tranquillity of Frenchmen; in pursuing this role the court found
itself entangled in the affairs of the Sorbonne. During the sixteenth
century the court had to intervene in the elections of rectors on five
occasions, three times to put an end to violence and twice to control
43
B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fol. 162, November 18, 1631.
Le Jay had bought the post of lieutenant civil at the Chatelet after 
the death of Frangois Miron in 1^ 10. He remained there three years, 
purchasing a presidency in the Parlement in 1613.
44
B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 186-87, March 17, 1632.
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irregularities in procedure. Prom medieval times the Parlement fixed 
the times of lectures and the dates and methods of examinations, 
helped shape the curriculum, regulated qualifications for degrees, 
seconded appointments to professorial chairs, and issued a host of 
arrets dealing with the unseemly and unruly behavior of students.^
The role of the Parlement as public censor began about the time 
of the Reformation and grew in proportion to the threat posed by 
Protestant heresies. In 1523 the court went so far as to draw up 
a list of prohibited books. Over the course of the sixteenth century, 
the court's index llbrorum prohibitorum was broadened to include works 
as diverse as Rabelais’ Pantagruel and Calvin's Institutes. Towards 
the first part of the seventeenth century the court became somewhat 
less paternal in its censorship, but never did it abandon its firm 
opposition to any work which smacked of heresy or anti-Gallicanism.
After Henry IV’s murder, the problem of Jesuit Ultramontanism 
increasingly displaced reformist doctrines in the magistrates’ 
attentions. In June, 1610, the Parlement condemned the de Rege 
et Regis institutions of the Spanish Jesuit Juan de Mariana for 
praising in express terms the assassination of Henry IV. Con­
demnation of other Jesuit works followed: Cardinal Bellarmine’s 
Tractatus de Potestate summi pontlflcls In temnorallbus went to 
the public hangman in November, 1610, and Suarez’ La Defense de la 
fol cathollque. apostolloue. contre les erreurs de la secte
^^ Maugis, Histolre du Parlement. H, Appendix H, "Du controle 
et de la reformation des universitSs par le Parlement au XVIe siecle," 
352-57; Shennan, Parlement of Paris, pp. 91-93; Aubert, "Le Parle­
ment et la ville de Paris, "~56^-71.
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46d*Angleterre followed soon after. Suppression of these Jesuit 
works did nothing to reconcile the principles of the Order with those 
of secular authority; the issue of Jesuit literature would appear 
once again in the 1620's when the Parlement attempted to suppress 
an Ultramontanist work by the Jesuit Santarelli.
By the end of the sixteenth century, the Parlement had achieved 
an illustrious reputation as the highest tribunal in the kingdom. As 
sovereign judges, the magistrates had dealt out justice in the 
greatest civil and criminal cases in the history of the monarchy; in 
judging such cases, many of which were wrought with implications for 
the welfare of the Grown, the court established a renowned reputation 
as defender of the monarchy and unifier of the kingdom. In 1476, 
for example, judges from the Parlement had condemned the comte de 
St. Paul, Constable of Prance, for conspiring with the due de 
Bourgogne against the king. In 1528 the court adjudged Charles II, 
due de Bourbon and Constable of Prance, guilty of lfese-majestd and 
ordered his arms and heraldry effaced, deprived him of the peerage 
of Bourbon, damned his memory, and confiscated his property in the 
name of the Crown. The list of greats condemned for crimes against 
the Crown continued throughout the Wars of Religion and into the 
seventeenth century. In 1602 the Parlement deemed the marfischal 
Biron guilty of crimes against the king and dauphin, and again in
46Sherman, Parlement of Paris, pp. 94-96; Glasson, Le Parlement 
de Paris. I, 120-21; Richelieu, Mlmolres. I, 59-61, 202-03; Aubert, 
"Le Parlement et la ville de Paris," 471-76; Roland Mousnier, The 
Assassination of Henry IV, trans. Joan Spencer (New York, 1973), 
pp. 101-03, 251-58.
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1605 the court found Louis Delagonia, sieur de Merigues, guilty of 
47lese-ma.iestg. As administrators, too, the court had acted in less 
spectacular ways to defend the interests of the Grown and to main­
tain law and public order on a daily basis. The court continually 
ministered to the needs of Parisians, supported Gallicanism and the 
Catholic faith, supervised higher eductation, and upon occasion 
organized the defense of the capital.
By the reign of Louis XIII, then, a long tradition dictated that
the Parlement was the proper repository and guardian of the law of
the kingdom. Bearing in mind the diffuse nature of sovereignty,
justice, and the qualities of public functions under the Old Regime,
i.e., those qualities that D’Avenel labeled the "confusion of powers,"
it was virtually certain that the magistrates would be drawn into any
matter of legal import to the Crown. As J. H. Shennan has noted,
"this institution more than any other could remind the king of his
primary obligation to rule justly. For to rule justly implied
respect for the law, and the law of the kingdom and the countless
civil and criminal judgments based upon these laws were enshrined in 
48the parlement*s official records."
In historical terms, the long political traditions of the 
Parlement might be traced back to its parent body, the curia regis.
47These examples and a host of others dating from 576 can be 
found in B.N. Ms. fr. 7549, fols. 208-44, "Des punitions et peines 
ordonn§es contre divers grands, et personnes plus considerables en 
France."
48J. H. Shennan, Government and Society in France. I46l-l66l 
(New York, 1969), p. 14. See infra, pp. 97-98, for a description 
of the court's records.
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which had expressed all aspects of Capetian authority. In spite of 
two and a half centuries of institutional autonomy and despite the 
transformation of its personnel, the Parlement never escaped the 
stamp of its councilliar origins. The ancient council had advised 
and administered as well as judged the kingdom, and over the course 
of centuries the Parlement had continued to do likewise. This 
situation was dramatically symbolized in the ceremony of the lit de 
justice when king, peers, and court solemnly assembled in a plenary 
session which re-enacted a meeting of the old curia regis. Lits de 
justice were exceptional expressions of the councilliar quality of 
the court, but on a daily basis the kings of France had continued to 
treat their high court as a consultative body, sending it legislation 
for preliminary examination and demanding of it advice on thorny 
legal problems. In so doing, the monarchy created a long tradition 
of consultation which would, by the 1500's, be transmuted into an 
important check on the absolute prerogatives of royal legislation.
The practices that led to the Parlement's famous right of regis­
tration and judicial review began in a modest way with the sending of 
royal documents to the court for review and examination. The pro­
cedure centered upon the court's practice of registering and 
publishing royal letters and ordinances. This ceremony was a public 
one held in the Grand*Chambre, where all the judges were assembled 
to hear the new enactments read out and solemnly transcribed into 
the Parlement's registers. The practice had a dual purpose: new 
enactments were properly publicized, and inscription in the court’s 
registers provided an authentic and permanent record of all royal
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legislation. The custom of registration began soon after the
Parlement acquired its separate identity, as revealed by early
registers: "Given at Paris in our Parlement, the year of grace
1325 > in the month of March . . . read and published in the Parle- 
49ment and the assembled chamber." The formula varied somewhat in 
coming decades, but the essential phrase lecta et •publicata remained 
very nearly the same throughout the history of the court. In time, 
registration and publication came to be regarded as marlM ng the 
formal legality of royal law, and after registration the Parlement 
disseminated copies of the new law or letters to all subordinate 
jurisdictions.
Prom the middle of the fourteenth century the formula of regis­
tration began to alter in subtle but important ways which represent 
a modified procedure. As early as 1366 one can find evidence of the 
right of the court to participate with members of the council in 
discussion and correction of the text of ordinances: "Seen, read, 
and corrected [italics Maugis] by lords of the Great Council and 
deputies of the king's Parlement."**'1' In 1376 another royal ordinance 
was published and registered with reservations inserted by the 
procureur gSnSral and approved by the court to protect the rights of
^Maugis, Hlstoire du Parlement. I, 522-23.
^Olivier-Martin, Histoire du droit francals. pp. 541-42;
Esmein, Cours glSmentalre d*hlstoire du droit francals. pp. 507-11; 
Shennan, Parlement of Paris, pp. 159-^ 0.
■^Maugis, Hlstoire du Parlement. I, 523, quoting registers of 
the court for July 25, 13*>6.
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the king.^
Out of the scrutiny of royal acts and the modification of them 
arose the procedure of remonstrances. During the early fourteenth 
century the Parlement presented informal, verbal complaints to the 
king about those aspects of his legislation which conflicted with 
established law or which the magistrates deemed ill-advised. The 
time of troubles which came with the minority of feeble-minded 
Charles VI (1380-1422) strengthened the practice of remonstrances 
into a recognized, though badly defined, part of •parlementalre pro­
cedure. Llts de .justice and unions of the court with the council 
were frequent during this time and enhanced the Parlement's consul­
tative traditions, as did commissions drawn from the court which 
prepared edicts and staffed chambers working on the reformation of 
justice. The court was permitted, even expected, to advise the 
Crown on law submitted to it; on the other hand, the remonstrances 
were expected to be concise and not impede the registration process. 
The court, too, was expected to maintain at least the forms of 
humility and respect as indicated by the ritual formula tres humble 
et tres resuecteuses remonstrances (very humble and very respectful
52"A tergo litterarum predictarum, erant scripta verba que 
secunturt Presentes littere lecte fuerunt et publicate in camera 
Parlamenti, salvo et reservato procuratori regio de impunandc dlctas 
litteras pro jure regio et dlcto jure super hoc, loco et tempore, 
persequendo, de quo dictus procurator regius protestatus est."
Maugis, Hlstoire du Parlement. I, 525» quoting registers of the court 
for March 28, 13737
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remonstrances).^
Obviously the king was not always willing to see the magistrates'
point of view and comply with their recommendations, nor could he
allow them to block proposed legislation by their refusal to
register enactments. Consequently, as early as 1392 kings began
the practice of issuing royal lettres de .iussion when the Parlement
remained obdurate after having received a reply to its remonstrances.
Lettres de .iussion emanated from the king's person and ordered
immediate and unqualified registration in a prescription which would
change little from the first known example*
We summon and rigidly enjoin you that not withstanding the 
debates and allegations of our said procureur. nor others 
however made or done, and the said support of cause, you 
should obey our said other letters, and register or have 
them registered point by point without any difficulty what­
soever, according to their form and tenor . . . because 
it pleases us to be thus out of-pur special grace, certain 
knowledge, and royal authority.
The court was then presumed compelled to register without 
further contention, but if it complied, it was only reluctantly and 
with a careful note of the compulsive circumstances: lecta et 
puhlicata de expresso mandato dominl regio (read and published 
at the express mandate of our lord king).^
^Ibld., 523-25; Olivier-Martin, Histoire du droit francals. pp. 
543-44.
54Isambert, Anclennes lols franpalses. VI, 703.
^Esmein, Cours gl&aentalre d*histoire du droit franpais. p. 513. 
A more vigorous expression of the same compulsive circumstances was 
that registration had been made de l'expres comTna.ndf»Tnent du roi, 
plusleurs fois r§lt§r§ (at the express command of the king, several 
times repeated). Olivier-Martin, Hlstoire du droit franpals. p. 544; 
La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des parlemens. Bk. XIII, Ch. XVII, No. 
14. The court’s memory for forced registrations was very long and
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If the court remained recalcitrant sifter lettres de .iussion. the 
king had other resources. He could reinforce letters hy sending them 
in the care of an important prince or councillor; if the court 
resisted these measures, the final and ultimate royal alternative 
was for the king to come in person and force registration hy holding 
a lit de .justice. On these solemn occasions the presence of the king's 
person, minor or not, was considered sufficient to ensure the court's 
immediate registration without further discussion or dissension. Thus 
hy the instruments of royal letters or royal appearance in court, the 
king preserved his authority, while the procedure of remonstrances 
conserved the councilliar heritage of the court and acknowledged the 
Parlement's role in political matters.^
The development of the apparatus of negotiation was interrupted 
during the first third of the fifteenth century hy the breakdown of 
centralized authority. Like all Frenchmen the magistrates were riven 
between the contestants for royal power, and after 1418 the adherents 
of Charles VII left Paris and constituted a separate narlement at 
Poitiers. With the triumph of Charles and his return to Paris in
was, in fact, ingrained in official practice. In the seventeenth 
century La Roche-Flavin wrote that "when the court, after several 
refusals, .iussions. and remonstrances, is constrained to publish 
some edict prejudicial to the public with the accustomed clause 
at the very express command of the king, it then makes a deliberation 
that each year following tres humble remonstrances will be made to 
the king to revoke such edict until it should be revoked.” La Roche- 
Flavin, Treze livres des narlemens. Bk. XIII, Ch. XVII, No. 16.
“^ Olivier-Martin, Histoire du droit francals, p. 5^* Esmein, 
Cours glgmentalre d'hlfltolre du droit francals. p. 512.
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in 1436, the two courts were reunited, but it was some time before 
the prestige of the court was restored.
The last fifty years of the fifteenth century marked the final 
evolutionary stage in the development of registration and remon­
strance. Until this time the court had often been associated with 
the preparation of legislation, and it had occasionally even 
formulated reform measures on its own initiative. Under the 
vigorous rule of Louis XI and Charles VIII, however, there was 
an increasing tendency to exclude the Parlement from consultation 
until final registration and publication were required. The result 
of this trend was a narrowing of the ways in which the consultative 
function of the court might be effected. The initiative for, and 
drafting of, legislation fell more and more into the hands of king 
and council; concurrently, the modifications of the court came to 
be submitted as remonstrances after the reception of the final draft. 
Even more importantly, the Parlement was forced into a negative and 
critical position which had to be overcome by royal authority. 
Remonstrances thus tended more and more to become the prologue to 
prolonged negotiation and confrontaxion when the court objected to 
proposed legislation.
The new pattern is illustrated very well by procedures followed 
in 1493 and 1499 when the court received legislation without its 
prior knowledge or consultation. In July, 1493, Charles VIII 
personally informed an assembly of the court that he had decided to 
turn his attention to the reform of justice and had committed to the
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project several great and notable personages, including princes, 
lords, prelates, barons, and his royal council. This commission 
had produced a new ordinance which was then read to the gathering.
The next day the King returned to the Parlement to have the articles 
published in his presence and to receive the oath from those who had 
to guard and keep the new law. On this occasion, however, the First 
President told the King that certain articles presented the day before 
were merely the repetition of old ordinances to which some new pro­
visions had been added. After an exchange on this point and remon­
strances by the avocat g€n€ral Le Maitre, Charles agreed to entertain 
the court’s advice and remedy the difficulties. Next day, in full 
assembly, the court decided to request modification on several points 
and proceeded to draw up the necessary revisions. A little later 
the King was presented with the modified articles, which were
accepted. This done, members of the court then took the oath to
‘57guard and keep the ordinance and proceeded to publish it.
Six years later, on April 15» 1499• Louis XII presented another 
ordinance of reform for registration in the same manner as his prede­
cessor. The First President responded that the court would see to the 
matter with all diligence. This the court did, undoubtedly through 
a committee of examination; the assembled court heard the committee’s 
report on June 6. Even after seven weeks of work by rapporteurs in 
committee, though, the full court still found four articles unac­
ceptable and ordered them redrawn. The revisions were apparently
■^Maugis, Hlstoire du Parlement. I, 540-41; the text of the 
ordinance is in Isambert, Anclennes lols francalses. XI, 214-49.
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minor, for the very next day the reformed articles were presented 
in a second plenary session and were approved. Further action was 
delayed until final publication in a lit de .justice on June 13.
After an emphatic speech in which Le Maltre rendered homage to the 
two powers which had colloborated in giving law to the kingdom, the 
avocat ggnSral required that the formula lecta. publicata. et 
reglstrata should be written across the ordinance, "so that no 
one should pretend cause of ignorance and that they [the articles] 
should be perpetually formed and established."-^ After this was 
completed, the First President took the opinions of all magistrates 
and reported the results to the King, who ordered them written into 
the register. As had been the case in 1493, the First President 
reserved the right of the court to inform the King should it be dis­
covered upon usage that the ordinance needed to be corrected, en­
larged, or reduced. Then, with the doors of the Grand'Chambre closed 
and the public retired, the eighty-four judges present swore on the 
Scriptures, under the hands of the Bishop of Albi, to obey the new 
law quantum fragilltas humana poterlt (as much as human frailty would 
permit).^
At the beginning of the sixteenth century, the procedures of 
registration and remonstrance, like the publication of edicts, were 
fixed in most essential aspects as they would be in the reign of Louis
^^Maugis, Hlstoire du Parlement. I, 543*
-^ Ibld.. 542-43; the text of the ordinance is in Isambert, 
Anclennes lois francalses. XI, 401-05.
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XIII. The course of the sixteenth century would add nothing funda­
mental to the apparatus of negotiation, "but previously accepted 
practices underwent elaboration when the court confronted the 
increased authority of strong Renaissance monarchs. Francis I,
Henry II, and Henry IV were authoritarian rulers, jealous of their 
rights, and were, moreover, engaged in many sensitive enterprises, 
including waging a massive war and suppressing internal religious 
dissension; they were not men to tolerate extended controversy and 
benevolently allow their decisions to be frustrated by the Parlement. 
If these rulers showed themselves ready to take council in matters 
of a strictly juridical sort, they also showed themselves determined 
in all matters directly interesting to their authority and govern­
ment. Amid the public calamities of the century, on the other hand, 
the Parlement's political heritage, the growth of its complement, 
and the aggravations and abuses of venality could not help but em­
bolden the magistrates to make themselves more than ever the 
universal interpreter of complaints, especially during the first 
half of the century when the Estates General did not meet.^
The increasing complexity and intensity of the confrontation 
between the court and Grown appeared early in the 1500's with the 
Parlement's resistance to the Concordat of Bologna. On June 8, 1517, 
the Concordat itself was sent to the Parlement for registration; the 
gens du roi concluded that further examination of the document was
^Maugis, Histoire du Parlement. I, 5^3-^ 5»
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in order and a commission was appointed to see to the matter. This 
decision meant delay, and on June 21 Francis wrote to the court to 
demand immediate registration. The magistrates continued to pro­
crastinate even after the King sent his uncle, RenS of Savoy, to 
assist in the deliberations; on the 24th of July the court finally 
decided to refuse registration of the Concordat as against the honor 
of God and King, as contrary to the liberties of the Galilean Church, 
and detrimental to the well-being of the kingdom. In particular the 
Parlement objected to the violation of the electoral principle and the 
payment of the annates which went contrary to the Pragmatic Sanction 
of 1438, If the King remained intransigent, the court held, it would 
be necessary to convene a council of the French Church as had been 
done in elaborating the Pragmatic Sanction. From the magistrates' 
point of view, the situation was simply that both the King's policy 
and his method of procedure were arbitrary, and the Parlement was 
bound to oppose him on both accounts.^ 1
Francis, on the other hand, saw his authority being undermined 
by the Parlement's resistance and moved to overrride it. On Feb­
ruary 28, 1518, he conducted an interview with deputies of the court 
at Amboise. After hearing their remonstrance, the King replied 
with stinging harshness "that there would be only a king in France," 
and that "they should take heed that there would not be a senate in 
Prance as in Venice." The concordats should be published, "otherwise
^Shennan, Parlement of Paris, p. 195» Dufey, Hlstoire des 
parlemens de France. I, 157-63.
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he would make them sorrier than they had ever been before.” The 
proper function of the court was the administration of justice, to 
which the judges should confine their attentions, seeing that it 
"was as badly administered then as it had been a hundred years ago." 
Francis continued in this vein, admonishing the judges that if they 
did not obey he would have them "scamper after him like those in the 
Grand Cons ell.11 ^
By maintaining that the Parlement was only a court of law, 
which clearly it was not, Francis was again asserting an extreme 
view of his own authority. The magistrates were less willing than 
ever to approve the Concordat and were forced into a decision only 
after hearing rumors that the King was contemplating the creation 
of a parlement at Orleans to replace that of Paris. More than a year 
after its initial presentation, the Concordat was finally registered 
on March 22, 1518. Even then the court insisted that final regis­
tration should not abrogate the provisions of the Pragmatic Sanction, 
that a prince of standing should present the document to the court, 
and that the formula of registration should note the forced nature 
of the circumstances. These provisions were accommodated. In the 
presence of the seigneur de TrSmoille, the King's chamberlain, the 
court reluctantly entered the necessary words on its registers:
"Read, published, and registered at the express order of our lord 
king several times repeated and in the presence of his emissary 
2^
Dufey, Histoire des parlemens de France. I, 164-65.
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63specially sent." Even these conditions did not satisfy the con­
sciences of the magistrates; on the 24th of March the court con­
fided its protestations to secret registers separately and illegally 
64maintained for the purpose.
Relations between Francis and the Parlement remained tenuous 
after the affair of the Concordat; indeed, the remainder of Francis' 
reign would he filled with abusive creations of office, remonstrances, 
.iusslons. and more or less forced registrations. In 1519 the Parle­
ment stalled Francis' attempt to enlarge the court by creating a 
third chamber of Enquetes. and the creation was not registered until 
1523. Immediately after conceding this creation, the court objected 
to the establishment of a records keeper for the Sorbonne and several 
posts subordinate to the prgvot of Paris. The years of Francis’ 
captivity (1525-1526) continued to be troubled ones as the court took 
the opportunity of the King's absence to press for reforms in the 
Church, finances, justice, and the army.^
Perhaps the worst conflict of Francis’ reign flared up during 
the summer of 1526 between Chancellor Antoine Duprat and the Parle-
*^Maugis, Histoire du Parlement. I, 554; Dufey, Hlstoire des 
narlemens de France. I, 156-72.
64Maugis, Hlstoire du Parlement. I, 550-54; Shennan, Parlement 
of Paris, p. 195^
^Maugis, Hlstoire du Parlement. I, 552-55. Shennan, Parlement 
of Paris, p. 197; Christopher Stocker, "The Politics of the Parle­
ment in 1525." French Historical Studies. VIII, no. 2 (Fall, 1973). 
191-212.
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ment.^ Over the objections of monks and canons, Duprat had been 
named to the archbishopric of Sens and the abbacy of Salnt-Benolt- 
sur-Loire. When the offended Churchmen appealed their case to the 
Parlement, the judges ruled in behalf of the electoral principle and 
in favor of Duprat's rivals. The wrangle between Duprat and the court 
escalated into a major affair in which the Chancellor himself was 
subpoenaed to appear before the bar of justice. Despite repeated 
evocations to the Grand Conseil and nullifications of parlementaire 
arrets, the judges three times accepted the appeal of Duprat’s an­
tagonists. In remonstrances presented on July 27, 1526, the court 
boldly claimed that "the procedure of remonstrances has been created 
for cases of dissent. When remonstrances are honest and reasonable, 
they have traditionally reduced the prince to reason."^ Believing 
Francis would soon return, the regent held firm and a temporary lull 
came as the court was distracted hy prolonged discussion of a peace 
treaty with England.
But in December, 1526, Francis returned to Paris and the case 
of Duprat was re-opened. Three conselllers and the procureur g€n§ral 
were summoned into Francis' presence, there to confront the Chancellor
66Antoine Duprat, appointed Chancellor of France on January 5» 
1515* was a former First President of the Parlement. Despite his 
magisterial experience, Duprat was a staunch defender of royal 
prerogative. Duprat died at Nantouillet on July 9, 1535, after 
having taken ecclesiastical orders in 1517.
67
Maugis, Hlstoire du Parlement. I, 572.
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and his agents in the conflict. After hearing both sides, the King 
supported Duprat and stiff punishment was meted out to the four 
ringleaders: all four ware banned from entering the court until the 
King should next go there in person. The King did not go until six 
months later in a memorable lit de .justice held on July 27, 1527, 
when Francis, still thoroughly at odds with the court, laid down a 
specific and detailed denial of the Parlement's right to meddle in 
affairs of State. The Parlement was not in the future to consider 
affairs other than those of justice; it was to receive annual letters 
of confirmation of membership; it was prohibited from judging matters 
involving archbishops, bishops, and abbots; all limitations proposed 
by the judges during the regency and all appeals heard in contra­
vention to royal wishes were negated. The court was restricted to 
making remonstrances presented in a manner benefitting royal authority 
and was prohibited from creating any limitation to an ordinance or 
edict of the king. As a final surety, the clerk of the court was 
ordered to present his registers within fifteen days to show that
he had struck out all offending passages recorded during Francis'
68absence.
After the restrictive edict of 1527» one might conclude that the 
Parlement would no longer be involved in high matters of State. 
Nothing could be further from the faults, for the prohibitions of 
1527 became a dead letter as a result of variable and often contra-
“ d m - , 580-8**; Isambert, Anclennes lols franyalses, XII,
279-80.
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dictory royal actions and attitudes. Just six months after 
restricting the court, in December, 1527. Francis sought the legal 
opinion and backing of the Parlement in abrogating the Treaty of 
Madrid. After four days of deliberation, the Parlement reported 
its common opinion which wholly satisfied the King on a.11 points.
Yet in August, 1539. after submitting the Ordinance of Villers- 
Cottorets to the court, Francis cut short review of the articles 
and imperatively ordered its registration without delay. On 
this occasion Francis declared he found the court’s delay very 
strange* the deliberation and decision made in his council was 
fully sufficient, therefore publication according to form and tenor 
should follow immediately. In March, 1540, however, the King sub­
mitted a detailed financial edict regulating the minting and value 
of money. The court brought extensive modifications to the edict, 
and apparently this modification process was tolerated by the Grown, 
for the discussions continued for a year.^
The variable and contradictory relations exhibited between 
Francis and his Parlement also characterized the remainder of the 
sixteenth century. Relations between Henry II and the court began 
on a good footing and this amicability was sustained for several 
years by Henry’s moderate attitude. The first lit de .justice of 
the reign was not held until 1549. and on this occasion the Chan­
cellor exalted the role of the Parlement and was careful to set forth
^Maugis, Hlstoire du Parlement. I, 580*87, 640-41.
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its role in the State. Thus officially recognized, the court 
examined projects submitted to it and even returned to edicts of the 
last reign. The Ordinance of Villers-Cottorets, for example, was 
reviewed once again. In June, 1559» however, Henry solicited the 
opinion of the magistrates in dealing with the Huguenot problem.
Most comments passed without special note, but three conseillers 
seemed to take a permissive stand on the religious question. Henry 
was notably angered by the response of Anne du Bourg, who was con­
sequently accused of heresy, tried before the Parlement, and 
70executed.'
The Du Bourg Affair signaled for the Parlement the beginning of 
a long period of unsettled relations with the Crown which reflected 
the troubled nature of the times. The Wars of Religion showed the 
court to be consistently hostile to heresy as identified with 
tumult and armed revolt. Moreover, the judges were staunchly loyal 
Catholics; a defense of royalist tradition and the kingdom*s law 
plus personal faith made the parlementaires firm, but not fanatical, 
opponents of the Huguenot party. Controversy arose because the 
judges did not always agree with royal policy in dealing with the 
religious problem. Extraordinary tribunals such as the Chambre des 
LuthSrlens or the Chambre de la relne were favorite royal instruments 
for the extirpation of heresy; the court saw such commissions as 
illegal and in November, 1558, forbade its presidents and conseillers
"^ Glasson, Le Parlement de Paris. I, 21-26; Shennan, Parlement 
of Paris, p. 207.
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71to sit on any irregular panels.
Throughout the tumultuous period of the late sixteenth century, 
the varied and sometimes contradictory relations between the court 
and Grown continued as under earlier Valois. In August, 1563, Charles 
x IX was persuaded to declare his majority at Rouen, in the Barlement 
of Normandy, rather than in Paris. The violation of tradition 
angered the Parisians and provoked them to draw up remonstrances 
asserting that all royal ordinances had to be verified and registered 
in the court at Paris before any other -parlement could have cog­
nizance of them. The supporting argument produced on this occasion 
was that the Parisian court represented the Estates General and 
therefore had primacy over all other -parlements. Such a line of 
reasoning was demonstrably without historical validity, and it 
produced an equally unrealistic response on the Crown's behalf. 
"'Remember,'” the King told the deputies of the court, '"that your 
company has been established only to render justice following the 
ordinances of sovereigns. Leave to the king and to his council 
the affairs of State; beware of the error of regarding yourselves
as the tutor of kings, as the defenders of the kingdom and as the 
72guardians of Paris." Continuing in the same vein Charles renewed 
the injunction of Francis I against the practice of repeated remon-
^Shennan, Parlement of Paris, pp. 206-07.
^Glasson, Le Parlement de Paris. I, 30, quoting [Jacques- 
Auguste^ ] de Thou, Histoire de France. IV, 553-5** 0*53-5*0; Maugis, 
Histoire du Parlement. I, 608-09.
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strances once the first complaints of the court had been rejected.
Yet just three months after this order prohibiting delay, the 
judges were presenting remonstrances once more, and in December,
1565, a royal declaration permitted the Parlement to make and repeat 
any remonstrances it thought necessary.^
No less than Francis I or Charles IX, Henry IV sometimes found 
the Parlement*s right of remonstrance and its meddling in matters 
of State an irritating obstacle to Crown policy. Most historians 
acknowledge that Henrj possessed admirable qualities as a leader of 
men, yet all of Henry's kindness, tolerance, and political acumen 
were put to the test in dealing with extreme instances of procras­
tination on the part of his court. During Henry’s reign the Parle­
ment continued its traditional role as defender of the monarchy and 
guardian of the Crown's rights against outside interests, particularly 
those of Jesuit Ultramontanism and Spanish influence. Yet in the 
name of the interest of Crown and kingdom, the Parlement often 
raised difficulties over financial measures, objecting particularly 
to creations of office and to increased borrowing through the issuance 
of rentes as well as to the alienation of the royal domain. On at 
least one occasion the resistance of the court went so far as to 
threaten the prosecution of the war against Spain* the fall of 
Cambrai in October, 1595» was directly attributable to a shortage of 
funds brought by the court's delay in registration of bursal edicts
^Maugis, Histoire du Parlement. I, 615-19. Shennan, Parlement 
of Paris, pp. 214-15.
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7I Isome months earlier.
The spring of 1597 witnessed the most severe crisis "between 
Henry and his Parlement, and an examination of the course of events 
is revealing in several respects. In the middle of March, 1597, news 
arrived in Paris of the collapse of Amiens’ defenses "before the 
Spanish; despite energetic measures, the policies of the government 
inspired very little confidence and spirits in the capital were 
generally at a low ehh. Under these conditions and with the King 
away, the Parlement assembled in plenary session to draw up articles 
complaining of the misery of the people and the misconduct of the 
King's affairs. At the same time the court received two financial 
edicts for consideration; remonstrances on these, together with the 
earlier articles, were presented to the King upon his return to 
Paris on April 12. The remonstrances of the Parlement were not well 
received at such a critical juncture, and Henry insisted to deputies 
of the court that his kingdom was in danger and that the Parlement 
should immediately execute his will. Reluctantly, on April 1^ one 
edict alienating part of the royal domain was registered.^
No sooner was this registration completed, however, than the 
Parlement ordered the arrest of one Nicolas Parent, a high official 
in the administration of the gabelle. for "diversion of revenues." 
Parent’s official papers were seized, he was imprisoned, then dragged
7kGlasson, Le Parlement de Paris, I, 91.
^Albert Chamberland, Le Confllt de 1597 entre Henri IV et le 
Parlement de Paris (Paris, 190 )^, pp. 1-5.
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"before the Parlement to explain what was happening to the King's 
salt taxes. Henry, now lodged at Saint-Germain near Paris, summoned 
representatives of the court to account for its treatment of Parent. 
Neither the King's personal injunctions on this, the 26th of April, 
nor lettres de .iussion on the 5th of May brought the magistrates to 
comply with the royal will.^
An already tense situation was considerably exacerbated on May 
10 when the court received an edict creating a prSsldent and ten 
conseillers in the court, together with a lettre de cachet explaining 
the pressing financial needs of the Grown. Well aware that the 
collective temper of the court was aroused, Henry’s letter offered 
the judges a generous tripartite arrangement under which the Parle­
ment, Chambre des comptes, and the Crown should supervise the expen­
diture of revenues resulting from the creation. The court refused
the edict and the offer of supervision; Henry retaliated by ordering
77the exile of parlementalre ringleader Jacques Riviere. With 
tempers thus aroused on both sides, Henry received the court's
^^Nicolas Parent was a trSsorler des gabelles. It is quite 
possible that the Parlement selected him or his administration for 
rather brusque treatment because the court's wages were drawn from 
the salt taxes and were far in arrears throughout the 1590's. On 
the payment of the Parlement's wages at this time see Maugis, 
Histoire du Parlement. II, Appendix III, "Note sur la question des 
gages du Parlement apres 159^»" 388-93.
77This seems to be the first instance of a judge being exiled 
by royal action for disciplinary reasons. The practice would 
become more common during the l630’s.
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deputies at the Louvre on May 13. The scene was a memorable one.
In plain language the King told the magistrates of his wills
"I have sent you an edict which is of importance to me; it 
concerns my State; peril is eminent; all of you know it. If 
you delay, my affairs are lost, my State ruined. Instead of 
working for the expedition of my edicts, 2rou address remon­
strances on petty things. You have come to excuse a 
recognizedp.error. Proceed to the verification, all things 
ceasing."
In spite of repeated words to the same effect, the deputies persisted
in asking the release of Riviere, to which Henry replied:
"Return to the court. I wish to be obeyed and not to have 
things delayed. I wish to be obeyed. My State is lost. I 
will conserve it. When the Parlement has completed deliberation 
and verified the edict, I will consider when it should be given 
satisfaction; but I am King, I want to be obeyed."
Neither this bluntness nor further lettres de jussion persuaded the
court; Henry, having exhausted all other means, determined to use
constraint. On May 21 Henry came to the Parlement to hold a lit
de .justice forcing the registration of ten financial edicts and an
eleventh declaration severely limiting the deliberative rights of
the court. Citing the interminable delay caused by the rendering of
over 200 opinions and the retardation of justice brought thereby,
the declaration stipulated that in the future assemblies for
verification should be made up of the conservative senior judges
in the Grand'Chambre plus the oldest president and the dean of each
chamber of Enquetes and Requetes. a total of fifty men in all.®0
78Chamberland, Le Confllt de 1597. p. 36.
79Ibid., citing registers of the court for May 14, 1597.
®°Ibid., pp. 55-61. A copy of the edict, which remained a dead 
letter, can be found in B.N. Ms. fr. 18413, fols. 134-35.
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Even after the lit de .justice of May 21, the Parlement refused 
to resign itself to royal orders. Upheaval reigned among the 
Enquetes. who, after having been shut out of public affairs, went 
on judicial strike and refused to perform their duties. The affair 
was only slowly resolved after June 2, when Henry permitted Riviere 
to return to the Parlement and agreed to suspend the recent 
restrictions on the court in exchange for a voluntary loan and 
acceptance of the creations of office. The court agreed, but 
acceptance of these conditions did not mean the sub rosa resistance 
of the court came to an end. Not until December was the last of 
the eleven new officers received into the Parlement.^
The events of 1597 show clearly that the most diplomatic of 
rulers might expect difficulty with the Parlement in times of 
national crisis. Henry IV had found, as Louis XIII would find 
decades later, that the Parlement saw itself as the spokesman for 
the nation's overburdened subjects. In resisting the Crown’s 
policies, the judges could maintain that they were only fulfilling 
their traditional duty to inform the king of ill-advised legis­
lation. A clash was inevitable when these measures became necessary 
for the preservation of the kingdom. The conflict of interests 
became all the more complex when the self-interest of the judges was 
involved, as it was in the creations of office registered on May 21. 
The exile of Riviere and the resistance of the court after a lit 
de .justice were symptomatic of the willingness of both sides to
^Chamberland, Le Conflit de 1597. pp. 55-61; Maugis, Histoire 
du Parlement. II, 223-27.
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carry their case to extremes; these extremes were to be further 
accentuated under Louis XIII as the Grown pressed its policy of 
absolutism at home and intervention in the Thirty Years' War abroad.
By the beginning of the seventeenth century, the internal pro­
cedures of the Parlement in handling public matters were fully 
developed in all essential respects. Discussion of public affairs 
was conducted according to the form of judiciary deliberations, the 
pattern of which was followed down to the least detail. Whenever 
a royal project was revealed, whether an edict, declaration, or 
lettre de cachet presented by the gens du roi, the court began by 
scrutinizing the document in the Grand'Chambre to determine if all 
chambers should be assembled immediately for deliberation. If the 
issue were not pressing, or if the court wished to delay, it would 
be referred to a committee of rapporteurs (reporters), who examined 
the articles and presented conclusions at the session following.
When the committee had finished its inquest, the results were 
presented en conseil to the Grand'Chambre, that is to say, to the 
Grand*Chambre acting "in council” rather than in a judiciary 
capacity. If the issue were of import, the Enquetes and Requetes 
might be summoned to a frill session.**2 In either case final action
82The decision to assemble all the chambers lay in the hands 
of the First President following the consensus of his colleagues the 
presidents 3. mortier. The decision to convene a plenary session was 
often of considerable importance because the younger Enquetes and 
Requetes were more radical than the conservative Grand'Chamhriers 
and were more inclined to favor measures opposing Crown policy. On 
the other hand, tradition dictated that the younger judges were 
entitled to participate in matters affecting public affairs; when 
excluded, they often resorted to invasions of the Grand'Chambre, 
judicial strikes, and other measures of protest.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
96
commenced, with a legal commentary by one of the gens du roi, who
was free to present all views but was duty-bound as the king’s
attorney to terminate his speech hy requiring registration or other
action favorable to the king according to the official formula
audlto et requirente procuratore general! (heard and requires the
procureur general). Then the chambers turned to secret deliberation
during which each magistrate offered his remarks in turn, according
to rank and seniority.^ If at least a quarter of an hour was
allowed for each judge, while the court counted from fifty to 150
present, it is not surprising that deliberations often filled entire
weeks, even at two sessions per day. After all opinions were
received by the chief clerk, the president summarized them and offered
a conclusion according to the majority. It was a general rule of the
court that all deliberations should be held in secret and that all
record lists of the votes (billets des opinions) be destroyed
immediately after tally in the interests of justice. Very few billets
have in fact survived, a situation which makes reconstruction of
8^parties and factions within the court impossible. With sentiment
83rhe "style" or formal code of the court's discipline always 
considered that it was a closed body, open only to members regularly 
received and sworn in and bound by a solemn oath to keep and observe 
the ordinances and to preserve silence on internal matters. Even the 
highest personages of the land, members of the royal council, princes 
of the blood, secretaires d'Etat. maltres des requetes. and peers of 
Prance retired as soon as the court began to deliberate en consell. 
Maugis, Histoire du Parlement. I, 271-72.
Occasionally, however, billets des opinions were preserved 
by the clerks for consultation upon need, and in some circumstances 
the billets passed to another chamber, or even to the king or chan­
cellor, when the court found itself divided over a trial or reso­
lution. This was apparently the case for the only surviving billet
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of the court made known, the chief clerk was then ordered to tran­
scribe the decision (arret) into the registers under the rubric 
"It will be said . . ."or "The court orders . . .". ^
Since the thirteenth century the Parlement had maintained con­
tinuous registers in which the daily life of the Parlement was 
recorded. By the seventeenth century these registers were divided 
into five major series: (l) Ordonnances. containing official and 
final copies of royal laws, (2) registres du consell. in which 
public and political deliberations were recorded, (3) registres 
des plaidolres clvlls. for civil suits, (4) registres crlmlnels. 
for criminal trials, and (5) unofficial and unacknowledged registres
secrets in which the court sometimes recorded observations and remon- 
86strances prohibited by the Crown. The first four series were con-
des opinions for the period 1624-1642, when on April 26, 1631, the 
court debated the advisability of registering a declaration of March 
30 against Gaston d* Orleans, brother of the king. On this occasion 
thirty-four judges favored registration and thirty-four were for 
remonstrances; the names of presidents and conseillers on both sides 
are given in B.N. Ms. ft. 18413, fols. 127-12?v°.
^Maugis, Histoire du Parlement. I, xvi-xvii.
86After 1636 a sixth series, the registres du consell secret, 
appeared to supplement the registres du conseil. The distinction 
between the judiciary matters recorded in the registres du consell 
and the political matters in the conseil secret was often artificial 
and somewhat arbitrary. The original archives of the Parlement of 
Paris are conserved almost intact at the Archives Nationales, with 
the exception of several registers which have been lost or mislaid 
in other depots. The original registers make up the following series: 
SSrle a" , Arrets. Consell. Plaldolrles. Enreglstrements des actes 
royaux. Chambre du domains, Grands Jours. Coutumes reformges. 
Correspondence. S6rle a  . Minutes des Chambres des Enquetes. du 
Conseil. SSrie , Registres crimlnels. Sgrie , Minutes des
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fided to the chief clerk and his staff who prepared them from rough 
minutes; the secret registers were held apart by select conseillers 
who transmitted than from generation to generation. Unfortunately 
for modem historians, almost all of the secret registers have dis­
appeared, leaving only the registres du conseil to record public and 
political affairs, and even these registers are deficient in the 
extreme.^ Entries are riddled hy extensive and systematic silences, 
such as the daily series recording the twenty-five or thirty sessions 
considering the great ordinances of the sixteenth century; "The court,
all chambers assembled, discussed articles of the ordinance until 
88adjournment." Later entries may clarify previous sketchy infor­
mation, but nothing can replace material lost through fires, theft,
89and alterations ordered by both Crown and court for various reasons. '
3a *chambres.crlmlnelles. Sfirie X , Registres des Requetes du Palais.
SSrle a , Minutes des Requetes. The Archives Nationales and the
Bibliotheque Nationale possess numerous collections of copies, of
extracts, and of tables of registers utilized by jurists. Worthy
of particular mention among these collections are those of the
parlementaire Lamoignon family (B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 7979-8500)
and those of Joly de Fleury (B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 2102-2477)*
The citations in this essay are to eighteenth century copies of
registres du consell and consell secret. B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9890-
989*+ \Nov., 1o23-Nov. , 16*0) originally held in the library of
Lefebvre de Caumartin, Bishop of Blois (1719-1733).
^The entire curious matter of the secret registers of the 
Parlement has been discussed bjr Madeleine Dillay in "Les ’Registres 
secrets' des Chambres des Enquetes et des Requetes du Parlement de 
Paris," Bibliotheque de l'Ecole des Chartes. CVIII (1950), 75-123*
See also Maugis, Histoire du Parlement. I, xiii-xxv.
^Maugis, Histoire du Parlement. I, xvi-xvii.
89Information on the registers of the Parlement may be found 
in A. Grun's Introduction to Actes du Parlement de Paris, ed.
E. de Boutaric, I, i-ccxcvi, and in R. Filhol, "Les Archives du 
Parlement de Paris: source d'histoire," Revue historique, CCXLII 
(l9*l-7), *+0-6l. In 155*+ the registers of the court recorded that one
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In spite of their manifest shortcomings as historical source
material, the registers of the court provided the judges with archives
superior to any which the other institutions of the Grown possessed.
The royal council in particular had no systematic records until
rfeglaments of 1616, 1628, and 1630 ordered the secretaries and clerks
of the council to keep registers of petitions presented and decisions
reached; up until this time the papers recording the official business
of the council were considered the private property of the secretaries 
90dispatching or receiving them. Even these reglements apparently
Bertrand Grebert, a parchmentmaker, was condemned by arret of Febru­
ary 9» 14931 to be hung and strangled for having tom out and sold 
the parchment of the registre du consell for 1443-1451. Sometimes 
the registers wore diverted for private purposes as reported on May
4, 1565. The chief clerk complained that agents were publicly 
printing and selling copies of the remonstrances on an edict of Jan­
uary, 1561, even though he had kept the original under lock and key 
and in the custody of a single clerk who worked at home. The Parle­
ment instituted an investigation, the results of which are not 
recorded. Finally, after Francis I returned from captivity in 1526, 
he ordered the clerk to bring him all registers made in his absence 
so that the King might verify that dissenting remarks had been 
scratched out. For these examples and others through the sixteenth 
century, see Maugis, Histoire du Parlement. I, xvi-xxlii. The 
destruction of oarlementalre records continued in the seventeenth 
century. A disastrous fire on March 7. 1618, destroyed many records. 
On May 13, 1631, Louis XIII ordered the greffier of the couirt to 
bring him the sheet of the court's notes bearing the deliberations 
made on April 26, 1631, when the court had refused to register a 
declaration outlawing the King's younger brother Gaston d'OrlSans.
The greffier complied, and the King ripped up the page in the presence 
of the judges. Glasson, Le Parlement de Paris. I, 138-39.
90
Roland Mousnier, "Le Conseil du Roi de la mort de Henri IV 
au gouvemement personnel de Louis XIV," in La Plume, la faucille 
et le marteau. p. 164; Roland Mousnier, "Les Reglements du Conseil 
du Roi sous Louis XIII," Annuaire-Bulletin de la SoclStg de 1'histoire 
de France. 1946-1947 (Paris, 1948), pp. 153-96; D’Avenel, Richelieu 
et la monarchie absolue. I, 46-47, 64, n. 1.
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did little to assuage the situation in the council, for only a few
of these registers were drawn up, and the council remained essentially
91without systematic records throughout Louis’ reign. In any case,
no minutes of any sort were permitted in the Conseil d’en haut which
made secret policy decisions. The result was an obvious advantage for
the Parlement in legal disputes with the Grown which were largely 
92based on arguments of precedent. Before the king and his ministers 
might even be aware of an issue that had arisen in the Parlement, the 
magistrates would have already searched through their archives, found 
a suitable legal precedent for their case, and issued an arret which 
might very well conflict with royal interests.^
^Mousnier, "Le Conseil du Roi," p. 164.
^Legal arguments on both sides sometimes relied on the citation 
of precedents which were centuries old. See, for example, the list of 
criminal trial precedents drawn up by Michel de Marillac while garde 
des sceaux to lend authority to his essay "Mgmoire dressS par le garde 
des sceaux de Marillac principalement contre 1*authority du Parlement.” 
The precedents in this instance go back to some dubious ones in the 
sixth century. B.N. Ms, fr. 75^ 9, "Extrait de 1’instruction, Juges, 
et Jugements de plusieurs proces importants" (576-1560), fols. 244- 
55• See also the arguments presented by garde des sceaux Chateauneuf 
in addressing deputies of the Parlement at the Louvre on May 13, 1631, 
in which reference was made to an edict of Charles VIII dated 1495.
W. F, Church has noted that both Richelieu and SSguier were careful 
to prepare themselves with legal advice. To do this, they supple­
mented official records with documents assembled for them from various 
sources. Characteristic of these private archives are three volumes 
stamped with the arms of SSguier now held by the Bibliotheque Nationale 
asi B.N. Ms. fr. 18321-18323* copies and extracts from the registres 
du conseil and consell secret of the Parlement; B.N. Ms. fr. I8367, 
a collection of manuscript and printed pieces concerning the Parlement 
from 1543; B.N. Ms. fr. 18410, a collection of accounts of 11ts de 
.justice, speeches, and deliberations in the Parlements of Paris, 
Toulouse, Bordeaux, and Rouen between 1369 and 1632.
^Moote, Revolt of the Judges, pp. 8-9.
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.The passage of the sixteenth century had witnessed a considerable 
increase in the political ambitions of the Parlement since the time of 
Francis I. The system of venality and heredity of offices had greatly 
strengthened these pretensions; the cohesion of the magistrates grew 
steadily because of material interests which concerned all the judges. 
The unity of the court was heightened, too, by continuation of its 
traditional role as high councillor to French kings. Periodic royal 
prohibitions against meddling in affairs of State and the delaying 
tactics of repeated remonstrances remained meaningless gestures as 
long as monarchs continued to seek out and respect the opinions of 
their judges. The history of the rapport between court and Crown 
was thus an increasingly complex one, characterized by spasmodic and 
often contradictory patterns of royal behavior on the one hand and 
tenacious insistence on the forms of legality by the Parlement on the 
other.
Though the 1500*s had seen substantial, augmentation in the 
political pretensions of the court, the constitutional framework of 
what has been called the "traditional monarchy" had not been altered.^ 
Accepted theory dictated that the king was the living embodiment of 
sovereignty in the kingdom. His royal sacerdotum was divine, not of
Q/j,
The term "traditional monarchy" was used by Georges d’Avenel 
to describe the corpus of theory and practice of French government 
as it existed until the time of Richelieu. The chief characteristic 
of this monarchy was a harmony and balance between the theoretically 
absolute royal powers and the representative tradition as vested in 
the local and national estates, the royal council, and the Parlement 
of Paris. According to D'Avenel’s thesis, the assumption of power 
by Richelieu marked the beginning of a fundamentally different 
"absolute monarchy" in which royal prerogatives were abused at the 
expense of the rights of subjects and their representative institutions. 
See D ’Avenel, Richelieu et la monarchle absolue. I, 1-lHU.
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the people, having been mystically conferred by birth and confirmed 
with the ceremony of coronation. So endowed, the king was the unique 
source of legislation in the kingdom— in the legal shorthand of the 
seventeenth century, si veut le roi. si veut la loi (as the king 
wishes, so wishes the law),9'* It was a crime of lese-ma.iest€ to 
contest his ordinances and his absolute power. These ordinances and 
other legislation, however, assumed their ultimate form, efficacy, 
and legality only after having been submitted to the thorough exami­
nation of the Parlement acting en conseil.
Parlementalre doctrine held that the court’s deliberation and
control were born of experience and were imperative in order to
restrain the arbitrary exercise of royal authority. The court saw
itself, as avocat gSnSral Le Maltre maintained in 1499» as "’the true
Senate of the kingdom, where edicts and ordinances of kings take their
96final form and authority when they are published and registered."’ 
Over a hundred years later, First President Achille III de Harlay 
reminded Henry IV of the same traditional usages '"Edicts are sent 
to the Parlement not only for verification, but for deliberation 
according to the ordinary forms of justice.’" ^  A few years later,
95This expression was at least as old as the thirteenth century, 
when it can be found in the writing of jurisconsul Philippe de 
Beaumanoir. Beaumanoir proposed only three limitations on the king's 
authority* (l) the general interest of subjects (2) rule by con­
sultation in tres grand conseil. or "very great council," and 
(3) respect for the laws of God. See Esmein, Cours glSmentaire 
d'histoire du droit franpals. p. 466.
9^ Maugis, Histoire du Parlement. I, 5^ 3.
97Ibid.. 522, quoting registers of the court for September 7,
1605.
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the jurisconsul La Roche-Flavin wrote that "the parlements have
not only heen established for the judgment of affairs and trials
among individuals, hut they have also heen destined for public
affairs and the verification of edicts."^ By the middle of the
sixteenth century, this point of view had heen positively affirmed
in written law. Article 2 of the Ordinance of Moulins (1566)
maintained that
after our edicts and ordinances have heen sent to our courts 
of parlement. and other sovereign courts to he published there, 
we wish that they he attended to, all [other] affairs re­
linquished, except that in case they determine to make some 
remonstrance to us, in which case we enjoin them to do it 
immediately. After such remonstrances, having made our will 
known, we desire and-order that publication ensue without 
recourse to others.
In summary, hy the l600's the court's formerly consultative 
function had heen transmuted into a powerful constitutional strong- 
point from which it could challenge, or even block, actions of the 
Crown it deemed as arbitrary. No more lucid or concise statement of 
the court’s position in this regard can he found that in the words 
of avocat g§n€ral Cmer Talon when addressing a lit de .justice on 
July 31, 1648s
Formerly the king's wishes were never executed hy his subjects 
without being first approved by all the great men of the king­
dom, hy the princes and officers of the Crown; today this 
political jurisdiction is vested in the Parlement; our pos­
session of this power is guaranteed by a long tradition and 
respectfully acknowledged by the people. The opposition of 
our votes, the respectful resistance which we bring to bear 
in public affairs should not be interpreted as disobedience 
but rather as a necessary result of the exercise of our
^^Treze livres des parlemens. Bk. XIII, Ch. XVII, No. 1. 
99Isambert, Anclennes lols franyaises. XIV, 191.
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office and of the fulfilling of our obligations, and certainly 
the king’s majesty is not diminished hy his having to respect 
the decrees of his kingdom; hy so doing, he0govems, in the 
words of the Scriptures, a lawful kingdom.
In short, the opinions of the court did not hind the king, hut they
should enlighten him; the just and wise monarch was expected to
respect the advice of the court when presented as remonstrances. In
case of insoluble conflict, however, the sovereign nature of the
monarchy required that the king should prevail. In the last instance
the king could restrict the right of remonstrances out of his own
authority. As Cardin LeBret wrote in 1632,
It has heen asked if the king can make and publish all these 
changes in law and ordinances hy his sole authority, without 
the advice of his council or his sovereign courts. To which 
it is answered that there is no doubt of it, because the king 
alone is sovereign in his kingdom, and sovereignty is no more 
divisible than the point in geometry. At the same time it will 
always he well for a great king to have his acts approved hy 
the uarlements and other principal officers of the Crown, who,0, 
are obliged hy oath to serve and advise him with all loyalty.
Talon’s speech of 1648 reflected accepted parlementalre doctrine
of the era, hut his words, like the doctrine, failed to define at
what point the "respectful resistance" of the court became active
disobedience to the king's authority and therefore illegal. Just as
■^Qmer Talon, Mfmoires, continues par Denis Talon, ed. J. F. 
Michaud and J. J. F. Poujoulat (Paris, 1854), p. 260.
101Cardin LeBret, De la souveralnStS du Roy (Paris, 1632),
Bk. I, Ch. IX, p. 71, Cardin LeBret, seigneur de Flacourt, was bom 
in 1558 and pursued a distinguished legal career. Ke was avocat 
ggnSral at the Cour des aides, then in the Parlement until 1619.
Being in the Parlement he was breveted as a conselller d'Etat in the 
king's councils on May 7, 1605, and took the oath on June 8. In 1629 
we was sent as intendant to Metz; during the 1630's he was associated 
with several political trials initiated by Richelieu. In 1632 LeBret 
published De la souveraln6t€ du Roy which expressed absolutist 
thought current at the time. LeBret continued his councilliar career 
during the l640’s and 1650's, dying dean of the council in 1655.
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the court's jurisdictions in private law were confused and over­
lapped with administrative attributions, the Parlement's role in 
the arena of public law was never set out within well-defined consti­
tutional boundaries. The court was traditionally presumed to be 
the legal guardian of the kingdom's law, but in the seventeenth 
century, the legal foundation of the monarchy was immensely flexible 
and comprised many elements within the corpus of public law.
The immediate legislative capacity of the king has already been 
identified as an adjunct of his sovereignty. The place of the Parle­
ment in this law-giving process has also been sketched out through 
its historical evolution. In time the products of royal law giving 
were amassed in a body of royal ordinances, edicts, and declarations
which represented the legislative expression of past monarchs in 
102written form. Seemingly concrete and lasting, written royal law
rtoyal ordinances, edicts, and declarations all had behind them 
the same general authority of the king. The distinctions and termi­
nology were never respected exactly and have no real juridical impor­
tance. Esmein, Cours elementaire d'histoire du droit frangais. pp. 
736-37; Olivier-Martin, Histoire du droit frangals. pp. 3 5^-53; 
D’Avenel, Richelieu et la monarchie absolue. I, 77-103. Five printed 
collections of royal ordinances should be mentioned. The only com­
plete collection of royal acts that were committed to print during 
the ancien rSglme is found in the Salle des imprimSs of the Biblio­
theque Nationale. This collection comprises the Actes royaux. 
which are original copies of printed royal legislation. The volumes 
of the Actes royaux are bound and catalogued in the French fashion 
according to dimension, subject matter, and year issued. Access to 
the Actes royaux may be gained through A. L. T. Isnard, Catalogue 
ggnSral des livres imnrlmSs de la Bibliotheque Rationale: Actes 
royaux (6 vols.; Paris, 1910-196>7). In addition to the Actes royaux. 
four other collections of royal ordinances should be mentioned. 
Unfortunately for historians of the ancien regime, each has short­
comings in chronological coverage or editorial quality. The best 
presentation for the centuries embraced (l051-151^ » reigns of Henry 
I to Francis I) is Ordonnances des rois de France de la troisieme 
race, published volume by volume between 1723 and 18^9 under the 
successive direction of Eusebe de Lauriere, Denis-Frangois Secousse,
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from past reigns was actually open to extensive modification and 
interpretation. Its provisions could always be overridden by new 
monarchical utterances arising out of contemporary needs. Moreover, 
observation of written law was shaped by usage and custom. Article 1
L. de Villevaut, Louis de BrSquigny, Claude de Pastoret, and J. M. 
Pardessus. During the ancien regime this publication was made under 
the initiative and authority of the royal chancellor. Publication 
was resumed during the Napoleonic period under the patronage and 
direction of the Acad§mie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres which 
pushed it up to the twenty-first volume completing the reign of Louis 
XII. Volume XXIbis (1847) contains a chronological table. In 1902 
the AcadSmie des Sciences Morales et Politiques resumed publication 
of this work under the title Ordonnances des rois de France: regne 
de Francois I . In 1974 the work had been completed through 1537* 
The Recueil g§n§ral des anciennes lols franyaises depuls I'an 420 
.iusqu’a la~revolution de 1789. published from 1823 to 1827 by Jourdan, 
Decrusy, Taillandier, and Isambert is best known under the name of 
Isambert. The Anciennes lois franyaises include twenty-eight volumes; 
a table appeared as Volume XXEX in 1833. The collection, though 
representing the entire history of the monarchy, is highly selective, 
incomplete, and marred by mistakes in editing and notation. The 
deficiencies of the above collections are partially compensated 
in two others prepared during the ancien regime. The Edits et 
ordonnances des roys de France, depuls Louis VI. dlt le Gros, .iusques 
i present, edited by Antoine Fontanon and ordinarily so designated, 
first appeared in 1580. A second edition, revised and augmented by 
Gabriel-Michel de la Roche Maillet, appeared in l6ll. The three 
volumes of the l6ll edition, though selective and defective, repre­
sent a useful supplement to Anciennes lols franyaises. as does 
another collection, Recueil d'Sdits et d*ordonnances royaux. sur le 
fait de la .justice et autres matleres les plus lmportantes. which 
first appeared in 1^35 under the editorship of Pierre NSron and 
Etienne Girard. Ordinarily known as Ngron and Girard, the Recueil 
d*edits et d*ordonnances royaux subsequently appeared in 1647, 1656, 
1666, and 1720. The last edition, revised and augnented by Claude 
Ferriere and Eusebe Lauriere in two folio volumes supplemented 
legal texts with extensive annotations and commentary. On the 
printed editions of the royal ordinances see Alfred Franklin, Les 
Sources de 1’histoire de France (Paris, 1877).
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of the Code Michaud of 1629 spoke of ordinances "not abrogated by
contrary usage" and so officially recognized usage as one form of
10?interpretation of the law. J Shaped in this way by custom, the 
diffuse and flexible nature of French public law was to prove crucial 
in the development of absolutism, for just and legal arguments could 
be produced both for the absolutism of Richelieu and for the 
Parlement’s challenge to royal arbitraire.
Above and beyond the written and customary law was a second 
category of public law which was not subject to royal modification, 
abridgement, or abrogation. This category was the "fundamental laws" 
of the kingdom which contemporaries and modem historians alike have 
postulated as the authentic constitution of the monarchy. Mathieu 
MolS, First President of the Parlement, spoke of these laws in 1645 
in saying "that there were two sorts of laws in the State: some 
transient, species of laws of police which changed according to 
occasion; the others fixed, certain, and immutable, under authority
i 01l
of which the State was governed and royalty subsisted." Writing 
two and one-half centuries later, historian AndrS Lemaire concluded 
that the French kingdom was governed by these fundamental laws which 
represented a constitution appropriate to the nature of the monarchy 
and the historical circumstances surrounding its evolution. Lemaire 
cautioned that one should not expect to find a constitution in the 
modem sense in which public functions are delineated by a written 
document or collection of titles stipulating laws, rights, obligations,
103
^Isambert, Anciennes lols franyaises. XVI, 225.
1 M l
Talon, Mgmolres, p. 148.
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and relationships "between prince and subject. There was never a 
formal juridical act or contract between Frenchmen and their kings 
establishing sovereign relationships within the State. In terms of 
written law there was no constitution; a constitution, however, was 
to be found in certain fundamental laws which kings themselves 
professed to be inalienable and which could not be abrogated or 
infringed within the context of legal rule. These fundamental laws 
were traditional and unwritten, but were nevertheless real and 
binding, respected by nation and ruler, and explained and commented 
on by jurisconsuls and historians throughout the centuries. Most 
importantly, the fundamental laws defined an unalterable framework 
within which sovereign authority could be legally exercised; hence, 
to violate the fundamental laws was to violate the true French 
tradition and was, therefore, to be considered despotism.1^
By Louis XIII’s reign, a thousand years of tradition had 
determined that the fundamental laws might be expressed according to 
certain general propositions. The first general principle maintained 
that the fundamental laws themselves were an expression of custom, 
usage, and tradition and were not rooted in a willful constitution 
by the nation, by the prince, or by any pact. In effect, this most 
permanent and most fundamental part of the constitution was not the 
free work of men. "It is not Clovis, it is not Charlemagne," wrote 
Lemaire, "who have constituted [italics Lemaire's] the monarchy; no 
more so is it their Franks; rather, it is all of them, and it is 
still more the innumerable facts, the multitude of circumstances, the
■^Andr§ Lemaire, Les Lols fondamentales de la monarchle fran- 
9aise d'a pres les thgorlclens de 1* ancien rSgime TParis, 190?), passim.
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X06climate, the race, the religion.” From customary usage followed 
a second principle that neither the king nor the people were per­
mitted to change the constitution and to do so would be purely 
destructive. The stability of the State depended on the faithful 
conservation of French traditions. Thirdly, the true French 
tradition could be found in certain propositions which had come out 
of the specific historical application, development, or complement 
of the general principles mentioned above. These could be called 
"derived" or "secondary" fundamental laws. By the end of the six­
teenth century the body of derived or secondary fundamental laws 
had reached full development, and political theorists were beginning 
to apply the term lois fondamentales to describe the basic 
unalterable principles of the monarchy. Reduced to their essential 
provisions, the universally recognized fundamental laws around 
1600 were:
The State is a pure monarchy: the sovereign power is one and 
belongs to the king alone.
Royalty is hereditary by virtue of a law of succession 
appropriate to it. It passes without division or diversion 
to the oldest male child of the preceding king, or to the 
nearest male heir after him. Candidacy is admitted following 
the order of primogeniture; women, descendants through women, 
bastards and their descendants are excluded. Also barred are 
foreign princes whose accession would bring the kingdom under 
foreign dominion. The monarch cannot dispose of the Crown, 
either to living persons or by testament. Domain and Crown 
are inalienable. The properties of the prince who accedes 
to the throne are amalgamated with the domain of the Crown.
The king is major at thirteen years and one day. A regent
106Ibid., pp. 279-80.
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governs in case of minority, absence, or insanity of the king 
under royal authority, that is to say, without power in his 
own name. The king can make provision for a regency. If this 
has not been done, the regency is, in principle, attributed 
to the heir presumptive of the minor, absent, or insane king.
The king never dies.
The king of Prance is Catholic. He assumes a certain respon­
sibility for the Church in the kingdom as conservator of the 
Gallican Liberties.
The nation is divided into orders. In the Estates General 
and provincial estates, votes are taken by order.
Provinces and communities are endowed with certain liberties. 
Custom or individual statutes determine the nature and extent 
of these liberties.
The king governs par tres grand conseil (with a very great 
council), that is, with the subordinate cooperation of a 
greater or lesser part, more or less representative, of 
the nation. '
Of these fundamental laws, only the nature of the last two 
would be in question during the early seventeenth century, and only 
the question of tres grand conseil involved a basic restriction 
on the development of absolutism. Nevertheless, this single issue 
was of immense significance because the Parlement*s resistance to 
absolutism would be founded largely upon the claims of the court to 
act as tres grand conseil to the king. The traditional interpretation
10W  , pp. 279-83. The expression tres grand consell was 
as old as the thirteenth century. Philippe de Beaumanoir proposed 
counsel as one of three major limits on Crown authority. In some 
form or another, most theorists after Beaumanoir recognized the need 
for limited monarchy and most saw limits as a combination of three 
forms: divine law, fundamental law, and natural law. Parlementalre 
La Roche-Flavin likened the Parlement to the Roman Senate whose 
advice and counsel was essential to the glory and endurance of the 
Roman State. The same comparison could be found throughout the 
Renaissance period, strengthened until 1515 by the coincidence of 
the numbers of personnel sitting in the court with the one hundred 
members of the ancient Roman republican Senate.
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held that the king’s tres grand consell had been successively- 
represented by primitive Prankish commitatus and tribal assemblies, 
then by the court of the first Capetians, next by the court of the 
first Capetians, next by the Estates General, and finally by the 
provincial estates and the Parlement of Paris. At times the king 
had convoked assemblies of notables for purposes of advice or reform, 
but these usually represented a reduced form of the Estates General, 
a less extended version of the tres grand conseil.
By the first decades of the l600's, only the Estates General 
and the Parlement of Paris represented institutions with the 
potential to act as tres grand conseil, and there were indications 
that the Parlement, in spite of the abuse of remonstrances, was more 
effective than the Estates General in offering council and support 
to the monarchy. The court had the advantages of a traditional 
legal heritage and three centuries of continuous existence; it was 
permanently and conveniently located in the capital; its procedures, 
however clumsy and prolonged, were no less effective than those 
of the Estates General. By the end of the sixteenth century, these 
advantages were becoming more apparent. In 1593 the Parlement had 
acted decisively to defend the validity of the Salic law and to 
ensure that the French throne would be occupied by Henry de Bourbon, 
the legitimate heir; on June 28, 1593* the court resolved to draw up
108Lemaire, Les Lols fondamentales. 282, 302-15. The possibility 
that the royal council, the linear and nominal descendant of Frankish 
institutions and the curia regis. could fufill the function of tres 
grand conseil diminished after the thirteenth century as it became 
clear that it was an instrument of the king’s government. AndrS 
Lemaire ignores it as a potential expression of tres grand conseil.
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a decree defending the fundamental laws of France and requiring
that the throne pass to Henry de Bourbon. At the same time an
Estates General convened by leaders of the Catholic League was
wavering in its allegiance between the attraction of legality and
the influences of Spain, of the due de Mayenne, and the League.1^
The Parlement demonstrated no vascillation; upon hearing of Henry's
conversion to Catholicism the court promptly confirmed him as
rightful king of France. Upon Henry's death in 1610 the regency of
Marie de Medicis was immediately confirmed by the Parlement and
not by an Estates General, and by usurping this role, the prestige
and authority of the court received a substantial b o o s t . F o u r
years later, in l6l4, when the regency seemed about to founder
on the rocks of inept statecraft, the Estates General was convened
to lend its advice. But the orders utterly failed to agree on any
major point and the meeting was adjourned without positive result.
After the failure of the meeting of the Estates of l6l4, the Estates
General's worth as a councilliar body was in serious doubt, while the
prestige of the Parlement stood at a new high:
It was in keeping with the developments of the previous century 
that the Parlement should once more assert its superiority 
over the Estates-General, but the political significance of 
what it had done on this occasion ^ Henry's death] was sufficient
^■^Glasson, Le Parlement de Paris. I, 68-76; Shennan, Parlement 
of Paris, pp. 230-32.
^^Glasson, Le Parlement de Paris, I, 119-20; Shennan, Parlement 
of Paris, p. 242. In 1484 the regency of Anne and Pierre Beaujeu 
for Charles VIH was extensively discussed by an Estates General of 
that year; in 1560 an Estates General approved the regency of 
Catherine de Medicis for Charles IX. The question of the regency of 
Marie de Medicis was never submitted to the Estates General.
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to convince the court that its political function should he 
hoth central and permanent. There was nothing novel about 
this conviction save the emphasis, and the new emphasis was 
all important, for it could no longer be doubted now that 
the Parlement alone shouldered the responsibility for 
representing to the king the myriad ri^rts and privileges 
of his subjects, for offering the only constitutional form 
of opposition to royal actions, for preserving the traditional 
balance of the French State.
As the course of events was to show, the Crown recognized the
deficiencies of the Estates, and they were not convoked again until
1789. The disappearance of the Estates left the Parlement with
widened opportunities and a heightened sense of responsibility to
advance its claims; immediately after the collapse of the Estates
in 1615, the court began to press its case for a greater role in
affairs of State.112
111Shennan, Parlement of Paris, p. 2^ 3*
112Roland Mousnier, "L'Evolution des institutions monarchiques 
en France et ses relations avec l'Stat social,” in La Plume, la 
faucllle et le marteau. pp. 215-30* Along with the development of 
feudalism on the land and the coming of the intendants. the author 
holds the disappearance of the Estates General to be one of the 
three great institutional modifications of the seventeenth century. 
Mousnier rightly notes that this "disappearance” was in reality 
merely a suspension and did not mark any change in the juridical 
status of the body; the Estates General continued to exist in theory, 
but the king simply did not convoke them.
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CHAPTER I I I
THE PARLEMENT AND THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY CRISIS
If the reign of Louis XIII could be characterized as having a 
single distinguishing feature, a quality impressive in both intensity 
and duration, that feature would be the atmosphere of political and 
economic crisis which hung over the reign from beginning to end.
This atmosphere became apparent after Henry IV's violent end and 
intensified after the failure of the Estates General of 1614. As 
the second decade of the century came and went, the peace, prosperity, 
and general progress made during Henry's rule disintegrated into 
civil war and religious strife. Vascillaticn and badly directed 
statecraft typified the regency of Marie de Medicis, whose uncertain 
and unfortunate policies produced nothing but a resurgence of old 
religious tensions and a revival of the political ambitions of the 
great nobility. The declaration of Louis XIII's majority in October, 
1614, changed nothing since the government of Prance continued to be 
dominated by Marie and her Italian confidant, Coneini.1 The thrifty
oneini and his wife, who took the Florentine name of Eleonora 
Galigai, were the favorites of Marie de Medicis and exercised the 
preponderant influence in French government after the death of Henry
IV. Concini enjoyed every favor the Queen Mother could bestow; he 
sat In council; he received immense riches and many titles, including 
that of marquis d’Ancre, and was later made a marSschal de France. 
Concini's highest personal goals were those of power and self- 
enrichment; these dubious qualities plus his Italian origins made him 
odious to the common people. The Huguenots hated him for his Ultra­
montane Catholicism, and many nobles were jealous of his influence
114
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care of Sully in the finances gave way to waste, inefficiency, and 
outright corruption in fiscal matters; the savoir faire and 
political acumen of Henry were replaced by la politique de largesse 
and other clumsy manoeuverings. In l6l6 alone, Marie was compelled 
to grant the governorship of Berry and 1,500,000 livres to the 
prince de CondS in exchange for his good will; over 6,000,000 livres
2
were distributed among his confederates Soissons and Bouillon. 
Changes after Louis' coup d'etat of April, 1617, meant little. The 
inept Concini was replaced by the due de Luynes, Louis' falconer- 
tumed-favorite, but neither Luynes nor Louis were able to bring 
firm direction to the government. By 1624 it seemed that the fabric 
of French society, so laboriously rewoven by Henry and Sully, might
in the innermost circles of government. During Concini's pre­
dominance, which lasted until 1617, the young Louis XIII was shunted 
into the background, ignored, and even insulted by both the Queen 
Mother and by D'Ancre. In l6l6 and 1617 Louis fell under the influ­
ence of his falconer, a lowly Provenjal by the name of Luynes, who 
was personable and sympathetic to Louis' frustrations. On April 
24, 1617, Louis, urged on by Luynes, attempted to have Concini 
arrested. Concini was killed resisting arrest, and his wife was 
later tried and executed for witchcraft by the Parlement of Paris.
The feeble leadership of Concini did not come to an end with his 
demise, for Luynes proved incapable of dealing with fractious nobles 
such as the prince de CondS and was unable to resolve the fundamental 
conflict between Louis and his domineering mother. For the early 
years of Louis' reign, see especially C. J. Burckhardt, Richelieu and 
His Age. Vol. Is His Rise to Power, trans. Edwin and Villa Muir 
(London, 1940), henceforth cited as Burckhardt, Richelieu. His Rise to 
Power; Victor TapiS, la France de Louis XIII et de Richelieu 
(Paris, 1967); and J. H. MariSjol, Henri IV et Louis XIIlTL598-1643). 
Vol. VI, Pt. 2, of Hlstoire de France, ed. E. LavisselParis, 191137 
Henceforth cited as MariSjol, Henri IV et Louis XIII.
2Burckhardt, Richelieu, His Rise to Power, p. 75.
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once again unravel into its constituent threads.-^
The crisis conditions which appeared in Prance after Henry IV's 
death were scarcely unique in the Europe of the time. To the con­
trary, it is clear that the French situation was part of a larger 
general European crisis of the same period which troubled most 
states. In England, religious and political turmoil during the 
reigns of James I and Charles I indicated the breakdown of the 
Elizabethan Compromise and the onset of a constitutional crisis of 
the first order; this crisis climaxed in civil war in 1641. At the 
same time, severe political crises appeared in Denmark, Sweden, the 
Netherlands, and Spain. Open Spanish-Dutch warfare in the Nether­
lands was resumed in 1621 when the Twelve Years' Truce of 1609 
expired; the war in the Low Countries merged with the Bohemian Revolt 
of 1619 to become part of an all-European Thirty Years' War. Cata­
lonia, Naples, and Sicily flared into revolt during the 1640's, and
3
A complete bibliography of the reign of Louis XIII would be far 
too lengthy to present here. The best point to begin is with the an­
notated bibliography of Louis AndrS and Emile Bourgeois, Les Sources 
de l'histoire de France. XVII siecle (8 vols.; Paris, 1913-1934)•
The Catalogue de l'histoire de France's eleven original volumes 
(Paris, 1855-18?o7 and five supplemental volumes are indispensable 
for research among the printed sources held by the Bibllotheque 
Nationale. Also very useful are W. F. Church's "Publications on 
Cardinal Richelieu Since 1945," Journal of Modern History. XXXVII 
(December, 1965)1 421-44, and Jacques Lelievre's "Esquisse d'une 
bibliographie d’histoire du droit public frangais au XVII siecle," 
XVII siecle. Nos. 58-59 (1963)» 83-104. To these may be added the 
bibliographies provided by MariSjol, Henri IV et Louis XIII. Ex­
tensive bibliographies are also provided by Carl J. Burckhardt in 
Richelieu and His Age. Vol. II: Assertion of Power and the Cold War, 
trans. Bernard Hoy (New York, 1970), and Vol. Ill: Power Politics 
and the Cardinal's Death (New York, 1970). The first volume in this 
series does not include a bibliography. See also the sources listed 
by Georges MongrSdien in La JoumSe des dunes (Paris, 196l).
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as far away as Russia, upheaval and disorder prevailed in a general 
"time of troubles" associated with the foundation of the Romanov 
dynasty.
Amid the considerable discussion about the exact nature and 
meaning of the "crisis of the seventeenth century" which has appeared 
since the thesis of general crisis was first proposed in the 1950's, 
certain salient causes and symptoms have been above debate. His­
torians are now in agreement that the first half of the century was 
a period of pervasive and widespread economic depression in some 
way connected with the Price Revolution and shifting trade patterns 
of the last fifty years of the sixteenth century; a depression .in 
economic activity was continued and aggravated by the Thirty Years' 
War in Germany, by the collapse of Spain as a world power, and by
stagnation in Mediterranean trade which brought the decline of once 
h
prosperous Italian states.
4The thesis of a general seventeenth century crisis was first 
given coherent and comprehensive expression by E. J. Hobsbawm in "The 
General Crisis of the European Economy in the Seventeenth Century," 
Past and Present. nos. 5 and 6 (May and November, 1954). Since its 
initial appearance, Hobsbawm's thesis has been much elaborated and 
detailed in a vast body of literature. Hobsbawm's original article 
is included in a noteworthy collection of essays on the subject by 
H. R. Trevor-Roper, Roland Mousnier, J. H. Elliot, and others 
edited by T. H. Aston as Crisis in Europe, 1560-1660 (London, 1965). 
Additional evidence may be found in Jean Meuvret, Etudes d’histoire 
Sconomique. Cahiers des annales, no. 32 (Paris, 1971), and in Roland 
Mousnier, Fureurs paysannes: les paysans dans les rSvoltes du XVII6 
siecle (Prance. Russle, Chine) (Paris. 196?). The most comprehensive
statement of the nature and effects of the crisis in all areas of 
society, culture, government and economics can be found in Roland 
Mousnier, Le XVI et XVII siecles, 3rd ed. (Paris, i960). A 
critique of Western writing on the crisis from the Marxist stand­
point may be found in A. D. Lublinskaya, French Absolutism: The 
Crucial Phase, 1620-1629, trans. Brian Pearce (Cambridge. England. 
195877 pp. 4-81. See also the comments on the thesis of crisis 
made by J. H. Sherman in Government and Society in France, pp. 62-70.
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The seventeenth century depression was fundamentally economic 
in character, but it also had important political corollaries: it 
was inextricably tied to the working out of a new balance of power 
between the dynasties of Bourbon and Hapsburg as well as the 
emergence of what has been termed "the modern State," a form of 
monarchy in which royal governments enjoyed substantially more 
authority and effectiveness than ever before. Englishmen of the 
time knew the political crisis as a clash between royal prerogative 
and parliamentary rule; after a half century of tension, nine years 
of civil war, and the execution of a king, Parliamentary supremacy 
and limited monarchy triumphed. On the continent, governmental 
development took a different path. In Prance, the principles of 
monarchical authority were victorious over representative insti­
tutions, corporate and individual rights, and regional particularisms 
in what is conventionally termed an "age of absolutism." The 
Spanish Hapsburgs attempted to emulate the French model of central­
ization, but Olivares’ Union of Arms failed to weather revolts in 
Naples, Portugal, and Catalonia.'’ Disintegration of the German 
Empire during the Thirty Years’ War was confirmed at Munster and 
Westphalia. Though the Hapsburgs maintained a firm hold on the 
crown lands, they had to admit the permanent loss of the United 
Provinces which had emerged during the War as a great mercantile
^On the political turmoil which characterized the mid-century 
decade, see R. B. Merriman, Six Contemporaneous Revolutions (Oxford, 
1938)* Merriman was unable to fit the revolts in Naples, Catalonia, 
Portugal, the English and Dutch revolutions, and the Fronde into a 
common international pattern of cause and effect.
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power. As a result of these changes and others, after mid-century 
Prance asserted herself as the major European land power while the 
Dutch and English contested control of the seas.
In Prance prevalent European conditions were reflected in an 
era of popular uprisings which seem to have "been hoth a reaction to, 
and symptomatic of, general crisis conditions within the society, 
economy, and government of Louis XIII. Recent studies by Roland 
Mousnier and Boris Porschnev have confirmed that peasant revolt was 
endemic in the kingdom throughout the 1620*s, 1630’s, and 1640's; 
the same historians and their students have shown that disturbances 
in the countryside were often related to urban gmeutes (riots) and 
to resistance to royal policies on the part of peasants, townsmen, 
nobility, provincial assemblies, and even royal officers. The 
frequency and intensity of outbursts shows a general correlation 
with economic conditions as well as with the progress of absolutism 
and centralization during Louis’ reign. As early as 1617 and 1618, 
popular turmoil boiled to the surface each year in one part of the 
kingdom or the other; the frequency of these disturbances increased 
throughout the decade of the 1620’s to reach a crest in the period 
1637-1639. In November, 1623» there were popular riots lasting two 
days at Rouen; at Poitiers In 1624 urban rioters attacked the houses 
of royal officials with stones and firearms. In May, 1624, a more 
serious affair broke out around Figeac and Cahors in Guyenne where 
a peasant army looted and pillaged the countryside for days on end. 
In the years following 1625 such upheavals became commonplace. In 
1626 there were troubles at Troyes; in 1628 at Amiens and Laval; in
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I63O, a spasm of revolts shook Angers, Dijon, Caen, and Lyons, The 
decade of the l630's brought no relief, rather, the fury and mag­
nitude of gmeutes and .jacqueries increased. There were riots in 
Paris in 1631 over the imposition of a new aide on wine and in 1638 
over the non-payment of interest on the royal rentes. or bonds, and 
the rural revolts of the Croquants of Pgrigord in 1637 and the 
Norman Va-nu-pieds in 1639 were more serious than any preceding ones. 
In the uprising of the Croquants. for example, no less than 6>000 to 
7,000 men took up arms against the authorities, and in their final 
stand more than 1,000 were killed.^
The causes of disaffection were numerous and complex. Some of 
them certainly lay buried deep in the history of the country. Robert 
Mandrou, especially, has seen the tensions of Louis XIII's era as a 
product of the adjustment of "collective mentalities" to long duration 
changes in social conditions. For Mandrou, social conflict had two 
orientations: one a great "dialogue a trois voix among the noblesse 
d'gpge. the noblesse de robe, and the bourgeoisie marchande, the other
noland Mousnier* s Fureurs paysannes is the best general source 
on French rural revolt. See also the same author's "Recherches sur 
les soulevements populaires en France avant la Fronde," in La Plume. 
la faucille et le marteau. pp. 335-69; Boris Porschnev, Les Souleve­
ments populaires en France de 1623 a 164-8 (Paris, 1963); Monique 
Degame, "Etudes sur les soulevements provinciaux avant la Fronde: 
la rSvolte du Rouergue en 164-3," XVIIe siecle. no. 56 (1962), 3-18; 
Robert Mandrou, "Vingt ans apres, ou une direction de recherches 
fgcondes: les rSvoltes populaires en France au XVIIe siecle," Revue 
historique, CCXLII (July-September, 1969)> 29-4-0; J. H. Salmon, 
"Venality of Office and Popular Sedition in Seventeenth-Century France: 
a Review of a Controversy," Past and Present, no. 37 (July» 1967). 
21-4-3; Tapig, La France de Louis XIII et de Richelieu, pp. 200-07; 
Marigjol, Henri IV et Louis XIII. pp. 432-34-.
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a violent expression of popular upheaval in town and country.^ 
Weakened by the Wars of Religion, the old nobility found its 
dominant position increasingly embarassed by economic decline and 
threatened by the opportunities opened up to the bourgeoisie for 
social advancement into the newer noblesse de robe.® Continuing 
the theme of continuity with the past, Mandrou has also observed 
that the disturbances of the reign were not the first nor the last 
of such outbursts, and that it is therefore necessary to see them 
in a sequence of preceding troubles and those reaching at least 
to 1676. In brief, it is the long perspective which is important.
In addition to economic crisis, he maintains, historians of popular 
unrest
should be equally attentive to locations and cartography: the 
West, Normandy, Guyenne, the Center (Marche, Berry, Bourbonnais), 
there is the area most often touched, the most often afflicted 
by a continuity of troubles. Can one see here a consequence of 
the larger participation of these provinces, bordering the ocean, 
in the vigor of the "long l6th century": the ebbing of the years 
1620-1680 having provoked a more noticeable slump here than in 
more continental, more developed regions? But these zones of 
rural and urban agitation of the 17th century are also the 
provinces in whichgthe religious wars were most ardent in the 
preceding century.
Victor TapiS has also pointed out that popular unrest was rooted
deep in the collective psychology of the past:
In truth, there was scarcely a province in Prance which had not 
received from the past some traditions of civil war, some
7
Rgbert Mandrou, Classes et luttes de classes en Prance au dfbut 
du XVII siecle (Messina and Florence, I9S5J, p. 13.
8Ibid.. pp. 29-62.
9 ..Robert Mandrou, "Les Soulevements populaires et la sociSte 
fra^aise du XVII siecle," Annales: Economies, sociftfs, civili­
sations. XIV (1959), 761.
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because they had been Protestant, others because they had 
been Leaguers, and, going further back into history, Bur­
gundian, "Armagnac," or Breton. The slightest return of 
tranquillity or of peace effaced or contained these memories, 
but as soon as the ravages of misery broke out anew, these 
sore spirits were resurrected with the confused legends of 
the wars of other times.
As in past times of great distress, the failure of strong and 
able leadership during the regency encouraged civil disorder, 
especially among the great nobility who took the opportunity to 
raise their provinces against royal authority and among the 
Huguenots who saw a potential revocation of the Edict of Nantes 
in the flaccid policies of Marie de Medicis. Out of these motives 
and for mere private gain, armed bands crossed and criss-crossed 
large areas of the countryside throughout the second and third 
decades of the l600's. Whether carried out by peasants or princes, 
by rebels or royalists, the depredations of marauders accentuated 
the misery and hardship of the poor and the uncertainty of the 
times. Richelieu was able to bring the anarchy of a warring 
feudality and the rebellion of the Huguenots under control by 
1630, but after this time the kingdom was threatened by foreign 
Invasion. In 1636, the infamous "Corbie Year,” Spanish forces 
crossed the frontier, ravaging and pillaging to within ninety 
miles of the capital.
The role of economic causation and its relationship to the 
crisis of Louis’ reign is not yet fully explored or understood. The
10Tapi§, La France de Louis XIII et de Richelieu, p. 372.
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economic and demographic indicators available for the first half 
of the century are scanty and widely scattered; it is to be expected, 
too, that conditions varied greatly from year to year and from 
province to province. For these reasons, it is not surprising that 
the general French scene is as yet unclear. From the studies 
available at present, it appears that from 1615 the course and 
relationship of prices and wages were generally unfavorable to 
urban craftsmen and artisans. During the first third of the century, 
at least, prices were generally rising and wages lagged behind the 
rise. For the rural peasantry, the rise in prices may have meant 
prosperity to those with a disposable surplus of foodstuffs. It is 
more probable, however, that rising prices were a reflection of 
shortages and increasing demand linked to a rising population. The 
first half of the century was marked by frequent violent cyclical 
variations brought about by seasonal shortages and poor harvests. 
Such fluctuations were certainly characteristic of the entire agri­
cultural history of the Old Regime, but the amplitude and frequency 
of short-term oscillations were often abnormal during the first 
half of the 1600’s.11
The studies of Goubert for the Beauvais and Mousnier for the 
kingdom as a whole indicate that the French population was rising
13-For the general economic conditions of Louis' reign see the 
works previously cited in notes 3 and 4 and Pierre Goubert, Beauvais 
et le Beauvaisis de 1600 a 1730 (2 vols.; Paris, 1961).
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steadily until the decade of the l640's. In the Beauvais, for most 
parishes, the level of population reached a figure in the 16&0's 
that was not equaled until the beginning of the nineteenth century.
On the eve of the Fronde the total population of the kingdom was to 
reach or even surpass twenty million, a height that had not been 
attained since the fourteenth century. Between the fourteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, the French population had oscillated between 
a minimum of fifteen and a maximum of twenty millions; these limits 
were relatively fixed and were closely related to disease, famine, 
and the limited agricultural productivity of the French economy. By 
the era of Richelieu the demographic level may have outstripped 
production techniques, for as Mousnier maintains, "Prance is above 
all an agricultural country, and the agricultural technique of the 
times does not allow enough productivity [for population] to exceed
12the maximum level, nor is it regular enough to avoid abrupt jolts."
The seething unrest of Frenchmen is easily understood when the 
fiscal demands of the Crown and the distribution of the royal tax
12Roland Mousnier, "Etudes sur la population de la France au 
XVIIe siecle,” XVII siecle. no. 16 (1952;, 535* • See also Goubert, 
Beauvais et le Beauvaisls. passim; Pierre Goubert, "Recent Theories 
and Research in French Population Between 1500 and 1700," trans. 
Margaret Hilton, in Population and History, ed. D. V. Glass and 
D. E. C. Eversley (Chicago, 1965T7 pp. 5^7-73; Jean Meuvret, 
"Demographic Crisis in France from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth 
Century," trans. Margaret Hilton, in Population and History, pp. 
507-22. The conclusions of Mousnier and Goubert are reinforced by 
the findings of Jean Meuvret for the latter part of the seventeenth 
century in "Les Crises de subsistance et la demographie de la France 
d'Ancien RSgime," Etudes d*histoire Sconomique. Cahiers des annales, 
no. 32 (Paris, 197l), pp.*271-78.
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burden is considered. Henry IV and Sully had managed to accumulate 
a sizable surplus through careful direction of the finances, but 
Marie de Medicis abandoned their stewardship. Henry's nest egg was 
consumed a few years after his death, and the expenses of govern­
ment began to edge upward, a trend sustained after Louis' coup d'gtat 
of 1617. The costs of civil wars and campaigns against the Huguenots 
supported the rise during the 1620's; no sooner were these major out­
lays suspended than Richelieu began a costly involvement in inter­
national politics, secretly buying alliances, influence, and infor­
mation. After May 19, 1635, when France's war turned from cold to hot, 
it became necessary to conduct a financial campaign paralleling the 
military and diplomatic effort. The inevitable result was a dramatic 
escalation of revenues collected. After the figures supplied by 
Mallet, royal revenues averaged about 40,000,000 livres a year during 
the 1620’s. In 1632 this rose to 57,000,000 livres. becoming
72.000.000 in 1633 and 120,000,000 in 1634. In the critical year of 
1635, the total revenues collected amounted to no less than
208.000.000 livres. a figure dropping the next year to 108,000,000 and
stabilizing at about 90,000,000 livres per year until the end of the
reign. It should be noted that these revenues represent sums bons aux
trSsorlers de l'Spargne, that is to say, monies accounted for by the
central treasury. What sums beyond these were spent in unaccounted
ways for fortifications, military logistics, garrisoning of troops, and 
13so forth remain unknown.
13See Appendix I. Numerical data taken from the tables of Jean- 
Roland Mallet, Comptes rendus de 1* administration des finances du 
royaume de France pendant les onze demieres annfies du regne de
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The enormously increased taxation of the 1620's and 1630's was 
distributed inequitably among various social classes so that injustice 
was added to exaction. The taille. principal direct royal tax, fell 
almost exclusively on the peasantry. During the first three decades 
of the l600's, this tax remained virtually stable at a level of about
8.000.000 livres assessed under Henry IV. By 1633» however, the Crown 
found it necessary to increase the amount of the taille. and by 1637, 
the year of the Croquant revolt in PSrigord, the taille produced about
20.000.000 livres, or twice the amount it had during the 1620's. Much
the same was true of the indirect taxes which also bore heavily, though
not exclusively, on the rural and urban lower classes. Like the
taille. the aides. traites. entries, octrois. and gabelles remained
relatively constant until 1632, when they began to rise substantially.
The average amount collected through these indirect taxes during the
1630's was about one-third greater than the amount taken in each year 
14during the 1620's. Heavy taxes burdened the peasantry, but they 
also affected the landed nobility as well, for increased royal 
collections meant a decreased ability to pay the seigneurial dues. 
Except for this factor, the nobility and clergy remained largely 
exempt from levies. The important special case of taxes on the royal
Henri IV, le regne de Louis XIII. & soixante-clnq annSes de celul de 
Louis XIV TParis, 1789), pp. 198-212. The factor of monetary 
inflation is difficult to estimate but must be taken into account. 
D'Avenel, Richelieu et la monarchie absolue. II, Appendix IV, "Le 
Prix de la vie en France," 392-426, suggests that the livre lost about 
twenty-five percent of its value between 1600 and 1645.
14Mallet, Comptes rendus des finances, pp. 198-212.
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officers and on office holding will he considered later.^
The research of Roland Mousnier and Boris Porschnev and their 
students supports the probability that popular unrest was closely 
related to economic hardship and the burden of taxation by showing 
that the majority of risings began as an attack on royal fiscal agents 
which sometimes became a general clash between rich and poor. In the 
countryside revolt visually began with assaults on persons and property 
representing those who affirmed new taxes or exercised the office of 
Slu where these officials were newly introduced into pays d'gtats.~^  
Sometimes, as Porschnev has pointed out, the peasants attacked those 
persons or property representing any king of feudal oppression: on 
these occasions the seigneurs. their chateaux, its frui't trees or 
vines were the victims of peasant wrath. Much the same pattern could 
be discerned in urban areas. Symbols of municipal or royal authority 
or economic well-being associated with tax collections, such as the 
hotel de ville. greniers de sel. and the houses of royal officials, the
1-*See infra, pp. 141-45.
"^After 1627 the Crown attempted to introduce its own tax agents 
for the taille. the Slus, into the pays d’Stats of Dauphine, Bur­
gundy, Provence, and Languedoc. The reform, had it succeeded, would 
have eliminated the provincial rights of these provinces in matters 
of finance and gone far to introduce administrative uniformity 
throughout the kingdom. The reform, however, was maintained only in 
DauphinS, where the estates ceased to meet. Georges Pages, la Mon­
archic d’Ancien Regime en France de Henri IV a Louis XIV (Paris,
1928), p. 104; Marigjol, Henri IV et Louis XIII. pp. 402-06.
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17mayor, or tax assessors, were set upon.
Popular risings before the Fronde were, then, indicative of a 
profound economic and demographic crisis in French society. The 
causes of the crisis were complex, because natural factors inter­
acted with man-made ones to intensify the troubled nature of the 
times. Riot and rebellion were a response to increased taxation 
feeding the maw of internal and foreign war; they were also probably 
associated with long-term movements in prices and a crisis in the 
ability of gens de rien to eke out a subsistance; they were directly 
linked to a general crisis in government and society brought by the 
challenge of the Grown to local and individual rights and privileges. 
Roland Mousnier has shown that unrest provoked by such conditions 
cut across all class lines when, peasants followed their seigneurs 
into rebellion. In these instances, which Porschnev*s Marxist view 
cannot accommodate, the vertical ties of clientage, patronage, and 
mutual benefaction proved stronger than horizontal barriers of 
socio-legal division. The peasantry and artisans, most numerous 
and most touched by suffering, provided the dynamic for violence, 
but the nobility, and even ecclesiastics, were often indifferent to, 
and sometimes actively involved in, demonstrations of discontent.
In this crisis, the King could not even rely on his officials 
to enforce Crown policies. Mousnier, together with his students
17Mousnier, "Les Soulevements populaires avant la Fronde," 
in La Plume, la faucllle et le marteau. pp. 335-$+; Porschnev,
Les Soulevements populaires de 1^23 a 1648, passim; Degame,
"Les Soulevements provinciaux avant la Fronde," 3-18.
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Monique Degame and Ren§ Pillorget, have provided ample evidence 
to show that royal officials at all levels often incited and some­
times organized resistance to policies of absolutism and central­
ization. Frequently, it seems, when called upon to implement orders 
from the council or from intendants. the officers of the venal 
bureaucracy preferred to defend their own and local interests rather 
than execute their obligations to King and State.
At Aix-en-Provence in 1630 and 1631, when the royal government 
attempted to transform the province into a pays d1election, it was 
president Coriolis of the Parlement of Provence who, along with other 
officers of the court and bourgeois of the town, directed the revolt 
of the Cascavoeux. The revolt, which infected most of Provence during 
the winter of I63O, coincided with a period of poor harvests, plague, 
and the passage of troops into nearby La Rochelle and the duchy of 
Savoy. The Parlement of Aix was also particularly disturbed by the 
expiration of the paulette at the end of 1629; when lntendant Dreux 
d’Aubray arrived in the province to enforce establishment of the j§lus, 
one faction of the parlement headed by Coriolis and his nephew 
directed agitation and violence against the lntendant. Some of the 
rebels swore to cut their throats rather than see the Slus intro­
duced into the province; several houses of financiers were burned 
while the bourgeois garde de ville of Aix refused to march against 
the rioters."*"®
l8Ren§ Pillorget, "Les ’Cascavoeux*s L'Insurrection aixoise 
de 1’automne I63O," XVII siecle. no. 6^  (196 )^, 3-30; Mousnier,
"Les Soulevements populaires," pp. 355-56.
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Many of the same conditions could be found at Moulins in the
summer and fall of 1640. A royal tax collector had been murdered
and his money stolen. In quelling the ensuing disorder the governor,
the comte de Saint-GSran, encountered continual difficulty with local
municipal and royal officials. In writing Chancellor SSguier on
August 11, Saint-GSran accused the lieutenant-gSnSral of the
PrSsldial of Moulins, who was also mayor, of having abandoned him
at a moment of need. On August 15, the governor wrote Seguier
again to say he had been obliged to imprison an Schevin of the city
who had let a rioter escape from his custody. He accused the judges
of the prSsidial of favoring those in revolt, and he asked for
commissaires to investigate and prosecute the affair. This was done.
An lntendant. Humbert de Chaponay, was sent to Moulins to deal with
the guilty. He informed SSguier after his arrival that it would be
necessary for him to judge the guilty himself "because of favors
and protection that all these murderers and thieves receive on the
part of the principal officers and magistrates of this city who openly
favor their crimes against the will of the King plainly manifested to 
19them." Chaponay added that he hoped to administer a "severe and
exemplary chastisement" to the culpable to ensure the safety and 
20security of the King’s subjects. Whether or not Chaponay had his
1 M^ousnier, Lettres et mSmolres adressSs au chanceller SSguier.
I, 481, from B.N. Ms. fr. 17374, fol. 72-73, De Chaponay in Moulins 
to SSguier, January 23, 1641.
20Ibid. See also Mousnier, "Les Soulevements populaires,"
P. 357.
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way with the troublemakers is not recorded.
The same pattern of official instigation and bourgeois co­
operation was found in many other cases, even among the sovereign 
courts of the provinces. As early as July 15, 1630, garde des sceaux 
Michel de Marillac could write concerning troubles at Laval and 
Angers that
"I do not think it would be possible to imagine anything more 
prejudicial to the authority of the King, or to his affairs, 
especially in the present state £of affairs^. All are filled 
with sedition in Prance. The parlements punish no one for it. 
The King has given judges for these trials and the -parlement 
stops the execution of these judgments, and consequently the 
seditions are authorized. I do not know whether to hope or to 
fear from that, seeing the frequency of these upheavals, of 
which almost each day brings us a new opinion."
Marillac's accusations of parlementalre indifference to sedition were
not without cause, at least among the provincial parlements. The
revolt of the Parlement of Aix in I63O-I63I has already been
mentioned. At Dijon in 1630 the Parlement of Burgundy bore a heavy
responsibility in the uprising of the Lanturelus; at Bordeaux in
1635 the bourgeois guard stood aside while the parlement incited
disorder. Involvement of the sovereign courts was obvious, too, in
the troubles at Rouen in 1639 where the attitude of the parlement
was such that the King interdicted its functions, along with those 
22of the Cour des aides.
better of Michel de Marillac to the King or to Richelieu, 
dated July 15, 1630, and quoted by Georges Pages in "Autour du 
'Grand Orage's Richelieu et Marillac, deux politiques," in Revue 
historic ue. CLXXIX (1937), 72-73, citing Archives des Affaires 
Etrangeres, M§m. et documents; Prance, T. 795bis. fol. 290.
22Mousnier, "Les Soulevements populaires," pp. 356-57; MariSjol, 
Henri IV et Louis XIII. pp. 431-34; TapiS, La France de Louis XIII et 
de Richelieu, pp. 368-83.
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Monique Degarne has described the interaction of royal officials 
and their common animosity towards the intendants in the revolt of the 
Croquants of Rouergue in the summer of 16*4-3. The causes of the up­
heaval in Rouergue were much the same as elsewhere* plague, poor har­
vests, rising taxation, and inequitable division of the taille 
appear prominently here. The reports of intendants plus lists of those 
arrested indicate that most participants in the troubles were ordinary 
peasants, vine workers, laborers, artisans, and tradesmen, A 
sprinkling of nobles was also involved. The rebellion in Ville- 
franche-en-Rouergue had the support of the presidial of the city 
and a faction which centered about the city fathers; the local court, 
together with the city magistrates, were suspended from their 
functions by royal order after July, 1643. The prgsldial did not 
content itself with inciting disorder in Villefranche, for reports 
of the Intendants show that it maintained a constant liaison with the 
nearby Parlement of Toulouse. That parlement. second oldest and most 
prestigious after that of Paris, showed itself thoroughly sympathetic 
to the rebel cause. On June 5» conselller Juillard reminded the 
court of seizures made in enforcing the taille. The fault for local 
disorders, he said, lay not with local officials but with the 
exactions of the intendants. At least some of the judges addressed by 
Juillard were hardly disinterested observers of these intendants and 
the collection of the taille. being themselves landlords who had not 
paid the taille for years. This evasion was patently illegal in 
Languedoc, a pays de taille rgelle where all landholders were liable
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for payment. Following Juillard.’s speech the court issued an arret
which suspended all commissions not verified in the parlement.
Conscious of the undisguised hatred thus demonstrated towards him,
intendant Jacques Charrenton wrote SSguier on June 29 that
"Messieurs of the Parlement of Toulouse are proposing to 
make great complaints against me out of hatred for the views 
I have given His Majesty concerning that which they have done 
contrary to the authority and service of the King. I heg you 
to consider that they direct it more towards the intendancy 
than towards my person, angered at having a controller of 
their actions so near and so exact."
Degame concluded that several other groups of royal officers such
as the trSsoriers de France showed an animosity no less great in
■ok
regard to the intendant for similar reasons.
Several general reasons can immediately be identified for the 
behavior of the judges in the Parlement of Toulouse as well as other 
royal officials found in collusion with resistance to the King’s 
authority. All of these causes had an ancient common ground in the 
establishment of the royal bureaucracy during the fifteenth and six­
teenth centuries, in the introduction of venality and the paulette, 
and in subsequent effort of the Grown to tax its officers as well as 
to supervise their growing independence after 1610. In recovering 
from the debilitation brought by the Hundred Years' War, the 
Renaissance monarchy had strengthened its ties with Frenchmen
23 %
Degame, "Les Soulevements provinciaux avant la Fronde,”
18, quoting B.N. Ms. fr. 18378, fol. 141.
24Ibid. See also the primary documents provided by Mousnier 
in Lettres et mSmolres adressgs au chancelier SSguier. II, Appendix 
III, "MSmoires sur diverses seditions, ’ 1112-132.
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everywhere in the kingdom by gradually assembling an elaborate
25bureaucracy to conduct provincial administration in the king's name.
Quite typical of this process was the fashioning of machinery to
collect deniers extraordlnalres such as the taille. which were now,
more than ever, imposed by regal right outside the domain. By the
end of the sixteenth century, this financial machinery extended
through several levels, from the Slus at the grassroots through the
receveurs at provincial level to the four intendants des finances in
P a r i s . A t  the same time, the Crown further consolidated its grip
on the countryside by erecting a sophisticated judicial apparatus
which was utilized not only for the execution of royal law but also
27for administrative tasks in conjunction with noble governors. 
Particularly noteworthy among these tasks was the court's function of 
disseminating knowledge of new royal legislation within their juris-
25•^ "Renaissance Monarchy” is here used to encompass the reigns 
between Charles VII (l422-l46l) and Henry III (1574-1589). The 
qualities of the Renaissance Monarchy and its bureaucratization of 
Prance are discussed by J. Russell Major in Representative Insti­
tutions in Renaissance Prance (Madison, Wisconsin, I960),pp. 3-20, 
and by Christopher Stocker in "Office as Maintenance in Renaissance 
France," Canadian Journal of History. VI (1971).
^Certain provinces, those deemed pays d'Stats, remained out­
side the region within which the royal financial officials operated. 
In these, collection of the taille and other impositions royaux 
were made through the estates of the province. In all areas of the 
kingdom, indirect taxes such as the gabelles. aides, and traltes 
were never collected by royal officials but were farmed under con­
tract to traltants and feralers whose private agents collected in 
the king's name. These exceptions to the regular financial apparatus 
limited its operations but in no way affected its original raison 
d'etre.
27
Gaston Zeller has postulated that Renaissance administration 
was largely effected through the combined activities of the 
gouverneurs and the provincial parlements. See Zeller, "L'Adminis­
tration monarchique avant les intendants."
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dictions, ensuring that subordinate courts as well as subjects were 
kept abreast of declarations, edicts, and arrets posited as law.
Like the Parlement of Paris, the nine provincial parlements put down 
brigandage, regulated commerce, ministered to the poor, and dealt 
with myriad details of fairs, markets, bridges, roads, education, and 
health within their ressorts. The administration of these functions 
made the royal courts, especially the parlements. vital links between 
the centralized royal authority in Paris and the various provinces 
that made up the kingdom.
During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the royal bureau­
cracy had demonstrated its worth to king and country. It had 
accumulated numbers large enough to make Prance the most thoroughly 
bureaucratized of the great European states while establishing a 
reputation for loyalty and effectiveness in furthering the king’s 
interests.^ Beyond this, the establishment of a regular civil 
service had helped fill the royal treasury, provided a means of 
maintenance for Crown servants and clients, and had laid down a 
ready path for social, advancement through an otherwise restricted 
social system. As long as the Renaissance monarchs respected local 
privileges and customs, sought to impose a modicum of taxes, and
28ln 1505 the royal bureaucracy— officers as well as clerks, 
sergeants, notaries, and miscellaneous agents— counted about 12,000 
members in a nation of 15.000,000 inhabitants and 480,000 square 
kilometers, or one official for each 1,250 inhabitants and for each 
forty square kilometers. Major, Representative Institutions in 
Renaissance France, p. 5. This figure had risen to about 40,000 
by the early seventeenth century, or one official for every four 
hundred subjects in a kingdom of about the same extent. Moote, 
Revolt of the Judges, p. 6.
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associated their central authority with decentralized provincial 
institutions, the royal bureaucracy proved highly effectual. Unfor­
tunately for the interests of Louis XIII and Richelieu, however, the 
civil service policies and governmental institutions which had proven 
sufficient In the Renaissance Monarchy showed themselves to be of 
limited value, even restrictive and ennervating, to royal authority 
in an age of absolutism. The helter-skelter pyramind of courts, 
bureaus, officers, and jurisdictions piled up since medieval times 
had quite adequately answered the limited needs and objectives of 
Renaissance rule, but this jumble was less amenable and often antag­
onistic to exactions demanded of-it by Louis and Richelieu.
What accounts for the independence exhibited by royal officials 
during Louis' reign? At the outset it should be noted that there was 
not, and could not be, any universal explanation. The bureaucracy 
was far from monolithic. The interests of an §lu in Orleans were 
vastly different from those of a president in the Parlement of 
Brittany, and both had little in common with a secretaire du rol 
in Paris. True, all of the officers could claim to participate in 
the public power of the Crown, but real uniformity ended there. The 
entire body of officials was broadly split vertically along func­
tional lines into financial and judicial officers. Both categories 
were fissured irregularly across horizontal lines of power, prestige, 
tradition, and anclennetS. Embedded in the diverse mass were curious 
anomalies like the mattres des requetes. presumably magistrates but 
just as often fulfilling the role of administrators. Almost all of
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the officers were touched by the paulette, which represented their
common interest in office holding. Yet even the paulette had its
exceptions and exemptions. A few officers were still outside its
regime in the seventeenth century. Others, like the sovereign judges,
were so prestigious and so powerful politically that they were able
to escape many of its more onerous aspects. Despite this mSlange
of various identities among the officers, some common factors for
29opposition to royal policies can be suggested.
Part of the answer lies in the consistently ad hoc policies 
the Crown pursued in instituting, organizing, and recruiting its civil 
servants. In multiplying the number of parlements, for example by 
creating the Parlement of Normandy out of the former ducal exchequer, 
or by making that of Burgundy out of the erstwhile ducal court, the 
Crown almost inevitably elevated pre-existing local institutions to 
the status of royal parlements.^ In so doing, kings successfully 
flattered local ambitions, eased the transition to centralization, 
and seemingly created stronger bonds with the province, but the 
particularist traditions of the courts so elevated were actually only 
given royalist trappings rather than truly transmuted by their 
assumption of the king's name and seals. The personnel of the 
provincial courts continued to be drawn in large measure from the
29On this question see especially Moote, "The French Crown Versus 
its Financial and Judicial Officials" and the same author's Revolt of 
the Judges, pp. 3-63.
^°See supra, p. k6, n. 10.
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locality; the law practiced before such courts continued to be as much 
the local custom as the royal ordinances. The same paradoxical 
assimilation of local offices by royal personnel had infiltrated other 
parts of the bureaucracy by the l600's. The glus. originally medieval 
agents locally designated by the various diocese to collect subsidies 
they had granted the king, had been integrated into the royal bureau­
cracy during the fourteenth century as the most humble financial 
31agents of the nays d*Election. Sometimes royal offices had resulted
from other ad hoc circumstances. The prSvots and baillis, for example,
had originated as independent commissioned delegates of the king,
wholly under his control and at his disposal. These commissions had
gradually been subverted into regular heritable offices by the
fifteenth century, usually being held as honorary sinecures by local 
32gentlemeh. When the interest of these officers conflicted with 
that of the Crown, it is hardly surprising that regional ties, 
familial orientation, material values, or customary law sometimes 
proved more tantalizing than allegiance to a distant king.
Self-interest and independent attitudes among all officials were 
greatly encouraged by traditional mores of office holding in 
Renaissance France. Since medieval times, offices had been distributed 
by king and noble alike among loyal retainers, servants, and clients.
^Marion, Dlctionnalre des institutions. p. 198; Fawtier and Lot, 
Les Institutions royales. p. 276; Rodolphe Dareste, ia Justice admin­
istrative en France. 2nd ed., rev. and comp, by Pierre Dareste 
(Paris, 1898), pp. 39-42.
■^Marion, PictipmiairR des Institutions, pp. 32, 453; Fawtier 
and Lot, Les Institutions royales. pp. 141-44; 148, 194-96; Dufey, 
Hlstoire des -parlemens de France. I, 5»
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The understood intention was that the recepient should exploit the 
position for personal and familial ends, i.e., for his maintenance. 
Salaries were usually low or non-existent, hut ample opportunities 
existed for the officer to compensate himself through legal fees, 
court costs, or charges for his public services. Sometimes this 
meant that the discharge of official obligations would be wanting, 
or at other times excessive, but disadvantages of the system were 
held to be of little consequence when placed alongside advantages 
accruing to the donor. Offices were a convenient and honorable 
bequest, suitable for nobleman as well as commoner, and the gift of
them a highly satisfactory means of acquiring followers devoted to
33one's service.
As survivance established itself, so too did the tendency for 
a family to capture a royal office and regard it as part of its patri­
mony. During the sixteenth century, the distribution of offices 
gradually became "royalized" and subjected to sale rather than gift. 
The independence of functionaries was further fortified after l6(& 
by the introduction of the paulette. which simplified and sanctioned 
centuries-old practices. Through the purchase of office, individuals 
and families found rich opportunities for public service, social 
advancement, and material reward, but at the same time kings also 
came more and more to understand that the regalian right to create 
offices had a potential to produce revenue even after posts had been
33Stocker, "Office as Maintenance," passim.
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sold and seemingly alienated. Officers, in short, could he taxed 
for their cherished privileges.
The net result of Renaissance practices and the introduction of 
venality was the creation of a "new feudality" based on office 
holding, a theme first developed by Georges Pages in 1928 when he 
wrote that
royalty had long availed itself of officers in order to divest 
the feudality of public power, to leave the one-time masters 
of the soil nothing but the privileges of honor and useful 
rights. But the officers did not work solely for royalty.
They had come to form, by their own admission, a semi-indepen­
dent body which doubtless lent its support to the Crown, but 
which also assumed to know royalty's interests even better than 
it knew them itself, and thought to enlighten and control it.
Then venality of officea— it, too, the work of kings— assured 
heredity to them. A little later, royalty perceived that it 
had reconstituted by its own hand a kind of new feudality.
Roland Mousnier returned to the same expression in summarizing the
situation in the civil service at the beginning of the sixteenth
century:
Officers of all categories are recruited especially among the 
notable and rich families of each locality. If one recalls 
that certain families monopolized several offices, where they 
are well enough rooted to provide for them like a patrimony, 
and if one considers that they join the authority given by 
riches and long residence with the investment of royal authority, 
the part of public power that they possess, then perhaps one 
could conclude that these families share with the king the 
administration of the kingdom, that royal authority is greatly 
tempered by ownership . . . that the kingdom is under the sub- 
ordination-of rich families and that it looms as a new form of 
feudality.
At least as late as the Mars of Religion, however, the "new feudality"
34Pages, La Monarchle d'Ancien RSgime en France, pp. 123-24. 
■^Mousnier, La VgnalltS des offices. p. 33.
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worked for, instead of against, royal interests. Until this time 
the admission of proprietary rights of office holders was a minor 
matter in comparison with the revenues returned. And perhaps equally 
important during troubled times like those endured by the last Valois, 
the "new feudality" tended to exclude private parties from the dis­
tribution of royal offices for their own advantage and profit.^
Thus by the second decade of the l600’s, the French bureaucracy 
contained within itself diverse and not always harmonious possi­
bilities. In the past it had usually served its royal masters well. 
During the fifteenth and especially during the sixteenth centuries, 
the bureaucracy had become an acknowledged and accessible path for 
upward social mobility. It was a useful instrument for the diffusion 
of royal orders and a potential source of revenues. The Crown 
recognized its need for servants, as well as the necessity of re­
warding and providing for these servants, but it chose to associate 
them with, rather than to separate them from, a gnawing fiscal 
appetite. The venal system worked well enough for both parties as 
long as officials were not required to unduly violate their local, 
kindred, or propertied interests.
The latent possibilities for insubordination which slumbered in 
the venal bureaucracy were awakened to active widespread resistance 
when shaken by the crisis of Louis' reign. The first symptoms of 
an involvement by the officialdom in the crisis appeared in 1614
^Stocker, "Office as Maintenance," 42-43.
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when, after a general assault on venality by the clergy and nobility 
in the Estates General, it seemed that the Crown might act to 
suppress the paulette. Unnerved by this possibility, the sovereign 
courts launched a cacophony of protests. Deputations from the Parle- 
ment of Paris saw the King on January 2, 1615, to be followed two 
days later by deputies from the narlements of the provinces. Under 
pressure from the officers, threatened by overtures made to the Paxle- 
ment by the prince de Cond§, and uncertain as to how to replace the 
lost revenues of the Parties casuelles. Marie decided to delay 
suppression of the naulette until 1618
By 1618, however, Louis had seized the reins of government
from his mother, and for personal reasons he decided to allow the
droit annuel to lapse. On January 15, 1618, an arret du Consell
revoked the annuel and dispensations from the forty days clause.
A storm of remonstrances from the Parlement and the Chambre des
comptes of Paris ensued, but Louis held firm. Usually pious and
Idealistic, Louis felt obliged to honor promises made to the Estates
General three years before; furthermore, the suppression of venality
appealed to his sense of justice and thus to the well-being of the
kingdom. Eternally jealous of his regal rights, too, the freedom
to dispose of offices fitted in well with Louis' concept of his 
38kingly obligations.
-^Mousnler, La VSnalitS des offices, pp. 275-76.
38Ibid.. pp. 281-82.
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This kind, of royal idealism, however, was destined to survive 
just two and a half years. The revolt of the Queen Mother in 1618, 
followed by religious civil wars, inaugurated an era of growing 
deficits in the balance of royal revenues which compelled a restor­
ation of the droit annuel. After 1624, with a drift towards abso­
lutism at home and military involvement abroad, fiscal exigencies 
became pressing, then imperative. At first the Crown reacted to 
these pressures as it had at similar times in the past. It raised 
taxes, floated loans, debased the currency, and finally sought 
refuge in still more extraordinary measures. During the 1630's 
the monarchy came to the end of its financial rope, and swinging 
over the pit of bankruptcy, its fiscal policies became more and more 
irregular. A study of Appendices I-III will indicate why these 
fiscal techniques poisoned the rapport between the Crown and its 
servants. Between 1604 and 1620 (with the exception of the period 
1618-1619), the paulette had represented a regularized tax on the 
officers (the droit annuel) amounting to one-sixtieth of the assessed 
value of the office; at the same time the creations of office 
remained relatively restrained so that total income from the Parties 
hovered around eight to ten percent of royal income. During the 
1620's, however, the Crown discovered that it could effectively wring 
its own bureaucracy for funds after additions to the taille and 
indirect taxes on the peasantry could no longer be countenanced. It 
did this primarily through a combination of adroit management of the
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paulette, forced loans from the officers, and creations of office.39
Recourse to these singular practices hegan to manifest itself 
after the rebellions of 1618-1620. In exchange for renewal of the 
paulette privilege, in July, 1620, the officers were required to 
advance the Crown five percent of the value of their office within 
nine months and one percent annually thereafter for the remaining 
eight years of the agreement. The initial five percent loan would 
be returned to the officers as a deduction made against another flat 
fee of twelve and one-half percent due at first resignation, tech­
nically for the privilege of survlvance. Resistance to these un­
precedented terms was too great, however; the officers, led by the 
sovereign courts, refused to pay. Adjustments had to be made. In 
February, 1621, the sovereign courts, maitres des requetes. and 
trSsorlers de France were satisfied by an agreement giving them the 
right of heritability upon payment of a droit annuel of one-sixtieth 
and a resignation tax of twelve and one-half percent. In compen­
sation for losses so engendered, the Crown raised the exactions 
levied on lesser officials.. This discriminatory treatment toughened 
the resistance of the lesser officials so that a final settlement for 
them was not arrived at until March, 1621. At that time, judicial 
officials below the sovereign courts were subjected to an immediate 
loan of three percent and other officials five percent. All were 
liable to a resignation tax of twelve and one-half percent. The 
officers accepted these terms, and the custom of negotiating the
39Ibld.. pp. 393-415, 420-27, 645-63.
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terms of the -paulette was horn.
Extortionate techniques were revived in 1630-1631 when the 
Crown again elicited huge sums through manipulation of the -paulette 
and hy threats to abolish survivance all together. When all agree­
ments were eventaully completed after more than two years of nego­
tiation, the officers of finance had been squeezed for a loan of 
twenty-five percent. The highest judges received the same prefer­
ential gratuity that they had been granted in 1621, while those from 
the -prSsidlaux and lower courts were forced to pay seventeen to 
twenty percent in loans plus the usual droit annuel of one-sixtieth. 
These dealings proved to be so profitable and the demands of war so 
great that the contractual term of nine years was not allowed to run 
its course. In 1636 the agreements of I63O-I632 were scrapped, and 
all functionaries except the Parlement of Paris were asked to make 
an immediate payment of the droit annuel due across the next six 
years.^ Once again, discriminatory treatment was utilized to split 
the magistrature across its horizontal layers to prevent a unified 
resistance from developing. The sovereign courts were exempted from
any advance; other officers were assessed various amounts during the
42course of complex bargains effected after 1637*
40Ibid., pp. 284-91.
^The Parlement was granted the -paulette through a- special 
concession in connection with the agreement to register some edicts. 
See infra, p. 522.
^^Housnier, la Vgnalltg des offices, pp. 291-301* Mousnier 
has described the exact requirements presented on each occasion that 
the paulette was renewed during the 1620’s and 1630's.
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While dangling the -paillette before its officials, the Crown also 
extracted funds from the upper echelons of its financial officials 
by forcing them to lend money in exchange for salary increases or 
for the right to collect higher taxes. The officer's increased income 
was considered to represent interest on a loan to the Crown capi­
talized at ten to fifteen percent. The result was the generation of 
large sums. For example, in 1637 the receveurs des tallies had to 
accept 250,000 livres in hereditary salary increases; among them the
receveurs had to collectively remit 3»500,000 livres to the 
43treasury. The wage increases were compulsory; the officers had 
either to accept them or to see their offices suppressed. Having 
once contributed a lump sum to the treasury, the officers' woes were 
not over, because old salaries as well as increases were usually far 
in arrears. Moreover, the salaried interest returned on offices, 
never very large, was further eroded by a reduction of one-fourth 
universally applied to the wages of all royal officials in l639> 1640, 
and 1641, a cut which rose to three-eighths in 1642-1643.^
Throughout the crisis years of the 1620's and 1630's, the Crown 
also expanded the practice of creating hundreds of new offices for 
sale. Because no complete lists of civil servants exist for the first
^Ibld.. p. 412.
44Ibid., pp. 455-62. These efforts to cut costs were applied 
to the sovereign courts. See B.N. Ms. Melanges de Colbert 326, 
fols. 2-14v , for reductions made in the pensions, special salaries, 
and gratuities given the judges of the Parlement during the early 
1640's.
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half of the l600's and because of suppressions, modifications, and
unsold offices, it is impossible to accurately estimate either the
total number of royal officials or the exact additions to their ranks
during Richelieu's ministry. Even French authority Mousnier has
contented himself on this point by saying that "it is certain that
the number of offices was very great,” and that "it is difficult to
know it [the number] with precision."^ Nevertheless, it is plain
that sales of office were crucial to royal finances during the l630's,
for between the years 1627 and 1642 there were no less than one
46hundred forty-five creations of offices. Most of these acts pro­
vided for the sale of several offices, created wholly new insti­
tutions, or established entire categories of new positions. The 
very substantial yield from these operations is shown in Appendix 
III. In 1630, creations of new offices brought in twenty percent 
of royal income; in 1633» twenty-five percent; in 1636, nineteen 
percent; in 1642, six and one-third percent.^
Royal officers feared and opposed new creations as eroding their 
own investment. The effects of this policy of venality seem at first 
to contradict these fears, for all during the first thirty-five years 
of the century there was a steady rise in the value of almost all
^Mousnier, La Vgnalltg des offices, p. 128.
^Ibld.. pp. 130-32.
47'For the derivation of these figures, see notes to Appendices
I-III.
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offices, high or low. A twelve-fold rise in the prices of offices
in the Paris Parlement during the epoch 1597-1635 has already been 
48noted. It is interesting, though, to observe that at Paris the
price of offices did stabilize for a time after 1635• The price of
a conselllership was 120,000 livres in 1635 and the same in 1637;
perhaps this was due to a large creation of twenty conseillers in
December, 1635- In the Parlement of Rouen a similar relationship
between the prices of a conseillership and external factors can be
traced through a continuous series of reliable figures:
1593 7,000 livres 1634 80,000
1622 40,000 " 1636 79,000
1626 66,000 1637 85,000
1628 68,000 1640 67,000
1629 70,000 1641 25,000
1631 74.000 1642 55,000
1633 84,000 1643 62,500 livres
Mousnier believes that at Rouen the prices of offices were influenced
by new creations and by the politics of the paulette. The dip in-
prices after 1633 could be attributed to threats of creations in
1633 and 1635, and there was a recovery in 1637 due to a reduction
in newly created offices and the prolongation of the droit annuel
for six years under the generous conditions of 1604. The fall in
price after 1640 could be accounted for by the interdiction of the
court after the Va-nu-pleds affair of 1639 and by the creation of
49forty-six new conseillers and six presidents in 1641. On the other
48See supra, p. 35*
^Mousnier, La Vgnalltg des offices, p. 361.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
149
hand, there are also figures to show that the value of two offices 
growing in political significance in Richelieu's government, those 
of the maitres des requites and the secretaires d'Etat. escalated 
without check during the first four decades of the l600's. Prom 
1621 to 1642, the price of an office in the corps of mattres des 
requites went from 102,000 to 180,000 livres; the extremely influ­
ential office of secretaire d'Etat attained 180,000 livres in 1608, 
350,000 in 1622, and 700,000 in 1643.5° For the less important, hut 
far more numerous, offices comprising the hulk of the bureaucracy 
Mousnier gives few figures because few continuous series are 
available. He suggests, however, from fragmentary evidence that 
"it is possible that they increased much less in price, and that the 
price of certain ones, especially in the category of offices of 
judicature, diminished."^ Mousnier concluded by asking, "Is there 
not a contradiction between the great heights we have found, which
implies great demand, and certain traces of slump that we have 
52encountered?"^ Nothing of the sort, he says, because
height and slump do not concern the same offices or, for the 
same offices, are not produced under the same circumstances. 
Those of the conseillers of the narlements. in particular, 
increase in price since they are the least undermined by 
edicts of creation, and the most favored by the conditions 
of the fdroit] annuel. They also contract as soon as the king 
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officers enter conflict with the king, sales slow down or 
cease. There is no contradictions there are different con­
ditions, and it is always necessary ...to take into account the 
times, the places, and the events.
All of the above evidence suggests that the combined operations 
of the Parties casuelles became steadily more important as a source 
of revenue for the Grown as Richelieu's ministry progressed. Further 
study may show that along with the greatly expanded operations of the 
traltants. fermiers. and financiers, the wholesale effort to tax the 
bureaucracy was part of the transition to the financial establishment 
of the early modern State in France. By 1600 the great private 
Renaissance banking houses had been ruined; in any case their capacity 
would have been sorely strained by the demands of the Thirty Years'
War. Certainly the ordinary tax base of the monarchy was inadequate, 
falling as it did upon a basically inelastic agrarian economy whose 
productivity was limited by the techniques of the times. Perhaps 
during the first half of the seventeenth century new national systems 
of credit were being organized in which tax farmers and royal officials 
together supplied the government with the vast sms of ready money it
tjL
required.
Without pursuing these possibilities, however, other conclusions
53Ibid.
54 e pA thesis supported by Mousnier in Les XVI et XVII slecles.
p. 168. No satisfactory study presently exists of the financial 
operations of Louis XIII's government. Some promising beginnings 
have been made by Julian Dent in Crisis in Financet Crown. Fina.np.iers. 
and Society in Seventeenth Century France (Newton Abbot, England, 
1973XSee also AndrS Chaleur, "Le Role des traitants dans 1*admin­
istration financiere de la France de 1643 a 1653," XVIIe siecle, no. 
65 (1964), 16-49.
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appear reasonably justified. Squeezed by loans and threatened by 
the loss of the investment, the officials of Louis XIII's France 
found themselves drawn towards an attitude of evasion, corruption, 
insubordination, and even connivance at insurrection. The attraction 
was made all the easier by the assault on Renaissance traditions of 
independent, exploitative office holding which were remote from 
modem conceptions of dutiful obedience among civil servants. In 
effect. Louis and Richelieu pressured not only the traditional feudal 
independence of the noblesse d'Sptje but also the "new feudality” of 
the Renaissance bureaucracy. And, as with the monarchy's reduction 
of les grands, the objective was never the destruction of an estate 
but its subjection to royal will and royal needs.
As has been seen the French bureaucracy was far from being a 
compact, uniform, homogeneous group. Hence, the effects of royal 
policy and the tactics of bureaucratic opposition were necessarily 
as varied as the officers' duties, powers, location, and opportunities. 
Magistrates at all levels largely had to content themselves with ju­
dicial retribution— presentation of remonstrances, delay in verifi­
cation of edicts, contrary decisions, procrastination in receiving 
new colleagues, and, upon extreme provocation, going on judicial 
strike. Reduced salaries and heavier taxes might be made up to a 
degree through increases in the Spices (court costs) and other 
judicial fees paid by litigants. As a result the power and impact 
of resistance among lesser judicial officials was of correspondingly 
less consequence than among the sovereign courts, especially the
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sovereign courts of Paris.
Financial officials, on the other hand., found greater chance 
to recoup their losses through shady dealings, a factor that the 
Crown itself liked to take advantage of when assessing the droit 
annuel. survivance dues, and forced loans. Other types of official 
behavior were also incomptable with the needs of the royal adminis­
tration. Elus. receveurs. trgsorlers-ggngraux. and trgsoriers de 
France sometimes reacted to royal pressures by delaying the assess­
ment of vitally needed taxes or by contriving a variety of mal­
versations. Friends, neighbors, kin, and the locally powerful or 
rich were treated with favoritism; the poor and unprivileged suffered 
the consequences of official rapacity. In normal times, behavior of 
this sort was more or less acceptable, but it rapidly became in­
tolerable when it short-changed the treasury or stimulated popular 
revolt.
What was perhaps typical of the behavior of some was reported
to Chancellor Sgguier by lntendant De la Fertg from Mortagne (Perche)
in August, 16361
In the execution of the commission which it has pleased you 
to give me . . .  I have uncovered the greatest thefts on the 
widest scale and in the most arrogant fashion which I have 
ever heard of, because I think that in this Election £of Perche^ 
they have stolen more than one hundred thousand 6cus in various 
years. The complaints-of poor people and the proof have come 
to me from all sides. 5
lntendant Alexandre de Seve, in Auvergne, could report that he had
found the accounts of several receveurs "in such disorder that some-
^Mousnier, Lettres et mSmoires adressgs au chancelier Sgguier. 
I, 29^ , from B.N. Ms. ft. 17372, fol. 152r , De la Fertg in Mortagne 
to Sgguier, August 7, 1636.
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times it has been necessary to tour the parishes in order to get at
the truth," and that he had found an embezzlement of 25»000 livres
in a single account which had been examined by the Ghambre des
comptes.^ And in an edict of May, 1635» the King denounced the
attitude of the staffs making up his provincial bureaux des finances:
For some years, they [the trgsoriers-ggngraux^ ] have made them­
selves so obnoxious in the execution of our edicts and com­
missions that it seems that they want to directly oppose and 
frustrate them, from which we have received a very great 
prejudice to our affairs by the delay which they bring to 
them.'5'
The edict went on to outline a shuffling of personnel in the bureaux 
des finances for each of the ggnSralitSs along with the addition 
of new officers called lntendants-ggngraux.
Though a common front among the officers was unlikely, the 
capacity of the civil service to obstruct royal policies remained 
enormous. Evidently something more them mere reform in existing 
institutions or periodic manipulation of the paulette were required 
to deal with the complex crisis conditions of the 1630's, and in fact
56Ibid., 618, from B.N. Ms. fr. 17381, fols. 25-26, De Seve 
in Riom (upper Auvergne) to Sgguier, January 18, 1644.
^Isambert, Anciennes lols franqalses. XVI, 443.
-*^ The ggnSralltg was a district in the financial administration 
that virtually coincided with a province. Since this edict provided 
that new officers called intendants-ggngraux would be added to the 
bureaux des finances, historians long believed that the edict of 
1635 actually instituted the much more important and widely known 
intendants de justice, police, et finances, or more simply, the 
intendants des provinces. The error in identification was perhaps 
originated by the editors of Anciennes lois francalses, who mis­
takenly associated the creation of the venal offices in the bureaux 
with the Crown's use of the commissioned agents called the Intendants. 
See Isambert, Anciennes lols francalses. XVI, 442, n. 1; Dareste,
La Justice administrative, p. 97» n. 1.
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long before the edict of 1635 Louis XIII and his ministers had 
adopted more effective methods of government to combat the inade­
quacies that characterized the bureaucracy. Two of these measures 
amounted to significant milestones in the evolution of the royal 
administration. At the center of government, the royal council was 
narrowed as princely councillors were excluded from it. While this 
took place during the late 1620's, Richelieu was gathering around 
him a reliable team of creatures dependent on him and devoted to his 
interests. Several of these men, professional administrators all, 
found their way into the posts of secretaire d'Etat or surintendant 
des finances from which they came to supervise the tasks of daily 
government after 1630. At the same time, the organizational struc­
ture of the Consell d'Etat became distinctly more specialized along 
functional lines of finance, internal administration, and justice.
Carefully distinguished among the men who conducted business in the 
Conseil d'Etat were those with the right to attend the exclusive 
Consell d'en haut. now, more than ever, an intimate circle of the 
King's most trusted advisers. These changes and others had produced
by 1635 an efficient and loyal central control mechanism for the 
59implementation of royal authority.
Centralized authority, however, had to have direct contact with 
the problems besetting it. To suppress revolt, try dissident nobles,
59^ Orest Ranum, Richelieu and the Councillors of Louis XIII 
(Oxford, 1963); Mousnier, "Le Conseil du roi"; D'Avenel, Richelieu 
et la monarchie absolue, I, h-O-56; Dareste, La Justice adminis­
trative . pp. 53-93.
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handle military logistics, assure tax collections, and supervise 
recalcitrant officers, Louis XIII and his ministers returned to a 
time-honored expedient, the use of the extraordinary commissioned 
agent. There were two distinct species of these coniniiRsa.iTPs 
operative in Louis XIII's era. One type, drawn from the ranks of 
the conseillers d'Etat and maitres des requetes. found themselves 
assigned to short-lived judicial panels or chambres charged with 
political trials and financial investigations, usually in or near 
Paris. Intendants. on the other hand, were also drawn from among 
the conseillers d'Etat or maitres hut operated individually as 
commlssaires dgpartle in the countryside. The efficacy of both types 
came from the complete control the king had over them, and it was 
this same quality of control which so clearly distinguished the 
commission from the office.^ This control was both legal and
Regular officers such as the maitres des requetes were usually 
chosen to hold commissions, though conseillers d'Etat. parlementaires. 
and other gens de robe were occasionally selected. Because of this, 
some authors have tried to controvert the differences between 
officiers and commlssaires. J. H. Salmon has written, after A. D. 
Lublinskaya, Vnutrenniva Politika Frantsuzskogo Absolyutlzma. 1633- 
16^9 [The Internal Politics of French Absolutism, 1633-lG^j 
(Moscow and Leningrad, 1966), that "the clear distinction drawn 
by Mousnier between the holders of venal office and the commlasal-ras 
must also be questioned. The intendants. with one exception, were 
drawn from the maitres des requetes. who sat in the parlement and, 
under the chancellor's direction, provided the administrative staff 
for the business of the royal council. These officials owned their 
offices, although they did not posses fsic] any property rights in 
the additional posts they might he granted as commlssaires. Thus 
the chancellor had full power to revoke their commissions as 
Intendants but he did not directly control their tenure of office 
within the collegiate body of the maitres des requetes." "Venality 
of Offices and Popular Sedition in Seventeenth Century France," 33.
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personal. Commissioned powers were non-venal, temporary, and 
immediately revocable. In selecting their hearers, considerations 
of ability, political reliability, and callosity could rule supreme. 
The effectiveness of most commlssaires was further enhanced by the 
fact that they were drawn from the ranks of councilliar personnel, 
making them in effect striking arms of the council. The extent of 
the powers vested in commlssaires varied with the job at hand, but 
a general three part enabling formulary remained the same: the King 
recognized some particular administrative problem, empowered the 
commlssalre to deal with it as he saw fit, and admonished all 
officers and subjects to cooperate with him to the fullest extent.
So wielded, royal power could cut through time and distance as well 
as circumvent the most perverse bureaucratic ineptness, corruption, 
or insubordination.
The most common cnmmissaitb found in Louis XIII's Prance was 
the lntendant. and because the intendants played an important role 
in both controlling and provoking the Crown’s functionaries, some 
understanding of their origins and operations is requisite to any 
explanation of the bureaucracy’s part in the crisis of the reign. 
Although much remains unclear about the origins and functions of the 
early intendants. it is certain that the idea of sending individual 
fiommlssalres into the provinces did not originate during Louis XIII's 
reign. The expedition of such agents was nearly as ancient as the 
monarchy itself, Charlemagne having sent members of his court into 
the countryside as mlssl dominie1 to bring justice and royal authority
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directly to the diverse peoples of his empire. In lieu of a regular 
civil service, the missi dominicl effectively satisfied the rudi­
mentary requirements of the Carolingian Empire. The collapse of the 
Empire brought with it a recession in royal authority which lasted 
well after the establishment of the Capetian dynasty in the former 
Frankish kingdom. In recovering and extending central authority 
over their growing domain, the early Capetians returned to the use 
of commlssaires on mission. The prSvots. the earliest royal officers 
in the domain, as well as the balllls who followed and supervised 
them, probably originated as commlssaires whose tours had become so 
protracted and regularized that they were finally fixed in one 
location as permanent officials. Sons followed fathers in the same 
area, and these once temporary agents were gradually transformed 
into the basic elements of the bureaucracy.^
As the bureaucracy grew, however, and as survlvance took hold 
during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Grown found it 
harder and harder to adequately oversee thousands of officials 
scattered over many provinces. The normal difficulties of communi­
cation and distance were carried to impossible levels by the decay 
of orderly government after 1560. Under these conditions the com- 
missalre was again the logical solution to the Valois* need to make 
their presence felt in distant or troubled areas of the realm. From
6lThe thesis that parts of the royal administration developed out 
of the regularization and fixation of commissaires is presented by 
Pages in "La VSnalit§ des offices dans l’ancienne France,” 477-95.
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the early sixteenth century, maitres des requetes had been selected 
for chevauchSes through the countryside to inquire into the conduct 
of officials as well as to bring immediate relief to humble subjects 
entangled in lengthy judicial proceedings or oppressed by inequitable 
or iniquitous tax collections. During the Wars of Religion these 
duties of the maitres were confirmed and regularized at law. The 
three great ordinances of OrlSans (Article 33 )i of Moulins (Article 
7), and of Blois (Article 209) authorized maitres des requetes to 
make their tours and "to receive complaints from all persons and to 
insert them in their proces-verbaux" for presentation to the council 
upon return.^ In addition to the chevauchges of the maitres. 
other commlssaires were sent out irregularly to deal with financial 
and military problems. The edicts on the taille for 1583 and 1600 
conferred on these Intendants de justice, police et finances es 
armges the right to hear appeals from taxpayers concerning the 
division of the taille between parishes and among the inhabitants of 
each parish. Henry IV found various commlssaires dgpartls an indis­
pensable instrument in rebuilding his kingdom, and under him the use 
of commlssaires was further expanded, with many designated as 
lntendant. lntendant de justice, or lntendant de finance. The use 
of intendants continued throughout the early part of Louis XIII's 
rule, employed, as in the past, to enforce the collection of new 
taxes, to reinforce controversial legislation, to assist military
^Isambert, Anciennes lois francalses. XIV, 73, 191-92, ^30-31. 
The phraseology employed in each ordinance is virtually the same.
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operations, or to oversee the regular officers in their duties.^
Considering the Crown’s historical reliance on cnmmlssaitos. it
is not surprising that Richelieu frequently resorted to the use of
the temporary judicial commission to handle crucial administrative
problems. A necessity for constant and thorough management of the
machinery of justice became evident to the Cardinal well before the
Day of Dupes, brining Richelieu to outline specific recommendations
to deal with what he later described as "the thorny objections of
64the narlements which obstruct all things." In several memoranda 
prepared for the King, and later in -the Testament -politique, the 
Cardinal sketched out plans to send both panels and individual 
commissioned agents into the provinces. As early as 1625» Richelieu 
had toyed with the idea of an ambulatory chambre de justice which 
would tour the countryside as a travelling assize, hearing com­
plaints about malpractices in the regular courts and hastening the 
overlong processes of justice. According to this plan, the chamber 
would be a form of grands jours made up of members of the sovereign 
courts: four conseillers from the Parlement of Paris, two from 
Toulouse, and one each from each of the other six -parlements. It is 
worth noting that the presidency of the chamber would have been in
^Zeller, Dictlonnalre des institutions, pp. 116, 142-45;
Doucet, Dictlonnalre des institutions. I, 425-36; Edmond Esmonin,
Etudes sur la France des XVII et XVIII6 siecles (Paris, 1964), pp.
25-2(3; Mousnier, "Etat et commissaire," in La Plume, la faucllle et 
le marteau. pp. 179-80; Dareste, La Justice administrative, pp. 94- 
100.
64
Armand Jean du Plessis, Cardinal due de Richelieu, Testament 
•politique, ed. Louis AndrS (Paris, 1947). p. 246.
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the hands of two conseillers d'Etat. which would effectively place 
control of hearings and audiences in the hands of members of the 
council and thus beyond the interference of regular magistrates.^ 
Ten. years later, Richelieu returned to the same scheme in the Testa­
ment politique, proposing
to send into the provinces from time to time chambres de .justice 
composed of conseillers d'Etat and maitres des requetes care­
fully chosen to avoid the thorny objections of the parlements 
which obstruct all things, in order that this company, receiving 
complaints which could be made against all sorts of persons,^  
no quality being, excepted, could immediately deal with them.
Richelieu's plans for the touring chambre de .justice never 
materialized, probably because the use of individual intendants 
proved more practical and effective in coping with what increasingly 
became a fiscal crisis after 1635. The Cardinal himself certainly 
recognized the practical advantages of individual commissaires in 
both the judicial and financial role, since he wrote in the Testa­
ment politique that
because it is impossible to send such companies into all the 
provinces at the same time . . .  I think that it would be very 
useful to frequently send into the provinces some carefully 
chosen nonselllers d'Etat or maitres des requetes. not only 
to carry out the functions of lntendant de .justice in capital 
cities . . . but [also] to go into all provincial places to 
inquire into the behavior of judicial and financial officers, 
to see if impositions are levied in conformity with the 
ordinances and if the receveurs vex the people with injustice, 
to discover the methods used in exercising their charges.
Armand Jean du Plessis, Cardinal due de Richelieu, Lettres. 
instructions diplomatiques et paplers d'etat du Cardinal Richelieu, 
ed. Georges d’Avenel (8 vols.; Paris, 1835-1877), II, 160, 179-80.
^^ Richelieu, Testament politique, p. 246.
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to learn how the nobility governs, to stop the course of all 
sorts of disorders and especially the duress of those who, 
being rich and powerful, oppress the weak and poor subjects 
of the King.
A more precise statement of the activities of the intendants during 
the 1630's can hardly be found. During this decade the intendants 
steadily grew in numbers and powers to become the most powerful 
agents of the king in the countryside. After December, 1633» 
Intendants were sent out to regulate division of the taille among 
parishes and households. By instructions given in May, 1634-, these 
commlssaires were expected to judge appeals from excessive taxation, 
redivide the taille if necessary, and to scrupulously inquire about 
local economic conditions in order to inform the council about future 
rifilements. These missions naturally resulted in friction with glus, 
bureaux des finances, and trSsoriers de Prance when their bureaucratic 
inadequacies, injustices, and peculations were exposed. Despite the 
fact that the officers' shortcomings were becoming more and more 
obvious, it seems that at least until the mid-l630's, the lntendant*s 
role was intended to be that df overseer and supervisor, rather than 
executor, of administrative tasks. The government did not intend to 
supplant the ordinary officers but sought to extract useful, honest 
service from them.^
These intentions did not prove workable. Hostilities between 
officials and intendants continued to grow, as did the king's fiscal
^Ibid.. pp. 246-47.
^^ Mousnier, "Etat et commissaire," pp. 184-87.
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needs. The reform of 1635 in the bureaux des finances proved to be 
a failure. These factors, along with popular uprisings and military 
activity, pushed the Crown towards a reliance on intendants instead 
of officers. Sometime between 1637 and 16*4-1— losses in the inten­
dants * reports to Chancellor Sgguier make it impossible to be more 
exact— the Intendants underwent a crucial transformation. They 
began to carry out, rather than merely to supervise, the division 
and assessment of the taille; this, in turn, brought their intro­
duction into all the ggngralitgs. The reglement des tallies of 
August 22, 16*4-2, confirms that by this time the council had entrusted 
the Intendants with the essential power to levy the taille. tallIon, 
crues. and other impositions destined for the maintenance of troops. 
Commissions for the collection of these taxes were jointly addressed 
to Intendants and trgsorlers de Prance. The trgsorler was reduced 
to the role of technical councillor. The lntendant now had the right 
to preside over the bureau de6 finances and to tour the glectlons 
in company with a trgsorier. If he or the glus proved perverse, the 
intendant could make the division in conjunction with other officers 
or notable persons. In addition to the assumption of these immensely 
important financial responsibilities, the Intendants were also saddled 
with a host of miscellaneous duties which brought them into conflict 
with ordinary officers.^
Introduction of the Intendants. therefore, further aggravated 
a civil service already alienated by unprecedented conditions of
^Ibid., Esmonin, Etudes sur la France, pp. 25-26.
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office holding. According to the testimony of Richelieu’s MSmoires.
upon Henry IV’s death in 1610 Marie de Medicis had found it expedient
to placate the animosity of ordinary officials towards commissions
hy suppressing fourteen extraordinary commissions and fifty-eight 
70others verified in the parlements. This gesture seems to have been 
purely a temporary one, founded upon Marie's momentary need to woo 
the officers, for the use of commissions continued unchecked through­
out the next decade. For reasons that will be seen later, the Parle- 
ment of Paris hardly mentioned the issue in its great reform remon­
strance of 1615, but in 1626 thirty First Presidents and gens du roi 
of the sovereign courts in attendance at the Assembly of Notables 
utilized the opportunity to demand suppression of the intendants de 
.justice. In Article 1*4- of a twenty-three point charter of grievances, 
the parlementaires spoke out on their own behalf and that of the less 
articulate judges beneath them:
Your narlements receive a great prejudice from a new usage of 
intendants de .justice which are sent into the jurisdictions and 
territories of the said narlements . . '. their functions, which 
they hope to hold for life, which are without legislative base, 
establish a chief and supernumerary of justice and are created 
without paying any finance. They correct the heads of sub­
alternate courts and overcharge your salary costs, forming a 
kind of justice calling parties by virtue of their [royal] 
mandate and seizing clerks of court. From this [behavior] 
comes a variety of disadvantages, among others, the undermining 
of the jurisdiction, censure, and vigilance of your parlements. 
officers of the s6n6chaussSes. ballllages. prSvotSs. and other 
subaltemate judges. Moreover, they take competence of various 
cases, appeal from which they direct to your council.
°^Richelieu, Mgmolres. I, 75.
^Petit, L’AssemblSe des notables. Appendix 5, "Articles de 
Messieurs les officiers des cours souveraines,” pp. 266-67.
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In this article, the magistrates catalogued most of the complaints 
against the intendants. and one may assume that it more or less 
accurately reflected the contemporary magisterial view since it was 
issued by representatives of all the -parlements. The judges indi­
cated a number of affronts. They felt the intendants' powers were 
dubious because they were based on councilliar authorization and not 
legislation. Furthermore, as agents endowed with the dernier ressort, 
their powers conflicted with those of the parlements. which made them 
both a "chief" and a "supernumerary" of justice. From the officers' 
point of view, this could only result in illegal practice and injury 
to their functions. Beyond this, the absence of venality and the 
ambitious attitudes of the intendants added insult to injury.
The protest of 1626 went unheeded, and the Assembly of Notables 
represented the magistrature's last opportunity during Louis' rule 
to present a united front against the intendants. Nevertheless, the 
provincial parlements continued to be the implacable enemies of the 
Intendants. as the intendants' reports to Sgguier testify. With the 
expanded employment of these commissalres. it seemed that the Crown 
was assiduously seeking to reduce their functions, a reduction which 
could only mean diminished prestige and income. This point of view 
was at least partially substantiated after 1637 when the intendants 
began to assume the administrative responsibilities of the Jilus, 
bureaux des finances, and trSsorlers de France. Lacking the power 
of remonstrance, the protests of these officials remained more muted 
than those of the sovereign courts even though they were more offended
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72by the intrusion of the intendants.
The reaction of the officers to the intendants represents the 
final link in a circular chain of cause and effect which deeply 
entangled the civil service in the crisis of Louis' reign. The stage 
for this national crisis was set by natural conditions of depression 
prevailing in Prance in the first decades of the century: rising 
population, limited production, periodic famine and plague. Factors 
like these were accompanied and compounded by long-term adjustments 
in economic and social relationships between the noblesse d'Spee, 
noblesse de robe, and the bourgeoisie; the anxieties of these groups 
as well as the peasantry were sharpened by the absence of able 
leadership after Henry IV’s death. Amid this setting Richelieu 
determined to follow an ambitious and expensive policy which placed 
serious demands on the resources of the country. The decade of the 
1620's represents a period of counterpoise: the problems of the
TJespite their inability to bring pressure on the Crown under 
Richelieu's ministry, the trSsoriers and §lus had resources that 
would become significant during the Fronde of 1648. Since 1599, 
the trgsoriers de France had been organized into a professional 
association, complete with dues and representatives in Paris charged 
with defending their interests. In 1641 the §lus had been allowed 
to follow the trSsorlers in organizing a permanent syndicate; like 
the company of trgsoriers. the §lus had a charter, dues, maintained 
a secretary in Paris, and were recognized by the Cour des aides. 
Chambre des comptes, and the Conseil d'Etat. During Louis XIII's 
rule, at least, the influence of these financial officers seems to 
have been minimal. Vith the outbreak of the Fronde, however, the 
trSsoriers and §lus succeeded in influencing the courts of Paris 
to demand the withdrawal of the intendants. Roland Mousnier, 
"Recherches sur les syndicats d’officiers pendant la Fronde: 
TrSsoriers generaux de France et Slus dans la Revolution,” in 
La Plume, la faucille et le marteau, pp. 301-33; Moote, Revolt of 
the Judges, pp. 93, 129-30, 143, 147, 160.
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Huguenots, the nobility, and national leadership were resolved, but 
the material and spiritual expenses of these achievements substituted 
other equally grave problems in French society. After the Day of 
Dupes the French crisis broke in force as the effects of Richelieu's 
policy worked themselves out.
For the officials, these effects were represented by signifi­
cant departures from past governmental practices. Finding the 
traditional tax base to be inadequate, the Crown turned to new sources 
of wealth in the tax farmers and officials. Having traditionally 
enjoyed a certain independence in their offices, the officers were 
now confronted with stringent demands both on themselves and on the 
country. Tom between official obligations and their natural sym­
pathies, the civil service proved insufficient in meeting royal 
expectations. The Crown then resorted to the use of commissalres 
who, in effectively answering the requirements of centralization, 
further ulcerated the feelings of the officers. The larger elemental 
relationship at work during the height of the crisis has been sum­
marized by Salmon in writing that
it can be said, at least, that . . . the tensions within the 
ruling classes took the form of antagonism towards the com- 
mlssaires of the central government; the demands of foreign 
war increased the financial burden on the lower classes and 
often coincided with famine and pestilence; the consequent 
risings of the masses further divided the upper classes^and 
increased the monarchy's reliance on the commjssal-rps.'
Exactly how the officers* role affected other elements in society is 
^Salmon, "Venality of Office and Popular Sedition," *+0.
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still being debated. As Salmon has noted,
further agreement [about the role of the officials] is prevented 
by differing assumptions about the articulation of society. To 
Mousnier the integration of venal office-holders within local 
communities provided the focus for risings; to Porschnev the 
exploitation of the peasantry resulted in spontaneous lower- 
class revolt in which a class of ''feudalized1' bourgeois office­
holders momentarily made use of peasant initiative. Both 
explanations assumed that French society in the seventeenth 
century experienced a critical change of direction which fore­
shadowed, if it did not predetermine, the subsequent history 
of the ancien rSgime.
Salmon might have added that agreement on an explanation would be 
rendered problematical, since the officialdom, like society, encom­
passed a variety of different elements whose part in the crisis was 
shaped by a diversity of locations, public functions, traditions, 
and social ranks.
In light of the involvement of the royal officers in the crisis 
which gripped France during the early seventeenth century, the 
relations between the Crown and the Parlement of Paris assume a 
crucial importance in the development of French absolutism. If 
during the first half of the century, there was any single insti­
tution of French government which might have offered a serious 
challenge to the development of absolutism, that institution was 
the Parlement of Paris. Far more than any provincial sovereign court 
or corporation of lesser officers, the Parlement possessed the unique 
potential to block the augmentation of royal authority and limit the 
use of the king’s prerogative. In 1610 over 300 years of continuous
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evolution had endowed the Parlement with a heritage of power, 
prestige, and respect in public affairs unsurpassed by any other 
institution of the kingdom. Supreme court, administrative and police 
agency, counsellor to kings, the court had grown with the monarchy 
and powerfully aided its development. Unlike the sovereign courts 
of the provinces, the Parlement of Paris was a truly national body: 
among the •parlements it alone had sprung from the curia regis and 
it alone could claim the councilliar heritage this ancestry implied. 
Sitting as the Court of Peers, the greatest figures in the land were 
cognizable before it; in common cases its legal jurisdiction was 
recognized over all the central portion of the realm.
Yet more importantly for the exercise of royal authority, the 
court had a singularly eminent niche in the realm of public law.
The court was recognized by French kings as the foremost guardian 
of.their ordinances and as legal counsel in times of crisis. Though 
theoretically the power to legislate was exclusive to the sovereign 
alone, in reality the Parlement had also come to have a singular 
part in the legislative process. By the seventeenth century it was 
a hallowed legal tradition that the Parlement*s approval was requi­
site to the legality of royal law. Whether or not that approval was 
enthusiastic and sincere or forced and merely technical was also 
highly meaningful to the success of any law, so great was the Parle­
ment 's influence on lower courts, jurisconsuls, and the legal com­
munity at large. Therefore, in a monarchy resting upon a foundation 
of law, the Parlement*s procedures of registration and remonstrance
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represented important limitations on royal power unmatched by any 
other governmental institution. Moreover, after 1615 its respon­
sibilities as well as its ambitions were sharpened by the demise 
of other traditional representative institutions such as the Estates 
General.
Defense of a traditional and balanced monarchy, however, 
represents only the institutional face of the court. Especially 
after the reign of Henry IV, the judges of the Parlement were 
passionately involved with the preservation of their interests. As 
the highest magistrates in France, the judges' offices brought them 
an official standing equal to that of the Crown's great officers 
and only just below that of the Chancellor and ministers of State. 
Even without the ownership of their offices, the judges would have 
been deeply engaged in conserving their corporate position; when the 
factors of venality and the naulette were added during the sixteenth 
century, preservation of precious personal and familial property 
rights was mingled with corporate interests. By the early l600's 
the magistrates knew their own interests as well or better than their 
public responsibilities, and during Louis XIII's reign defense of 
interests and discharge of responsibilities brought the Parlement 
directly into a collision with Richelieu's extension of royal power.
Since the Parlement's elite social position and its firm con­
stitutional foundation endowed it with qualities, duties, and 
interests not shared with any other corps in the State, the court's 
unique place in the body politic ensured that its relations with
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royal authority would assume an exceptional place in the crisis of 
Louis' reign. The Parlement's individuality ensured, too, that in 
a general encounter of French officials with Crown policy the court's 
nature would generate a role quite unlike that of other, lesser, 
institutions. Issues which sent ripples of anxiety through the 
bureaucracy as a whole sometimes failed to affect the Parlement at 
all, or touched it only tangentially, while at the same time the 
contentions coming out of parlementaire politics were not necessarily 
those raised by officials in other parlements. other sovereign courts, 
or the civil service at large.
The paulette provides a ready sample of how the Parlement stood 
apart in matters affecting the bureaucracy. Throughout the ministry 
of Richelieu the Parlement demanded, and got, exclusive treatment 
in paulette negotiations befitting its elevated status. Discrimi­
natory handling of the Parlement did not originate with Richelieu, 
for when the paulette was renewed in 1620 the Parlement, along with 
the other sovereign courts, refused payment of the new and higher 
rates born in the declaration. After eight months of wrangling with 
his judges, Louis consented to give the sovereign courts their 
privileges on the same terms which had prevailed since 1604. The 
magistrates had only to pay the former droit annuel rate pegged 
at one-sixtieth instead of contributing the three percent loan 
extracted from subordinate magistrates or the five percent taken 
from the financial officers. A favorable precedent had been set, 
a precedent which Richelieu found difficult to abandon. In the
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paulette negotiations of 1630, 1636, and 1639 the parlementalres 
were eventually treated more leniently than other officials, 
receiving either outright exemptions or markedly lower assessments. 
The malleability thus induced was deceptive and shortlived. Across 
the eighteen years of the Cardinal's ministry, discrete treatment 
heightened the Parlement's privileges, inflated its collective ego, 
and stoked the fires under its resolve to defend its immunities.7"^ 
More than any other institution, the Parlement was the victim 
of judicial abuses which were an outstanding feature of Richelieu's 
absolutist practices. These abuses took on many guises, but all had
75The use of the paulette as a disciplinary measure has been 
subject to a variety of interpretations befitting its complexity. 
Mousnier suggests that the royal policy of using the paulette to 
divide and rule was a successful one when considered for the bureau­
cracy as a whole over the reigns of Henry IV and Louis XIII. "This 
passion of the officers for the droit annuel." he writes, "their 
anxiety that it might not endure, enables the king to hold them in 
line. In order to have the annuel, the greatest number of officers 
remain loyal to the king and maintain the people in their loyalty.
To have the annuel and to have it under better conditions, the 
sovereign courts separate themselves from the other officers, weak­
ening the ’fourth estate,' that of the gens de robe who aspire to 
the government of the kingdom, prostrate themselves before the 
sovereign, [and] register bursal edicts and even political edicts."
A little further, Mousnier continues that "fiscal exigencies become 
such that until the end of the reign of Louis XIII, the question of
the annuel was added to that of creations of offices to provoke dis­
content, resistance, and rebellions all over the kingdom. Without 
the division that the annuel, accorded under unequal conditions, 
maintained between the officers of the sovereign courts and the 
others, the situation, already bad, could have become very dangerous." 
La VgnalitS des offices. pp. 307-08. See also the remarks on pages 
599-600 and those in Les XVI et XVII siecles. pp. 168-69. Lloyd 
Moote, conversely, has written that "while one can agree sub­
stantially with Mousnier's emphasis on the immensity of the task
before the monarchy, it is debatable that the financial security
of the official hierarchy provided a satisfactory solution. The 
story of the Fronde indicates that bribery was not always suffi­
cient." "The French Crown Versus its Officials," 147.
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a long historical tradition and most were intimately related to the 
rapid evolution in the royal council which accompanied the growth of 
absolutism. Prom its emergence in the fourteenth century, the Parle­
ment had been engaged in a running contest with royal efforts to 
set the council over the sovereign courts as a superior judicial 
body. Despite periodic attempts to redress the situation, by the 
seventeenth century the council had appropriated many attributes of 
a sovereign court,, legitimately adjudicating necessary appeals to the 
king but also issuing evocations for prerogative judgment and 
pronouncing judicial arrets which quashed decisions of the sovereign 
courts. Under Richelieu the practice of evocations was utilized to 
shield tax farmers, privileged communities, and favored individuals 
from the processes of ordinary justice. Councilliar authority was 
of immense consequence in public affairs, because by wrapping the 
arbitrary judicial power of the king in the cloak of legitimacy 
provided by the phrase fait par le roi en conseil, the Parlement’s 
deliberations could be cut short, effectively shutting the court out 
of affairs of State. This had happened in 1615 when the court assumed 
a posture of State reform, issued a great remonstrance, and proposed 
to assemble the peers; it would happen again in I63I on two important 
occasions involving the use of commlssalres.
In fact, when the institutional veneer is stripped away, this 
issue of judicial arbltralre is revealed as the nuclear problem in 
the establishment of absolutism and centralization in the French 
monarchy, for it represents the essential opposition of royal power
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confronting the older, limiting agents of a traditional monarchy.
The triangular association between the king's judicial arbitraire.
councilliar development, and the functions of the Parlement has been
succinctly summarized by J. H. Shennan in writing that during the
reign of Louis XIII
the new men [the secretaires d'Etat] in the King’s Council 
could have little patience with the Parlement's cumbersome 
political machinery, the inadequacy of which had been revealed 
on more than one occasion during the reign of Henry IV. . . . 
Increasingly, as the king consolidated his control over the 
state, the chief cause of tension in the kingdom was to become 
the struggle between two opposite needs, that of the sovereign 
to take whatever political measures were deemed necessary by 
his professional advisers and that of the Parlement, which 
sought to maintain the king in his obligation to respect the 
law. The crown's future was to be bedevilled by the pull of 
these opposite forces and ultimatelxAts inability to solve 
the dilemma was to decide its fate.
Thanks to the power of councilliar arrets. by the end of 1632 the 
Crown had established a shaky victory on the issue of councilliar 
superiority. This victory, while not yet consolidated, was doubly 
meaningful, because it also helped break the Parlement's resistance 
to commlssalres. the instrument par excellence of the absolute 
monarchy in criminal justice.
The monarchy’s reliance on judicial commissions was a spec­
tacular and infamous practice which could be traced to the Parlement's 
unique jurisdiction over cases of lese-majestS and those of the dukes
and peers. This competence created embarrassment when Richelieu 
sought to root out conspiracy in high places or to attack his 
political enemies through judicial procedures; since the Parlement
Parlement of Paris, pp. 24-8-49.
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was not likely to return the thoroughly reliable verdicts required 
in such trials, the Cardinal turned to the use of pliable handpicked 
judges selected from among councilliar personnel and armed with 
total powers. The Parlement complained loudly of resulting injustices 
in the trials of marSschal Louis de Marillac (1631), the due de la 
Valette (l639)» and in the operations of the Chambre de 1*Arsenal 
(1631), only to have their remonstrances cut short by arrets du 
Conseil or by the King's personal orders.
Richelieu’s high criminal commissions hardly concerned magis­
trates outside the Paris Parlement, and sensing that the provincial 
•parlements would prove pliable in cases with little impact on their 
rights, Richelieu sometimes referred sensitive cases to them for 
prosecution. This was the case in 1632 when the Parlement of 
Toulouse summarily condemned the due de Montomorency, a duke and 
peer, to death for rebellion and lese-ma.iest§. In the same way in 
1633 the Parlement of Dijon condemned and executed in effigy the 
dues d'ELboeuf and Montpensier for having fled the kingdom with 
Gaston d'Origans. In the same year the new Parlement of Metz 
executed Francis Alpheston and Blaise Rouffet Chavagnac for plots 
against Richelieu's life. By complaisantly rendering decisions such 
as these, the behavior of the provincial -parlements provided a 
curious, yet logical, contrast to their colleagues in Paris.^
In  comparison w ith  t h e i r  stand  a g a in s t ju d ic ia l  commiswai -res.
77Le M ercure f r a n y o is . X IX , f i r s t  p a g in a tio n , 4 7 -4 8 ; F ayard , 
Aperqu h is to r iq u e , I I ,  91-93; Church, R ic h e lie u  and Reason o f  S t a t e , 
pp. 234-36, 319.
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the judges in Paris seem to have heen little concerned with the 
intrusion of the intendants which so aggravated the other elements 
of the civil service. This was probably because the intendants 
usually operated in outlying areas of the kingdom which fell under 
the jurisdiction of other -parlements. because the intendants were 
not regularized in all g§n§ralites until sometime after 1637, and 
because their functions tended to develop in the direction of 
financial rather than judicial tutelage.78 Nevertheless, the 
registres du conseil and conseil secret show that the Parlement 
occasionally protested the use of mattres des requetes as individual 
commlssaires extraordinalres. a term the court preferred over inten- 
dant. An instance of this occurred on July 15, 1626, when the 
procureur gSnSral reported that some maitres had undertaken the 
execution of commissions not verified in the court and "in order
79that this disorder cease, required that provision be made for it.
The court put the matter into deliberation and
made very express prohibitions and inhibitions to all maitres 
des requetes. conselllers [d'Etat?], and other officers, and 
to all others of whatever quality and condition that they might 
be, of executing any commission or of performing any act of 
justice by virtue of letters bearing an attribution of juris­
diction for whatever cause that might be, in civil or criminal 
matters, which have not been verified in the court, at penalty 
of ten Hjousand livres fine and of suspension from their 
charge.
A survey of the intendant's letters to Sgguier in the period 
1633-1642 indicate that most of them were written in provinces in the 
south of Prance or along the northern frontier. Mousnier, Lettres et 
m&nolres adressgs au chancelier SSguier, I, passim.
79B.N. Ms . fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fol. 748, July 15, 1626.
80B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fol. 748, July 15, 1626.
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The judges followed this up by admonishing all minor officers of 
justice to ignore the maitres* commissions. The next day orders 
were issued that prisoners held in the Fort l'Eveque prison by virtue 
of such commissions should be transferred to the Conciergerie in the 
Palais under the Parlement's surveillance.®'1'
In February, 1631, the Parlement encountered the problem of 
commlssalres once again, this time because of a criminal prosecution 
made by a certain mattre des requetes named Le Maistre against one 
Antoine Brillet, an avocat du roi in Angers.®2 Brillet had appealed 
to the Parlement, which took up his case on the legal grounds that 
"the said Le Maistre, being of the corps of the said court [of Parle­
ment J could not be prosecuted in [anyl other place."®^ On February 
7, the matter was discussed and handed over to the gens du roi who 
took it to the garde des sceaux. The next day, February 8, the gens 
du roi reported back to the court that "the king had found the affair
Qh
of consequence and that he wanted to deliberate on it in council."
In the meantime all maitres had been forbidden to consider it further. 
The court was not satisfied. On February 11, the judges sent remon- 
to the King about the use of commissaires in Brillet's case, along
81B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fols. 750-51, July 16, 1626.
®2Probably Louis Le Maistre, sieur de Bellejambe, received as 
a maitre des requetes in 1626, who held commissions in Picardy 
between l6j6 and 16^ 3, and died in 1666. Mousnier, Lettres et 
mgmoires adressgs au chancelier Seguier, I, 152-55. The case may 
have come out of troubles in Angers during July and August of I63O.
® B^.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fol. 72, February 8, I631.
8k
B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fol. 73, February 8, 1631.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
177
with two other examples. On February 12, the garde des sceaux 
answered the remonstrances by repeating the King's word that matters 
would be suspended. At this point the issue disappears from the 
court's registers, undoubtedly pushed aside by far more pressing 
matters surrounding the trial of Marillac and the flight of Gaston 
d'OrlSans from the kingdom.®-*
Mention of commlssaires did not reappear in the court's registers 
again until September, 1631, when the court attacked the Chambre de 
1'Arsenal. Sitting irregularly in Sully's munitions plant, this 
assembly had been created in mid-June under the disguise of an 
investigation into counterfeiting. The Parlement had no objections 
to these endeavors, but hy November it became quite clear that the 
maitres des requetes at the-Arsenal were becoming a kangeroo court 
dedicated to the administration of prerogative justice for all sorts 
of crimes. The Parlement found the operations of these commlssaires 
intolerable and moved to block them. After a stormy affair during 
which narlementalre deputies were summoned into the King’s presence 
at Metz and there thoroughly browbeaten, the court was forbidden to 
consider matters of State. This injunction was interpreted to in­
clude not only the Chambre de 1'Arsenal but discussion of any com­
mission, and since no further debate on the problem appeared during 
Richelieu’s ministry, it was a significant victory for the principle 
of absolute monarchy.
A final example drawn from the early years of Richelieu’s
®-*B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 75ff., February through 
July, 1631.
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ministry serves to underline the self-serving attitude that prevailed 
among all the -parlements and their foremost dedication to affairs 
concerning only their locality and their privileges. Sometime during 
l625» Richelieu conceived the creation of a centralized royal 
administration over colonial, marine, commercial, and naval affairs, 
a jurisdiction which since medieval times had been diffused among 
ports, provincial estates, -parlements. and even individual seigneurs. 
Such royal naval authority as there was belonged to the grand amiral 
de France et Bretagne, a dignity dating to the Renaissance Monarchy 
and conferred as an honorific right upon a great noble family.
Guyenne and Provence each had their own admirals and admiralties 
independent of the grand amiral. These ancient authorities exercised 
a chaotic pattern of rights to maritime justice, port duties, salvage 
rights, customs, and naval service. Richelieu rightly understood 
that France could have neither successful colonies, a thriving water- 
born commerce, nor a powerful navy without first having centralized 
coordination and direction securely in the hands of a royal appoin- 
tee.86
The Cardinal launched his project late in 1626. By edicts of 
August and October Richelieu was granted the imposing title of grand 
mattre, chef et surintendant ggn&ral de la navigation et commerce de 
France. Far more than a grandiose label, the office carried with it 
uniform authority over the administration of ports, seamen, and
B o ite u x , R ic h e lie u , "grand m a ltre  de l a  n a v ig a tio n  e t  
du commerce de France" ( P a r i s .1955). pp. 9 8 -100 ; D oucet, Les I n s t i ­
tu t io n s  de l a  F ra n c e . I ,  1 2 0 -2 2 .
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maritime justice. The grand mattre was charged with drafting con­
ventions with those wishing to form commercial companies, colonial 
endeavors, and those engaged in land or sea traffic, as well as 
preparations for war, coastal security, and the protection of sea 
traffic. These edicts, in effect, created a sort of ministry of 
marine for the first time. They were complemented by a further 
edict of January, 1627» suppressing the office of grand amiral and 
uniting its functions with those of the grand mattre.^
All of Richelieu’s ambitions for maritime enterprises, however, 
hinged about the reception of the -parlements required to register 
the new arrangement. These courts included that of Paris, for 
binding legality over all the kingdom, and the parlements of the 
coastal provinces of Brittany, Guyenne, Normandy, Languedoc, and 
Provence, to bind each of their regions. A comparison of the 
reaction of the Parlement of Paris, which had little to lose in the 
affair, with the courts of the coastal provinces, reveals once again 
the singularly elite independence of the Paris Parlement as well as 
its influence over its lesser bretheren. Richelieu first presented 
his program to the Parlement of Brittany in August, 1626, forecasting 
that that province's maritime interests and extreme particularism 
would raise the greatest objections. This proved true. In spite of 
repeated injunctions, the Bretons refused registration for months 
and in March, 1627, decided to delay any further action until the 
provincial estates could meet at the end of the year. This procras­
87
B o ite u x , R ic h e lie u , "grand m a ttre ,"  p . 1 00 ,
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tination was intolerable to the Cardinal, who turned next to the
Parlement of Paris. That court had relatively little interest in
overseas affairs nor had it yet been soured by the domestic travail
that would follow the Day of Dupes. On March 8, 1627, -procureur
gln&ral MolS received the edicts of August and October; the court
smoothly registered them on the 13th, and Bichelieu took the oath
of office as grand ma?tre on the 18th. 88 This registration probably
prompted other courts to fall into line, for the Parlement of Rouen
registered without difficulty on April l6th, the Parlement of Rennes
on the 24th— but with reservations— and the Parlement of Bordeaux
on the 16th of May. The courts at Toulouse and Aix never approved
the measures, and Richelieu's authority as grand mattre was not
89recognized in Languedoc and Provence until 1631.
The Parlement was moved by royal financial operations in a very 
particular way. In the government of the ancien rSglme. no single 
body was invested with the "power of the purse" to be found in the 
contemporary English Houses of Parliament. To be sure, this entire 
concept was inappropriate to the French mode of government as it was 
practiced in the seventeenth century. Approval for royal levies 
could come in a variety of ways reflecting the hodge-podge of 
responsibilities in the kingdom's government. Certain royal levies, 
for example, had virtually come to be considered a Crown prerogative 
by the l600's. In contrast to his brother-in-law across the Channel,
88Ibid.. pp. 102-04; Molg, MSmolres. I, 419-48.
^Boiteux, Richelieu, 'grand maftre." pp. 102-04; Lublinskaya, 
French Absolutism, pp. 288, n. 1, 289, n. 1.
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Louis XIII could decide in council the amounts and division of the 
impositions, those taxes like the taille. taillon. and subslstance 
which had been approtioned and imposed by royal right for so long that 
they had been accepted as customary. But the assessment of im­
positions was readily enforceable only in the pays d*Elections: 
Brittany, Languedoc, Provence, and scattered border provinces 
jealously guarded their right to consent to taxation through their 
provincial estates. Other taxes, among them the indirect gabelles. 
aides, traites. and octrois were created and assessed in a compli­
cated way which essentially gave the Crown control over them. After 
conception and gestation in the Conseil des finances, the creation 
of new indirect taxes or increases in their rates nominally had to 
be submitted to the Cour des aides or Chambre des comptes for 
registration, but the resistance powers of these courts were sub­
stantially less than that of the Parlement. Additionally, after 
registration the collection of indirect taxes was always farmed out 
through contractual arrangements made in the Conseil des finances, 
which furnished another opportunity for the Crown to interfere with 
their application. Hate agreements made between Crown and farmer 
behind the closed doors of the council room usually remained a matter 
for conjecture, and in reality the farmers often simply collected 
whatever they could. If subjects complained about this and sued in 
a royal court, the Crown could shield the farmer by an evocation 
to the council. The Parlement, therefore, could really do very little 
about the taille. which was assessed without parlementaire consul­
tation, and the judges were equally impotent to combat the rise in
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aides, traites. gabelles. and other indirect taxes. In any case, 
since the magistrates were exempt from these duties, their own status 
was not directly jeopardized by alteration in tax rates.
In a last category of revenues, though, the Parlement of Paris 
could wield a negative kind of veto "power of the purse." When the 
monarchy was in great fiscal need, as it visually was in the 1630' s, 
the Parlement's right of verification could be brought into play 
to sidetrack or even to modify edicts alienating the domain, issuing 
rentes on the Hotel de ville of Paris, or creating offices. The 
Crown's heavy reliance on these types of measures during the financial 
crisis of the l630's and l640’s made it proportionately vulnerable 
to narlementalre politics.
The Paxlement was especially aroused when the Crown attempted 
to enlarge its ranks. Prom 1597 until 1631 the Crown had circum­
spectly honored the integrity of the court and resisted the temp­
tation to add new posts to it, even though the value of narlementalre 
offices would have made such creations a lucrative proposition. In 
December, 1630, an effort was made to create two maitres des requetes 
and five conselllers. but the Parlement protested and the edict was 
not registered until eight months later in a lit de .justice.^ 0 Even 
then the court won a reduction in the number of new conselllers from 
five to four. In 1635» however, with fiscal needs skyrocketing, the 
Conseil des finances decided to offer twenty-four conseillershins
^B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 59-60, 119-33» December 
30, 1630, and August 13, I63I.
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for sale. When the edict was presented in a lit de justice held 
December 20, 1635» violent agitation broke out which rapidly es­
calated into a major confrontation with the Grown. Before matters 
were smoothed over with a compromise, five judges had been ordered 
out of Paris and the Chambre des enquetes had gone on judicial 
strike against the new conseillers. Though a reduction in the 
number of creations to seventeen had been conceded, the Parlement 
raised continual trouble with the reception of men into these new 
positions for another decade.
As the ministry of Richelieu matured, royal relations with the 
Parlement remained stormy. In August, 1636, at the height of the 
so-called "Corbie Year," some members dared to raise dissension 
while the kingdom was demonstrably in danger from a Spanish invasion. 
In 1638 the court became embroiled in a reduction of the interest 
on government bonds based on the credit of the Hotel de ville of 
Paris; excitement surrounding the rentes blended with the affair 
of the conseillers and with creations of -procureurs and maitres 
des requetes to maintain tension at a high level. After years of . 
embittered relations, the Crown acted decisively to end the court's 
resistance; a royal declaration registered in a lit de justice of 
February 21, 1641, conclusively restricted extrajudicial activities 
of the judges and limited their right of remonstrances. This edict 
was untested by any major disputes to that parlementaire politics 
were calm until the death of Louis in 16^ -3 resurrected the judges' 
political ambitions once again.
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The extent and intensity of that resurrection during the regency 
of Anne of Austria was unmistakably exhibited on May 13, 164-8, when 
the Parlement issued a startling arret decreeing a union with the 
other sovereign courts of the capital, summoning them to send 
deputies to assemble in the Chambre de St. Louis within the Palais.
The subsequent events in this, the Fronde parlementaire. represented 
the nadir of the seventeenth century crisis in France and the greatest 
institutional challenge to royal authority that the Bourbons faced 
before the Revolution of 1789. The Parlement's pre-eminent part in
the Fronde has been extensively studied and need not be repeated
91 *here. The arret d'unlon of May 13 had not spelled out the precise 
purpose of the union, which only became evident during the summer. 
Between June 30 and July 29, thirty-two deputies of the courts, 
fourteen of the from the Parlement, addressed themselves to a complete 
overhaul of the judicial and financial administration of the kingdom. 
The principle of monarchical sovereignty was never controverted, but 
by the end of July the judges had formulated twenty-seven articles 
expressing their major grievances against two and a half decades 
of councilliar government, the use of commlssaires and intendants.
91The bibliography of the Fronde is extensive and only the most 
important works need be mentioned here. The latest essay, A. Lloyd 
Moote's The Revolt of the Judges, is presently definitive for the 
participation of the Parlement. The constitutional questions of 
the Fronde are treated in Paul Doolin's The Fronde (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1936). Ernst Kossman, La Fronde has been superceded 
by Moote’s study but remains valuable for its diverse insights.
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excessive taxation, farming of the taille. forced verifications, 
creations of office, arbitrary imprisonment, and other abusive 
practices associated with the absolutistic administration of Richelieu 
and Mazarin.
But however dramatic and revealing the articles of the Chambre 
de St. Louis were, they were only the culmination of many years of 
strained relations between the Crown and its chief servants which 
reached well back into Louis XIII's rule. As the most recent 
historian of the Fronde has pointed out,
in 1610 a major revolt by officiers against the royal admin­
istration was still inconceivable to the king, his officials, 
and his other subjects. What made that revolt finally possible 
were the drastic governmental policies forced on a hesitant 
monarch and his consummate politician-minister by internal 
strife and foreign war. Without knowing or willing it, Louis 
XIII and Cardinal Richelieu prepared the Fronde by under­
taking an administrative re,"'lution which profoundly changed 
the way in which the government of France functioned.
The expression "administrative revolution" used by Mo’ote to describe
the policies of Richelieu may be questioned when applied to the
Parlement of Paris, for the history of the Parlement between 1624
and 1642 reveals no significant administrative innovations in
regard to that distinguished corps. The instruments of Louis XIII's
and Richelieu's narlementalre policy, with the exception of juggling
the paulette. were nothing more than a continuation of the means,
methods, and tactics used by strong monarchs since Renaissance times
to circumvent or override the Parlement. Nevertheless, there can be
92Moote, Revolt of the Judges, p. 35-
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little doubt that the seeds of rebellion which flowered in Paris 
in 16^8 were planted during the preceding reign and had their roots 
deep in the conflict between the Parlement’s defense of "the true 
French tradition" and the rise of what is conventionally called 
absolute monarchy. The real distinction of this conflict lay in 
the unparalleled intensity of the discord inspired by the leader­
ship of a minister determined to make the king supreme in France 
and Prance supreme in Europe.
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CHAPTER IV
RICHELIEU, ABSOLUTISM, AND THE PARLEMENT
The principles of absolutism so intimately associated with the 
ministry of Richelieu and with the seventeenth century as a whole 
were implicit in the French monarchy from the earliest Capetian era. 
The French had very early arrived at the idea that the king held 
his power from God and not from the people. Merovingian, Carolingian, 
and early Capetian kings were popularly elected by tribal assembly, 
but no one questioned that the essence of royal sovereignty was 
divine and that this Christian basis of royal power was conferred in 
the ceremony of coronation when the royal sacerdotum was mystically 
bestowed by a high Churchman. Having been once divinely ordained, 
the power of the king could not in theory be checked by any earthly 
or secular restraints. The extinction of the ritual of election 
after Philip Augustus and erosion of Papal pretensions after Philip 
the Fair further strengthened the reality of royal power. The 
theoretical implications inherent in divine right monarchy were 
explored as early as the fourteenth century and had been more or 
less fully developed by jurisconsuls during the sixteenth century. 
Little elaboration would take place after this time. When legal 
commentators of the seventeenth century wrote that Louis XIII was in
187
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principle absolutus legibus, or above all earthly law, they merely 
reiterated a view expressed by Beaumanoir in the thirteenth century 
and probably held before his time.1
Yet at the end of the sixteenth century, as in the thirteenth, 
the moral and practical limits to royal authority were extensive and 
very real to king and subjects alike. The prince had to take into 
account certain checks in exercising his divinely ordained obligations: 
every jurisconsul maintained that the sue of royal authority was 
legitimate only within the bounds of divine law, natural law, the 
fundamental law of the realm, or some combination of these. Inter­
pretation of the fundamental law varied, but all commentators 
agreed that the government of France was a monarchy in which sovereignty 
resided in the person of the king, that the Crown must devolve upon 
the nearest male Catholic heir, and that the king should not alienate 
the royal domain. Traditionalist writers, certainly in the majority 
before Richelieu's ministry, equally maintained that the lawful 
monarch must respect the principles of tres grand conseil and conserve 
the traditional customs, privileges, and rights of subjects, both 
individually and collectively. Every monarch should be aware of his 
divine obligation to "rule justly," that is, with due respect for the 
general principles of good kingship and with a scrupulous eye for the 
web of ties which held every estate, council, municipality, guild, 
province, corporation, and court of justice in obedience to the 
sovereign.
^livier-Martin, Histoire du droit francais, p. 346; Lemaire,
Les lois fondamentales, pp. 1-35; Francois Dumont, "Royaute Francaise 
et monarchie absolue au XVTIe siecle," XVIIe siecle, nos. 58-59 (1963), 
3-29; See, Les Idees politiques en France, pp. 7-11.
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How then did the "absolute monarchy" of Louis XIII diverge from 
the expectations of the traditionalists? One brief answer has been 
provided in a recent article by Francois Dumont.2 The absolutism of 
the seventeenth century was, he maintains, a "recovery of the true 
nature" of the essential monarchial principle through the abridge­
ment of traditional usages which restricted the exercise of that 
sovereignty.3 This fulfillment process was the determing charac­
teristic of the French monarchy of the seventeenth century, but it 
remained incomplete, even under Louis XIV. "Absolutism" in France 
never meant absolute power, for down to the Revolution kings 
continued to face limitations on the exercise of arbitrary power.
The "absolute monarchy" of Louis XIII was, therefore, only rela­
tively absolute in comparison with the usages of traditional monarchy.4
The contribution of Richelieu to the growth of French absolutism 
has been treated in a wealth of literature devoted to the Cardinal's 
personality, career, and the mechanisms of his ministry.5 Though the
'^3h Royaute Francaise et monarchie absolue au XVIIe siecle,"
3-29.
3Ibid., p. 18.
^Roland Mousnier and Fritz Hartung arrived at virtually the same 
conclusions in "Quelques problemes concemant la monarchie absolue," 
in Relazioni del X Congresso Intemazionale di Scienze Storiehe, Vol. 
IV, Storia Modema (Florence: 1956), pp. 3-55.
5See n. 1, p. . In addition to the works listed, mention 
should also be made of Gabriel Hanotaux1s multi-volume Histoire du 
Cardinal Richelieu (6 vols.; Paris, 1933-4-7). More recent publications 
can be found in the very thorough annotated bibliography prepared by 
W. F. Church, "Publications on Cardinal Richelieu Since 1945: A 
Bibliographical Study," in Journal of Modem History, XXXVII 
(Dec., 1965), 421-44.
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person and influence of Louis XIII remain less well known than those 
of his chief minister, it is now conventionally accepted that 
Richelieu's policies were largely responsible for the transformation 
which took place in the monarchy before mid-century. The contribution 
of Richelieu to this transformation lay not in the novel formulation 
of absolutistic theory, already well established by his time, nor in 
the development of new instruments of Crown authority, for the 
effectiveness of his agents had been proven by long usage. Rather, 
the singular ingredient provided by the Cardinal lay in his immense 
qualities of intellect, leadership, and ambition for power. These 
were allied with the relentless pursuit of a program to augment royal 
power in the interests of the glory and grandeur of the French 
State. Early in the Testament politique, the Cardinal succinctly 
laid down the four principle objectives of his ministry. "I 
promised him [the King]," Richelieu related, "to employ all my 
industry and all the authority that he pleased to give me to ruin 
the Huguenot party, humble the pride of the great nobility, reduce 
all his subjects to their duty and to raise his name among the 
nations to the place it should have."^
The moment for such a program was opportune. Upon being called 
into the council in April, 1624, Richelieu found respect for royal 
authority at a low ebb. A dozen years later, writing retrospectively 
in the Testament politique, Richelieu described the conditions he 
found prevalent in 1624:
^Richelieu, Testament politique, "Succincte narration," p. 95.
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When His Majesty resolved to give me entry into his councils and 
his confidence in the direction of his affairs, I could say with 
truth that the Huguenots divided the State with him, that the 
great nobility conducted themselves as if they were not his 
subjects, and the most powerful provincial governors as if they 
were sovereign in their charges. I could say that the bad 
example of one and the other was so prejudicial to this kingdom 
that the most regulated companies (the parlementsl sensed their 
derangement and in certain cases diminished your legitimate 
authority as much as they could in order to bring theirs beyond 
the bounds of reason. . . .  I could say that foreign alliances 
were mismanaged, individual interests preferred to those of the 
public and, in a word, the dignity of the royal majesty was so 
disparaged and so different from that which it should be through 
the fault of those conducting your affairs that it was almost 
impossible to recognize it.?
By this time the French crisis had been deepening for a decade;
during these years the monarchy had drifted without real direction in
spite of Louis' intense desire to be the image of his respected and
effective father. Some of the country's problems could be attributed
to economic conditions which accompanied the general European crisis,
but weakness and division in the innermost circles of government
encouraged disorder, increased mismanagement of finances, and lessened
the prestige of the monarchy. Louis, while intelligent and willing,
was crippled by severe psychological imbalances which prevented him
from adequately filling his father's shoes. Insecure and suspicious,
timorous and yet ever desirous of esteem, Louis represented a mass
of contradictions within himself which infected the administration
of the kingdom. It was essential that he rely on firm and able
ministers, yet until 1624 Louis had been either unable to find such
men or unwilling to submit to their tutelage. The chief influence in
Louis' life, and thus also in the councils of State, remained the
domineering and inept Marie de Medieis. Under these circumstances
7Ibid., pp. 94-95.
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it is not surprising that Richelieu entered an arena characterized 
hy cross purposes and absence of long range policies. Although the 
uncertainty and conflicting currents at the highest levels of 
French government remained throughout the first years of Richelieu's 
ministry, the thrust of his policies soon became clear and, after 
1630, dominated the entire French political scene.
The essential statement of Richelieu's response to the diffi­
culties of the kingdom can be found in his Testament politique, pre­
pared during the 1630's and dedicated to Louis. Unlike Richelieu's 
M&moires, which were intended as a massive history of the reign, the 
Testament politique combined documents, personal remembrances, and 
oral information with projects of reform, notes on the parlements, 
and maxims of conduct into a unique statement of Richelieu's 
political philosophy.® As he noted in his dedicatory epistle to 
Louis, the Testament was
conceived in the shortest and clearest terms of which I am 
capable, as much to follow my own inclinations and customary 
manner of writing as to accommodate myself to the temperament
The long and acrimonious debate over the authenticity of the 
Testament dating to the eighteenth century has now been reduced to a 
question of the exact mechanism of its preparation. The most con­
vincing proof of the authenticity of the Testament was provided by 
Gabriel Hanotaux in 1880 through the publication of Maximes d'Etat 
et fragments politiques du Cardinal Richelieu. The phraseology of 
the maxims and many passages in the Testament are almost identical, 
and Hanotaux drew them from an original manuscript with marginal 
notations indicating their inclusion in the Testament. For the 
origin and composition of the Testament, see the Introduction to 
the Louis Andre edition and extensive commentaries listed in Church's 
"Publications On Cardinal Richelieu Since 1945."
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of Your Majesty, who has always desired that one come to 
the point in a few words and who gives as much credence to 
the substance of matters as he distrusts the long discourses 
that most men use to express them. 9
The Testament is, therefore, a highly personalized rendition of views
Richelieu though necessary to transmit to his sovereign "for the
regulation and guidance of your realm."10 Never theoretical, these
views were essentially expressive of Richelieu's experiences in the
hard school of political necessity. As Henri See has remarked,
"they expose his doctrine, scarecely doing any more than expressing
his political practices."^ S€e's observation is bolstered by the
clear connection between the Testament and Richelieu's maxims of
statecraft, discovered and published in 1880 by Gabriel Hanotaux.^
Of the ideas which made up the Cardinal's Weltanschauung, the
prism through which all others should be seen is the nature and
expression of authority within the State. Richelieu was first and
foremost an authroitarian. "In fact," writes a recent commentator,
"it may be said that an all-encompassing concept of authority
provided the foundation of his entire political system."1^ As an
aristocratic high Churchman moving in the intellectual currents of
^Richelieu, Testament politique, "Au Roi," p. 91.
10Ibid., pp. 90-91.
1:LSee, Les idees politiques, p. 48.
^As MflYimfis d'Etat et fragments politiques du Cardinal Richelieu, 
ed. Gabriel Hanotaux (ParTs, 1880). ’See supra, p
^Church, Richelieu and Reason of State, p. 83.
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the Baroque milieu, it is hardly surprising that Richelieu found the 
highest expression of authority in the time-honored principles of 
divine right monarchy. Inherent in the concept of divine right was 
a theoretical framework which provided for a pre-existing, eternal, 
and divinely ordained hierarchy of authority extending from the 
highest to the lowest members of society. This hierarchy, of course, 
agreed closely with the realities of society and institutions as they 
existed in the Cardinal's time. At the head of the earthly hierarchy 
was the king, "the true image of God," whose "monarchial government 
more than any other imitates that of God . . . , all sacred and 
profane political philosophers teaching that this type of regime 
surpasses all those which have ever been put into practice."1^
Above all other considerations it was important that the king 
be powerful. Richelieu put this in straightforward terms. "Power," 
he wrote at the beginning of a long passage in the Testament, "is 
one of the most necessary things to the grandeur of kings and to the 
success of their government, and those who have the principal 
conduct of a State are particularly obliged to omit nothing which 
might contribute to rendering their master so authorized.Power 
took on many forms, all of which contributed to the entirety of the 
prince's respect and public image. The prince should be powerful 
by his reputation; he should maintain sufficient military forces
•^Richelieu, Testament politique, p. 307.
15Ibid., p. 372.
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to ensure respect among other princes; he should enjoy adequate 
revenues; he should possess the hearts of his subjects.
Richelieu realized very well that the human element in monarchs 
was often distracted or disinterested in the exercise of power, and 
he made provision for it. "If the sovereign cannot or does not wish 
to have his eye continually on the map or the compass, reason makes 
it desirable that he give the charge of it to some individual above 
all the others," to a first minister who would have "superior 
authority," because "there is nothing more dangerous in a State than 
various equal authorities in the administration of affairs."^
Though the minister might be powerful, as Richelieu was, and have 
the principal conduct of affairs, as Richelieu did, ultimate 
authority still resided in the king: "V/hatever authority that a
minister might have, it cannot be great enough to produce certain 
effects, which require the voice of a sovereign and an absolute 
p o w e r . T h e  unity and direction provided by one person were 
essential. All government of many persons was to be avoided, as 
reason
showed clearly that that which is committed into the care of 
many was much less assured than decisions of one . . . because, 
while there are many wise men of probity, the number of fools 
and evil ones is always the greater. Experience teaches every­
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Indeed, Richelieu recommended that the maximum number of royal 
councillors should he four, and that one should have superior authority 
"which moves all the others while being moved only by his own intel­
ligence. The recommendation matches almost perfectly the actual 
power structure which emerged in Louis1 council after 1635, when 
Richelieu directed the activities of two surintendants des finances ~ 
and two favored secretaires d'Etat who formed the core of the 
Conseil d1Etat.
Absolute royal power did not mean despotism or the abuse of 
power, for the king was subject to the will of God, to high moral 
obligations, and to the satisfaction of the public interest. The king 
should constantly be aware that his power is from on high; kings as 
kings "are obliged to carefully use their power to the ends for 
which they received it from heaven, and what is more, not to abuse 
it by extending the exercise of their royalty beyond the limits 
which are prescribed to them. "2<‘1 The power of kings also had 
practical limitations, for the indiscriminate use of power would 
cause the loss of it. As Richelieu warned the king in 1629, "kings 
who avail themselves of their authority to despoil or oppress those 
who are inferior to them in force, without any right other than the 
force of their arms, will lose themselves by the abuse and the 
excessive extent of their power."21
19Ibid., p. 306.
20Richelieu, Lettres, III, "Avis au Roy," 193-94*
21Ibid.
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Above all, the public interest should be the sole criteria for the
exercise of regal authority; public interest should always prevail
over private ones:
Public interests should be the unique objective of a prince and 
his councillors, or, at least, both are obliged to give them 
special consideration and to weigh them more than those of 
individuals. It is impossible to conceive of the good that a 
prince and those of whom he makes use in his affairs may do if 
they religiously follow this principle, and one cannot imagine 
the evil that happens to a State when private interests take 
precedence over public ones and the latter are ordered according
to  th e  fo rm e r .22
Below the king ranged a great interlocking mosaic of units 
arranged in an organic whole which made up the State. This definition 
of the State is particularly important in light of his philosophy of 
reason of State. While not spelled out in the Testament or other 
writings, it appears that for Richelieu the State and society were 
one and the same. The State, then, is the assembly of constituted 
bodies of which the kingdom is composed, the ensemble of communities 
not the government and the functionaries opposed to the rest of the 
nation. Richelieu's conventional organization of the State and its 
units is apparent in Part I of the Testament, in which the minister 
successively treated the clergy, nobility, and Third Estate. Each 
of these orders had a well-defined place in the social pyramid; to 
each belonged certain duties, privileges, customs, and traditions.
The three great social orders were further subdivided into lesser 
groups, corporations, and colleges, each with an established and
22Richelieu, Testament politique, p. 330.
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divinely ordained niche in the scheme of things. The royal officers
found themselves in the uppermost level of the Third Estatej below
them ranked men of commerce, professional people, and peuples has.
Regardless of station in life, he it high or low, the individual
could only find fulfillment in his place, performing his God-given
duties to the best of his ability and obeying those superior to him.
Obedience was crucial, since around it hinged the good of the polity:
Kings are kings only as long as their authority is recognized 
and they demonstrate their favor. They cannot ensure the effect 
of these if they are not religiously obeyed, since an individual's 
disobedience has the potential to disrupt a design from which 
the public would receive much benefit. Obedience is the true 
characteristic of the subject.2^
In the early seventeenth century, however, Frenchmen of all classes
were not in obedience to the Crown,* they were, in Richelieu's view,
oblivious to the needs of the State, which, in effect, came more
more to mean the interests of the king and the Bourbon dynasty. ''One
of the faults of France," he wrote as a maxim, "is that no one is
within his duty. The soldier speaks of what his captain should do.
The captain imagines faults in his mafttre de camp. Neither the one
nor the other are doing their duty."2^ This behavior was especially
evident during the decade of the 1620's, and it is worth noting that
three of the four major goals announced for the Cardinal's ministry
23lbid., pp. 150-235.
^Richelieu, Lettres, II, 321. A marginal notation on articles 
proposed to the Assembly of Notables in 1626.
25Richelieu, Maximes d'Etat, maxim LV, pp. 33-34. A similar 
passage can be found in the Testament politique, p. 300.
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at the beginning of the Testament were directly concerned with the 
submission of Frenchmen to royal authority. Achievement of the 
fourth objective, international glory and grandeur for the King 
of France, was also highly dependent on accomplishment of domestic 
tranquillity.
Out of Richelieu's view of royal power and the definition of the 
State came the famous doctrine of reason of State. Phrased in its 
simplest and broadest definition, reason for State meant the appli­
cation of man's natural rational faculties in guiding the State's 
affairs. In Richelieu's words, "Man having been made reasonable, he 
should act only by reason, since to do otherwise would be contrary to 
his nature and thus contrary to He who is the author of i t . I t  
logically followed that reason should be the guiding principle for 
the statesman; to employ the capacity of reason meant to institute 
the reign of reason in every action and "to wish only for that which 
is reasonable and just."27 Strict adherence to this principle 
could only result in orderliness and obedience, since "it is impos­
sible that subjects will not respect a prince if they know that 
reason is the guide for all his actions."2® In essence, Richelieu 
held that "authority constrains obedience, but reason persuades for
2%ichelieu, Testament politique, p. 325. 
27Ibid.
28Ibid., 326.
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Reason of State was, however, nmch more than reason guiding the 
State. It actually meant the establishment of dual standards of 
justice and morality concerning private actions and those involving 
the welfare of the State. Because of the philosophical and ethical 
considerations implicit in the concept, voluminious commentaries 
have been produced on the morality of reason of State. For the 
purposes of this discussion, only the application of the doctrine to 
issues affecting the Parlement of Paris will be examined in detail. 
These issues were extremely important, even critical, however, 
because they represented the nexus of the struggle between absolutism 
and the usages of the traditional monarchy. It was in the adminis­
tration of justice that reason of State found its purest and most 
contested expression, for it was through the apparatus of justice 
that the laws of the State were enforced, that obedience of subjects 
was secured, and that the interests of the State and all within it 
were fulfilled.
In Richelieu's vocabulary, as in that of his contemporaries, the 
concept of "justice” included not only the adjudication of private 
disputes between members of the polity, but also the function of the 
police of the kingdom, the maintenance of order, and the pursuit of 
certain administrative obligations. Taken in this broad sense, the 
highest responsibility of the French Crown, as with all governments, 
was the maintenance of justice within the State. This was, according 
to Richelieu, a divine commission, accorded to kings and magistrates 
for the preservation of the common good:
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God has not wished to leave vengeance in the hands of 
individuals, because under this pretext each would exercise his 
passions and trouble the public peace. He has put it into 
the hands of kings and magistrates, according to the rules 
that He has prescribed for it, because without example and 
chastisement there is no injustice and no violence which will 
not be impudently committed to the prejudice of the public 
repose.
This concept of justice also had strong overtones of social
conservatism. As an aristocrat, a Christian, and a Churchman, Richelieu
held it was the king's obligation and duty to preserve the status quo
in society, with each order and estate in its traditional place.
Reduction of orders and individuals to obedience did not mean an
equivalent reduction of social privileges; to the contrary, enforcement
of justice meant preservation of the existing social order:
As a whole can subsist only through the union of its parts in 
their natural order and positions, so this great realm cannot 
flourish if Your Majesty does not eompell the bodies of which 
it is composed to continue in their order, the Church holding 
first place, the nobility the second, and the officials who 
lead the people the third.
Here Richelieu was specifically concerned about the threat to the
integrity of the State presented by "certain officiers" of the
magistracy who, with the attitudes of nouveaux arrivistes, were
pretending to an unjustified prominence in the social and political
order:
I say this {the above] boldly, because it is both important 
and just to arrest the course of the enterprises of certain 
officiers who, inflated with pride, be it because of great 
property that they possess or the authority which their 
official duties give them, are so presumptuous as to want to
^^Richelieu, Lettres, III, "Avis au Roy," p. 195. 
^Richelieu, Testament politique, p. 256.
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have the first place when they should only have the third. This 
is so contrary to reason and contrary to the welfare of your 
service that it is absolutely necessary to stop the progress of 
such undertakings, since otherwise France can be nothing more 
than she has been . . .  a monstrous body which, as such, can 
have neither subsistance nor duration.32
This reference was almost certainly made concerning the hautes roMns
in the parlements and financial courts who in Richelieu's day were in
the process of elbowing their way into the Second Estate.
From the nature of justice and the regal duty of enforcing it,
the Cardinal went on to the most effective means of administration of
police and justice. In conducting the kingdom's affairs, Richelieu
argued that two principles, the use of rewards or punishments, should
guide both minister and monarch. The latter principle, however, was
to be much preferred over the former and, in the event, inspired the
policy most often followed in public matters. "I put punishments,”
he wrote in the Testament, "before rewards, because if it were
necessary to do without one or the other, it would be better to
dispense with the last rather than with the first.”33 Here Richelieu
again manifested a fundamental suspicion of human nature:
Experience teaches those with long practice in this world that 
men quickly forget rewards and, when heaped with them, they 
expect even more, and often become both ungrateful and ambitious 
at the same time. It teaches that punishments are a surer means 
of constraining a person within his duty, since people are less 
likely to forget what has made an impression on their emotions. 
This is more powerful over most men than reason, which has little 
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The point is made plain: what mattered was that the law he enforced
in the interest of obedience. Many times Richelieu reiterated the
certitude of punishment as a restraint to the violation of law. In
1629 he advised Louis that "kings should be severe and exact to
punish those who trouble the police and violate the laws of their
kingdom."35 Indulgence, he later wrote in the Testament, "had often
brought it the kingdon to very great and deplorable circumstances."3&
Not to rigorously enforce the laws of the State was to undermine the
authority of the king, disrupt the body of the State, and lead to
further disorders. As Richelieu wrote to Louis in 1629,
It is so dangerous to act with indifference to the execution of 
the laws of the State that I can only remark that it seems His 
Majesty could not have enough warmth and vigor for the obser­
vation of his, particularly the edict on duels. One could truly 
say that His Majesty and his council will answer for all the 
souls lost in this diabolical way if they could stop them by 
the rigor of penalties due such a crime. There is nothing so 
ordinary [now] as to commit an error in a matter of State, as to 
disobey a commandment of the king, as to ignore the the exe­
cution of his edicts, his ordinances, and arrgts of his justice. 
Up until now such disorders have been committed with impunity, 
but deficiencies of this nature are of such consequence by 
their example and aftermath that if one is not extraordinarily 
severe in chastising them, the estates cannot subsist.37
Severity was never pleasant, and it would be far more agreeable to do
without it, but other choices were even less palatable. It was much
preferable to be strict with the enforcement of law than to live in
a state where the laws were weakly enforced or enforced erratically
and without reason:
-^Richelieu, Lettres, III, "Avis au Roy," p. 196. 
36Ri.chelieu, Testament politique, p. 340.
^Richelieu, Lettres, III, "Avis au Roy," pp. 192-93-
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It is, said the consul Fronto, a great pity to live under a 
prince who never wants to remit the rigor of the law. But 
it is still greater [a pity] to live in the country of another, 
under whom all things are allowed and who, "by pusillanimity or 
nonchalance, pardons without discretion all things done there 
contrary to law and to reason.38
Enforcement of law required not only certainty and severity but 
application without favoritism, for one of the worst evils that 
could come to any state was a government which employed favor over 
justice and reason. As the minister wrote in the Testament, "A 
kingdom is in a bad state when the throne of this false goddess 
(favor) is raised above reason."39 The same thought is projected in 
another maxim which reveals the close association, even inter­
changeability, in the minister’s mind between reason and justice:
"Very often in the court of princes, the throne of justice is set 
a step below that of favor."4°
Consideration of all these factors meant that the administration 
of justice was a delicate matter, for prudence, insight, wisdom, and 
resiliancy of will were all requisite. The king must be neither 
too lenient and bring on disorder, nor find himself a tyrant by 
excessive punishments. The question of prudence was particularly 
important in crimes involving the State where the good of all was 
involved:
For example, he [the prince] can pardon someone of a passing 
thought of troubling the State, if he is truly repentant of it, 
and if he has the appearance of not repeating the error. But
^Richelieu, Maximes d'Etat, maxim CXXXIX, p. 63.
^Ibid., maxim CXVII, p. 53, n. 8; Richelieu, Testament politique, 
p. 361.---
4°Ibid., maxim CXVII, p. 53.
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if he recognizes that one is continuing in his malevolent 
design, he is obliged in all conscience to punish it, and he 
cannot pass it by without trespass. He can remit a disobe­
dience of one of his subjects, but if by reason one could see 
that in the future he would abuse this pardon to boldly scorn 
his commandments, if he believes that by forgetting this fault 
it will give cause for others to disobey after his example, to 
the prejudice and repose of the State, he is obliged to punish 
this crime, and cannot exempt it without committing a greater 
one.41
From these assertions it was only a small and logical step to
distinguish between crimes involving the State and others of a
purely private nature. In making this distinction, the application
of reason of State led to a double standard of justice which
Richelieu was unafraid to express in the baldest of terms. The
passage in the Testament enouncing this doctrine is based on earlier
Tnfl yt ms of State which Richelieu had probably maintained early in his
career. The final version reads:
Ordinances and laws are wholly useless if they are not 
followed by vigorous execution, and although in the course of
ordinary cases justice requires authenticated proof, it is not
the same in those which concern the State, because in such 
cases what appears to be conjecture must sometimes be held 
sufficiently convincing, since plots and conspiracies formed 
against the public well-being are ordinarily conducted with such 
cunning and secrecy that there is never any conclusive evidence 
until they strike, by which time they are beyond remedy. It 
is necessary in such occasions to sometimes begin by acting 
whereas in all others it is necessary to have enlightement 
through due process of law by witness or by irreproachable
evidence.
^Richelieu, Lettres, III, "Avis au Roy," p. 194-
^Richelieu, Testament politique, pp. 343-44- Earlier versions 
of the same philosophy can be found in two maxims of State published 
by Hanotaux; the passage of the Testament politique is certainly 
developed from these maxims which were incorporated almost verbatim. 
The first of these maxims reads: "In affairs of State, it is not
like others; in the one it is necessary to begin by information 
through legal process, in the other by execution and possession." 
Hanotaux notes that this paragraph in the original was struck out
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The implications in the maintenance of such doctrines -were 
manifestly great and are made all the more significant since 
Richelieu unhesitatingly pursued them throughout his career. The 
minister was aware of the dangers inherent in the application of 
reason of State to matters of justice, and he sought to qualify 
and justify the risks. In defending his philosophy of justice, 
he wrote that
this [passage above] seems dangerous and in fact it has something 
perilous which can only be corrected by the perception of a 
judicious and penetrating mind which, wise in the course of 
affairs, should certainly know the future by the present, as 
mediocre judgments through the observation of things. But in 
as much as the consequence of this maxim is dangerous only 
for the individual, it does not cease being admissible, seeing 
that the loss of individuals is not comparable to the public 
well-being and the danger can fall only on some individuals 
whereas the public receives its benefit and advantage. This 
maxim is good for great minds and could open a path to tyranny 
to mediocre ones.
Essentially, then, Richelieu was cognizant of the dangers in his
position, but he was also confident that a minister of superior
perception could negate the attendant risks through prudence and
by stopping short of the most arbitrary measures. The lynchpins of
with a marginal notation "Testament." Hanotaux, Maximes d'Etat, maxim 
LXXX, p. 42. The second maxim is similar to the first: "In the course 
of ordinary affairs, justice requires clarity and evidence of proof. 
But it is not the same in affairs of State where it is necessary to 
act siunnw rerum. Often conjectures must take the place of proof, 
since great designs and notable enterprises never make themselves 
known other than by success or attempt which can then receive no 
remedy." Hanotaux, Ma-rimas d'Etat, marim CXXTV, p. 56.
4%ichelieu, Maximes d'Etat, maxim CXXV, p. 57. An almost 
identical passage can be found in the Testament politique, p. 344.
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the system were the perspicacity and judgment of the prince and his 
councillor without which reason of State would collapse into 
despotism.
This brief summary of Richelieu's political philosophy illus­
trates the extent to which Richelieu was willing to violate traditional 
values and processes of justice in the kingdom. They are also 
suggestive of a novel standard of political justice raised up to 
justify the abridgement of historic limits on royal power. These 
standards, sometimes defended under the guise of State needs, have 
often been held to be unwarranted and unconstitutional in the context 
of French precedents. Henri See, twentieth century student of 
French political ideology, has gone so far as to remark that "that 
which is striking in the government of Richelieu is a very marked 
tendency to despotism. Without hesitation and without scruples, 
he put himself above all legal forms.However debatable these, or 
other moralistic comments may be, the result of the Cardinal's 
ministry was a ruthless distortion of previous procedures of justice, 
a warpage of customary usages in favor of the immediate needs of 
the monarchy and the State.
Nowhere was the Cardinal's employment of the mechanisms of 
justice in the establishment of absolutism more evident than in his 
development and application of the charge of lgse-majeste. At the 
beginning of Richelieu's ministry, the definition of treasonous be­
havior had been subject to hazy interpretation and considerable
4^Les jdees politiques, p. 48.
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flexibility. Before the seventeenth century, charges of lgse-
majeste had usually been leveled against noble conspirators, rebellious
Huguenots, and regicides. In the absence of any clear distinction at
law between the security of royal persons and that of the commonweal,
a great many rather ordinary crimes could also be construed as
l§se-majest§ if they flagrantly contravened the king's will or seemed
to threaten public well-being. The charge could be used to describe
violations of dueling laws, and it served equally well against
perturbateurs du repos public, or "disturbers of the king's peace."
Most often, however, it carried implications of treason. An ordinance
issued at Villers-Cotterets in 1539 attempted to define the offense as
"conspiring, plotting, or acting against our person, our descendants,
or against the common weal (rgpublique) of our kingdom."45 Forty years
later, the Ordinance of Blois elaborated the meaning of lese-majeste
by applying it to those who
henceforth enter into any association, collusion, agreement, or 
offensive or defensive tie with princes, potentates, republics, 
or communities within or without the kingdon, directly or 
indirectly by themselves or through intermediaries, verbally or 
in writing, or who make any levy or muster of gens de guerre 
without our express permission, leave, and license.56”
A declaration issued shortly after Henry IV's death reinforced
prohibitions against private levying of troops, amassing of arms and
munitions, or establishing strongpoints.47
^Isambert, Anciennes lois frangaises, XII, 590. This edict 
is not to be confused with the longer and more famous Ordinance of 
Villers-Cotterets of the same year.
46Ibid., XIV, 424, art. 183.
47Ibid., XVI, 6-8.
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Thus defined at the beginning of Richelieu's ministry, l§se- 
majeste provided a ready legal means of suppressing the disloyalty 
which then plagued the kingdon. The Cardinal understood quite clearly 
that the charge would play a large part in his plans for strengthening 
royal authority over insubordinate subjects, and soon after entering 
the council he began to formulate recommendations for clarification 
and expansion of the concept of treaonous behavior. These proposals 
were among a package of reforms presented to an Assembly of Notables 
held at the end of 1626.4^ The Assembly's timing was opportune for 
a discussion of high treason. The Chalais conspiracy had been broken 
during the preceding summer and a leading conspirator, the comte de 
Chalais, executed in August. Deputies to the Assembly were carefully 
selected to produce the desired results. Dominated by thirty 
judicial officials of the sovereign courts, but also attended by a 
baker's dozen from each of the First and Second Estates, the makeup 
of the Assembly served as a useful sounding board and propaganda 
agency for a wide variety of reforms.49 The preponderance of 
judicial officials among the nobility increased chances that possibly 
controversial revisions in the definition of lSse-majeste would find 
a sympathetic reception, and in fact this proved to be the case.
4®0n the Assembly see Jeanne Petit, L'Assemblee des notables, 
1626-1627 (Paris, 1937), and the account of Paul Ardier, L'Assemblle 
des notables tenue a Paris es annees 1626 et 1627 (Paris, 1652).
49>rhe delegates are listed in Petit, L'Assemblee des notables, 
Apprendix III, pp. 233-4-5. The Parlement of Paris sent three 
representatives: First President Nicolas de Verdun, second president
Jerome de Hacqueville, and procureur general Mathieu Mole.
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In the early weeks of 1627, with the Assembly in full swing, 
Richelieu delivered several specific measures against conspiracy.^ 
The Cardinal's objectives were twofold: to widen and sharpen older
ordinances regarding treason, and to muster popular opinion behind 
a tough policy of enforcement. To directly propose such before an 
assembly of judicial officials alone would probably have carried 
easily, since the judges' esteem for harsh laws was notorious, but 
objections could be expected from the nobles and Churchmen present. 
Accordingly, Richelieu adopted a devious manoeuvre: it seemed to
him, he told the Assembly, "more expedient to impose severe penalties 
and to immediately enforce them without moderation than to retain 
the austerity of the former ones, to which, nevertheless, one never 
intended to stoop.Marginal notations on original drafts, though, 
reveal that the Cardinal probably never had any sincere intention of 
leniency. 2^ in any case, the lawyers of the parlements carried the
The entire program of measures complete with Richelieu's 
marginal notations on them are presented in Lettres, II, 315-22. The 
printed version is based on D'Avenel's examination of five copies of 
the propositions. See Lettres, III, 315, N. 1.
^Ardier, L'AssemblSe des notables, p. 132.
5^ See, for example, the notation on one manuscript draft beside 
the article on disobedience that "There is a complete proposition 
under the title of amassing arms and levies. It seems to me that it 
is not necessary to think of lesser penalties, but to accumulate all 
and especially to render the deprivation of charges more prompt and 
without semblance of trial fsans figure de procSsI." Richelieu, 
Lettres, II, 321, n. 3- On another copy of his proposals he wrote 
that "Kings are kings only as long as their authority is recognized 
and they demonstrate their favor. They are unable to ensure the 
effects of these unless they are religiously obeyed, since 
disobedience by one individual is capable of arresting the course of 
a plan whose effects will benefit the public." Lettres, II, 321.
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day for severity.The Assembly decided to retain all the rigor of 
the old ordinances— an infamous death with confiscation of property 
and offices— and asked for their enforcement. In this way Richelieu 
managed the public's approval for his politics of repression while 
shifting some of the opprobrium for such policies onto the shoulders 
of the Assembly.
It only remained for the Assembly to sharpen the definition of 
crimes of lSse-majeste. Without much discussion a comprehensive 
article was drafted conforming closely to former motifs. To be 
declared contumacious rebels liable to confiscation of body, property, 
and charges were all those who raised troops without the king's 
permission; who amassed reserves of arms, powder, or lead; who founded 
or kept cannon without royal commission; who entered into leagues or 
associations among subjects or foreigners; those who fortified cities, 
strongpoints, or chateaux; those who might hold public or secret 
assemblies without permission. The last provision was even extended 
to the governors and lieutenants-generals of the provinces, great and 
powerful noblemen who often used their posts as springboards to 
rebellion. Similarly declared rebels were any French subjects who 
departed the kingdom without first notifying local magistrates. 
Finally, tacked onto the end of these proposals was a genuine 
innovation. All slanderers, authors, editors, and printers of 
defamatory libels or pamphlets could be charged with lSse-majeste.
53 ^As indicated by Petit, Assemblee des notables, p. 197, n. 9,
the presidents of Rennes, Pau, and Rouen favored more severe
penalties. The reaction of the deputies from Paris is not recorded.
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Thus formulated by the Assembly, these provisions were incorporated 
into law in Articles 170-78 of the Code Michaud of 1629, and even 
though the Code was not put into effect, its statutes represented 
French law on lese-majest§ for the remainder of the reign.
Having secured a firm legal foundation on which to act, Richelieu 
operated within accepted law whenever possible but did not hesitate to 
choose wholly arbitrary measures when these were necessary to further 
his objectives. Louis' full confidence came late in 1630, and after 
this time Richelieu repeatedly employed accusations of lSse-majeste 
against his own political enemies as well as those plotting against the 
monarchy. The two categories were hardly differentiated in the 
minister's eyes, but conspirators often had another view. For them 
it was not a question of disloyalty to Louis but resistance to an 
erosion of traditional feudal values brought on by a tyrannical 
Cardinal. No serious moral dilemma arose in instances of outright 
armed rebellion, as in the due de Montmorency's raising of Languedoc 
in 1632, but grave questions were raised in the minds of many when 
Gaston d'Orleans fled the kingdom in 1631. Negotiations with foreign 
princes and domestic treason soon ensued. The King's brother and heir 
was above prosecution for lgse-majeste, but Richelieu ruthlessly 
pursued his clients, followers, and servants who had chosen allegiance 
to him over loyalty to Louis. Feudal principles had always upheld 
such behavior as justified, but in Richelieu's view the claims of the 
State were higher than those of personal loyalty.54
^W. F. Church has brilliantly developed this theme in 
Richelieu and Reason of State, pp. 176-84-
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The increase in royal power envisioned by the Cardinal 
inevitably meant a confrontation with the Parlement of Paris which 
represented the highest and most prestigious judicial and administra­
tive corporation below the royal council. If the Cardinal's goals 
for the kingdom were to be met, an adjustment of the traditional 
role of the court within the structure of the monarchy would be 
necessary. Since the court's heritage included a voice in the 
management of royal affairs, Richelieu found it necessary to curtail 
its interference in matters of State and to whittle down its 
independent councilliar role. Yet the Cardinal's philosophy is 
regard to the Parlement and its role within the monarchy was not 
determined solely by considerations of royal power, the implemen­
tation of reason of State, or any calculated readjustment of 
relations between Crown and court. 5^ Indeed, his outlook on, and 
treatment of, the Parlement represented a sophisticated blend of 
the realization of ideal goals for power with an aristocratic 
familial background and a high measure of shrewd political know-how.
By birth and genealogical lineage Richelieu was, and always 
considered himself, an aristocrat. His father and paternal ancestors 
were authentic, if humble, noblesse d'epee from Poitou; among his 
forebears was Francoise de Rochechouart, Richelieu's paternal 
grandmother, a representative of one of the great families of the 
realm. On his mother's side, however, Richelieu had to acknowledge
5%or was it largely dependent on the circumstances of the 
moment, an impression generated by George D'Avenel in his massive 
four volume Richelieu et la monarchie absolue.
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members of non-aristoeratie robe families from the Parlement of Paris. 
The Cardinal's mother, Suzanne de la Porte, was the daughter of 
Francois de la Porte, a distinguished avocat before the court. 
Richelieu's maternal grandmother was Claude Bochart, member of an 
outstanding parlementaire dynasty which, beginning in 14-66, sent 
seven consecutive generations into the sovereign courts of the king.-^ 
The influence of old family ties apparently remained strong 
after Richelieu assumed a political career. In 1628 Jean V Bochart, 
Seigneur de Champigny and de Noroy, Richelieu's distant relative, 
was made First President of the Parlement, even though he had not 
previously been a president & mortier and had pursued an active 
career with the royal council as an intendant and surintendant des 
finances rather than rising through the ranks of the Parlement. 
According to at least one source, Bochart's appointment as First 
President was made through the influence of Richelieu.^7
-^Gabriel Hanotaux and Due de la Force, Histoire du Cardinal de 
Richelieu (6 vols.; Paris, 1933-47), I, 41-43; Francois Bluch, 
L'Orlgine des magistrats du Parlement de Paris au XVIIIe si&cle 
rParis, 1954), pp. 95-96; Jean-Baptiste de l'Hennite-Souliers and 
Francois Blanchard, Les eloges de tous les premiers presidens du 
Parlement de Paris depuis qu'il a este rendu sedentaire jusques a 
present; ensemble leurs genealogies, epitaphes, armes et blasons~ 
(Paris, 1645), pp. 85-86.
57B.N. Ms. fr._11427, "Memoires sur les families du Parlement, 
de la Chambre des comptes, de la Cour des aydes, du Grand Conseil 
et du Conseil," fol. 60, notes of Champigny "that Cardinal Richelieu, 
his relative, made him surintendant des finances, then First President 
of the Parlement in 1628." The appointment remained largely an honor, 
as Champigny never actually presided over the Parlement. His duties 
were assumed by Nicolas Le Jay, the second president 8. mortier.
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Of noble extraction on his father's side, Richelieu naturally 
assumed the social and political attitudes associated with his 
noblesse and with the station of a bishop and cardinal. Important 
among these attitudes was one common to both upper estates, that the 
royal officers in general and the robins in particular were parvenus 
intent on climbing the social ladder by any means possible. Such 
class attitudes are most plainly reflected in the Testament politique 
in which, as has been seen, the Cardinal demonstrated a certain 
condescension and even arrogance towards those of the Third Estate.
Yet however imbued with the aristocratic outlook of his order towards 
ordinary officers and magistrates of the robe, Richelieu had to be 
able to master his hauteur in favor of a more realistic appraisal 
of the standing, merit, and ability of the judges in the Parlement 
and other sovereign companies. However ambiguous the social status 
of the judges in these courts may have been in the early seventeenth 
century, no one doubted their elevated standing. Elite social 
position was reinforced by enormous political power and prestige, so 
that as a realistic and pragmatic statesman Richelieu was compelled 
to grant the sovereign judges a sincere, if grudging, respect.
Respect of this sort can be found in the Cardinal’s comments upon the 
death of the famous and very able Achille III de Harlay in 1616. 
Richelieu devoted a long passage in his M&noires to eulogizing the 
virtues of the late First President, noting his probity, integrity, 
and "inflexible courage in matters of justice.
-^Armand Jean du Plessis, Cardinal Due de Richelieu, Memoires, ed. 
Petitot and Monmerque, Collection des memoires relatifs a l'histoire 
de France (10 vols.; Paris, 1823), I> 379-80.
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men retained passions of loyalty towards their former institution.
It is probable, though, that experience with the court instilled in 
them some professional understanding and respect, if not loyalty, for 
their former colleagues. These feelings were doubtlessly reinforced 
by a web of familial ties with sons, sons-in-law, brothers, brothers- 
in-law, uncles, and other relatives serving in the Parlement.
Out of the attitudes associated with Richelieu’s robe and 
aristocratic ancestry evolved a technique of negotiation, compromise, 
management, and supervision in the interests of royal authority of 
the State. As in other areas Richelieu's parlementaire policy was 
completely dependent upon Louis' authority, confidence, and co­
operation. Until 1630 these factors were uncertain, but after the 
Day of Dupes they matured into a working relationship in which 
Richelieu fulfilled what the King desired but was incapable of 
achieving himself. In foreign affairs this meant statesmanship dedi­
cated to the greater grandeur of France; in dealing with the men in 
the Palais de Justice it meant sustained application, a shrewd 
awareness of human nature, and the facility for daily give-and-take 
while keeping long-range goals in mind.
Louis himself had none of these qualities. In trying to deal 
with the judges' legal dodges, severe weaknesses of Louis' personality 
were revealed to everyone around him and even to himself in 
moments of introspection. At the bottom of these limitations lay 
contradictory psychological shortcomings in the King's character.
On the one hand, Louis had inherited a troubled, insecure, and 
mercurial temperament incapable of calm, rational, and methodical
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Thus by family background and social station, Richelieu entered 
public service with a due respect for.the high robe as a profession and 
for the magistrates’ traditional place in the monarchy. Among other . 
factors the influence of robe personnel among Richelieu’s associates 
should not be discounted, though the degree of this influence is 
certainly debatable. Many of Richelieu's creatures had at one time 
been associated with the milieu of the Parlement which supplied 
many royal administrators. This was true, for example, of Pierre V 
Seguier who had been a president A mortier from an important 
parlementaire family before being made garde des sceaux in 1633 and 
Chancellor in 1636. Three of the four most important and influential 
royal councillors* after 1635 also came from a parlementaire family.
The Le Bouthilliers, who supplied two of Richelieu's most devoted 
creatures in the Conseil d'Etat, Claude and Leon le Bouthillier, 
were trained in the Parlement. Claude le Bouthillier, whom Richelieu 
helped make secretaire d'Etat in 1628 and surintendant des finances 
in 1632, had begun his career as conseiller in the Parlement in 1613. 
Leon le Bouthillier, Claude's son and also a creature of Richelieu, 
had been conseiller in the Parlement before coming into possession of 
his father's office of secretaire d'Etat in 1632. Finally, Claude 
Bullion, surintendant des finances between 1632 and 1640, began a 
lengthy civil service career as conseiller in the court.^ Time 
spent in the court, of course, does not necessarily mean that these
^Ranum, Richelieu and the Councillors of Louis XIII, pp. 27-44; 
Maugis, Histoire du Parlement, III, 309; Francois Blanchard, Catalogue 
de tous les conseillers du Parlement de Paris, deftuis l1an mil deux 
soixante jusques A present (Paris, 164^ ), pp. 117, 123-
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negotiation with the Parlement. In this Louis was the sad heir of 
his mother. But Louis was also the child of Henry le Grand, Henry 
the well-beloved, Henry the image of the great and just king. The 
second Bourbon was not unintelligent: he knew M s  father’s repu­
tation and willed it for Mmself. Unfortunately, when treating 
with M s  judges this craving for self-respect all too often became 
a singleminded desire for obedience. Often, too, it was frustrated 
by eruptions of impatience and a temper pathetically petulant in 
its outraged helplessness.
Examples of this behavior were legion, the most famous being 
an interview between Louis and deputies from the Parlement held at 
Metz on January 30, 1632. The audience climaxed months of the 
most obstinate sort of indifference to royal orders regarding the 
nhamhrA de 1*Arsenal, and Louis' patience was at an end. The hearing 
began smootMy enough, but when First President Nicolas Le Jay 
tried to justify the court1s actions, Louis lashed out that "you 
were established only to judge between Master Peter and Master John, 
and if you go on with your enterprises, I will cut your nails to the 
quick, The incident has rightly been noted by almost every 
Mstorian of the period as characteristic of the lack of rapport 
between Louis and M s  judges.
Whatever faults Louis had, he was still the embodiment of 
sovereignty, and as King M s  subjects were presumed to have more 
respect for M s  person or M s  signature than for any miMster. As 
M s  ministry progressed, therefore, Richelieu preferred to set the
60Mariejol, Henri IV et Louis XIII, p. 395; Glasson, Le 
Parlement de Paris, t, 144.
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King or the symbols of his authority against the Parlement rather 
than address the court himself. Only once, in January, 1634> did 
Richelieu officially speak during a lit de justice, and this 
occasion, it should be noted, was a non-controversial one. During 
everyday interviews, too, the Cardinal preferred to be unobtrusive. 
Richelieu's hand, though, guided and directed the King wherever 
possible. Most of their joint decisions were probably worked out 
in conversation, but sometimes the prompting took the form of 
lengthy memoirs like the "Avis au Roy" of 1629.^  Sometimes, too, 
Richelieu dictated letters or speeches of the King intended for the 
Parlement. As early as 1627, Richelieu wrote to the Parlement under 
Louis' name to hasten the passage of several fiscal edicts needed for 
the siege of La Rochelle.62 This practice became more frequent after 
1630 as Richelieu assumed primary control of parlementaire policy.
When a prolonged bout with the judges ended with a visit to the Louvre 
on March 17, 1636, Richelieu wrote out Louis' lines in the scenario.63 
A year later, on March 1, 1637, the Cardinal again cued the King when 
he had to lecture a deputation about disrespect for his edicts.
On this occasion he wrote:
The King, having heard Mrs from the Parlement, will tell
them:
That the edict about which they have made remonstrances was 
registered in his presence, and that it concerns his authority 
that it should be executed;
61R ic h e lie u , L e t t r e s , I I I ,  1 9 3 -2 0 2 .
62see infra, p. 238.
63Richelieu, Lettres, V, 429-30.
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That they have solemnly promised to obey him and have 
received concessions from him on these grounds;
That if the kings his predecessors had once conceded 
that the company should not include registry clerks in the 
resale of the domain, they had done it at a time when the 
necessities of the State were not as great as they are at 
present;
That since venality did not prevent the officers in question 
from being faithful, discreet, and capable, one should be able 
to say the same of presidents and conseillers;
In conclusion, Messieurs, reason requires that I be obeyed, 
and I want to do as reason requires.64
In general Louis tried to follow Richelieu's guidance in regard 
to the Parlement, but sometimes this tutelage tested his own faith 
that severity would cure all. Before the meeting at Metz, for 
example, Richelieu and Louis had tried to break the court's resistance 
by sending five judges into exile. The subsequent meeting had 
inflamed Louis, but a settlement was reached a few weeks later and 
Richelieu advised the King to release the offenders. Louis rather 
skeptically accepted the advice in a remarkable letter which provides 
an insight into the way he thought the judges should be handled:
Mon cousin,
I will gladly agree to that which you have asked of me in 
regard to the five robes, although it is pleasurable to see them 
take a little stroll following my court. The more one eases up 
with such men, the more they abuse it. When one of my musketeers 
is a quarter of an hour late to drill, he goes to prison. If one 
disobeys his captain when he gives some command into his keeping, 
he is demoted, and in case he should disobey it jthe order) he 
loses his life. It will be said that the robes longues will 
freely and boldly disobey me, and that I will remain down wind
64Ibid., 758-59. On the back of the original one of Richelieu's 
secretaries wrote, "That which the King said to USPS from the Parle­
ment of Paris, the 1st of March, 1637." The original note is in the 
handwriting of Chancellor Seguier, but it was almost completely redone 
in the margin by a secretary writing under Richelieu's dictation. The 
first line of the revision is in the Cardinal's hand. See D'Avenel's 
notes 2 and 3, p. 758.
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of it, and that these seigneurs will win their case while 
pretending to leisurely take breakfast in their huvette [the 
Parlement's refreshment bar] and then spend three hours seated 
on my fleurs de lys. By an arrest [du Conseil ?| given at Ste. 
Menehould, it will not be thusl It is ordered that you will be 
less ready and less apt to have pity on these seigneurs after 
they have been penalized for having erred in that which they owe 
to the master of the shop, who is fonder of you than ever. At 
Ste. Menehould, this 12th of February, 1632.
Since the minister's relations with the Parlement were ulti­
mately determined by his place in the King's confidence, the evolution 
of Richelieu's philosophy in regard to the court should be correlated 
with the overall progress of his political career. A sequence of 
three phases is evident. The concurrence of the last two of these 
phases with Richelieu's public service and with the growth of French 
absolutism after 1624 is unmistakable and reinforces conventional 
opinion that Richelieu's career should be organized into three parts: 
the pre-ministerial period to 1624; a rise to power, 1624-1630; 
mature ministry, 1631-1642.
The first of these periods, 1610-1624, encompasses the regency of 
Marie de Medicis and the prevailing influence of Concini and the 
due de Luynes. During this time governmental policy drifted without 
firm purpose or long-term direction; the royal council was dominated 
by the Queen Mother and a faction known as the "Gray Beards" left 
from Henry's reign. With the exception of extensive and important 
parl^iyntaire remonstrances after the Estates of 1614 and dissension 
over the paulette in 1618 and 1620, relations between the Crown and
65B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9775, fol. 53- Another copy is in 
B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 7223, fol. 116. The nature and application 
of the Ste. Menehould arret remain unknown.
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the Parlement were generally untried. The court's demands of 1615 
were suppressed by an arret du Conseil while at the same time the 
feelings of the judges were placated by promises and by the renewal 
of the paulette on favorable terms. For the remainder of the decade 
and into the 1620's the court held itself aloof from the intrigues 
of the princes which dominated domestic politics of the period.
In the period before 1624, Richelieu was in a position of 
political responsibility only briefly and had no opportunity to 
develop a wor-ing rapport with the Parlement. As a shrewd observer 
of men and events, however, the future minister undoubtedly developed 
a realistic appraisal of the Parlement's public functions in rela­
tionship to royal power. A more detailed assessment of Richelieu's 
views during this time is difficult because of a paucity of docu­
mentation. His written references to the Parlement during the 
period before 1624 are extremely limited, being confined to occasional 
passages in the M&noires. There seems to be no revealing evidence 
in the Cardinal's correspondence before his ministry. Even the 
MSmoires, setting forth his version of the history of the reign, 
were prepared during the 1630's and consequently were colored by 
later intervening experiences which tended to alienate the minister 
from the Parlement. Moreover, the M&noires touch only the most 
important parlementaire affairs and very often the account of these 
is obviously based on official documents. It is also highly probable 
that the Memoires were drawn up in part to justify the Cardinal' s 
program and to help immortalize his accomplishments. All these
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factors detract from the value of the Memoires as a source of 
parlementaire relations, but given their limitations, occasional 
passages help reveal Richelieu's attitude towards the Parlement in 
the historical situation preceding his ministry.^
Examination of the scanty material available shows the Cardinal 
early as a political realist with considerable insight into the 
historical role of the Parlement, as well as a politician with a 
thorough understanding of the contemporary distribution of public 
powers within the monarchy. The Parlement had a long history of 
supporting the Crown in times of crisis as well as subjecting it to 
criticism; by the time the Memoires were assembled in the 1630's, the 
negative aspect of the court was much more evident to Richelieu than 
its positive qualities. Nevertheless, looking back from twenty years 
after, Richelieu objectively noted instances during the regency when 
the Parlement entered the realm of affairs of State to uphold royal 
rights, maintain the Crown's authority, and, in general, to preserve 
the integrity of the monarchy. The Cardinal's remarks concerning 
these occasions are particularly important when his absolutist royal 
position is bom in mind.
Richelieu acknowledged the Parlement's role in public 
affairs, for example, when the court intervened in the crisis which 
followed Henry TV's assassination. As Richelieu recorded in his 
M&noires, upon Henry's death Chancellor Brulart de Sillery let
^An excellent conmentary on the Mgmoires and the Testament 
politique may be found in Church, Richelieu and Reason of State,wmrm -----------
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
22k
himself be intimidated by threats on his life coming from the comte 
de Soissons and hesitated to affix seals to the declaration con­
firming Marie as regent. In these pressing circumstances the 
Parlement did not hesitate to act. Henry had been killed at four 
o'clock in the afternoon of May 1-4; upon receiving the news, First 
President Achille III de Harlay clambered out of his sickbed, 
assembled the Parlement, and led deliberations as to what should be 
done. Before seven o'clock on the same evening, the court had, in 
the Cardinal's words,
concluded unanimously that it would be better to do too much 
than too little on this occasion, when it would be dangerous 
to have arms crossed, and that they could not be blamed for 
declaring the will of the late king as it was known to all 
of them who had the honor of being near him. On this basis 
and others similar, they exceeded in this encounter most 
usefully the limits of their power.^
The last sentence is most interesting. Richelieu freely recognized
that in this critical time the Parlement had overstepped the limits
of its authority and had done it in the public interest:
Upon Chancellor Sillery's hesitation to act the Parlement 
did not do the same; to the contrary, the public interest 
compelled it to pass beyond the limits of its power to assure 
the regency to the Queen, although the parlements had never 
become involved in similar affairs.®®
In effect, the Cardinal admitted that the unprecedented action of the
court had been justified; the action met with Richelieu's approval,
6?Richelieu, Memoires, I, 42.
k^ Ib id . , 41. An account of the events of May 14 and the Parle- 
ment's large role in these events can be found in Roland Mousnier, The 
Assassination of Henry IV, trans. Joan Spencer (New York, 1973), PP* 
2 1 -2 3 , 50-60. The lapse in Chancellor Sillery's courage is not 
mentioned by Mousnier.
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and he acknowledged that the court had acted with the best interests 
of the kingdom at heart.
In the unsettled period of tension which followed the establish­
ment of the regency, there were other occasions for the Parlement 
to demonstrate its usefulness and loyalty. Richelieu carefully 
recorded, for example, the Parlement's suppression of Jesuit works 
which smacked of regicidal doctrines and thus threatened the public 
order of the kingdom. On June 8, 1610, immediately after Henry's 
death, the Parlement condemned de rage et Regis institutione by the 
Spanish Jesuit Mariana to be burned by the public hangman as 
containing passages praising the assassination of tyrants. In 
1612 a new work by the Jesuit Becanus surfaced in France. This 
book was condemned by the Parlement, and two years later Suarez1 
La Defense de la foi catholique, apostolique, contre les erreurs de 
la secte d1Angleterre was ordered burned by the Parlement as teaching 
it was permissible for subjects to conspire against the person of 
sovereigns. On this occasion the court went further than before.
Four Jesuit fathers were summoned before the court and enjoined 
to make known the Parlement's decisions through their sermons. While 
containing no overt comments of approval, the context of Richelieu's 
remarks show that he considered the Parlement's censorship beneficial 
in damping the religious fervor of the Jesuits and in preserving 
royal authority amidst Ultramontantist doctrines.^9
69Ibid., 59, 61, 149, 202-03.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
226
In 1614 Richelieu participated in the Estates-General of that 
year as representative of the First Estate. His account of the 
Estates is largely concerned with the difference of the three orders 
over the issue of the paulette. In this instance Richelieu dryly 
recorded the rancor without noticeable prejudice to the Third Estate, 
which desired the continuation of the droit annuel opposed by the 
First and Second Estates. The entire work of the Estates had, the 
Cardinal reported, no result except to subject the provinces to 
the payment of their deputies and to let everyone see that the 
excessive corruption of the regency had not been rectified.7*^
Following the failure of the Estates of 1614, the Parlement 
of Paris took advantage of the opportunity to present a massive 
series of remonstrances calling for reform in the government. Richelieu 
presented an exact account of the remonstrances. Unfortunately the 
account is plainly based on official documents with almost no personal 
comment and thus Richelieu's authentic opinion is almost impossible to 
discern. The affair was touched off, according to Richelieu's account, 
by the great princes who sought to explicit the Parlement to their 
advantage:
[.After failing the Estates] they turned then towards the Parle­
ment and tried to produce there the effect that they had not 
been able to in the Estates. They sowed in this body jealousy 
against the government, persuading them the judges that after 
having been of service in the declaration of the regency, they 
had not been given the part they deserved in the great affairs 
treated there. These words were not without their promise to 
assist them to maintain their authority, and to support the 
occasions when they should be near their Majesties.”1
70Ibid., 245.
71Ibid., 245.
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The agitation of the princes was successful. Four days after the 
adjournment of the Estates, the Parlement assembled and demanded a 
convocation of the peers, dukes, and great officers of the Crown, 
together with the Chancellor, to advise on propositions to he made 
for the service of the King. This decision was quashed by an arret 
au Conseil, the text of which the Memoires largely reiterated, and 
was reinforced by a personal reprimand at the Louvre on the 9th of 
April. These admonitions notwithstanding, the Parlement proceeded 
to draw up lengthy remonstrances and presented them on the 22nd 
of May, together with "some weak examples to prove that at all 
times the Parlement had taken part in affairs of State, and that 
kings had been accustomed to send them treaties of peace so that 
they might give their advice."72 These remonstrances were rejected 
by an arret du Conseil and another royal warning to the gens du roi 
at the Louvre. With this suppression the remonstrances of 1615 re­
mained quashed, and Richelieu's account comes in an abrupt end 
without concluding remarks which might elaborate his opinion on 
these events. 73 With the passing of the remonstrances of 1615, 
relations between Crown and court stabilized and remained relatively 
undisturbed until the suppression of the paulette in 1618 excited
72Ibid., 246.
7 T^he text of the remonstrances of 1615 and related arrets du 
conseil may be found in Male, Memoires, I, 20-57. A comparison 
with ihe account in Richelieu's MSmoires indicates many similarities 
to these official documents, probably indicating that the Cardinal's 
version was based on them.
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the Parlement once again. Unfortunately, Richelieu's Memoires present 
no comment on this affair or on other encounters before the Cardinal 
entered the council in 1624.
After Richelieu entered the council in April, 1624, a second 
phase in Crown-parlementaire relations gradually became evident. As 
Richelieu's policies emerged between 1624 and 1630, friction between 
the royal council and the court began to increase; the deterioration, 
however, took place slowly and factors other than the Cardinal's 
influence played an important part. It should be remembered that 
Richelieu's entry into the council in no way guaranteed his security 
before the King or ensured acceptance of his recommendations. The 
King remained nervous and psychologically insecure in separating 
himself from his mother; he continued to rely on her advice as well as 
on that of the devfrt party until the Day of Dupes (November 10, 1630). 
This indecisiveness was mirrored in the royal council which remained 
divided between the party of the bons francais and the devftt faction 
led by Pere Berulle and Michel de Marillac.74
^Along with Vincent de Paul and Francois de Sales, B6rulle was 
one of the chief figures in the great Catholic revival of the early 
1600's. A mystic and visionary, Berulle had introduced the 
Carmelite Order into France and founded the Oratorian Order. In 
political matters Berulle was deeply attached to Marie de Medicis, 
to the King's younger brother Gaston d'Orleans, and to the Marillac 
brothers. With these, as with others of the dlvSt party, Berulle 
was hostile to England and favored an Ultramontanlst and pro-Hapsburg 
policy of peace and co-existence within the framework of a greater 
Catholic Europe. Michel de Marillac, bom in Paris in 1563, had 
followed a career as a magistrate and statesman; he had as well a 
sincere interest in religion and affairs of the Church. In 1586, at 
the age of twenty-three, Marillac had entered the Parlement of Paris 
as a conseiller. At first an ardent supporter of the Catholic 
League, Marillac rallied to the cause of Henry IV and with his sup­
port was made a rnattre des requites in 1595. Marillac continued to
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The factions of the hons francais, with whom Richelieu asso­
ciated himself, and the devftts, who came to he his political enemies, 
had coalesced out of the complex politics of the early period of 
Louis' reign. Neither group was an organized party; rather, each 
was a loose fraternity of important persons in Church and State 
holding like opinions on the issues of the times. Each group was 
relatively small and largely confined to the court circle. The 
hons francais strongly resembled the former politique faction that 
had represented moderate Catholic opinion during the Wars of Religion. 
Like the politiques, the hons francais were numerous among jurists,
serve both Henry and his wife, and he was rewarded with the dignity of 
conseiller d'Etat in 1612. Attached to Marie de Medicis, he was 
charged by her with the establishment of the Carmelites in the 
Parisian faubourg Saint-Jacques. Thanks to the influence of the 
Queen Mother, he was made surintendant des finances along with Bochart 
de Champigny in 1624 and garde des sceaux in 1626. Between 1626 and 
1629 Marillac was principally concerned with drafting a revision of 
French law which became the ill-fated Code Michaud of 1629. Along 
with his brother Louis, who had pursued a military career, Marillac 
fell from grace after the Day of Dupes in 1630, was arrested, and 
died in prison in 1632. The principal characteristics of Marillac's 
personality were piety, solemnity, severity, and high personal inte­
grity. After his imprisonment in 1630, Marillac produced translations 
of the Psalms and a famous translation of the Imitation of Christ 
by Thomas a Kempis which went through more than fifty editions. The 
bibliography on Michel de Marillac is not extensive. The best 
complete biography is that of Edouard Everat, Michel de Marillac: 
sa vie, ses oeuvres (Riom, 1894). Supplementing this was two short 
works by nineteenth century lawyers. See Camille Amaud-Menardiere, 
Essai sur Michel de Marillac (Poitiers, 1857), and Euxpere Caillemer, 
Etude sur Tufa-rilln~ (Caen, 1862). The anonymous collection
entitled Documents historiques sur la famille de Marillac (Paris, 
1908), contains some very worthwhile pieces, though the commentary 
is often a panegyric on behalf of the Marillac family. Standard 
histories of the reign and of Cardinal Richelieu may be used to 
supplement these biographical essays. Especially noteworthy is 
George Mongredien, La Jouraee des dupes (Paris, 1961). See also the 
important article "Autour du 'grand orage': Richelieu et Marillac, 
deux politiques" by Georges Pages which appeared in Revue historique, 
CLXXXIX (1937), 63-97.
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Galileans, magistrates, and royal officers. In foreign affairs they 
favored a vigorously anti-Hapshurg foreign policy, even at the 
expense of Papal relations and international Catholic interests. In 
domestic affairs the hons francais maintained the tradition of 
religious tolerance established by Henry IV and put the interests 
of religion after those of the State and of France. The dgyfrts, 
conversely, put the interests of Catholic Christianity before those 
of the State, especially in foreign affairs. Wishing to unite 
Christian interests in Europe, the devots essentially strove to recover 
the res publica Christiana of pre-Reformation Europe. Since this 
would require the leadership of the Papacy and co-existence, if not 
outright co-operation with the Hapsburg Empire, good relations with 
these powers were desirable above the national interests of France.
With peace abroad, royal attention could be directed towards domestic 
reform and improvement of the lot of the common folk. The conflicts 
with Richelieu's objectives should be obvious.^
The dichotomous nature of forces at work within the council was 
crucial for Richelieu's relations with the Parlement before 1630. 
Between 1626 and 1630 Michel de Marillac, devot and political rival of 
Richelieu, held the post of garde des sceaux. As such Marillac's 
position vis-a-vis the court was at least as important as Richelieu's 
in the capacity of chief minister. In the absence of an effective
^Church, Richelieu and Reason of State, pp. 9-10; Tapie, La 
France de Louis XIII, pp. 138-41; Mongredien, Ia  Joum(?e des dupes, 
pp. 3-4^7 The last work is particularly valuable for its vivid, and 
incisive portraits of the principals in the politics of the 1620's.
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chancellor, the garde des sceaux was hoth officially and personally 
interested in the course of daily affairs of justice and administra­
tion.^ It was Marillac, for example, who presided over the sessions 
of the Assembly of Notables. Between 1626 and 1630 Marillac1s 
letters to Mathieu MolS, procureur ggngral of the Parlement, indi­
cate that he, and not Chancellor D'Aligre, conducted most official 
business with the court. The King and Richelieu also wrote Mole 
directly, but the frequency of their correspondence was much less 
than that of Marillac.’77
In addition to frequent contacts with the Parlement, Marillac 
was especially interested in reform of the central administration 
and of justice. Between 1626 and 1629 he was absorbed in the 
revision of French law which was to become the Code Michaud. At 
exactly the same period he was also attempting to reform the royal 
council by a series of rSglements.7^ As a result of his reform
Etienne d'Aligre, Chancellor of France from 1624 to 1635, never 
enjoyed an active or influential role in public affairs. Disgraced in 
1626 after having been frightened during the appearance of a conspi­
racy by the eomte de Chalais and others, D'Aligre was stripped of all 
official duties, including custody of the seals which were given to 
Marillac. Marillac remained garde des sceaux until just after the Day 
of Dupes, when he was replaced by Charles d'Aubespine, Marquis de 
Chateauneuf. Chateauneuf remained just two years and was replaced by 
Pierre V SSguier, former president & mortier of the Parlement. With 
the death of D'Aligre in 1636, S^guTer became chancellor and custody 
of the seals reverted to him.
77See Mol§, Memoires, I-II, passim.
7®The reglements for the council of Louis XIII have been published 
with a scholarly annotation by Roland Mousnier in Annuaire-Bulletln de 
la societe de l'histoire de France, 1946, pp. 96-211. The authorship 
oF some reglements remain unknown, but there can be little doubt that 
Marillac played an important part drafting those drawn up between 1624 
and 1630. See the comments of Georges Pages in "Autour du 'Grand 
orage,'" pp. 65-66.
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efforts, his insistence on observance of rigid technicalities, and a 
dry and harsh personality, Marillac's relationship with the Parle­
ment was never very good. Nor could the court easily forget 
Marillac1s participation in the League. On January 16, 1589,
Marillac had accompanied Bussy-Le Clerc, chief of the League faction 
in Paris, into the Grand'Chamb re with arms in hand to conduct three 
magistrates to the Bastille. The Parlement never pardoned Marillac 
for this misstep.^ The factors of personality were undoubtedly 
aggravated by the garde des sceaux1s firm denial of the Parlement1s 
competence in matters of State exposed in several letters to Mole, in 
addresses to the Parlement, and in his "MSnoire dressg par le garde 
des sceaux de Marillac, principalement contre 1'authority du 
Parlement," a manuscript now held in several copies by the Biblio- 
thfeque Nationale.^  Marillac's absolutist views are made abun­
dantly clear in the memoir, where he wrote that
^Documents historiques sur la famille de Marillac (Paris, 1908),
p. 186.
®^See, for example, Marillac1s letters to MblS in the latter's 
Mfinoires, I, 482,490-93, and the account of the lit de justice of 
■Tanna-ry 15, 1629, in Le Mercure frangois, XV, 1-28, second pagination. 
The manuscript memoirTs in B.N. Ms. fr. 7549, fols. 1-145. The 
"M&noire contre l'authorite du Parlement" is one of the strongest 
extant statements rebutting the authority of the Parlement. Because 
of its clarity, vigor, and scholarship, it apparently became very 
popular among constitutional lawyers of the Old Regime. Several 
other copies can be found in the Biblioth^que Nationale at Ms. fr. 
7550, 18366, and Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 7979. Marillac probably composed 
it as a legal brief in 1628 or 1629, intending to use it against any 
resistance put up towards his cherished Code Michaud. Influences 
of the memoir are, in fact, readily visible in the speech Marillac 
delivered in the lit de justice held for the Code Michaud on January 
15, 1629.
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It is necessary to pose a fundamental certainty, that the kings 
of France are the legislators of their State, making laws and 
ordinances, revoking them and descending to this tactic of 
revocation whenever it pleases them, because they themselves 
are the law of their kingdom, and are above their laws and 
ordinances, and take advice and council from whomever they 
please . . . not only because that conforms to reason and to 
justice, but also because such is the usage of the kingdom, 
and only quasi-kings have practiced otherwise, and such has been 
the manner of laws, ordinances, and the State of several 
centuries.®1
In another passage the garde des sceaux pungently denounced the
pretensions of the judges to check the power of rulers:
The greatest number of companies and of the persons composing 
them live in this belief that they are the mentors of kings, 
the protectors of peoples, and mediators between the people and 
kings, and that kings cannot make any law in their kingdom which 
has not passed their judgment and examination; and they make 
other speeches and thoughts of this nature, not only without 
foundation, but also contrary to the fundamentals and usages of 
the State, contrary to the dignity of the Crown, and manifestly 
contrary to the highest essential of the grandeur, dignity, and 
authority of the kings of France. There is need to enlighten 
people, to wipe out this error, and to show that the power of 
our kings is independent, having no necessity of taking advice 
from either company or person.82
Strong views such as these only encouraged divisiveness, and the 
mutual antagonisms between Marillac and the court culminated in a 
struggle lasting months when the completed Code Michaud was submitted 
to the Parlement for approval. Officially registered in a lit de 
justice held January 15, 1629 the massive ordinance was immediately 
subjected to criticism by the court, and though the Parlement even­
tually submitted its reluctant approval, the compilation of law was 
discarded after Marillac was disgraced in 1629.
8l B .N . Ms . f r .  7549, f o l .  76.
82B.N. Ms . 7549, f o l .  91.
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The relationship between Marillac, Richelieu, and the Parlement 
during the 1620's was a curious one. Unlike later gardes des sceaux 
Chateauneuf and SSguier appointed by Richelieu after 1630, Marillac 
remained independently minded in most matters of governmental policy.
Yet both Richelieu and Marillac were in fundamental agreement when 
dealing with the Parlement. Both respected the court, but both 
firmly believed in the supremacy of royal authority. This agreement 
on parlementaire policy, however, was totally negated by Richelieu's 
militant anti-Hapsburg policy, his moderate religious view, and his 
overwhelming ambition to eliminate his dSvot rival from Louis' favor. 
This abiding distaste for the Marillac faction, not disagreement over 
the Code Michaud, accounts for Richelieu's failure to uphold the 
document.
After achieving a place on the royal council, therefore,
Richelieu had to reckon with Marillac as well as with the Parlement's 
pwoer and prestige. Though Marillac dealt with administrative 
details, much policy making was left to the Cardinal. The court 
showed itself either amenable or indifferent to the implementation 
of much of Richelieu's early program. No significant difficulties 
were raised over legislation providing for the razing of nan- 
strategic fertifications in the hands of great nobility, nor did 
the Parlement become involved in the crushing of the Chalais 
conspiracy in 1626 and the subsequent execution of the comte de Chalais.
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Likewise, the court raised no serious objections to the establishment 
of a chambre de justice against corrupt financiers in 1624.^
Even though the Parlement's potential for obstructionism was 
probably more evident to Richelieu after he entered the royal council, 
he continued to acknowledge that the court was, within bounds, useful 
and necessary in maintaining the Crown's authority. This utility
view of the period 1624-1630 contradicts that of Glasson and 
consequently that of Sheiman who relied on Glasson's earlier work for 
his evaluation of this period. Glasson held that parlementaire oppo­
sition to Richelieu was aroused immediately after his entry into the 
council in 1624 by the creation of a chambre de justice aimed at 
investigating corrupt financiers lending money to the government and 
that antagonism between the Cardinal and the court was maintained at 
a high level during the 1620's: "As soon as he was master of the 
ministry Q_.e_., in Glasson's view, 162/Q he established a chambre de 
justice to research abuses committed in the administration"oF75niances. 
Richelieu desired that this commission be made permanent, but the 
Parlement resisted and with success. Extraordinary commissions 
continued to be established in similar situations, and it was before 
these that Richelieu tried his political enemies. Was the jurisdiction 
of these commissions illegal and irregular, as certain historians have 
written, or was it not a simple application of the justice retained 
by the king? That which is certain is that they were constituted with 
judges whose opinions were known in advance, and that this complete 
lack of impartiality rendered these extraordinary commissions odious.
When instead of questions of State it was a matter of religious affairs, 
the Cardinal was in rapport with the justice of the Parlement, always 
disposed to safeguard that which it called the liberties of the 
Galilean Church. On this point, but only on this point alone, the 
Parlement and the Cardinal were of accord; in all other relations, 
mistrust ruled and each surveyed the other with care." Glasson, Le 
Parlement de Paris, I, 133-34. In implying that Richelieu was master 
of the ministry after 1624, Glasson has glossed over the role played 
by Michel de Marillac and the influence of the d£v6t party, both of 
which remained substantial until the Day of Dupes. Richelieu's tenure 
remained uncertain until after 1630, and while he urged the creation 
of a chambre de justice in 1624, it was not a creation aimed at his 
political enemies but an attempt to squeeze money out of reluctant 
royal creditors. The chambre was indeed an extraordinary commission, 
but unlike later such panels, it was concerned with financial matters 
and not with affairs of ISse-majestS or political rivalry. In fact 
the Parlement did not resist the creation or the operation of the 
chambre of 1624, nor did it raise objections to many other of Richelieu's 
early endeavors such as the abolition of dueling, the razing of for­
tresses, and suppression of the Huguenot faction.
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became manifest at the beginning of 1626 when a dispute erupted among 
the clergy of France over libelous statements printed in a polemical 
pamphlet entitled ttysteres politiques. The Parlement of Paris inter­
vened in the affair and prohibited the clergy of France from 
assembling to discuss the matter further because it brought into 
question the authority of the king. In his Mgmoires Richelieu 
•recorded the delicate nature of the affair and his recognition that it 
was necessary to placate all interests, including that of the Parle-
The Parlement stirred itself up against the Church, and the 
matter of the dispute concerned the authority and person of 
the king. It was necessary to heal the schism, unite the 
clergy, maintain the authority of the Church, and not to 
violate that of the Parlement which on many important occasions, 
is necessary to the support of the State.
Some time later, when the Parlement refused to completely defer to
a royal evocation, Richelieu advised the King to proceed carefully in
dealing with the court:
He (the Cardinal] advised [LouisJ that it was not only at 
present that the parlements wanted to take cognizance over 
general affairs; that they never considered that they had not 
been instituted for that, and that the great companies are 
useful to strictly execute that which was deliberated and 
resolved by a few £l.£., the royal council], being with the 
multitude of councillors in the State as it is with doctors 
in regard to the sick, where a great number is detrimental.
No sooner had the affair of the Uysteres politiques blown over
than the clergy and the Parlement again became involved in a wrangle
over Jesuit literature which brought the authority of the king into
^Richelieu, Memoires, III, 20.
85Ibid., 21.
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question. During the first part of 1626, copies of Traetatus de
Haeresi by an Italian Jesuit, Santarelli, began to circulate in
France. Two chapters of the book debated the supremacy of State
over Church, and the Parlement condemned Santarelli’s work as
seditious and ordered it burned by the public hangman. At the same
time the Provincial of the Jesuits and a contingent of the Order
were summoned before the court to be interrogated about the matter.
Richelieu, realizing very well the possible implications of a
confrontation between the Order and the Parlement, advised Louis to
use both praise and restraint with the Parlement:
He (the Cardinal] believed that it was good that His Majesty 
should praise the Parlement for the action it had taken in 
having the book burned and preventing such pernicious doc­
trines from spreading through the kingdom, but that it was 
necessary that care be taken that they the judges did not 
pass a point which could be as prejudicial to his service as 
their actions had been useful to it. The reason for this 
counsel in sum was that it was necessary to reduce the Jesuits 
to a state in which they could do no harm by their power but 
also one in which they could not be brought to do harm through 
despair.56
Over the implimentation of measures to order the kingdom and 
strengthen royal authority, however, the relationship between 
Richelieu and the court gradually grew strained. In February, 1626, 
an edict providing stem punishment for dueling was presented to the 
Parlement for registration. The court registered but only after 
protests that the penalties proposed were too light in comparison with 
those currently held as law.^ The Parlement proved even more
86Ibid., 26.
^The remonstrances presented on the edict of dueling are 
printed in Richelieu, Maximes, 78-79.
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reluctant to approve wartime financing necessary to fund a terminal 
campaign against the Huguenots, even though the sentiment of the 
judges were sincerely Catholic. In April, 1627, several financial 
edicts, including creations of office, were presented for regis­
tration. The Parlement balked and procrastinated while the govern­
ment stood in need. Out of the delay came a remarkable letter to 
the court signed by Louis but actually dictated by Richelieu before 
the siege camp of La Rochelle:
I am here in the middle of winter, in continual rain, in the
midst of a great and perilous sickness, personally acting on the 
spot, sparing neither my person nor my health, all in order to
reduce my subjects of La Rochelle to obedience and to oust
from my kingdom the root and seed of troubles and emotions which 
oppress it and have afflicted it for more than sixty years. 
Instead of each contributing the most hidden and precious of his 
means to advance such a worthy and useful plan, they ^ in the 
courts]] obstruct assistance, they terrify those the financiers 
who can help; this is nothing other than causing my armies to 
perish for want of funds, and by this means to renew the courage 
and the forces of those in rebellion. If enemies do this one 
could not doubt their intentions; but I incur these hindrances 
from my principal officers who should have the foremost and 
most lively sentiments for the enduring success of my enterprises 
. . . .  After so many miracles for which He has brought to 
prevent the fruition of their [Protestant] enterprises, and the 
granting to me of time to combat and pursue them, I hope and 
expect of the same bounty that he will hush all these contra­
dictions, and that all ray subjects and ray officers will learn 
that their welfare and their repose consist in obeying me.°®
Richelieu's reaction to the court's resistance was a natural one.
As relations deteriorated during the late 1620's, the minister's
attitude towards the court became more estranged. While he retained,
and would always retain, a due respect for the Parlement's power and
f^ole, M&moires, I, 4-78-82. A text of the same letter, together 
with an important explanatory footnote commenting on the authenticity 
of the note, can be found in Richelieu, Lettres, II, 717-21.
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and prestige, by 1626-27 it was becoming more and more evident that the 
court stood in the way of many of his goals. The shift in estimation 
can be read from two memoranda prepared in 1626 and in 1629. In 
February, 1626, Richelieu had insisted to Louis that the Parlement 
should verify edicts coming out of the peace to be made with the 
Huguenots and the Assembly of Notables of 1626. The minister 
recommended that "the Parlement should verify the edicts of itself, 
or in the presence of the King with eulogy; I hope that this will 
be successful. If it is, it will be nothing small, these great 
and sovereign companies being the first grounds ^premier motive] for 
the content or discontent of the people.Three years later, after 
the Parlement*s obstructionism had become clearer to him, Richelieu 
took a more negative view. In an omnibus "Avis au Roy" of 1629, the 
Cardinal emphasized the necessity for a strong royal authority, the 
need for obedience from all subjects, and the absolute need "to 
abase and temper the sovereign companies which through assumed 
sovereignty every day oppose themselves to the good of the kingdom."99
When the Day of Dupes began a third and most crucial phase in the 
Parlement*s relations with the Crown, a phase which would last nearly 
a dozen years and which represented the critical period when absolutism 
was securely founded in the French monarchy.91 On November 10, 1630,
^^ Richelieu, Lettres, II, 194-97. The quotation is from p. 197.
90Ibid., III, 181.
910tnly A. D. Lublinskaya has ventured to assert a contrary thesis. 
With French Absolutism: The Crucial Phase, 1620-1629, Lublinskaya has 
maintained that the period 1620-29 was the "crucial phase" of French 
absolutism. She thus violates the conventional view of the career of 
Richelieu and the growth of French absolutism by asserting that "so
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Louis finally and reluctantly chose between his First Minister and the 
dgy6t clique surrounding his mother, the Marillacs, and Marshal of 
France Bassompierre. Now secure in Louis' favor, Richelieu assumed 
full direction of royal policy. In the months following, the Parlement 
of Paris, along with the rest of France, found itself embroiled in 
the aftermath of the Cardinal's victory. One of his first acts was to 
appoint Nicolas LeJay, formerly second president \ mortier, to fill 
the First Presidency left vacant by the death of Jean Bochart de 
Champigny in April, 1630. The seals taken from Marillac on the Day
far as French absolutism was concerned, the 1620's were decisive for 
its development in the seventeenth century. This is usually linked 
with the name of Richelieu, who is alleged to have sharply altered the 
political course followed by his predecessors. Our study of the 
political struggle of 1620-4 gives grounds for considering that there 
was no change of course as such and that Richelieu basically followed 
a path marked out already before his time. It is, however, beyond 
question that he achieved unprecedented success. It seems to me, 
though, that this success was decided by the profound changes in 
French society itself which took place between 1610 and the 1620's. 
Without these changes this greatest statesman in the history of 
absolutist France would probably have had to while away his life in 
some out-of-the-way bishopric, with no opportunity to display his 
outstanding talents, or else to end his days in imprisonment or 
exile.” Lublinskaya, French Absolutism, p. 332. The weaknesses in 
Lublinskaya's thesis are numerous. She has not dealt with or des­
cribed the "profound changes" in French society between 1610-20; 
she is restricted by a Marxian framework of class orientation and 
economic interpretation; she has not considered the mounting economic 
crisis which accelerated throughout the 1630's and 1640's. Addi­
tionally, she has ignored the financial crisis brought by the 
belligerent French foreign policy which became increasingly evident 
after 1630. Lastly, the constitutional tensions which accompanied 
the growth of absolutism were much more pronounced during the 
1630's than during the 1620's.
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of Dupes were handed over to Charles d'Aubespine, Marquis de 
Chateauneuf, a reliable supporter. The vanquished, including such 
substantial figures as the Queen Mather, the King's brother, the 
Marillacs, and Bassompierre were arrested or fled the country.
Richelieu determined to scourge them and their entourages with 
every means at his disposal, and in doing so he collided directly 
with the Parlement of Paris. The use of extraordinary commissions 
increased abruptly as the justification of reason of State was 
applied through extraordinary tribunals to deal with those guilty of 
l£se-majest€. Marie and Gaston, heir-apparent, were invulnerable to 
severe treatment, but their followers were not. Immediately after 
the Day of Dupes, Marshal Louis de Marillac was arrested and brought 
before a panel of mafrtres des requites for trial on charges of 
peculation and malversation. In March a declaration was drawn up 
against those in the following of Gaston d1 Orleans who had fled the 
country with him. A few months later the infamous Chambre de 11 
Arsenal was created to prosecute ldse-majeste among the servants and 
pamphleteers in the service of Marie and Gaston. The Parlement fought, 
these judicial operations at every step with traditional weapons: 
it prepared remonstrances, refused registration of edicts, denounced 
the conmrfssaires, and held drawn-out plenary sessions. These were 
met in turn by tough royal countermeasures in the form of personal 
warnings, arrets du Conseil, lits de justice, and exiles of 
magistrates.
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After 1632 the Crown managed to establish a shaky victory over the 
issues of councilliar authority and the use of comnri ssaires extra­
ordinaire s. The most serious phase of the French constitutional 
crisis was now past. The court, however, accepted its defeat with 
bad grace and sullenly refused to co-operate with the royal council. 
Therefore, throughout the remainder of the 1630's Richelieu had to 
anticipate friction with the Parlement at every turn. As has already 
been seen in Chapter III, the court's obstinate attitude was especially 
crucial as the country geared itself for war. Each move in the 
international arena required additional funding, and this funding often 
had to pass the scrutiny of the Parlement. The Crown's unprecedented 
reliance on extraordinary finances thus gave the court an unusual 
amount of leverage in fiscal matters. Quarrels over the rentes of 
Paris in 1634 and 1638 as well as creations of office in 1635, 1638, 
and 1640 made this leverage very apparent. But issues less serious 
than these matters of State also provoked resistance, and sometimes 
this foot-dragging had the air, if not the substance, of a personal 
grievance with the Cardinal. This was true, for instance, in the 
Parlement's hesitancy to approve the foundation of the Academie 
Frangaise.
The question of the Academie began early in the 1630's with 
Richelieu's decision to found an exclusive company devoted to 
literature and the French language. His objectives were several.
An Academy of the Arts would serve cultural purposes; it would 
provide a ready honor for writers and litterateurs; it had 
possibilities for propaganda; it would certainly embellish the State
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with glory and grandeur. Less obviously, the Academie would 
function as a kind of favored corps or guild and as such it might 
facilitate governmental supervision of the printing trade, a function 
up to this time largely vested in the Parlement’s enforcement of 
censorship.
The official foundation of the Academie was drafted as a 
declaration dated January 25, 1635.^ This document founded the 
organization, but its formal statutes took several months longer to 
prepare. It remained to have the edict verified in the Parlement.
The court found one reason after another to delay, and on December 30, 
1635, lettres de cachet went to the court, to the gens du roi, and 
to the First President Le Jay.^3 This nudging, though, failed to 
carry much weight in the Parlement, which was at the time immersed 
in heated discussions over a lit de justice held on December 20.
In addition to the letter, Richelieu personally summoned Mole to 
Conflans, told him that he desired the registration, and that having 
signed the statutes he deemed them worthy of the privileges accorded. 
The request was underlined by a threat to have the Grand Conseil 
register the declaration. Despite the best efforts of Richelieu and 
Mole, however, the final verification did not come until July 10, 1637, 
with the proviso ’that the said assembly and Academie would consider
9^The text of the declaration is in Paul Pellison and Abbe Olivet, 
Histoire de 1'Academie Frangoise depuls son etablissement jusqu1A 
1652, 1*729 edition, reprinted in Cimber and Danjou, Archives 
curieuses, serie II, vol. VI, pp. 75-214-. Pellison was historian 
of the Academie under Louis XIV. He died in 1693-
^The lettre is in Pellison, Histoire de 1'Academie, pp. 106-07.
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only the ornament, embellishment, and growth of the French language,
and of books which will be done by them and by other persons
desiring and wishing it."^
According to the account of Paul Pellison, historian of the
Acadlmie under Louis XIV, the resistance of the Parlement mirrored
the feelings of others in the French population. Richelieu, having
brought royal authority to a point higher than any one before, was
loved and respected by some, envied by others, detested by many,
and feared and respected by all. Besides the fact that the Academie
was a new institution which stirred up controversy on its own merits,
it was widely regarded as the work of the minister and judged for
good or evil according to the feelings one had for him. Some, says
Pellison, spoke of the plans for the Academie "with excessive
praise." Others, more suspicious,
did not know if [whether] under these flowers there was not 
some serpent hidden, and feared that at least this establishment 
was only a new prop for his domination intended only for men 
in his pay, bought to uphold all that he did and to observe 
the actions and sentiments of others. It was even said that he 
cut eighty thousand livres from mire of Paris to give them 
each ten thousand livres pension, and a hundred other similar
things.95
These emotions among the population at large were reflected in the 
Parlement except, says Pellison, "that there was less affection for 
him in this company than elsewhere, and that most considered him as
^B.N. Ms. fr. 9893, fol. 130; Pellison, Histoire de l'Acad€mie, 
pp. 107-08.
^Pellison, Histoire de l'Acadgmie, p. 110.
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the enemy of their liberty and a transgressor on their privileges."96 
These sentiments produced a three-way division in the court over the 
issue of verification. The first saw nothing to mistrust in the 
design but were too few to carry the day. A second group, "too 
devoted to the solitary study of the Palais and civil affairs," 
ridiculed the project as puerile. The last party, numerous and 
Influential, suspected everything emanating from the Cardinal and 
feared the consequences of the Academie's competence over the French 
language, literary world, and printing trade. Together the last two 
groups had managed to delay verification of the Academie's patents 
for two years.97
The above brief sketch of the 1630's should underscore the 
escalation of troubles with the court which began soon after the Day 
of Dupes and continued for the next dozen years. Throughout the 
1630's the Parlement represented a substantial and ever-present 
factor obstructing the realization of Richelieu's goals for the 
monarchy. Now in control of the royal council and more secure than 
ever in the confidence of the King, Richelieu alone directed Crown 
policy to be followed in dealing with the Parlement. How did he 
recognize and respond to the question of handling the court during 
this the decisive phase of his ministry? His own answer is nowhere 
expressed in more than general terms. To obtain a broad statement of 
of the philosophy which inspired the Cardinal' s parlementaire policies
^Ibid., p. 113.
97Ibid.
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after the Day of Dupes, it is necessary first to consult the 
Testament politique in which the Cardinal summarized twenty years of 
public experience and set forth his recommendations based on these 
experiences.98 The first three sections of Part I, Chapter IV, are 
of exceptional interest, for here Richelieu outlined his views on 
contemporary discorders in justice, his ideas on the reformation of 
these disorders, and finally his plans to bar the judges from 
encroaching on the royal authority. Further insights must be 
extracted bit by bit from his Memoires, correspondence, and papers of 
state.
At the beginning of his discourse on the administration of
justice in the Testament, Richelieu acknowledged that the current
situation in the courts and among the magistracy was filled with
"disorders.” These were principally in the area of public law and
policy and not in the procedures of trial justice, about which he
said virtually nothing. Richelieu's opening statement is particularly
interesting, for it sharply reveals the minister's general disdain
for the magistracy as a whole and the sovereign courts in particular:
There is no one who does not see that those who were established 
to hold the just balance in all things have themselves so 
charged one side [of the balance} to their advantage so that 
there is no counterweight. The derangements of justice have 
come to such a point that they cannot go any further.
According to the Cardinal, there were two abuses most in need
of reform: venality and heredity of office. Throughout his career,
9%ichelieu mentions the figure of twenty years of public 
experience on page 245, which permits the assumption that the 
Testament was begun after 1634.
^^Richelieu, Testament politique, pp. 230-31.
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Richelieu had condemned both practices as deeply rooted evils 
which ideally should he avoided for the good of the State. This 
opinion can be found as early as 1614 when, before the Estates 
General, Richelieu supported the opinion of the clergy and nobility 
that venality and heredity should be abolished. His views at the 
time, and those of the First Estate for whom he spoke, are recorded 
in his Memoires, in which he outlined three rather conventional 
reasons for the abolition of these abuses. Venality, he wrote, was 
bad because it increased the number of offices at the expense of the 
poor, who had to support them; venality encouraged increased fees 
of justice, and even the undermining of justice itself, because those 
who bought the offices tended to treat them as opportunities for 
exploitation; the sale of justice for gold and silver detracted 
from honor, the true reward of justice. Richelieu even went so far 
as to maintain that venality was contrary to the fundamental laws 
and had been introduced by Louis XII in imitation of the Venetians 
in order to fill the royal treasury.
These opinions apparently remained unchanged throughout the 
second decade of the century and into the 1620's, as several memoranda 
and advisory essays testify. When drafting resolutions for presen­
tation to the Assembly of Notables in 1626, Richelieu included 
recommendations for the abolition of venality:
100Riehelieu, MSmoires, I, 222.
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Venality of offices, favoring price over virtue, and barring to 
us the means of rewarding, of chosing and employing those of 
our subjects who have rendered us more services, and who are 
most capable of rendering them, be it under arms, in justice, 
or other functions . . .  we have, following the advice at one 
time given by the Estates General of our kingdom, and the 
resolution taken by it but retarded and obstructed by the 
unhappiness of ensuing troubles, decided and resolved that in 
the future it will no longer be permitted . . .  to sell or 
buy any offices, be it for money or for equivalent things, all 
brevets and permissions obtained notwithstanding, which at 
present, as then, we declare null and of no effect. 1
The Assembly of Notables accepted this proposition, but nothing was
done to implement it. As late as 1629, Richelieu advised Louis that
it was necessary "not to re-establish the paulette when it will
expire in a year."1®2
Sometime after 1630 and before the preparation of the Testament
politique five years later, Richelieu’s idealistic outlook concerning
venality and heredity was modified. In the Testament Richeleiu
continued to denounce the sale and inheritance of office, freely
1®1Riehelieu, Lettres, II, "R^glement pour toutes les affaires 
du royaume," 177. The ellipses are presented as in the source.
102Ibid., Ill, "Avis au Roy," 180-81. It is difficult to tell 
from the original passage if Richelieu intended to link this 
abolition of the paulette with an effort to reduce the court's power. 
The complete passage in the "Avis" reads "... not to re-establish 
the paulette when it will expire in a year, to abase and temper the 
companies of justice which by a pretended sovereignty set them­
selves up every day against the good of the kingdom." The two 
thoughts are linked in the original by a comma. Thus it is possible 
that in Richelieu's mind the abolition of the paulette might contri­
bute to reducing the court's pride and power. Certainly Richelieu 
was aware of the potential disciplinary effect abolition of the 
paulette would have.
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admitting that the system was filled with abuses and disorders.
By the mid-1630's, though, Richelieu had abandoned any pretense of
actually effecting any reform in the conditions of office holding.
The arguments presented in the Testament thus appear as shabby and
hollow efforts, to warrant a system which was patently ridden with
evils. Richeleiu deplored the situation in the bureaucracy, but
his arguments were all directed towards justifying the system for
practical reasons. The most apparent factor, and perhaps the
critical one in this change of mind, was the age-old exigency of
financial considerations. By the mid-1630's the Parties casuelles
produced a substantial and indispensable portion of Crown income
which made it unthinkable to-carry out a reform. By this time, too,
the government could, not risk further alienating its officials by
suspending venality.
Richelieu's arguments against reform began with the claim that
abuses were inevitable in the provision of offices because all
offices depended on the king, that is, on favor and intrigue. Hence,
it was better to provide for. these offices through sale and heredity
rather than through free royal appointment:
Although the suppression of venality and heredity of. offices 
should conform to reason and to all the constitutions of law, 
it is nevertheless true that abuses are inevitable in the . 
distribution of offices so dependent on the simple will of the 
king and by consequence on the favor and artifice of those who 
find themselves- the most influential. This renders the way by 
which provisions are now made more tolerable than that which 
was utilized in the past because of the great improprieties 
which always accompanied it. ^
•^Richelieu, Testament politique, p. 233.
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Richelieu continued by developing a historical argument that venality
was as old as the monarchy and that to change a fixed institution
would be a dangerous thing. The abuse of venality went back as far
as Saint Louis, who was known to sell offices, and "the complaints
which had been made about venality were common to all ages of the
monarchy."104 Francis I had established a regulated commerce in
offices, judging that "there was no better and more prompt expedient
to draw on the wealth of his subjects than to give them honor for
m o n e y . H e n r y  IV, with good counsel, had added the scheme of
the paulette to the practices of venality, presumably with great
consideration and forethoughtj hence, the practice should not be
changed without reason for a design which promised better. If the
monarchy could be newly established, reform would be possible, "but
prudence does not permit acting on the same basis in an old monarchy,
whose imperfections have passed into habit and whose disorders have
become, not without utility, part of the order of the State."1<^ )
Not only did Richelieu argue that reform would cause confusion and
disorder in the State, but reform would also bring the disaffection
of those holding office:
Only with difficulty could one change the established order for 
the disposition of offices without altering the affection of 
those who possess them, in which case it would to be feared 
that instead of retaining the people in their duty, as they have 
contributed no little in the past, they should contribute in the 
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The most potent moral argument against venality which the minister
had to counter was that the exchange of offices for money had led to
commercialization of justice. Richelieu's response to this ling
of reasoning was imprecise and elusive. He merely maintained that
the officers who had made such large and growing investments were
not likely to commit gross injustices out of fear that they would lose
their investments:
I know well that it is commonly said that those who buy justice 
in gross sell it in detail. But at the same time it is true 
that an officer who puts the greatest part of his property into 
an office will be not a little restrained from doing evil out 
of fear that he will have of losing all that he values, and that
in such case the price of offices is an accurate token of the
fidelity of officers.^®
This argument might have had some validity if the judges had been
vulnerable to removal for misconduct. This was not the ease, as
Richelieu was well aware. Nor did the price of offices and their
value ensure fidelity and loyalty, for the most expensive offices
in the kingdom, those of the magistrates of the sovereign courts,
proved to be among the most intractable to royal authority during
the Cardinal's ministry.
After resorting to these rather dubious arguments in defense of
the status quo, Richelieu went on to reveal his personal sentiments
in regard to those holding offices. These sentiments were, as
might be ejected, closely related to his own aristocratic birth and
correspondent inclination to contempt for those of lesser station.
108Ibid., pp. 234-35.
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This disdain is unmasked in several passages in the Testament in which 
Richelieu linked the abolition of venality to a conservative social 
dogma:
Instead of the suppression of venality and heredity opening the 
door to virtue, it would open it to intrigues and factions and 
to the filling of offices with men of low extraction, often 
more stuffed with Latin than with property, from which would 
come many indecencies. If one could enter office without money, 
commerce would be abandoned by many men who, dazzled by the 
splendor of dignities, would pursue offices and their own ruin 
to the general effect that they would take from trade that 
which renders families abundant.10^
Above all, Richelieu argued that low birth rarely produced good
magistrates. Men without property or noblesse were difficult to
deal with and possessed an insuperable miserliness:
A low birth rarely produces the qualities necessary to magis­
trates, and it is certain that the virtue of a person of good 
station has something more noble about it than that which is 
found in a man of petty extraction. The spirits of such men 
are ordinarily difficult to manage, and many have an austerity 
so pointed that it is not only perturbing but prejudicial.
It is with the first in regard to the second as it is with 
trees which, being planted in good ground, bear better fruit 
than those planted in poor soil.110
Finally, Richelieu stated in plain terms his belief that the magis-
trature should belong, as it had traditionally, to men endowed with
property and a certain honneur: "Consequently, rather than it being
necessary to condemn venality because it excludes men of low condition




m Ibid., p. 238.
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In short, the financial exigencies of Richelieu's ministry, the 
powerful opposition of the officers, and his own aristocratic outlook 
combined to make any reform in venality and heredity virtually impos­
sible. Above all, if heredity and venality were abolished, the 
Parties casuelles would suffer and office holding would be thrown 
open to intrigue and favor seeking. The Cardinal himself noted that 
any change in contemporary conditions of office holding could have to 
be delayed until peace time or pursed only with caution: "Disorders
which have come about through public necessities and which are 
fortified by reasons of State can be reformed only with time. It is
necessary to proceed carefully and not to go from one extreme to the
112other." It would be far more preferable to continue the present 
system than to risk incurring the wrath of the officials and to 
chance disrupting vital sources of income. This policy was, in fact, 
consistently followed throughout Richelieu's ministry, and the 
Parties casuelles operated in 1642 just as it had in 1624.
After considering the abuses of venality and heredity, Richelieu 
devoted a brief portion of the Testament to the reform of abuses 
within the corps of the magistrature. The brevity and superficiality 
of the Cardinal's discussion, limited as it was to the need for a 
certain maturity and education for judges, indicates that he was 
little interested in earnest reform in this area and probably 
regarded permanent correction as unlikely. In acknowledging the 
practice of receiving under-age judges, Richelieu confined his
112Ibid., p. 236.
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remarks to reiterating the importance of the standards established in 
the ordinances. The gens du roi should be held responsible for 
carrying out the requisite investigations into the candidate's 
qualifications. Other than an indication of the need for a certain 
age and maturity, the Cardinal simply recommended that the magis­
trates be well educated. The principal means to this end was to be 
the retrenchment of an established and widespread practice of 
tutoring young candidates for the magistrature in the study of law. 
Certain doctors were notorious for compelling their pupils to 
memorize and parrot what they could not learn. "Such men are," 
Richelieu noted, "like instructors in arms, who are only good for 
teaching men their own ruin and hindering them from learning the 
real excercises of the military, which can be learned only in the 
army after much time and training."I13 Despite the Cardinal's 
professed predilection against these professional coaches in law, he 
had no scruples against utilizing one of them, a certain Claude 
Colombel, in a scheme to force the Parlement to receive the new 
conseillers created in December, 1635. Rightly anticipating that the 
Parlement would harass, and if possible, reject, any candidate for 
the new seats during their entry examination, Richelieu had Colombel, 
a noted professor of law, submitted for candidacy. The court 
fulfilled every expectation. The judges embarrassed Colombel with 
trick questions and tried to ridicule his knowledge of Latin.
113Ibid., p. 245.
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Only the intervention of the prince de Conde in the examination 
made Colombel's eventual reception possible.-*--^
In the administration of justice, as in other aspects of govern­
ment, Richelieu was inclined to support a government of men and not of 
law, though he always sought the support of legal argument. What was 
of supreme importance to him was that those administering justice 
should be gens de quality, that is to say, men of property, of ma­
turity and experience, and especially of honneur. If the officers 
possessed these qualities, the nature of the law itself would matter 
but little, for the probity of those administering justice would 
overcome all defects in the statutes of the kingdom:
Even when the laws are defective, if the officers are men of 
property, their probity will be capable of making up any 
default, and, however good that they may be, the laws will 
be rendered fruitless if the magistrates neglect the execu­
tion of them . . . .115
When the power and prestige of the court in public matters are 
considered, when the traditional independence of the Parlement's 
behavior is known, and after having seen Richelieu's attitude towards 
the sanctity of royal authority, it is perhaps surprising to find 
only a few short remarks in the Testament dedicated to the role of 
the Parlement in the absolute State. In opening his discussion 
dealing with the Parlement's role in affairs of State and its 
encroachment on royal authority, Richelieu immediately revealed that 
words were necessary on such a subject when his intent could so
•^P&re H. Griffet, Histoire de r£gne de Louis XIII (3 vols.; Paris, 
1758), II, 673-79.
115Richelieu, Testament politique, p. 2UU-
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easily be summarized:
It seems that there should be much to say on such a subject 
[as the role of the court in matters of State], however, I 
could say enough about it in three words [raison d'Etat?] if 
I first say that it is necessary to do nothing other than to limit 
the officers of justice to rendering justice to the subjects of 
the king, which is the sole end of their establishment.
Indeed, this succinct motif would represent the key to Richelieu's
philosophy in regard to the court after 1630.
Justification for severely limiting the Parlement was, of course,
inseparably related to Richelieu's drive to augment royal authority.
The Parlement historically represented the values of a limited,
traditional, and constitutional monarchy. The court had a long
record of.political ambitions associated with its remonstrances and
a critical attitude towards royal authority which Richelieu could
not abide:
It is a thing so ordinary to such companies to regard and to 
look to the criticism of the government of states that it is 
not to be remarked upon. All subordinate authority always 
regards that which is superior to it with envy; if it dares 
not dispute its power, it gives itself the liberty to decry 
its conduct.117
Despite the court's long association with public affairs, an 
association familiar to Richelieu, the court had no legitimate 
claim to a place in the conduct of the State at the expense of 
regal power:
It would be impossible to prevent the ruin of royal authority 
if one should follow the sentiments of those who, being as 
ignorant in the practice of government of states as they presume 
to be wise in the theory of their administration, are neither 
capable of thoroughly judging their conduct nor competent to
n 6 Ibid.., p. 248. 
U 7Ibid., p. 249.
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to give decisions on the course of public affairs, which 
exceeds their grasp.U8
Richelieu's objections to the Parlement's participation in
affairs of State were not limited to the court's criticism and
jealousy of royal authority, or its encroachment on the king's
prerogatives. The Cardinal understood quite clearly the fundamental
weakness of the court in attempting to fulfill its limiting and
consultative role. The court as an institution was plagued with
a hydra-like Achilles heel: it could never represent itself as a
united and homogeneous body capable of acting as energetically or
decisively as a single minister or a few councillors:
It is necessary to bear with the imperfections of a body which, 
having several heads [the chambresl cannot have a uniform spirit 
and which, being agitated as much by diverse impulses as it is 
composed of different factions, cannot be brought either to 
understand or to tolerate its own good.^9
Everyone, said the Cardinal, recognized and disapproved of the
court's proceedings when it was carried away by some derangement, but
in rightly condemning it, it is difficult to bring a remedy to 
it because in the great companies the number of bad always 
surpasses the number of good, and even if all were found wise, 
it still would not be a sure thing that the best sentiments 
should find themselves in the majority, while judgments are 
diverse in themselves.^ 2®
In summary, the Parlement's potential or real limitations on 
royal power and on his personal goals for the French kingdom were an 
anathema to Richelieu, who loathed any checks on royal authority 
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of State. The Parlement stood in the way of the utilization of 
reason of State to order the kingdom, to glorify the king's power, and 
to provide the internal discipline and financial resources required 
to lead the French to greatness. For these reasons, it would he 
necessary to compel the court to obey the royal will like other 
institutions and subjects. The court's initiative in matters of 
State would have to be strictly delineated and the judges barred 
from encroachment on what was properly the sphere of the royal council.
Yet as a political realist, Richelieu always recognized that 
the Parlement was an integral and indispensable part of the monarchy. 
The Parlement1s registration was essential for legislation, because 
the court enjoyed immense respect among the king's subjects who 
considered the traditional verification essential for authentic 
legality. The court, too, was useful in enforcing law decided by 
others; for this function it was desirable to maintain the judge's 
standing untarnished. Finally, even Richelieu acknowledged there 
were occasions when the Parlement's prestige and political power had 
aided the monarchy; indeed, there were instances like those of 1594 
and 1610 when the court's initiative had helped preserve royal 
authority.
Additionally there was a certain personal factor to be accounted 
for. Richelieu had relatives in the court, and he knew well that the 
Parlement served as a training ground for many conseillers d’Etat 
and ma^tres des requites. Many of his creatures had come from 
judicial careers in the court or from the ranks of the maitres des 
requetes closely related by blood and professional duties to the
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parlementaires. Louis' chief minister could scarcely afford to 
ignore the web of professional and familial ties which held the high 
robe officials together in spite of grave institutional conflicts.
The same web of personal interest, as well as fiscal needs, regaled 
against any permanent resolution of the question of venality.
Dealing with the Parlement was then a thorny problem, made all 
the more delicate by the ever-pressing exigencies of a precarious 
foreign policy. Obviously, it was neither desirable nor possible 
that the court be suppressed like the great Crown offices of Constable 
and Grand Admiral, allowed to lapse in the same way as the Estates 
General, or used as a sounding board like the Assembly of Notables.
Nor could the magistrates be unduly compromised by the abolition of 
the paulette or excessively irritated by disciplinary measures. One 
critical question during Richelieu's ministry, therefore, would be 
to determine what instruments and what policy would prove most 
appropriate in furthering the interests of royal authority without 
inordinately alienating the judges or undermining popular respect 
for the legal qualities of the monarchy.
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CHAPTER V
THE PARLEMENT AND THE PRACTICES OF ABSOLUTISM
During the ministry of Richelieu the authority of the king, as 
symbolized by his signature and seals, lay behind all administrative 
and judicial decisibns. By its very nature the essence of 
monarchical government focused on the person of the king; royal 
officers held their posts and executed their decisions in his name. 
The king was in all ways the living embodiment of sovereignty, of 
la chose publique, and the foremost public person in the kingdom.
Yet however fundamental the person of the king was to the monar­
chical principle, his government could not have functioned without 
constant advice on policy and assistance in daily affairs. This 
advisory and administrative requirement was institutionalized in the 
royal council which, as the curia regis, the Grand Conseil, or 
Consell d'Etat, had always surrounded the king and stood at the top 
of the bureaucratic structure of the kingdom. Its central and 
supreme importance was rightly emphasized by Mousnier in commenting 
that "the council of the king is par excellence the sovereign's 
instrument for government. It is in the council that he legislates, 
that he judges as final arbiter, that he administers."^ Thus 
representing the interface between sovereign and sovereignty, the
■^ -Roland Mousnier, "Les Rfeglements du conseil du Roi sous Louis 
XIII," Bulletin de la SociStS de l1histoire de France (1946-47),
P. 93.
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role of the council became even more significant as government grew 
more sophisticated. In the seventeenth century the functions of the 
council and its rapport with the Parlement became critical to the 
inauguration of absolutistic practices of government.
From the misty origins of the monarchy in the Frankish tribal 
assemblies, tradition demanded the consent of the king's peers in 
decision making, especially in questions of law, and during the 
medieval period the curia regis conserved this tradition by offering 
its tres grand conseil to French kings. As long as the curia regis 
remained the only court of appeal in kingdom, there could be no 
question that it was the sole representative of sovereign justice. 
This situation became more intricate at the end of the 1200's as 
the Estates General came to share in representing the nation and as 
the judicial and financial sections of the council became the 
Parlement and Chambre des comptes. With the separation of these 
courts came the question of the relationship between the justice 
delegated to them and that retained by the king in council. 
Contentions between the Parlement and the Chambre des comptes had 
to be referred to some higher agency, as did decisions of these 
courts returned in violation of law or the king's will. According 
to feudal and monarchical principles, the king's person remained the 
highest authority in the land; therefore, his presence in council 
necessarily continued to represent the natural judicial extension 
of his being. In legal and judicial terms the king in council was 
the dernier ressort, the final and ultimate judge to whom one
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
262
could appeal. Decisions so rendered by him were denoted by the 
formulary fait par la roi en son conseil, a rubric which, at least 
during the medieval period, very accurately described the sovereign 
nature of judgments given in the king's presence. Contemporaries 
grasped this fact quite readily, and increasing numbers of fourteenth- 
century Frenchmen carried their appeals from Parlementaire verdicts 
to the council. Sometimes petitions were made directly to the 
council for justice in first instance; at other times sovereigns 
were unable to resist the temptation to evoke important matters 
to their judgment among their barons. For these reasons the council 
continued to act as a superior judicial institution even after the 
creation of the presumably sovereign courts. The results were 
immensely important for the history of French institutions, for 
despite repeated efforts at regulation the Crown found it impossible, 
and in some cases undesirable, to halt the steady growth of the 
council's justice retenue. The sovereign courts naturally resented 
and resisted such encroachments and conflict became a permanent 
characteristic of institutional relations at the highest level.
A limited requirement for some final superior arbiter over the 
Parlement was apparent even during that court's earliest formative 
years. Article 12 of the Ordinance of March 23, 1302, established 
that "decisions rendered by the court [of ParlementJ will be 
executed without appeal, and if there is some ambiguity or error,
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correction of it will be referred to the king or to the court 
fsic, the c o u n c i l ] . Royal authority was evidently expected to 
regulate the judges and provide for their transgressions of the 
law. These pronouncements took place in the Grand Conseil de la 
justice, quite literally a great council meeting including the 
king and as many barons, prelates, and officers as possible.3
In addition to correcting questionable decisions and main­
taining judicial orderliness, the development of evocations also 
engendered problems at an early date. The granting of such evocations 
was another expression of justice retenue. On the authority of the 
king and under certain circumstances, either party in a legal 
proceeding might request that their case be heard before the king 
in council rather than in the Parlement. The usual grounds were 
parents, or inequity because of kinship with the judges, but other 
legal reasoning might be accepted as well. When it is remembered 
that the council followed the king in his perambulations among his 
royal residences, the consequent hardships and inequity of this 
procedure can easily be imagined. Still more arbitrary were evo­
cations initiated on the part of the king, the barons, or other 
persons of influence to bring litigation into the council where its 
outcome could easily be determined.
^Isambert, Anciennes lois frangaises, II, 761.
C^heruel, Dictionnaire historique des institutions, I, 212.
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Charles V recognized this thorny problem and sought to guarantee 
the integrity of the Parlement's jurisdiction by sending it royal 
letters dated July 22, 1370, in which he prohibited evocations for 
"the pleading of any petty causes."^ The nature of the remedy, 
based as it was on royal will, was not such as to resolve the 
difficulty which continued unchecked throughout the fourteenth 
century. Monarchial weakness during the Hundred Years' War disrupted 
all normal judicial procedures and eroded royal authority, but as 
the monarchy recovered its vitality during the fifteenth century the 
judicial activities of the council was revived. After the emulsion 
of the English by Charles VII, the partisans of the king who had been 
dispoiled by the English had their property restored to them. All 
judicial affairs related to these restitutions were categorically 
evoked to the council.^
The constant multiplication of judicial attributions during the 
middle of the fifteenth century eventually led to a division in 
the heart of the council. During the reign of Louis XI a special 
judicial section of the council devoted exclusively to legal matters 
heard on appeal to the king or evoked from the Parlement began to
^Isambert, Anciexmes lois frangaises, V, 546-47. The editors 
of Anciermes lois frangaises note that these letters were some of 
the most remarkable of the reign. See p. 546, n. 1.
D^areste, La Justice administrative, p. 54, n. 4. Possibly this 
categorical evocation was due to the political attitudes within the 
Parlement of Paris, which in 1436 had just been reconstituted out of 
the royalist parlement at Poitiers and the Anglo-Burgundian judges 
who had remained at Paris.
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assume a semi-autonomous existence. The conditions under which the 
Grand Conseil emerged as a sovereign court thus almost precisely 
duplicated those which had produced the Parlement two centuries 
before. The existence of a separate segment of the royal council so 
denominated was clear by 1469, "because by this time the interests 
of the king were being defended by a permanent procureur du roi. 
Membership probably took in all the king's noble advisors, the 
chancellor, and the six ma£tres des requetes. After 1483 the Grand 
Conseil assembled on a regular basis and produced a continuous series 
of archives to record its business, though it still perambulated 
after the king in his wanderings.6
A new court's personnel and competence were defined by two 
ordinances of the late 1400's, one issued under Charles VIII 
(August 2, 1497) and the other under Louis XII (July 13, 1498).^
These acts show that the court was still considered an annex and a 
dependency of the royal council from which it was still only imper­
fectly separated. The legislation of 1498 explained the raison 
d'etre of the Grand Conseil by stating that the royal council, 
being ambulatory, often did not possess a sufficient number of legal 
specialists to deal with "the highest matters and affairs, . . .
^Noel Valois, ed., Inventaire des arrets du Conseil d'Etat 
(r£gne de Henri IV) (2 vols.; Paris, 1886-189317 I, Introduction, 
xxix.
^Isambert, Anciennes lois frangalses, XI, 292, 296-300. The 
text of the legislation of 1497 has been lost, and Anciennes lois 
francaises reproduces only the title and date. The provisions of the 
earlier act are known, however, because the ordinance of 1498 
repeated and confirmed the terms of its predecessor before going on 
to ennumerate certain modifications.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
266
hereditary and beneficial as well as others" which came before it.8 
Thus in 1497 Charles VIII had decided to add seventeen "clerical 
men, experienced in the rendering of justice" who would serve 
regularly as conseillers ordinaires alongside the chancellor, 
maitres des requetes, and such great nobles who chose to attend. 
Louis XII confirmed this arrangement in 1498, raised the number 
of conseillers from seventeen to twenty, and attached a procureur 
du roi, a clerk, and a secretary.9
The ordinance of 1498 officially erected the Grand Conseil 
into "a corps, court, and college" which "will have sovereign 
authority over all our kingdom, pays, lands, and seigneuries, 
and {over] all that our other sovereign courts, established in 
various places of our kingdom, have within their limits and 
ressorts."10 The causes it could hear were those "that it pleased 
the king to commit and send to it by lettres patentes. 1111 The king 
was reputed to sit in person in the Grand Conseil, hence its deci­
sions were rendered under the rubric "le Roi en son Conseil" ("the 
king in his council"). In fact, by the sixteenth century this 
formulary had become legal fiction as the presidency was almost 
always left to the chancellor.12
8Ibid., 297.
I^bid., 298-300; Doueet, Les Institutions de la France, I, 
102-03“
^Isambert, Anciennes lois frangaises, XI, 298.
11Ibid.
12Zeller, Les Institutions de la France, p. 113.
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These conditions made it certain, that the Grand Conseil1s 
jurisdiction could function only at the expense of the Parlement1s, 
and, in fact, bitter wrangles attest to the state of councilliar- 
parlementaire relations during the late 1400's and early 1500's.
At this point it should be noted that the interventions of the 
Grand Conseil were never very great in the area of criminal justice, 
but almost all varieties of civil justice and many public matters 
were referred to it on appeal, evocation, or in first instance.
The Grand Conseil arbitrated disputes between the sovereign courts, 
regulated their judges, heard appeals against the acts of royal 
officers, and entertained questions of fiefs and ecclesiastical 
benefices.
Of these categories of cases, the sorest point of contention 
between the Grand Conseil and the Parlement centered about royal 
appointments to clerical benefices; in reality the Grand Conseil 
achieved much of its importance by acting as a court of prerogative 
justice in clerical affairs. Because such affairs were entangled 
with papal relations and the quest of the Crown to dominate the 
Galliean Church, matters of clerical benefices were also matters of 
the highest State concern. Louis XI and his immediate successors, 
therefore, categorically referred such cases to the Grand Conseil 
for judgment with the assurance of a satisfactory verdict.
The clash over benefices began during the 1460's as part of a 
larger controversy over Louis' regulation of the Galliean Church. 
Immediately after his accession in 1461, Louis XI scrapped the 
Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges by a simple arret in council which
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was ill-counciled, if not illegal, and the Parlement strenuously 
objected in lengthy remonstrances of 1465, which Louis ignored.^
The Franco-Papal detente was carried even further in If.72 when a 
new concordat was arranged between Louis and Sixtus IV. he status 
of proposals in the agreement, however, was left shroud?, in 
ambiguity since Louis changed his Papal policy several times during 
the 1470's and because the Parlement did not register some of the 
documents involved. At Louis' death in 1483 the situation in the 
French Church was confused and would remain confused until the 
promulgation of the Concordat of Bologna in 1516.^
Inevitably the Parlement was dragged into the controversy which 
raged over Papal relations, the Galliean Liberties, and royal 
intercession in Church affairs. The political positions taken by 
the court and by the Crown were complex and need be described here 
only as they affected the jurisdiction of the Parlement. In 
general that court considered itself the palladin of the Pragmatic 
Sanction, which represented customary legal tradition in France. 
Among other provisions the Sanction had asserted the principle of 
canonical elections to fill major benefices. The Crown's determina­
tion to modify the Sanction and to dabble in clerical elections 
with Papal approval made ecclesiastical appointments an issue of 
the highest political sensitivity, and the contest over such
^The remonstrances are in Isauibert, Anciennes Lois Frangaises, 
X, pp.
^Shennan, Parlement of Paris, pp. 180-81.
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appointments was enmeshed in the struggle to control the Galliean 
Church. To ensure decisions favorable to its candidates and thus 
to its policies, the Crown consistently wielded the most convenient 
and effective legal weapons open to it. It evoked cases involving 
clerical appointments, the rSgale, the annates, and benefices to 
hearings before the king in the Grand Conseil.
The Parlement adopted the argument that it was the sole 
arbiter of disputes arising between secular and temporal authorities. 
Certainly the court had customary law on its side; after the 
Ordinance of Mbntils-les-tours of 1453> the Parlement could also 
cite written law giving it competence over prelates and the r&gale.-^  
The Parlement further fortified its claims on the unique grounds that 
it was a corps mixte, made up of men both ecclesiastical and lay, 
and therefore perfectly suited to the adjudication of clerical 
affairs.1^  In practice these doctrines meant that the Parisian 
court should hear all suits over the annates, regale, and causes 
brought by candidates to Church offices. The Parlement maintained 
that it could not divide this jurisdiction, given it by the king, 
of whom it was the sole representative, with any other body and 
especially with the Grand Conseil. A singular statement of parle- 
mentaire superiority against the pretensions of other jurisdictions 
appeared in remonstrances presented to Charles VIII in July,
15lsanjbert, Anciennes lois frangaises, IX, 204. The juris­
diction over the r5gale is mentioned in Article 5, the prelates in 
Article 7.
^Christopher Stocker, "The Politics of the Parlement in 1525," 
French Historical Studies, VIII, No. 2 (Fall, 1973), 200; Maugis, 
Histolre du Parlement, I, 375.
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1489. While these remonstrances were directed most notably against 
contemporary abuses of evocations, they also serve very well as a 
permanent general expression of the Parlement's stand vis-a-vis the 
competence of the royal council, for these fifteenth century 
principles were held to be equally valid in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries when the Parlement was again contesting the 
authority of the council. The remonstrances began with a recitation 
of the Parlement*s foundation and its historical tradition:
"The court of Parlement comes before the king, in all 
reverence, humility, and obedience, to remonstrate with him 
concerning the following things:
Firstly, that his very Christian predecessors of holy 
and good remembrance the kings of France . . . have ordered 
unum solium judicii, that it is one sovereign court, the court 
of the Parlement of Paris, of which it is written: Rex qui
sedet in solio judicii solo intuitu dissipat omne malum.
Item, that the said court is the true seat and throne of 
the king, constituted and ordered of one hundred persons, of 
whom he is the first and chief, modelled after the Senate of 
Rome, which was constituted of one hundred men, of whom the 
Emperor was one and the chief. And as long as the Senate 
endured, the Romans always prospered, subjugated, and governed 
the monarchy of the world.
Item, similarly, that in as much as it has pleased the 
kings of France to uphold their Senate and court of Parlement, 
the kingdom has always flourished and prospered in all things 
by the great justice which is done there, without exception 
to persons, in the name of the king and by him."
Having posited the Parlement's precedence and anciermetS, the
remonstrances went on to delineate its judicial competence:
"Item, that howevermuch the king has had for all his 
kingdom many ordinary judges receiving appeals from one and 
the other, all of them ministers and distributors of justice, 
nevertheless preceding kings instituted and always upheld 
one Parlement composed of one hundred men, of which the king 
in his person is chief and the first, twelve lay and clerical 
peers of France, his chancellor, four presidents, eight 
maitres des requetes and the remaining conseillers making up one 
mystical body made up of ecclesiastical and lay people all in 
the authority of Senators, representing the person of the king,
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because this is the dernier ressort and the sovereign justice of 
the kingdom of France, the true seat, authority, magnificanee, 
and majesty of the king.
Item, that the said court is founded, instituted, and 
ordered in order to hear ordinary cases arising out of the 
rights of the king, his authority and sovereignty, as much in 
first instance in great matters and concerning the right of 
regale which adheret floribus corone, as by appeal from the 
- personnel of his | Chambre del comptes and the conseillers of 
his treasury, from all his domain, and other great matters.
Item, also to know causes £arising out ofl the domain, the 
rights, authority, and pre-eminence of the twelve peers of 
France, the which, by plain right and in first instance cannot 
be pleaded elsewhere.
Item, causes of archbishops, bishops, abbeys, and other 
great benefices of the kingdom, by reason of which the prelates 
owe an oath of fidelity, because it is a singular right 
belonging to the king because of his crown, of which others 
cannot and should not hear other than a sovereign court, since 
the rights of the rggale and others belong to the king because 
of his crown. Also to preserve the rights of the king, the 
holy decrees and the statues of the Church, to repress, 
punish, and correct all violations of fact, to hear abuses 
made by ecclesiastical judges in making enterprises upon the 
justice and law of the king or otherwise."
The remonstrances continued with a general statement of the
Parlement's superior competence over all other jurisdictions within
the kingdom, including, presumably, the royal council without the
presence of the king:
"Item, finally, to hear, decide, judge, and determine also 
in sovereign and dernier ressort all appeals lodged, all 
petitions, outcries, and quarrels of those oppressed; also to 
hear sentences, judgments and writs of constables, marshals, 
admirals, maftres des requites de 1'hotel, and of all baillis, 
sSnSchaux, and those holding the Requetes du palais, and all 
other judges whatever, ordinary or delegated, of the kingdom, 
of whatever authority they have."
Having thus established their universal competence over all matters
of ordinary justice and administration, the judges went on to condemn
evocations to the royal council by pointing out that kings such as
Charles V had left them free to discern those which were just and
reasonable:
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"Item, that the very glorious preceding kings of France 
had always left the court in such respect and in such liberty 
and franchise that they wished, ordered and commanded orally 
- and in writing that they [the judges] should render justice and 
that they should not obey letters, summons, or evocations if they 
did not seem reasonable to them in their consciences."
The judges concluded with a specific condemnation of evocations to
the Grand conseil:
"Item also, that many have found the means to have their 
causes evoked to the Grand conseil of the king, which evocations 
are given to them very lightly, without regard to the status of 
the trial, which is sometimes in valvis sentencie, sometimes 
in inquiry before the ordinary judge, and without regard to the 
state of the parties which are often greatly troubled by them.
Hence it is necessary for them to hire new counsel and to 
leave those who had begun the conduct of matters in order to 
follow the king, badly lodged, badly treated, in danger of 
their persons, and of losing the letters and titles that they 
have to carry. [[They] have no access to judges because they 
know neither the place nor hour nor time, and can often hold 
no counsel, which is a great disorder in justice and is con­
ducive to parties abandoning all."1^
Appended to the remonstrances were a dozen individual cases illus­
trating the abuse of evocations and the injustices that had arisen 
out of the practice.
The remonstrances of 1489 remained without effect, but this 
hardly deterred the Parlement from protesting Francis I's insistence 
on continual expansion of the Grand conseil1s business. When the 
court presented long remonstrances to Louise of Savoy in 1526, for 
example, it included articles complaining about hindrances to the
■^ Maugis, Histoire du Parlement, I, 374-76, quoting remonstrances 
inserted into registers of the Parlement for July, 1489.
^Ibid., 377-79, reproduces the synopsis of these suits, the 
majority of which were concerned with clerical affairs.
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to the decisions of the Parlement (Article 6); it also cited 
evocations to the Grand conseil (Article 7) and the abuse of 
commlttimus by the chancellor and maitres des requetes (Article 13).19 
However, as long as Church-State relations remained politically 
sensitive, the Crown could not resist resorting to evocations to 
the council. Such was the case in the stormy affaire Duprat already 
recounted in Chapter II.20 Duprat, it will be recalled, had been 
nominated by Francis I as Archibshop of Sens and Abbot of Saint- 
Benoit le Fleury-sur-Loire in 1525; his clerical rivals had objected 
to Duprat's unsuitability and sued in the Parlement. Duprat and 
Louise of Savoy had the affair carried before the Grand Conseil 
where the Chancellor and his partisans reigned supreme. The 
Parlement refused to bow to repeated evocations and nullifications 
handed down by the Grand Conseil; moreover, on July 27, 1525, it 
created a commission to investigate the Chancellor's behavior and 
to bring him before the Parlement's bar of justice. On September 5, 
the Parlement enjoined Duprat to come to the court before November 15, 
and if he did not voluntarily appear, he would be compelled to 
account for himself in person.2  ^ Here the Duprat Affair was inter­
rupted by parlementaire consideration of a treaty with England. So
^The text of this remonstrance has never been published, 
though Maugis provides a lengthy summary in Histoire du Parlement, I, 
561-63- The original occupies folios 321r-319v of register X*a 1527 
in the Archives nationales. See Stocker, "Politics of the Parlement 
of Paris," p. 195, n. 12. This article contains a penetrating 
analysis of the remonstrances of 1526.
2QSupra, p. 85.
2lMaugis, Histoire du Parlement, I, 572-75.
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consumed, the month of October gave tempers a chance to cool, and 
the wrangle lapsed until Francis' return from captivity in December, 
1526. The passage of six months did not lessen Francis' determina­
tion to set his obstreperous Parlement straight for misbehavior 
during his absence, and in the lit de justice of July 27, 1527, he 
very firmly ruled that the Parlement could not hear issues arising 
over bishops, archbishops, and abbeys. These, presumably, would 
be heard by the Grand Conseil. Jurisdiction over the Chancellor 
belonged to the king alone.22
Thus confirmed in the lit of 1527, the powers of the Grand 
Conseil formed the basis of a jurisdiction that continued to grow 
through the next decades. In 1527 it gained sovereign competence 
over matters related to the dgcimes de la croisade; in 1528 
competence over the administration of hospitals and charitable 
institutions, the solde de 50,000 homines, and tolls were attributed 
to the Grand Conseil.23 More important than these was the attribu­
tion of all cases involving royal and muncipal officers given in 
an edict of October 25, 1529.2^ To these general attributions 
were added very numerous evocations, often bearing on the most 
important of matters. In short, at the end of Francis I's reign 
the Grand Conseil was demonstration a potential to supplant the
22pbid., pp. 582-83; Aubert, "Le Parlement de Paris," I, 74-0.
23Doucet, Les Institutions de la France, I, 205. The dgcimes 
de la croisade, a clerical tax for the crusades, went back into the 
medieval period. The solde de 50,000 hommes was a supplement to the 
taille imposed for the pay of 50,000 soldiers.
2'+Aubert, "Le Parlement," I, 74-1-42.
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specialization was being repeated within the heart of the council; 
as before, once begun, the process showed itself irreversable. A 
rSglement of 1557 indicates that by this time two weekly sessions 
of a Conseil des parties ("council of contentious parties") were 
being held to decide favored legal matters. Another rbglement of 
1578 demonstrates that the Conseil des parties, along with a Conseil 
des finances, had become identifiable subdivisions of the Conseil 
d'Etat. By this time the size of the Conseil des parties had grown 
considerable. The reglement of 1578 projected a body made up of 
the princes, cardinals, marshals, great officers, governors of the 
provinces, twenty-four conseillers ordinaires, and the presidents 
and gens du roi of the sovereign courts. It was to meet "in the 
aeeustomed manner, on Wednesday and Friday at an hour after noon"
of Paris or a Rouen crowd. The custom since had great vogue under 
King Henry II, so that there have been introduced men in the 
entourage of the court who act as procurers and advocats in this 
council just as in simple subaltemate jurisdictions. Indeed, 
sometimes fees have been charged for judgments by the maftres des 
requetes, a custom truly unworthy of this great tribunal of France, 
because of which, Francois Olivier having been recalled as chancellor 
at the accession of Francis II, the first thing that he recommended 
was to eliminate from the Conseil Priv£ all such trial matters, 
returning each to its own place. After his death this was very 
religiously observed by his successor Michel de l'Hospital.
Dareste, La Justice Administrative, p. 56, quoting Pasquier, 
Recherches sur la France, Bk. II, Ch. VI. In reality, says Doucet, 
the existence o7“a. procurer of the king in the council antedated 
the arrival of Poyet in the chancellery. His successors Olivier 
and Hospital do not seem to have been able to check the judicial 
activity of the council which continued to develop as before.
Doucet, Les Institutions de la France, I, 147, n. 2.
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Parlement; its highly irregular jurisdiction at mid-century has been 
described by Roger Doucet as "filling the needs of the king to 
impose respect for his will through the intermediary of judges whose 
docility was always assured to him. Henry II did nothing more 
than to continue down this path; by an edict of September, 1552, 
he confirmed all anterior measures in regard to the Grand Conseil.2 *^
Even as the attributions of the Grand Conseil multiplied 
through the first half of the sixteenth century, another portentious 
development was surreptiously and fatally undermining its apparent 
ascendancy. Well before Francis I's accession, kings had deserted 
meetings of the Grand Conseil to devote their attention to matters 
of State in the inner council. Absence of the king's person in the 
Grand Conseil thus precisely recreated an ancient judicial dilemma: 
however authoritative the Grand Conseil was reputed to be, it could 
not challenge the essential sovereign quality lent the inner council 
by the king's presence. After 1500 private matters of justice began 
to reach the king's ear in his Conseil gtroit or Conseil des affaires, 
and by 1530 the number of private intrusions had reached a point 
where a procureur du roi had to be appointed to argue the king's 
interests.2^  This was a sure sign that a past proclivity for
^Doucet, Les Institutions de la France, I, 205.
26Ibid.
^Etienne Pasquier attributed the growth of the Conseil des 
parties or conseil prive to Chancellor Poyet: "'Chancellor
Guillaume Poyet brought to the Conseil privg so many chicaneries 
that although before him they had treated in this place only matters 
of State, beginning with him it began to give ear to private 
parties for matters which could have been decided in a Chatelet
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and had virtually an unlimited jurisdiction, since the members 
themselves would decide which cases to hear and which to return to 
lower courts:
His Majesty wishes that hereafter all cases will be returned 
to the courts of Parlement and the Grand Conseil, except those 
retained by the opinion of the council, of which a roll will 
now be made to discharge the said council of the confusion of 
cases there.2®
The development of the Conseil des parties enormously compli­
cated jurisdictional problems and judicial procedures among the 
sovereign courts, for after the middle of the sixteenth century 
there were no less than three bodies having some claim to sovereign 
justice in ordinary judicial matters. Of these three, the standing 
of the Conseil des parties was clearest. Most intimately repre­
senting the king's person, it obviously had the highest and most 
sovereign ressort, a fact symbollized by the indisputable formulary 
fait par le Roi en son conseil appearing on its arrets. But what 
was the relationship of the Grand Conseil to the Conseil des parties? 
What was the Parlement’s status in regard to both the Grand Conseil 
and the Conseil des parties? What was the competence of each? What 
paths were appeals and evocations to take? Questions like these 
plagued the judicial scene and were made even more pointed after 
1551 when the prfesidiaux were thrust into the judicial structure 
just below the parlements.
^Etienne Girard and Jacques Joly, Trois livres des offices de 
France (Paris, 1638), I, 624-25; Doucet, Les Institutions de la 
France, I, 131-52; Zeller, Les Institutions de la France, pp.
111-14.
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Patterns of justice among the ordinary courts and the council, 
already confused by conflicting jurisdictions, lettres de comrrrfttimus, 
and evocations were made even more disorderly by an irregularity 
peculiar to high criminal justice. Faced with a frequent and tumul­
tuous political opposition among the great nobility, royal kin, or 
high officials, medieval and Renaissance monarchs were compelled to 
give affairs of peculation, rebellion, conspiracy, and lhse-majest§ 
careful consideration. In these cases exceptional circumstances 
were always at hand. Not only were the accused commonly persons 
capable of disrupting the tenuous skein of public peace, but their 
activities were usually conspiratorial and subject to conjecture 
until put into effect. Evidence, if extant at all, too often took 
a frail human form. Sometimes delicate problems of international 
relations were connected with sub rosa scheming. Almost inevitable, 
too, the Crown had to take into account the tenacles of clientage, 
the possibility of bribery, and the likelihood of political pressures 
within ordinary courts. Attendant to all these factors, of course, 
was a need for prompt action and, not infrequently, a requirement 
for exemplary punishments as well.
Early on, therefore, the monarchy preferred to commit sensitive 
criminal trials bearing political consequences to a special kind 
of handling commensurate with their danger to the State. Across the 
fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries, a bewildering 
variety of judicial procedures arose out of this discretion. 
Nominally, of course, the Parlement held rights of sovereign 
criminal justice, and upon favorable circumstances the court was
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allowed to conduct trials with political implications. More 
frequently, though, the Crown resorted to extraordinary procedures. 
These procedures could theoretically have taken the form of evocations 
to the Grand Conseil or Conseil des parties, hut in actual practice 
councilliar justice and evocations from the sovereign courts were 
almost always confined to civil suits, clerical affairs, and 
financial matters. The necessities of extraordinary criminal justice 
were better served by commissaires, the variety of which was so great 
that no exact pattern can be established. Each case thus tried 
presented its own individuality in charges pressed, quality of the 
accused, judicial procedures followed, judges chosen, and punishments 
meted out. It is, however, precisely these qualities of extensive 
usage and variability of form which render the history of commissioned 
justice significant to the evaluation of Richelieu's practices in 
the seventeenth century. With commissaires, as with other aspects 
of French law, precedent had its place in fixing legality. However 
morally reprehensible extraordinary justice was held to be, and 
however much it was decried in written law, a long series of 
precedents created a strong legal argument in favor of commissaires.
The utilization of commissaires by the monarchy certainly ante­
dated the fifteenth century. Quasi-legendary accounts going back 
to 576 were recalled as judicial precedents by garde des sceaux 
Michel de Marillac in the seventeenth century, but these, while 
perhaps possessing a grain of truth, cannot legitimately be compared
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
280
with practices in an age of institutionalized justice.29 By- 
definition a choice between ordinary and estraordinary justice was 
possible only with the permanent delegation of judicial functions, 
and this did not come about until the fourteenth century. Just at 
the time the Parlement was assuming that delegation, a notable 
example of extraordinary justice can be found in Philip the Fair's 
prosecution of the Knights Templars between 1307 and 1314. Neither 
this instance, however, nor that of Joan of Arc in 1430 can fairly 
be cited as typical, since the charges of heresy common to both 
necessitated a referral to ecclesiastical courts.
Trial by commissaires for matters of State can be firmly dated 
to at least 1409 when Jean de Montaigu, surintendant des finances 
and grand maftre de la maison du roi, was accused of embezzlement 
and turned over to a commission composed of a number of members of 
the Parlement presided over by the prgvot of Paris. Under torture, 
de Montaigu confessed to the charges imputed. His appeal to the 
Parlement was rejected, and in spite of the appeals of his family 
and manoeuvres of powerful persons, the surintendant was executed 
on October 17, 1409. From beginning to end, the Montaigu Affair 
had political overtones if not ends. The real causes of Montaigu's
29Marillac's citations are in B.N. Ms. fr. 7549, fols. 38-46 
and 209-42.
•^Paul Bastid, Les Grands procfes politiques de 1'histoire 
(Paris: 1962), pp. 72-118, has accounts of both triaTs. Participation 
of the Parlement in the Templar Affair was limited to a decision of 
1312 which put the Hospitalers of St. John of Jerusalem in possession 
of the Templar's property. Fayard, Apergu historique, I, 104.
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fall were his fortune and too great ostentation shown in the 
reception of his brother Gerard as Archbishop of Paris. He was, in 
Fayard's words, "a victim abandoned by the due de Bourgogne £jean 
sans peur] to a people exasperated by an augmentation of taxes to 
which Montaigu had contributed under the administration of the 
due £ Louis] d'Orleans."31
The trial of Jacques Coeur in 1453 provides another character­
istic use of eommissaiT*es in affairs of State. Bom in 1397 in 
Bourges, Coeur formed an association with two friends for striking 
money in 1427. At the same time he entered the commercial world, 
adding banking and money-changing services to coinage operations.
From 1437 he was a money lender and trusted confidant to Charles VII. 
In 1440 Charles named Coeur argentier au roi and ennobled him. In 
1442 Coeur was admitted into the Conseil Stroit et privS, the 
innermost circle of the king's advisors. Coeur seems to have used 
his wealth well in the public interest. Trusted by Charles, he was 
employed on several important diplomatic missions to Genoa, Savoy, 
the Papacy, and to England. Coeur's rise to favor, however, had 
generated jealousy among other councillors. On July 31, 1451, 
he was seized and accused of having poisoned the King's mistress,
Agnes Sorel, who had died under questionable circumstances. When 
this charge was shown to be fallacious, others were brought, including 
selling arms to infidels, illegal export of French moneies to the
-^Fayard, Aper&u historique, I, 187. The decision is in 
Isambert, Anciennes lois frangaises, XII, 218.
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Levant, having minted short weight money, and having kidnapped 
persons onto his vessels.^2
To carry out Coeur's trial, Charles named twenty comrrri ssaifpg 
extraordinaires drawn from the royal council and from the Parlements 
of Paris and Toulouse. First assembled at Lusignan, the commission 
underwent several changes in the course of the trial. There were 
some professional jurisconsuls included but also some personal 
enemies of the accused, among them Antoine de Chabanne, a former 
capitaine des Scorcheurs; Otto Castellani, trSsorier at Toulouse 
who hoped to replace Coeur as grand argentier; and one of Coeur1s 
employees, Pierre Teinturier. The work of the commission was 
directed by the most intransient advocates of guilt, Chabannes 
and Castellani.33 Before final judgment was pronounced, the evidence 
was reviewed before the Grand Conseil, attended by the commissaires, 
several other councillors, and notable persons.34
A final decision was rendered at Lusignan on May 29, 1-453, in 
the name of the king by Chancellor Guillaume Jouvenel des Ursins. 
Coeur was declared guilty of embezzlement, forgery, transport of 
money to the Saracens, illicit exportation from the kingdom, 
transgression of the ordinances, and other crimes of lfese-majeste.
He was sentenced to be deprived of all public and royal offices,
32Fayard, Apergu historique, I, 219; Bastid, Grands proces, 
pp. 120-2-4.
33The opinion of Bastid, p. 123.
3^B.N. Ms. fr. 7549, fols. 38-39; Bastid, Grands proces, 
p. 123.
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make an amende honorable, restore 100,000 ecus to the king, and
fined an additional 300,000 ecus. Finally, his property was
confiscated and he was sentenced to death, a judgment commuted to
banishment in perpetuity upon the recommendation of the Pope.
Fortunate to have excaped with his life from a sentence of lese-
majeste, Coeur apparently determined to flee if possible. In
November, 14-54, he escaped from prison and took flight to Italy.
Given a friendly reception by the Pope, Coeur entered Papal service
but died two years later on the Island of Chios.
The moral injustice inherent in procedures such as that against
De Montaigu or Coeur was not lost on contemporaries. Even as
Jacques Coeur's trial entered its final stage, the first of many
condemnations of commissaires through the royal ordinances was
being prepared. By the lengthy and important Ordinance of Montils-
les-tours, issued in April, 1453, judgments by comm-issaires were
forbidden. Article 79 declared that
We [Charles VIl] desiring to expell outcries, rumors, and 
scandals in order that our justice be governed and regulated 
in honor and reverence, prohibit and forbide the people 
of our Parlement that hereafter they should commission any 
conseillers of our court to hear, acknowledge, or report in 
our court any causes, be they great or small. If there be 
such causes which by their nature cannot be treated in our 
Parlement, we summon and enjoin the people in our Parlement 
to return these cases before the judges to whom jurisdiction 
belongs. If they should be causes which should be treated 
in our court by their nature, or which for good cause
^Bastid, Les Grands Proces, pp. 128-29; Fayard, Apergu 
historique, I, 220; Isambert, Anciennes lois frangaises, IX, 
254-256.
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court has retained the jurisdiction, we desire and order that 
the parties should be heard by our court and the case
decided.36
Articles 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the same ordinance confirmed the 
Parlement*s traditional jurisdiction, including l^se-majeste. To 
all appearances, then, the Crown had renounced the use of corrmrri ssaires 
by giving its most binding word in a royal ordinance duly registered. 
Ensuing decades would show how strongly the monarchy felt bound to 
respect its own laws.
The Ordinance of 1453 was respected in the next great trial 
of Charles' reign, that of Jean V d'Armagnac, son of the due d* 
Armagnac, who found himself charged with llse-majeste before the 
Parlement in 1457. The circumstances of his case, while serious, were 
really only marginally of political consequence. For several years 
D'Armagnac had pursued an incestuous relationship with his sister 
Isabelle, by whom he had had several children. Far from heeding the 
cautions of King and Church, he had forceably installed his bastard 
brother on the episcopal seat of Auch after having forced the chapter 
through the indignities of a sham election. The nomination was 
made in spite of the King's warnings and insulted his authority, 
behavior which constituted a crime of lfese-majestl. Prosecutions 
were ordered, whereupon D'Armagnac requested a safe conduct pass 
and a judgment before the peers as befitted the issue of royal 
blood. Charles accorded the safe conduct but denied judgment by the
36isambert, Anciennes lois franqaises, IX, 235.
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peers because D'Armagnac held no fief in peerage. In 1459 the 
accused presented himself before the Parlement of Paris, which had 
him arrested without regard for the safe conduct. The Parlement 
then allowed D’Armagnac to leave prison under promise that he 
would go no further than ten leagues from Paris. After the vio­
lation of the royal safeguard, D’Armagnac did not hold himself 
bound by a word of honor extorted from him, and when the moment 
came for his trial, he fled to Brussels. The Parlement condemned 
him in absentia to perpetual banishment and confiscated his
property.37
Even before the condemnation of Jean d'Armagnac, however,
Charles VII had once again resorted to extraordinary judicial 
measures in circumstances which quite clearly involved the security 
of the kingdom. In 1458 Jean, due d'Aleneon , was arrested and 
accused of having undertaken criminal intelligences with the 
English for a landing in Saintonge and Normandy. The Duke was 
first interrogated at Melun by the comte d'Eu, Constable of France, 
to whom he refused to answer. Further investigation and trial were 
carried out at Montargis, then at Vendome, by a heterogeneous 
commission made up of some of the princes of the blood; five peers 
of the Church; the comte de Dunois; the Chancellor; Pierre de Refugl, 
general de France; several counts and barons; sixteen lay and six 
clerical conseillers of the Parlement; and several maxtres des
^Fayard, Aperqu historique, I, 222; Isambert, Anciennes lois 
frangaises, IX, 365.
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requites. The crime of the duke was established by his own 
confession and by irreproachable proofs. D'Alengon maintained that 
if he had conspired, it was at the instigation of the Armagnac 
bastard and the Dauphin. The allegation was examined with the care 
it merited, but DTAlenjon could not substantiate it. He was 
declared guilty of lfese-majest£, and as such deprived of the honor 
of dignity of a peer and condemned to death, but Charles, upon the 
sollicitation of the due de Bretagne, commuted the sentence to life 
imprisonment at Aigues-Mortes.38
The trial of the due d'Alenjon raised various questions on the 
rights and prerogatives of the peers of France which the King 
presented to the Parlement by way of Jean Tudert, a mattre des 
requites. In particular Charles wanted a ruling on his right to 
attend or to preside at such trials. After having searched its 
registers, the court responded that the King not only had the right 
to attend the criminal judgment of peers, but that his presence 
was necessary. All the peers without distinction could attend 
but could not entrust their place to others. This was a confir­
mation of earlier decisions made in 1379 at the trial of the due de 
Bretagne and in 1389 at the trial of the King of Navarre. Hence, 
the trial of the due d'Alen§on was not the first time that the
A complete account of the trial of the due d'Alengon is in 
L. Cimber and L.-F. Danjou, eds., Archives curieuses de 1'histoire 
de France, depuis Louis XI jusqula~Louis XVIII (Paris: l£f34-40),
2nd series, I, 139-57, "Proems de Jean II, Due d'Alencon, Prince du 
Sang et pair de France." See also B.N. Ms. Fr. 754-9, fols. 40-4-1; 
Fayard, Apergu historique, I, 223; Dufey, Histoire des parlemens de 
France, I, 53-54; Isambert, Anciennes lois frangaises, IX, 331, 
339-54; Glasson, Le Parlement de Paris, I, 6-7.
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Parlement had participated in the judgment of a peer, but this trial 
strengthened its claims to act as the court of peers. Its powers, 
esteem, and hopes were thus considerably augmented. The monarchy, 
on the other hand, had unwittingly confirmed a usage which would 
reappear in similar circumstances one hundred eighty years later 
when, in 1638, Louis XIII adjourned the judgment of the due de la 
Valette to the royal council and presided over it in person.39 
Louis XI continued the erratic judicial procedures of his 
predecessors, ruthlessly employing both regular and irregular benches 
as it best suited his purposes. Louis' authoritarian ways created 
ample opposition among the grands, and trials of exceptional per- 
sonnages were a prominent characteristic of his reign. One of the 
first of these occasions came in 1474, when Louis permitted his 
Parlement en corps, assisted by the peers, to carry out a second trial 
of the due d'Alenjon. Having been freed upon Louis' accession in 
1461, the duke had shown himself throughly unrepentant and unreformed. 
Not only had he murdered one of those who had betrayed him years 
before, but he had also been unable to resist further treasonable 
correspondence with the English and had taken part in the League of 
the Public Weal as well. On the 18th of July, 1474, the Parlement 
condemned d'Alenjon to death for a second time, but upon the inter­
cession of the due de Bourgogne, d'Alenjon once again managed to 
escape the ultimate penalty.^
39Fayard, Apergu historique, I, 223-24*
^Ibid., 239; Dufey, Histoire des parlements de France, I, 54; 
Climber and Danjou, "Proems de due D'Alengon," 149-57.
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In November, 1-475, Louis de Luxembourg, the comte de St.-Pol, 
Constable of France and brother-in-law to the king, was brought to 
trial for laison with the due de Bourgogne and conspiracy to commit 
rebellion. The procedures followed seem to have been rather unusual. 
The royal council, chared by Chancellor Pierre Doriole, reviewed the 
case and sent it to the Parlement for judgment. The Parlement chose 
several commissaires to hear the case, including the Chancellor; 
the First President; several mattres des requetes; several lay and 
clerical conseillers; several procureurs and advocats au roi in the 
court; and De Lhuille, captain of the Bastille. On December 19,
1475, the Constable was condemned to death and beheaded the same 
day.41
The year 1476 saw Jacques d'Armagnac, due de Nemours, delivered 
into the hands of a commission for judgment on charges of high 
treason. The course of this trial was again highly exceptional. 
Initial proceedings were undertaken by a small group of commissaires; 
Chancellor Doriole; the First President of the Parlement; four 
seigneurs; and a rapporteur from the chancellery. Early in the 
hearing the duke gave up his right to trial by the peers, and none 
were summoned. The king recommended to his select body that De 
Nemours be made to talk freely, and under threat of torture he did 
so, implicating several other great personnages. Irritated by his 
Chancellor's objections to his arbitrary attitude, Louis purged him
^B.N. Ms. fr. 7549, fol. 224; Isambert, Aneiennes lois 
franqaises, X, 726-27; Fayard, Apergu historique, I, 240.
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from the commission, along with several others. At this point De 
Nemours invoked clerical privilege, presumably bringing immunity 
from capital prosecution and temporarily halting the course of 
events. Louis then had the Parlement transferred to Noyon, there 
establishing his son-in-law Pierre de Beaujeu as president. Beaujeu 
and several others refused to deliver any opinion, and Louis packed 
the bench with new commissaires to offset their neutrality. Under 
these exceedingly dubious conditions, De Nemours was finally 
condemned and executed on August 4> 14-77. His property was confis­
cated and distributed among the judges.^2
Louis XI's disregard for judicial forms did not stop with the 
fatally obesequious decision which had cost the due de Nemours his 
life. Adding insult to injury, Louis went on to remove three 
conseillers of the Parlement who had not given him satisfaction in 
the case, in spite of the fact that just ten years before he had 
guaranteed the irremovability of magistrates in an ordinance.^
The Parlement complained, whereupon Louis rudely answered that
I thought, seeing that you are subjects of the Crown of France 
and owe your loyalty to it, that you would not want to approve 
such a good bargain on my hide. Because I see that your letters 
do so, I now know that there are still those who would machinate 
against my person; in order to guarantee themselves against 
punishment, they want to abolish the terrible penalty found 
there. It will be well for me to put an end to two things:
4-2fi.N. Ms. fr. 754-9, fols. 42; Isambert, Aneiennes lois 
francaises, X, 777-78; Fayard, Aperqu historique, I, 240.
43fiy ordinance of October 21, 1467. See Isambert, Aneiennes 
lois frangaises, X, 511. See also supra, p. 2h.
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first, to purge the court of such men; secondly, to uphold 
the statute that I once made that no one should lighten the 
penalties for crimes of l$se-majeste.44
"It was in this way," says Fayard, "that Louis XI himself violated 
his own doings; in humbling the authority of the princes, he was 
not inclined to raise up another in the Parlement like it."45 
The uses of extraordinary justice receded drastically for 
several decades after Louis' demise, in part because the opposition 
of the great barons had been successfully broken. Charles VIII and 
Louis XII, therefore, had less need for judicial weapons to maintain 
themselves. Both men, too, seem to have been personally adverse to 
disreputable measures. On the whole, therefore, both were propor­
tionally more respectful towards conventional mechanisms of judgment.
Thus the trial of Pierre de Rohan, mareschal de Gie, between 
September 30, 1505, and February 9, 1506, was conducted not by 
commissaires but before the Grand Conseil and then by the parlement 
of Toulouse. Both of these courts qualified as regular jurisdictions, 
but the Grand Conseil, at least, was still in the orbit of the royal 
council. Presided over by the Chancellor, it was highly suseptible 
to royal influence. De Gie was pronounced guilty of some 100 
articles of lese-majeste before the Grand Conseil in December of 
1505, but the prosecution was unable to prove its contentions. The 
trial was then transferred to the parlement of Toulouse, where 
royal interference manifested itself in the form of a special
^Isambert, Aneiennes lois frangaises, X, 777, n. 1.
^Fayard, Apergu historique, I, 241.
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thirteen man chamber attached to the regular court. In the spring 
of 1506, this body found the mareschal guilty of a few minor charges. 
Those concerning lese-majeste were dismissed. In form, the whole 
proceedings seem to represent something of a compromise between the 
extremes of regular and irregular judicial process.46
The basis for the charges against the mareschal also departed 
from past legal definitions of lese-majeste. Innocent of treason, 
rebellion, or conspiracy, the mareschal1s dilemma had really stemmed 
from a political rivalry between the Breton faction at the French 
court, headed by Cardinal Amboise and Queen Anne of Brittany, and 
a "nationalistic" or vrai francais faction including mareschal de 
Gie. Much more than the personal rivalry of the mareschal and 
the Cardinal was at stake in the affair; rather, at issue was a 
national question of the union between France and the Duchy of 
Brittany, a union fervently desired by Louis XII but one which 
had not yet been accomplished at the time of the mareschal1s trial. 
Louis XII, who had already struggled to win Anne of Brittany's 
hand, was continually constrained to cater to her feelings to avoid 
imperilling the definitive incorporation of the duchy into the 
kingdom. It appears that Louis was willing to sacrifice De Gie to the 
denunciations of the Bretons as a concession to preserve the more 
profound interests of the monarchy.4?
46Bastid, Grands procfes politiques, pp. 132-33* 135-/41.
4?lbid., pp. 132-33, 142.
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Superficially Francis I, like Louis XII, was guided by good 
intentions in matters of justice. A story from early in the reign, 
perhaps apocryphal but interesting nevertheless, relates that 
Francis paid a visit to the tomb of Jean de Montaigu in the abbey 
of Marcoussy. Upon being shown the surintendant1 s monument, the 
King remarked to his guide, "What a pity that a man such as this 
should have died at the hands of justice." "Sire," responded the 
monk, "he was not judged by justice, but by commissaires."
Francis is reputed to have been so impressed that he swore on the 
great alter of the abbey that he would never permit anyone to die 
through the judgment of commissaires.48 Whatever the authenticity 
of the story, it illustrates very well contemporary attitudes 
towards criminal commissaires. Strong monarchs like Francis, 
however, felt no need to conform to public opinion, and the years 
of Francis' rule were characterized by a revival of commissioned 
justice reminiscent of Louis XI's reign. While several decisions 
of the period lacked the brutal executions exacted by Louis, 
personal motives of jealousy, vengeance, or financial credit 
remained, as before, entangled with genuine threats to the well­
being of the monarchy.
4^Jean Imbert, Quelques procfes criminels des XVIIe et XVIIIe 
si&cles (Paris: 1964), pf 7$, citing Pierre Dupuy,~Mimoires et 
instructions pour servir a justifier 1' innocence de Messire Francois- 
August e de Thou, conseiller du Roy en son conseil d'Etat, Arch.
Nat., ms. fr., s.d., tJ 816. The same remarks are given in Isambert, 
Aneiennes lois frangaises, VII, 219, n. 1, and in Fayard, Aperqu 
historlque, 1, 18$.
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The dilapidated state of the royal finances and the influence 
of the Queen Mother apparently contributed to the downfall of 
Jacques de Beaune, baron de Semblangay and surintendant des finances. 
Commencing in 1522, the Semblangay Affair worked itself out through 
two investigations made over a five year period. In 1522 Louise of 
Savoy, duchesse d’Angouleme, forced Semblangay to turn over 600,000 
livres to her, monies which had been destined for the pay of 
mareschal Lautrec's troops in Italy.49 Unpaid, Lautrec's Swiss had 
disbanded and the Milanese district was lost to the French. Upon 
his return to France, Lautrec defended himself by declaring that he 
had never received the sums promised him. Francis summoned Sem- 
blanjay, who declared that the funds prepared for Lautrec were not 
sent because the Queen Mother had expropriated them for pensions, 
her revenues and those of the King being held in common. The duchesse 
denied that the surintendant had said that the money given her should 
have been sent to Italy. On March 11, 1524, the King appointed four 
cf>rnnrlssaires to carry out a civil suit investigation of Semblangay's 
administration.50 This examination was largely resolved in the
49payard1s account gives this as 400,000 livres, one of several 
divergent elements in this version. Aperqu historlque, I, 296-97.
50^n investigation termed a "bien Strange procSs" by Henri 
Lemmanier, who has presented a summary account in Les Guerres d_'
Italie— La France sous Charles XIII, Louis XII et Francois I&r 
C1492-1547), Vol. of Matoire de France, ed. Ernest
Lavisse (Varis: 1911), 232-33. All the efforts of the agents of the 
King and the Queen Mother were limited to asserting that the 
surintendant had been wrong in confounding the accounts of the King 
and his mother, and in having employed 600,000 livres which rightfully 
belonged to the Duchesse d'Angouleme.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
29^
surintendant1 s favor: the judgment of January 27, 1525, recognized .
that he had acted on the orders of the King and the Queen Mother.
Despite this, Semblangay was declared to owe the duchesse d’Angouleme
a total of 707-000 livres; on the other hand, the judgment attributed
a greater royal credit to Semblangay of 910,000 livres.
Semblanjay's troubles did not end here, however. Having
extended immense credit to the State through his own efforts, he now
found himself pursued by debtors and creditors alike. On January 27,
1527, he was arrested and a criminal investigation undertaken. A
panel of commissaires was named by the King on May 27: the First
Presidents of the parleaents of Paris, Toulouse, and Rouen; a maitre
des requites; two members of the Grand Conseil; two of the parlement
of Dijon; two auditors from the Chambre des comptes guided the
te c h n ic a l end of things. The charges of embezzlement, peculation
and forgery were drown from the tangled relations between the State’s
finances and those of its servant. Semblangay was reputed to have
• fabricated false accounts indicating loans made to the State at
high interests, of which he would have received a part. The real
basis for the charges was probably a matter of convenience in
relieving the royal finances:
It was very much a question of the Italian bankers of Iyons, 
with whom Semblanjay had been in constant contact, and who 
themselves had business relations with London, Venice, Nuremburg, 
and Flanders. This kind of international syndicate disposed of 
considerable resources, and sovereigns, always short of money, 
were obliged to deal with it. Francis I owed huge sums to the
51Ibid., 233.
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Itfonese banks; lie was disturbed to see them carrying on deals 
with Italy and Germany. He sensed in them a cosmopolitan 
action which could at certain moments, become dangerous. In 
striking down Semblangay, he indirectly struck at them.52
Whatever the reasons for the charges, the court showed no mercy
towards the old and respected surintendant who had directed the
finances of France for three reigns. Condemned to death on August 9,
1527, he was hung at Montfaucon two days later. By thus eliminating
the surintendant, the Crown also maliciously liquidated a considerable
portion of its debts to him. Semblangay's condemnation had included
a fine of 300,000 livres to be deducted from royal debts owed the
surintendant. "One is thus right to think," concludes Henri
Lemmonier, "that they [Francis and the Queen Mother] here saw a means
of ridding themselves of an embarrassing creditor.
Equally strong personal motives were factors in the great
criminal trials of Admiral Chabot and Chancellor Poyet later in the
reign. These affairs were closely interrelated, and both were
carried out by commissaires in traditional fashion. The procedings
against Poyet are especially interesting since they mark one of the
few occasions when a chancellor was brought before a court of law.
The accusations directed against l'amiral de France Philippe de
Chabot de Brion, comte de Chamy and de Buzangois, were inspired by
52Ibid., 234.
^Ibid., 235. A different motive is presented by Fayard, who 
attributes Semblangay's arrest and trial to the personal influence 
of the Queen Mother. Fayard also asserts that the surintendant1 s 
papers were stolen, leaving him without the means to vindicate 
himself. Apergu historique, I, 296-97.
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the personal motives of Constable Montmorency, Diane de Poitiers, 
and the Dauphin. Attacked by them, secret investigations were ordered 
into the Admiral's affairs on September 23, 1538. The commission 
so charged was presided over by Chancellor Poyet, who was sold out 
to the enemies of the Admiral, and included presidents a_mortier 
Francois de Montholon and Jean Bertrand of the Parlement of Paris; 
a prlsident des EnquStes and nine eonseillers of the same court; the 
First President and four eonseillers from Toulouse; a president of 
Rouen; two maitres des requites; D'Argentre, sln£chal of Brittany; 
a mattre des requites of Brittany. On February 1, 1541, the 
Admiral was condemned to degradation, to banishment, and to the 
confiscation of his property; to the restitution of 778,000 livres; 
and finally to a fine of 15,000 livres for peculation, corruption, 
and malversation. A short time after this affair, in which Poyet 
was implicated with "revolting partiality," the decision was nullified 
by the K-tng (March, 1542), and Chabot's innocence was proclaimed in 
council on April 19, 1 5 4 2 . On May 24, 1542, Francis restored the 
Admiral's possessions, offices, and dignities.^5
The Chabot Affair did not end there, however. Chancellor Poyet 
had demonstrated considerable prejudice during the trial, and in 
turn he was arrested (August 1, 1542). On April 3, 1543, the Parlement
^Aubert, "Le Parlement de Paris," I, 748. Fayard concurs with 
Aubert in deeming Poyet a "man sold to the court." Apergu historlque, 
I, 316. Neither account deals with the circumstances leading to 
charges against the Admiral.
55Aubert, "Le Parlement de Paris," I, 746-48; Fayard, Apergu 
historlque, I, 316-17; several decrees may be found in Isambert, 
Aneiennes lois frangaises, XII, 547,721,773,777-78.
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received orders to proceed against him without delay. The com­
mission selected four days later was very numerous: Andrl Guillard,
a nwftre des requites; Francois de Lage, Antoine Minard, Jean 
de Gouy, and Andre Baudry, presidents aux Enqugtes at Paris; 
seventeen eonseillers of the Parlement; Pierre de Saignes and Jean 
de Ausons, of the parlement of Toulouse; Pierre Boucher and Briant 
de Talec, of Bordeaux; Dinart Rivalier and Felix Guerre, of the 
parlement of Grenoble; Louis Pltremol, president de la Chambre des 
Enqugtes of Rouen; five members of the Grand Conseil. On April 29, 
1544, Chabot*s widow presented her request for justice, and the 
interrogation of witnesses began on May 7. On May 15, the Chancellor 
had to answer grave accusations of abuse of power, falsifications at 
seal, false judgments, and embezzlement. Debates were lengthy, 
and not until April 23, .1545, did an arrgt declare Poyet guilty.
He was deprived of his office and declared incapable of filling any 
other, condemned to a fine of 100,000 livres, and ordered to live 
five years under the surveillance of the Crown in the Tower of 
Bourges. Poyet was forced to give up his property in order to acquit 
the fine, dying in shame and disgrace a short time after.^
^Aubert, "Le Parlement de Paris," I, 749; Fayard, Apergu 
historlque, I, 316-17; La Roche-Flavin, Treze livres des parlemens 
Bk. ittll, Ch. XXXII, gives a resume of the arrgt. fee constitution 
of the commission can be found in Isambert, Aneiennes lois frangaises, 
XII, 888.
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A few months after Poyet*s death in 1548, a commission investi­
gated and judged charges made against Jacques de Coucy, seigneur of 
Vervins and of Marie, and mareschal Oudart de Biez, his father-in- 
law, for having surrendered the port of Boulogne to the English 
without sufficient military cause.^  The real basis for the charges 
seems to have been the hatred that Henry II felt for the pair, 
possibly arising out of the fact that as the Dauphin he had commanded 
another military force in the vicinity of Boulonge at the time of 
the siege and had suffered embarrassment by its fall. The Charges 
were examined in the Cb»Tnhre de la Reine, an ad hoc body composed 
of several magistrates presided over by the chancellor. The 
examination of the charges was lengthy and many witnesses were 
heard on both sides. A verdict of guilty was returned against Vervins 
on June 21, 1549, which resulted in his execution. A decision against 
Du Biez on charges of lfese-majest£, peculation, and other charges 
in August, 1551, condemned the unfortunate mareschal to the depri­
vation of estates and honors, a 100,000 livre fine, confiscation of 
property, and decapitation. The death penalty was commuted into
57In 1544 Vervins had been placed in command of the garrison of 
Boulonge by Du Biez, his father-in-law. Both men were distinguished 
soldiers and held several honors and titles from Francis I. The 
English beseiged the port with a large army and sixty pieces of 
artillery for seven weeks. The general assault came on September 11, 
when in an attack of seven hours, four breaches were made in the 
walls. Vervins held for surrender upon the advice of his captains, 
who unanimously declared the place could no longer be held. The 
general consensus at the time held that Vervins had done everything 
possible, a view which Francis I also maintained.
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perpetual detention at Loches. After serving two years, Du Biez 
was released, and in 1575 Henry III exhonerated both men posthu­
mously. 58
At the middle of the sixteenth century, the history of the 
monarchy clearly demonstrated that the administration of commissioned 
justice represented one of the gravest defects in the French 
judicial system. The Parlement had reminded Charles VIII of this 
fact in the remonstrances of 1489, and it had returned to the point 
in its remonstrances of 1526.^9 French Kings continued the practice, 
however, for two very sound reasons: it was legally unassailable
as a manifestation of justice retenue, and it was politically 
useful. French kings understood both points very well and had 
frequently and brutally wielded extraordinary justice out of 
jealousy, expediency, legitimate suspicion, or for reasoned political 
purposes. Louis XI had found commissioned justice useful in breaking
5^A complete account of the events leading up to the trial and 
the investigation itself can be found in "Prods d'Oudart du Biez, 
marSschal de France, et de Jacques de Coucy, seigneur de Vervins," 
in Cimber and Danjou, Archives curieuses, 1st series, III, 103-116.
A note on page 101 indicates that this account is extracted from 
the Pierre Dupuy's Traitfe concernant l'histoire de France. The 
decrees pertaining to the affair can be f'ound inTsambert, Aneiennes 
lois frangaises, XIV, 88, 186, and XV, 276. Brief descriptions are 
presented in Aubert, "Le Parlement de Paris," I, 749-50, and in 
Fayard, Apergu historlque, I, 331-33*
59Maugis, Histoire du Parlement, I, 374-76, 561-63. Article 8 of 
the remonstrances of 152&”attacked the establishment of individual 
judges for certain crimes, condemnations for the purpose of confis­
cating property, and the violation of the jurisdiction of ordinary 
courts in such cases. Article 12 returned to the same them, asking 
that the scandalous and inconvenient practice of commissaires extra- 
ordinaires be abolished in favor of ordinary judges.
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down the opposition of his feudality; Louis XII had resorted to it 
in the preservation of his unification policy; Francis I had had 
recourse to commissaires for multiple reasons, some of them perhaps 
less honorable than any of his predecessors. Thus as an instrument 
of government, legitimate or illegitimate, irregular criminal 
procedures were entrenched in customary public law by the 1550*s.
The problems of judicial reform, institutional relations, and 
the regulation of justice did not go unrecognized in the legal world 
of the sixteenth century. On the contrary, Estates Generals, 
jurisconsuls, and the courts had from time to time exposed procedural 
abuses within the system and the Crown had sought to remedy them.
The Estates-Generals of 1355, 1357, 1413, and 1484 complained of 
confusion in judicial matters, of hardships wrought on litigants 
because of the drawn-out processes of appeal, and of the inequity 
of evocations. Especially after the creation of the Grand Conseil, 
the sovereign courts chimed in with disgruntled remonstrances that 
their jurisdictions were being nibbled away at the expense of legal 
usages as well as litigant's time and pocketbooks. The clamor for 
reform of judicial procedures was further sharpened among the public 
at large during the sixteenth century by the infiltration of venality 
and fiscal abuses into the court system.60
From time to time the Crown sought to treat the ills in its 
judicial body politic by issuing great ordinances of reform. Kings
60Doucet, Les Institutions de la France, I, 205-06; ChSreul, 
Histoire de 11 administration monarchlque en France, I, 188-92.
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had sporadically resorted to this measure during the fourteenth 
and fifteenth centuries, but after 1560 there began one of the 
greatest periods of legal reform in the history of the Old Regime.
It is one of the curious paradoxes of the monarchy that worthy 
efforts at judicial reform and lawful government should have taken 
place in the climate of general tension, lawlessness, and disorder 
that prevailed after 1560, but such was the case with the great 
ordinances of Orleans (1560), Roussillon (15640, Moulins (1566), 
and Blois (1579). The weaknesses of a regency and the riptides 
of religious strife which enfeebled the Crown after Henry II's 
death led to demands for reform which found expression in the 
Estates General of 1560. Quite possibly, though, the cahiers of 
the Estates would have been cast aside had it not been for the 
intervention of the talented politique Chancellor Michel de 1' 
Hospital, who saw in the plaints of the Estates an opportunity to 
create a lasting revision of French law while attempting at the 
same time an amelioration of the gnawing antagonisms in French 
society. De 1'Hospital's attention to the material contained in 
the cahiers produced the Ordinance of Orleans in 1561. This was 
revised with the Ordinance of Roussillon in 1564, followed by the 
comprehensive Ordinance de Moulins in 1566. With the exception of 
the Ordinance of Roussillon, each of these codifications represented 
an omnibus revision of the entire corpus of French public law 
concerning justice, ecclesiastical affairs, social problems, royal
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finances, and military matters. Each code attempted to come to grips 
with the fundamental problems besetting royal courts, institutional 
relationships, judicial procedures, and litigant's rights.^1
These ordinances are of particular importance to the institutional 
and legal history of Richelieu's ministry because they represented 
the most binding form of written law found in his time. Parlementaires 
cited them in defense of legality throughout the first half of the 
seventeenth century, and the Frondeurs of I648 demanded a return to 
the Ordinances of 1560, 1566, and 1579. With the failure of the 
Code Michaud of 1629, the sixteenth century codes remained the most 
comprehensive collections of French law until the appearance of the 
Code Louis during the 1660*s.
Among the 150 articles of the Ordinance of Orleans, three 
deserve special attention because they bore on the administration of 
sovereign justice. Articles 37 and 38 show that De I1Hospital 
understood the confusion caused by the overlapping and competitive 
ressorts of the Conseil des parties, the Grand Conseil, and the 
Parlement. The problem was attacked in direct fashion. As a 
parlementaire with six years of service in the court, he was naturally 
inclined to sympathize with the traditional claims of the Parlement. 
Undoubtedly, too, he perceived that the Grand Conseil was now some­
thing of an anachronism, its former raison d'etre having been
1 ^The role of Michel de 1'Hospital is the subject of a commentary 
in Albert Buisson's Michel de lfHospital (Paris: 1950). The texts of 
the ordinances of 15^ 0, 1564, T566, and 1579 are published in their 
entirety in Isambert, Aneiennes lois frangaises, XIV, 62-98, 160-69, 
189-212, 381-463. On the drafting of the ordinances see Chiruel, 
Hlstolre de 1'administration monarehique en France, I, 188-96.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
303
rendered obsolete by the activities of the Conseil des parties.
For whatever reasons, Article 37 of the Ordinance of Orleans 
drastically pruned the competence of the Grand Conseil by declaring
The men holding our grand conseil cannot and should not 
hereafter entertain causes and matters other than those 
attributed to them by their creation and institution, save 
that the suits pending at present in the said council will 
be judged and terminated.^
The implicit intention was apparently to limit the Grand Conseil
to ecclesiastical matters. Article 38 extended and clarified the
effects of this provision by establishing that
requests for appeals against the decisions of our sovereign 
courts and parlements will be sent to our mattres des requites 
the report and to judge them in our
Evidently De 1'Hospital intended that the Conseil prlvl (or Conseil 
des parties) should represent the highest court of appeal in cases 
coming out of the sovereign courts, and in fact this regulation 
seems to have taken hold. It was, of course, perfectly in keeping 
with the natural tendency of the past three decades. Conversely, 
the authority of the Grand Conseil underwent serious decline after 
the 1560's, with many of its former jurisdictions being reclaimed 
by the Parlement or passing to the Conseil des parties. The Grand 
Conseil remained a sovereign court, but its jurisdictions were
^Isambert, Aneiennes lois frangaises, XIV, 74-
63Ibid,
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effectively reduced to miscellaneous ecclesiastical affairs and to the
hearing of cases committed to it hy the king. In contrast with the
early part of the century, the latter category diminished considerably
in favor of the Conseil des parties.
The Ordinance of Orleans lacked a definitive and vigorous
statement on royal abuses of extraordinary justice.^ The defect
was left untouched by Article 30 of the Ordinance of Roussillon, a
collection of amendments and modifications registered by the
Parlement in December, 1564. Article 30 seemed to leave no question
regarding the matter of commissaires:
We wish and order that all trials should hereafter be judged 
ordinarily, in our parlements, Grand Conseil, and other 
sovereign courts as in our prgsidiaux, and prohibit them 
from judging any extraordinarily by commissaires.
In fact, though, the reference was to commissaires named by the courts,
not those named by the king.
Six years after the publication of the Ordinance of Orleans, the
Ordinance of Ifoulins sought to regulate the right of committimus, the
privilege of appearing immediately before the Grand Conseil, the
mnft.iv> a des requites, or the Grand*Chambre of the Parlement without
going through the judicial maze of lower courts. Without suppressing
^Article 34 had touched on the subject of commissaires by 
permitting their use in five instances of private law. These 
commissaires were judges named by the court to summarily handle 
minor cases and should not be confused with royal appointees.
Isambert, Aneiennes lois frangaises, XIV, 73.
65Ibid., 167.
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the privilege, Article 56 specifically ennumerated the categories 
of persons entitled to the right.66 Article 70 was another in a 
long series of attempts to limit evocations which took litigants 
away from their "natural judges." It declared that evocations in 
either criminal or civil matters "should not take place outside 
the cases permitted hy the edicts and ordinances" and in such cases 
were to be made only by means of letters sent by royal command and 
signed by one of four secretaires d'Etat.^ The parlements were 
permitted to make remonstrances on these evocations, and the party 
obtaining the evocation in a criminal matter first had to be made 
prisoner in his locality.68
After De 1'Hospital's death in 1573> further reforms were asked 
by the Estates General of 1576. The cahiers of this meeting were 
eventually incorporated into the Ordinance of Blois of 1579, a 
cumulative code of 363 articles which, along with the Ordinances 
of Orleans and Ifoulins, would serve as the basis of written French
66Ibid., 203-04* These categories were the great officers of 
the Crown, members of the Conseil priyg, mattres des requgtes, royal 
notaries and secretaries, domestic officers of the royal household, 
princes of the blood and the officers of the sovereign courts. 
Additionally, the twelve ranking proeureurs and avocats in the 
Parlement, the six ranking lawyers in other parlements, and the 
members of several churches, religious chapters, and religious 
communities "which have the privilege, for communal affairs of the 
said churches only."
6^isambert, Aneiennes lois frangaises, XTV, 208.
6®Ibid.; ChSreul, Histoire de 1*administration monarchique,
I, 201-02.
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public law for nearly 100 years. The most important provisions of
the Ordinance in regard to sovereign justice were contained in
Articles 91, 92, and 97-99 which clarified the relationship between
the royal council and the sovereign courts and regulated the use
of commissaires. The lasting importance of these articles mandates
quoting them at some length. Article 91 declared in principle that
our Conseil priv£ . . . hereafter should not be occupied with 
causes which lie in contentious jurisdiction; to preserve the 
jurisdiction which belongs to our sovereign courts and ordinary 
justices [we] bave returned suits introduced into our council 
and pending undecided . . .  to be heard before the judges 
who should have natural cognizance of them. In the future our 
council will not take cognizance of such and similar matters, 
which we wish to be treated before our ordinary judges and by 
appeal to our sovereign courts following our edicts and 
ordinances. '
Article 92 continued the theme of the superiority of the regular
courts by declaring that
the decisions of our sovereign courts cannot be nullified or 
retracted except by the paths prescribed at law . . . and 
through the form born by our ordinances. Nor shall the 
execution of these decisions [of the sovereign courts] be 
suspended or deferred by simple request presented to us in 
our Conseil priv6.
The long-standing issue of evocations was further treated in Article
97, which piously declared royal intentions that "hereafter we do
not intend to issue any letters of evocation, be they general or 
71individual, of our own initiative." This provision, in theory,
^Isambert, Aneiennes lois frangaises, XV, 404.
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restricted the possibility of using the council as an instrument of 
royal authority by having cases evoked to it. The possibility of 
granting evocations on the initiative of private parties, however, 
was continued:
The requests of those seeking such evocations should be reported 
in our Conseil privl by maftres des requites . . . to be there 
judged following the edicts of Bourdaisi^reand Chanteloup and 
other edicts since made by preceding kings and by us. If 
such requests for evocations should be found reasonable, the 
parties heard, and with knowledge of cause, then letters will 
be sent and not otherwise. All evocations will be signed by 
the secretaire d'Etat or of finances who received the expedition 
when the evocation was deliberated. Evocations obtained 
hereafter contrary to these forms will be of no effect or value, 
and notwithstanding them we wish that the judges from whom they 
would have been evoked continue with the investigation and 
judgment.7^
The struggle to regulate comnri ssaires extraordinaires continued with
yet another prohibition against them in Article 98:
In order to terminate the complaints made to us by our subjects 
on the occasions of extraordinary commissions previously issued, 
[wej have revoked and revoke all the said extraordinary 
commissions, desiring that prosecution of each matter be made 
before the judges to whom competence of it belonged. ^
Finally, Article 99 limited the maitres des requites to hearing
only those matters permitted them by the ordinances. They were not
to judge sovereignly or in last resort any cases regardless of letters
attributing this power to them.7^
The great ordinances cited above testify that throughout the
last half of the sixteenth century the Crown made an exceptional
effort to put its judicial house in order by imposing paper
72Ibid., 405.
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regulations on the processes and procedures of justice. The great 
ordinances touched on most aspects of appeal and attempted to guarantee 
the integrity of decisions coming out of the sovereign courts.
Abuses were decried, jurisdictions were defined, and the rights of 
litigants cared for; in these ways the ordinances of the sixteenth 
century provided impressive legal standards pertaining to sovereign 
justice. But as with the questions of venality and qualifications 
for magisterial office, these ordinances failed to settle the 
questions of public law treated in them. Centuries of monarchial 
behavior regaled against the strictures of written law, and tradition 
certainly had as much validity as legal codes in French public law. 
Further, given the ne plus ultra quality of royal authority and the 
real or imagined need to exercise it in favored cases, there were 
no effective means to ensure that the ordinances would be obeyed.
In the decades after their preparation, the provisions of the 
ordinances seem to have been violated as often as they were fol­
lowed; their only lasting accomplishment in the administration of 
justice was to assign a kind of legal,opprobrium to certain 
judicial procedures.
The chaotic state of royal government and the passions that 
inflamed the country during the Wars of Religion undoubtedly 
contributed to a continued degradation of French judicial procedures.
^One might cite, for example, the procedures followed in the 
case of the prince de condS, accused of lgse-majestg in 1560 and 
tried in council; that of Mole and De Coconas, executed April 30,
1574; the proceedings initiated against Admiral Coligny after his 
death; and those against Briquemaut and Cavagnes in October of 1572. 
Aubert, "Le Parlement de Paris," I, 750; B.N. Ms. Fr. 7549, fols. 
232-40.
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Thus First President Achille III de Harlay could complain to
Henry III that
"the council is reduced to the status of the Ch&telet of 
Paris. Issues are adjourned there from distant areas such as 
Languedoc or Guyenne for very small things, and in first 
instance, even for a quibble over nine feus."76
A certain restoration of orderliness accompanied Henry IV1s rule
after 1594, but even Henry's judicious tolerance and pacification
sometimes relied on irregular methods such as intendants. Henry's
respect for equitable justice probably showed most clearly in the
administration of high criminal justice where the Parlement’s
jurisdiction was usually honored in regard to lSse-majest§. In
1602 the Parlement was ordered to deal with the. accusations of
lese-majeste made against margschal Biron, a prosecution resulting
in the condemnation and execution of Henry's former companion-in-
arms. After Jean Chastel attempted to assassinate the King in 1594,
the Parlement was charged with investigation and prosecution of this
sensitive case. The court passed sentence on December 29, after a
trial of one day, and declared Chastel guilty of 15se-majest§ in
the form of attempted assassination. Yet as circumspect as Henry
was in such matters, irregular methods of justice continued to be
employed on occasion. A commission of six eonseillers d'Etat
carried out the trial of would-be regecide Pierre Barriere and
condemned him to death on August 31, 1593. Except for the fact
7^D'Avenel, Richelieu et la monarchie absolue, I, 54- The 
source and date of the quotation are not given.
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that the Parlement of Paris and of Tours had not yet been reunited, 
the circumstances surrounding Barriere's case appear to have been 
no different than several other attempts on the King's life which 
were handled by the Parlement. The last such incident, that of 
Ravaillac in 1610, was dealt with by the Parlement in an investigation 
beginning shortly after Henry's death on May 14 and terminating with 
execution of the condemned on May 27.77
That past regulations and ordinances had neither permanently 
improved the administration of justice nor clarified the functions 
of public bodies was evident at the beginning of Louis XIII's reign 
when the Parlement presented its famous remonstrances of 1615. These 
remonstrances were an outgrowth of the failure of the Estates General 
to treat positively the troubles besetting the monarchy, some of 
which, like venality and judicial reform, had a long history and 
others, such as fiscal extravagance and Concini's presence in 
council, could be ascribed to Marie's bumbling government. Four days 
after the Estates were adjourned without solution to these problems, 
the Parlement seized the initiative for State reform. On March 28, 
the court, with all chambers assembled, returned a historic decision 
to convoke the princes and peers and to formulate propositions 
which would be made "for the service of the King and the relief 
of his subjects."7® The judges justified their arrgt by citing
77B.N. Ms. fr. 7549, fols. 239-41; Mousnier, The Assassination 
of Henry IV, pp. 27-51, 215-24.
7®Isambert, Aneiennes lois frangaises, XVI, 61.
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the King’s prior promise not to respond to the cahiers of the 
Estates without hearing the Parlement’s views.^
The decision of March 28 was not well received in royal circles. 
First the gens du roi, then the entire Parlement, were summoned to 
the Louvre to account for their actions and to hear the Queen 
Mother denounce the unprecedented daring of the court. Despite 
this unmistakable manifestation of opposition, however, the Parle­
ment persisted in its determination to expose what it considered to 
be blatant abuses in the regency government. On April 9 the court 
began the drafting of lengthy and pungently worded remonstrances 
containing nearly twenty major criticisms or suggestions.^ The 
corpus of the articles was prefaced by the assertion that the 
decision of March 28 and the remonstrances had been made "under 
the King’s good pleasure", but the pithy comments which followed 
made this phrase seem facetious indeed. The Parlement condemned 
Marie's dalliance with foreigners and foreign powers (a veiled 
reference to Concini and Eleonora Galigai) reproofed the dissipation 
of State finances, and urged respect for the Gallican liberties.
The regent was urged to place only capable men in ecclesiastical 
positions, to abolish the venality of military offices, to reform 
the finances, to cut back pensions and gifts, and to reduce the
^^Fayard, Apergu historique, II, 35; Glasson, Le Parlement de 
Paris, I, 123.
^The remonstrances can be found in Mol£, Mlmoires, I, 28-51.
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numbers of financial officers. "In a word," says Glasson, "these
remonstrances touched on everything, they were the true cahiers
of the Estates General."81
The manoeuvers of the spring of 1615 were most indicative of
the Parlement's enlarged political role, but the remonstrances were
also enlightening in their judicial articles. These show that at the
beginning of Louis XIII1 s reign the judges in the Parlement believed
that the time-honored defects in French justice persisted as in
centuries past. Justice, the judges maintained, was one of the
principal columns of the State, lending both honor and affection to
Louis' rule. With this attitude in mind, the officers of the
Parlement, the trustees of royal justice, "were obliged to represent
to you that for some years it justice had been greatly violated and 
82its ornaments treated unworthily." Decisions of the courts had
been flaunted in the streets of the capital, and crimes had gone
unpunished at the expense of the honor of the Crown and the
authority of the officers. Marie was humbly entreated to remedy
this situation. The edict on duels should be observed, as should
legal decisions emanating from the council, which were "too often
changed, so that those who had won their suit often found a short 
83time later that they had lost it."
8lGlasson, Le Parlement de Paris, I, 125.
82Mbl£, M&noires, I, 40.
8W
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Byond this, the Parlementaires asked for a redress of grievances
concerning sovereign justice:
The hearing of affairs treated in council should he regulated 
following your ordinances, and contentious justice reduced 
according to its form, at penalty of invalidity for that which 
had been done. The decisions of your parlements should not 
be nullified or suspended upon request as is ordinarily done. 
Those who want to petition against decisions should do it 
only through means of law and according to your ordinances; 
likewise, too frequent evocations, of which complaint is noto­
rious, should be cut back to the cases allowed in the same 
ordinances.
The same lawful process, the judges held, should be applied to royal 
letters of pardon for those indicted for assassination and other 
violent crimes.Similarly, the Crown should not "send any 
commissions, be they for sovereign judgment or in dernier ressort, 
be they for the trial of any accused, that cannot be verified in your 
Parlement."^ Thus the Parlement indiscriminately condemned all 
forms of comnrissaires, either individual or empanelled. The request, 
as with others touching on the administration of justice, bore a 
singular resemblance to those issued in the past.
The Crown’s reaction was immediate, emphatic, and negative.
In an audience of May 22, 1615, the Queen Mother listened attentively 
to the remonstrances of the court and then in the presence of young 
Louis totally rejected them as indicative of Parlementaire meddling 
in affairs of State. The next day a vigorously worded arr|t du
34ibid., 39-40.
^5See Infra, p.
^^ Mole, Mamoires, I, 40.
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Conseil nullified the court's decision to unite the peers and present 
remonstrances. The arrgt cited decisions made in the reigns of 
Francis I, Charles IX, and Charles VIII "barring the court from 
affairs of State, reiterated previous royal injunctions made against 
the Parlement's intentions to assemble the peers, and hluntly 
declared that
inserted in these remonstrances [are] several articles whose 
falsity is apparent, and others which are notoriously slanderous 
in that they try to throw a general blame and cast a bad odor 
about all those who have a part in the administration of 
financial affairs. This is sufficient to judge that the intent 
was to give pretext to those seeking to disturb the public 
tranquillity, rather than to present the means for ending 
abuses and disorders that they exaggerate to swell individual 
discontent and commensurately diminish the authority of His 
Majesty.
The arr§t then nullified and revoked the court's decision of March 
28, "making proscription and prohibition to the said Parlement of 
mixing in affairs of State (in the future) except when so ordered."®® 
To ensure that the court followed at least the forms of submission, 
the council's order required that "the said arrgt [of March 28] 
together with the remonstrances should be struck out and removed 
from the registers," for which duty the greffler was held responsible 
at the cost of his office. The document concluded with the all 
important formulary "done in the Council of State, His Majesty there 
sitting, at Paris, May 23, 1615," which signified that the decision 
had actually been rendered in the King's presence and communicated 
his immediate and sovereign authority.^
®7Ibld., 55.
% b i d .
39lbid., 56.
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Forceful and ultimate as it was, the arrit du Conseil had no 
effect on the Parlement except to elicit another decision to make 
new remonstrances. Marie countered with .a lettre de jussion 
commanding registration of the councilliar arrgt. This was ignored, 
and the court pursued its wayward deliberations for the next two 
weeks. During the fortnight, however, another and more ominous 
note was sounded in the controversy. The prince de Conde and the 
due de Bouillion, chafing at exclusion from the government and 
nearly in outright rebellion, began sub rosa overtures for an 
alliance with the Parlement. The court had been perfectly willing 
to defy the Crown on legal grounds, but most of the magistrates 
could not bring themselves to become openly committed to conspiracy, 
an association with illegality contrary to all the traditions of 
the court and the law it upheld. Conversely Marie and her advisers 
were now inclined towards a rapprochment with the Parlement to have 
its support against the princely cabal. Accordingly, towards the 
end of June a working agreement was reached which veiled the dispute. 
On the 23rd of the month, the Parlement issued an arr€t by which it 
enjoined the prince de Conde- to discontinue mustering troops, and 
it declared that in its remonstrances it had not intended to 
discredit the government. The assembly of peers did not take place, 
but the Crown's arr£t du Conseil was never registered by the 
Parlement. 9°
9°Ibid., 57; Richelieu, Mgmoires, I, 250; Fayard, Apercu 
historique, I, 39; Glasson, Le Parlement de Paris, I, 125-2b.
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Conventional opinion holds that the events of May-June 1615 were 
a victory for the Parlement and the forces tending towards a 
balanced, harmonious, and traditional monarchy. Fayard, in parti­
cular, maintains that
the initiative of the Parlement had no other consequences ([in 
politics or reform], but that sovereign court had expressed 
its opinion on the direction of the government, and had 
sustained an act of authority in maintaining its arrgt which 
would serve it as a stepping-stone for future occasions. It 
was a complete victory of a nature to augment its pretensions 
and more and more to win for it the sympathies and the confi­
dence of the Third Estate.91
Patteming his account after Fayard, Glasson concurs in concluding
that "the Parlement came out victorious in this crisis."92 Yet
in fact the affair of the remonstrances of 1615 and the use of
councilliar authority to nullify them never reached a definitive
conclusion because of the intrusion of external events. The
interpretation that the Parlement was victorious in the encounter
must be tempered in the light of the regency's anemic authority
and its concurrent domestic crisis, factors which, together with
the popular disrepute brought to the council by Concini's presence,
subverted the royal position in the court's favor.
Nevertheless, the events of 1615 were in several ways meaningful
to the conflict that was to characterize the growth of absolutism
later in Louis' reign. In terms of the scope of its political role,
the Parlement had aggrandized its place in the State by assuming the
^Fayard, Apergu historique, I, 39.
92Glasson, Le Parlement de Paris, I, 126.
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advisory functions of the defunct Estates General and voicing its
complaints without prior solicitation from the Crown. The nature of
the widened political role thus generated had nothing novel about it,
for the Parlement had always thought of itself as an advisory agency,
but it did represent a significant heightening of the court's
responsibilities to act as a brake on monarchial power. This thought
has been well summarized by Shennan when he writes that
Of course these remonstrances were extraordinary, both in their 
scope and in the manner of their appearance, prompted by no 
prior royal legislation and lacking royal consent. They were 
much more reminiscent in style and content of petitions 
emanating from the Estates-General, and this was in fact the 
fact the first occasion on which the Parlement's role clearly 
comprehended that of the Estates as well. . . . Yet there is 
nothing even in this to suggest that the Parlement's intention 
was innovatory. Its own obligation was to defend the multi­
farious rights of the French nation, to preserve, in other 
words, the traditional concept of kingship, limited by law. . . . 
The Estates was concerned with the Parlement in enforcing 
another ancient limitation upon the monarchy, that involving 
the right to offer counsel. By the early seventeenth century, 
however, only the Parlement remained powerful enough to assert 
these customary values and in seeking to maintain them it 
added to its own essentially judicial role the political 
functions of an obsolescent institution.93
Apart from signifying a new and fortified political inspiration 
for the Parlement, the events of 1615 also suggest a prelude to the 
severe institutional antagonism between the Parlement and the 
council that accompanied Richelieu's ministry. As the history of 
the monarchy's judicial organs shows, there was really nothing novel 
about this discord, which was inevitable if the court was to fulfill 
its advisory function. As early as the fourteenth century, the
93shennan, The Parlement of Paris, pp. 24.5-4-6.
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council had exhibited a propensity to encroach on the legal 
jurisdiction of the Parlement, and the tendency for the council to 
establish itself as an ordinary, rather than extraordinary, ressort 
superior to the Parlement had continued since that time. In the 
reign of Louis XI, the Parlement and the council had frequently 
been at loggerheads over this usurpation; at about the same time 
the Grand Conseil had appeared out of royal needs to administer 
prerogative justice in matters of political sensitivity.
During the sixteenth century the arrogation of councilliar 
justice began to repeat itself as the Conseil priv£ or Conseil des 
parties replaced the Grand Conseil as dernier ressort in most legal 
and administrative matters. This usage was present in numerous 
appeals and evocations in private law, but the same judicial authority 
of the k in g  in council could also be utilized in matters of public 
law, legislation, and ad m in is t r a t io n  to nullify or bypass any kind 
of decision by the sovereign courts. Precisely this course had been 
chosen in 1615 when Marie had issued an arr€t du Conseil to suppress 
the Parlement's decision to present remonstrances (the decision 
of March 28). In so doing Marie had resorted to an ultimate expres­
sion of arbitraire, that of the king sitting in the Conseil d'Etat, 
tactlessly preferring this very blunt juridical means over more 
diplomatic and more customary means of negotiation through the gens 
du roi, lettres de jussion, or even a lit de justice.
The judges rightly feared the implications of such tactics 
which menaced almost everything the Parlement stood for. Most 
immediately, growth of councilliar justice in the Conseil prive
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meant a diminution of the jurisdiction of their corps which in turn 
threatened their prestige, their individual and collective social 
standing, and their income in cases lost to the council. There was 
no danger that the Parlement would disappear— that was unthinkable 
for many reasons— but the magistrates had good reason to fear that 
their benches would become a mockery of the past, an honorary 
anachronism of government consigned to the same institutional 
scrapheap that had claimed the Grand Conseil. If this came to pass, 
the judges' investment in the honor and dignity of office would 
proportionately be robbed of much of its value.
For those who looked beyond material concerns into the realm 
of public law, the imposition of councilliar authority meant an 
increased increment of royal power and a corresponding imbalance in 
the traditional constitution. The question was not per se one of 
the essential quality of sovereignty. All the magistrates recog­
nized, and venerated, the fact that the king's person was the primal 
source of all legislation and all justice. Instead of a corruption 
of the monarchial principle, the judges feared for the exercise of 
power, particularly the erosion of the time-honored mechanism of 
counsel which in their eyes conferred justice and legality on the 
translation of royal will into royal law. According to feudal 
tradition, this translation was binding only under conditions of 
wide counsel, more or less representative of law and the common 
good. Strengthening of councilliar authority sapped the fundamental 
principle of tr£s grand conseil in several ways. The physical size 
of the royal council, and therefore the breadth of opinion offered,
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was much smaller than the Estates General or the Parlement. Much 
more significantly, the king's councillors, when acting as conseillers 
d'Etat, were simple commis whose appointment, career, and dismissal 
lay wholly in the king's hands. Though the council was amply educated 
in the law, its principal orientation lay towards fulfilling adminis­
trative functions. In most cases this meant doing the king's will.
For these reasons the potential for ad hoc arbitrary decisions con­
forming purely to the king's will or to administrative necessity was 
substantially increased. The magistrates, therefore, could legiti­
mately argue that violation of their historic jurisdiction diminished 
both respect for their rights in property and respect for the law of 
the land. The Parlement was historically bound to advise the Crown 
of such illegality through its remonstrances. Marie's nullification 
of the court's remonstrances through the arrSt du Conseil thus posed 
a dual danger to the parlementaires and the maintenance of a balanced 
and constitutional monarchy.
Nearly a decade elapsed, however, before the possibilities 
inherent in councilliar government began to manifest themselves in 
a systematic way. Until 1617, at least, Marie's council reflected 
the effeminate and diffuse nature of the regency. In structure 
Marie's council was scarcely different from that of the sixteenth 
century. She inspired no progressive changes and for personnel 
could do no better than to rely on Concini, expell the careful 
Protestant Sully, and retain those professional ''graybeards" 
who exhibited little ability and less will power. Alert to this 
vacuity at the center of things, great princes such as Conde,
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Soissons, and Bouillon flocked into the council to assert their 
opinions. This caeaphony of private interests would prevail until 
Louis' coup d'etat of 1617 destroyed the Concini faction and 
inaugurated the influence of Luynes. Not until 1624 was the council 
filled with men of substance and character like Richelieu and 
Marillac.
At the beginning of 1624 there began the first in a series of 
events which would eventually transform the royal council into an 
efficient instru-ent of the king's will. Between January and April 
of 1624 Louis was persuaded to reform the membership of the council. 
In January and February Chancellor Brulart de Sillery and his son 
Puisieux de Sillery, a secretaire d'Etat for foreign affairs, were 
disgraced. On April 29> Louis, primarily under the influence of 
Marie de Medicis and her party, introduced Richelieu into the 
council and with his arrival came recommendations for further 
changes. The worthless surintendant des finances La Vieuville 
was dismissed and replaced jointly by Michel de Marillac and 
Bochart de Champigny. By 1626 further changes in personnel had 
taken place: Marillac became garde des sceaux and actual head of 
the chancellery while margschal d'Effiat received control of the 
finances. At about the same time Constable Lesdiguieres and 
Cardinal La Rochefoucauld died. With their passing the last 
prominent councillors of Henry IV1s era disappeared from the public 
scene.
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The councilliar housecleaning of 1624-26 also marks the begin­
ning of two decades of very rapid institutional development during 
which the council virtually assumed the form and power it would have 
for the remainder of the Old Regime.^4 Several factors undoubtedly 
contributed to this accelerated progress of the 1620's and 1630's, 
but it is difficult to separate councilliar developments from the 
arrival and subsequent influences of the garde des sceaux and chief 
minister. Different in method, philosophy, and in many ends, yet 
mutually inspired by a fundamental impetus to enhance royal authority, 
both men were interested in councilliar reform as a requisite to a 
restoration of the Crown's power and prestige.
Possessed of a legal background and a highly moralistic, 
pietistic, and methodical personality, as well as great administrative 
talent, Marillac was particularly drawn to reform through regulation 
in much the same way as his predecessor De 1'Hospital. The Code 
Michaud reflects his modus operand!, and between 1626 and 1630 he was 
probably chiefly responsible for several r&glements du Conseil which 
detailed the personnel, schedule, agenda, and competences of the 
Conseil d'Etat. The net effect of these rlglements can be seen in 
two parallel tendencies largely achieved before 1630. The first 
consequence of these efforts was an increase in specialization 
among different branches and refined methods of preparing materials 
for consideration in meetings. A second trend was the growing
^Mousnier would have the transformation begin after Luynes' 
death in 1622 on the evidence of reformation reglements of that 
year. Mousnier, "Le Conseil du Roi," p. 148.
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preponderance of gens de robe over the noblesse d’epee and ecclesi­
astics. This shift was inseparable from the effort to constitute a 
nucleus of career councillors who weuld receive preference over 
those who sought retirement or a second career in the council 
after leaving a sovereign court. This proclivity worked to the 
exclusion of ambitious parlementaires and exacerbated discord 
between the two bodies.The last councilliar r^glement of 
Richelieu’s ministry, that of January IS, 1630, was particularly 
important for its comprehensiveness. It systematized former rules 
and would serve to formally delineate the organization and activities 
of the council for the next dozen years, being superceded only in 
1643 by another set of regulations constituting the regency council 
of Anne of Austria.
Like Marillac Richelieu gave the appearance of interest in 
administrative reform. In 1620 he had drafted a proposal for the 
creation of four functional councils to supervise ecclesiastical 
affairs, military activities, finances, and justice.^ This 
project remained a dream as did another plan of 1625.97 As Orest 
Ranum has shown, however, it was really Richelieu’s superlative 
ability to work through personal relations rather than formal 
regulation that fulfilled the possibilities opened up before the Day
^Mousnier, "Les F&glements du Conseil," p. 126; Mounier, "Le 
Conseil du Roi," pp. 145-47, 166-71.
^D'Avenel, Richelieu et la monarchie absolue, I, 43-
97Riehelieu, Lettres, II, 169.
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of Dupes.9^  The chief minister knew very well how to manage Louis' 
mercurial temperament as well as how to coordinate and direct the 
client creatures he placed in the offices of surintendants des 
finances and secretaires d'Etat. Only those men— Bullion, the le 
Bouthilliers, Sublet de Noyers— together with one or two others 
having Richelieu's full confidence were admitted to the inner 
council.99 The princes of the blood and other grands, consumed by 
their own interests, were systematically excluded. Richelieu's 
creatures in turn informally reorganized their duties into more 
efficient pattersn, transforming, for instance, the former geographic 
division of correspondence into a functional one along the lines of 
war, finances, and foreign affairs. The net result of these changes 
was the transmutation of the council into what after 1631 could 
fairly be called a ministerial government.-^ ®®
Regulation and strengthening of the council crystallized, but 
really did not greatly alter, its formal organization which, as in 
times past, remained essentially divided into two parts, an inner 
and outer or narrower and wider council. The inner council, 
judicially superior to its larger but subordinate relatives, bore 
various contemporary titles such as Conseil secret or Conseil des
9^ln Richelieu and the Councillors of Louis XIII. See also 
Pagis, Les Institutions monarchiques sous Louis XIII et Louis XIV.
99^0 one has ever been able to discover or prepare a list of 
those admitted to the Conseil d'en haut after 1630. An acceptable 
estimate would include Richelieu, PSre Joseph, Marshal Sehomberg,
Claude Bullion, Sublet de Noyers (secretaire d'Etat for foreign 
affairs), Claude Bouthillier and Leon Bouthillier.
lOORanum, Richelieu and the Councillors of Louis XIII, pp. 3-15; 
PagSs, Les Institutions monarchiques sous Louis XIII et Louis XIV, p. 31.
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affaires depending on what regulation or person made the commentary.
For convenience sake it will here be uniformly referred to as the
Conseil d'en haut, a title actually assumed only some time after
1643. The Conseil d'en haut was the most direct linear descendant
of the ancient curia regis; in the absolute monarchy as in the
medieval or Renaissance Monarchy it denoted the king or regent
personally consulting with a few trusted advisors on policy. Its
competence included, as a rSglement of 1615 put it, "generally
affairs of the greatest importance, as it will please his Majesty
to o r d e r . T h e  rSglement of 1615 was the first to regulate this
council, and it proceeded to outline its activities, agenda, schedule,
and competences along with the rest of the council. Such committment
to paper scarcely affected the operations of the Conseil d'en haut
which in the era of Louis XIII continued to exhibit all of its past
spontaneity, superiority, and flexibility. The nature of this
council1 s makeup and business naturally stamped its workings as
informal, secret, and expeditious. Because of the king's presence,
it was unquestionably the dernier ressort in the kingdom. Mousnier
has perfectly captured its functions and relationship to other parts
of the council under Louis XIII in this way:
Politics properly said, high administration, finances, justice, 
it does them all. It appears as the Conseil du Roi par excel­
lence with loosely determined functions, whose members sit one 
day in finances, another for [contentious]) parties, another for 
politics. The other sections [of the council] are subordinated
-*-0-'-Mousnier, "Les R&glements du Conseil," p. 148.
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to it like little sovereign courts. The Conseil d'en haut 
seems on its own to begin anew the preceding evolution of 
the £ medieval] Cour du Roi and the [Renaissance] Conseil royal. 
The Cour du Roi assimilated unto itself practically all power 
and all functions, then specialized sections slowly appeared.
One of them, the Conseil du Roi, acquired a wider and wider 
competence and, in consequence, in its turn, painfully divided 
and its fragments specialized themselves.
Beneath the Conseil d’en haut were three administrative councils 
which, for simplicity's sake, can be thought of as sub-sections of the 
Conseil d'Etat. Each was broader than the Conseil d'en haut and 
shepherded day to day administrative policy formulated by the king's 
ministers. At various times during the week, the members of the 
Conseil d'Etat assumed the name of Conseil d'Etat et finances to 
study cases of financial litigation. Most of the same personnel sat 
in the Conseil de la direction des finances as a steering committee 
an financial policy. At other times most of the councillors 
assembled as the Conseil prive or Conseil des parties to treat 
judicial suits finding their way to the council by one means or 
another. These various sections of the Conseil d'Etat represented 
the administrative arms of the Conseil d'en haut, interlocking them­
selves with that body through the surlntendants des finances, the 
secretaires d'Etat, and the Chancellor who had the right to attend 
all councils. In addition to these six or seven men, about two 
dozen eonseillers d'Etat ordinaires had deliberative rights in the 
Conseil d'Etat only. These men received and discussed reports
102Mousnier, "Le Conseil du Roi," p. 153.
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compiled and presented by maitres des requites, four of whom also 
enjoyed deliberative rights after 1629. As Mousnier has said, 
these specialized fragments of the council stood in relationship 
to the Conseil d'en haut as the sovereign courts did to the council 
as a whole. The Conseil d'Etat was guided by its superior and its 
decisions could always be nullified by it. Unlike its superior, the 
Conseil d'Etat was almost always chaired by the Chancellor or 
garde des sceaux, a situation which led to a dichotomy between the 
theoretical sovereignty of the Conseil d'Etat and the patent reality 
of the king's absence..
All sections of the council possessed enormous judicial powers, 
but the adjudications of the Conseil d'en haut were limited in number 
and virtually unimpeachable at law, while the hearings of the 
financial councils were oriented towards financial cases. Conse­
quently the operations of the Conseil privl, the specialized judicial 
section of the council, were of primary concern to the Parlement of 
Paris. This portion of the council more than any other had demon­
strated the historical potential to become a true sovereign court 
superior to the Parlement. Its attributions had grown steadily 
during the sixteenth century, and by the early 1600's the Conseil 
privg was acting as a more or less regular court of high justice.
The Parlement had complained of this encroachment in its remonstrances 
of 1615 and the deputies of the sovereign courts to the Assembly of 
Notables had renewed them in 1626, but to no avail. The monarchy
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showed itself unable and unwilling to reform, the jurisdiction of 
the Conseil privl continued to swell throughout the first half of the 
seventeenth century, and one of the chief issues in the establishment 
of absolute government remained unresolved.
The inability to restrain the ressort of the Conseil privg 
certainly did not lay in ignorance of the problem, for after 1615 
there were repeated efforts to limit the jurisdiction of the 
Conseil privg through rgglements du conseil. Sometimes the Crown 
even presented statements confessing the origin and nature of the 
abuses, as it did in Article 3 of the reglement of May 21, 1615:
The multitude of causes which have been and are [now} in 
the Conseil du Roy stem from diverse motives which can be 
outlined in a few words.
Firstly, because of troubles and articles which have been 
accorded by the late King [Henry iv} to many princes, seigneurs, 
governors of places, cities, and communities, the knowledge of 
which and of all disputes which might come out of them has been 
reserved to the council of His Majesty as it was then necessary 
to thus employ it.
Edicts and declarations made by those of the reformed 
religion have brought the retention and judgment of many suits 
and disputes in the council of the king.
In all [taxj farm leases which were made in the time of the 
late king for gabelles, aides, and generally in all contracts 
made for the affairs and finances of His Majesty, there was 
always a reserve that all disputes which came out of the execution 
of the said leases should be judged in the council of the king. ^
This article was really a catalogue of political necessity. Under the
uneasy conditions of pacification during the 1590's, Henry had
found it necessary to protect the public peace by granting the right
of comnittimus, or the exclusive right of immediate appeal to
^%ousnier, "Les RSglements du Conseil," p. 14-7.
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councilliar justice, to various individuals and groups within the 
kingdom. The religious problem was perhaps Henry's gravest matter 
of State, and it, too, seemed to demand councilliar consideration.
In the same way, financial agreements with tax farmers were often 
delicate arrangements which could not bear the light of examination 
in regular courts. To shield the confidence and credit of his 
financiers and to the Crown were easily arranged.
Following this very accurate assessment, Article 4. went on to 
declare that
Nevertheless, the King wishes and intends that competence over 
all disputes that might come out of the execution of the edicts 
and declarations of His Majesty which hitherto have been treated 
in his council should be returned to the court of Parlement or 
other courts where the edicts were verified to be there judged 
and terminated in compliance with that which is ordered by 
the said edicts.10^
The same principle was to apply to tax cases, which were to be taken
away from the Conseil d'Etat et des finances and returned to the Cour
des aides. The result, Article 6 confidently asserted, would be
that "there will be no need to hold so many councils.
This sanguine expectation proved illusory. The business of the
Conseil prive was not permanently diminished, as continued rSglements
and the articles of the sovereign courts in 1626 testify. Nevertheless,
until Marillac's fall, the Crown continued to try, at least on paper,
to order the activities of its judicial council. The r&glement of
105Ibid., p. 148.
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January 18, 1630, prepared under the conscientious direction of 
Marillac, meticuously detailed the workings of the Conseil prive 
and once again attacked the abuses of justice administered in 
council. For the most part specific paragraphs reiterated past 
admonitions to proceed under the law. The first section piously 
reaffirmed the ancient principle that "all affairs which lie in 
contentious jurisdiction should be returned to the parlements,
Grand Conseil, Cour des Aides, and other ordinary judges. "1^ >
No one in the council was to vote or remain seated when issues 
involving relatives or "special friends" were discussed.Like­
wise no one was to attend if his impartiality had been challenged 
by colleagues. Several paragraphs established procedures to be 
used by the maitres des requites for reporting evocations, appeals, 
and contested cases in c o u n c i l . M b st importantly for the 
Parlement of Paris, Article 18 declared that "decisions given in the 
sovereign courts cannot be stopped or stayed [cessls ni surcisl 
save by means at law provided by the ordinances.
Section IV of the 1630 regulation defined "that business which 
His Majesty wishes and orders for the Conseil privi." Seven of the 
eight articles contained nothing beyond ordinary and legally 
sanctioned provision for requests, evocations, and the work of the
106Ibid., p. 184.
1Q7Ibid., p. 187.
108Ibid., pp. 186-87, Articles 9 and 12.
1Q9lbld., p. 187.
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the mitres des requites, but Innocuously buried in the middle of 
the section was an extremely important new provision. Article 26 
declared that the Conseil privl would be charged with receiving 
"the remonstrances of the parlements and other courts and affairs 
concerning justice and the functions.of their charges."110 This 
principle was not new, having previously been confided to the 
Conseil d'Etat et des finances, but now the Conseil privl was handed 
the right to hear and evaluate the remonstrances of the sovereign 
courts, even though the king were not present. This meant, in 
effect, that the Conseil privl could judge conflicts between the 
sovereign courts and the council.111
Despite the lack of written rSglements after 1630, the power 
and importance of the conseil privl continued to grow. By 1645 it 
had acquired the right to hear cases of violations, excesses, 
imprisonments, and rebellion originating out of the exercise of 
councilliar authority: the ordinances, arrlts du Conseil, judgments
of intendants, decisions of the trlsoriers de France, and other 
conmrtssaires. This authority gave the Conseil privl the duty of 
enforcing obedience to the council and the direct agents of the 
king in the provinces, thus completing a structure of extraordinary 
justice from intendant to council. This structure was parallel to, 
and outside of, the ordinary system of courts. By the end of
11QIbid., p. 188.
111Mousnier, "Le Conseil du Roi," p. 161.
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Richelieu's ministry, the Conseil privg had become, in Mousnier's 
phraseology, "an essential instrument of the realization of 
absolute power.
The Parlement and other sovereign courts firmly resisted the
growth of councilliar justice and, in particular, that exercised
by the Conseil privg. The legal position assumed by the parle-
mentaires at this time was no different than it had been at other
times of confrontation with the council. The courts in general
subscribed to the broad relationship expressed by conseiller d'Etat
and jurisconsul Cardin Le Bret in 1632:
The parlements have over them the king, assisted by his 
chancellor and his Conseil d'Etat in its broad sense from 
them to receive correction Tf in something they exceed the 
power given them, or if they come to do something contrary to 
the good, of His Majesty's service and to the utility of the 
kingdom.
The courts could not quibble with the superior authority of the king, 
who indubitably possessed the "supreme power bestowed on one alone" 
and who held the "right to command absolutely.Hence, when the 
Ving was personally present in his council, the Parlement and other 
sovereign courts acknowledged the validity of its decisions. This 
authority, however, did not extend to the council as an independent 
body which, without the king's essential presence, had no powers 
above those of the regular courts. In the mid-1640's, for example, 
when the chancellor asked Advocat General Omer Talon if he denied
112Ibid.
•^^Le Brat, De la souverain§tg du Roi, Bk. II, Ch. II, p. 157. 
^Ibid., Bk. I, Ch. I, p. 1.
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the power and authority of the king's council, he replied "that he 
acknowledged the authority of the King in his council and in his 
ministry, while he was present t h er e . W i t h o u t the mystical 
presence of the king, the council remained on an equal footing with 
the Parlement; both were sprung from common origins, the curia regis, 
and neither could claim legal superiority.11^
To be sure, the sovereign courts never challenged the power of 
the Conseil prive or the Conseil d'Etat et des finances in certain 
cases of private law tendered in the ordinances. The councils could 
suspend decisions of the sovereign courts upon an appeal from one 
of the parties based on the error of fact (proposition d'erreur) or 
other recognized legal technicalities. In these cases the maftre 
de requites were expected to examine the appeal and, if found worthy, 
to report it in the proper section of the council for examination.
The council, however, was not supposed to judge the matter itself,
but was to annul the decision and return it to the original judges
117with instructions for retrial as the ordinances provided. The 
Council could also evoke an affair upon a request based on the 
grounds of parente, that is, if the adversaries had relatives or 
kin among the original judges, if the judges had other interests in 
the case, or if they had been consulted or sollicited by either 
party. In these instances of inequity or ambiguity, the Council had
115Talon, M&noires, p. 152.
11^ Mousnier, "Le Conseil du Roi," pp. 145, 171.
lir^ By the Ordinance of Orleans, Art. 45, and that of Blois, Art. 
92. Isambert, Aneiennes lois frangaises, XV, 76 and 404.
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the recognized right to regulate subordinate judges. It might judge 
the case itself or commit it to another court. Finally, since only 
the king could chose and invest his officers with their public 
powers, only the Council could hear cases concerning provision to 
off ice.
Certainly the Parlement and other sovereign courts had frequent 
cause to complain of abuses in these categories of cases. The 
councillors often preferred to retain a case in the council and 
judge it themselves, rather than return it to a lower court. Fre­
quently, too, the king granted blanket evocation privileges for 
various political reasons to tax farmers, courtiers, rebels, the 
Huguenots, communities, and diverse individuals. These abuses 
were numerous, notorious, and often provoked the courts to remon­
strances, but they never carried the constitutional implications 
surrounding the superiority of the Council in questions of public 
law, matters of State, and bursal edicts. In these matters there 
existed a profound question of how royal arbitraire was to be 
exercised. If the superiority of the Council were upheld, a limited 
number of the king's appointees could disrupt the traditional 
balance between royal authority and the principle of wide counsel. 
The question was basic and essential to the struggle to establish 
absolutism in France, and it found both legal and institutional
l-^Mbusnier, "Le Conseil du Roi," pp. 175-76; Le Bret, De la 
souverain£tl du roi, Bk. IV, Ch. II, pp. 490-91.
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expression when the Parlement was excluded from public affairs through 
the use of councilliar arrgts.
The origin of the struggle over public matters, of course, was 
grounded in the absolutistic policies of Richelieu and Louis, 
policies which had as their basic premise "that the Parlement had been 
established only to render justice to the subjects of the King, and 
not to involve itself in affairs of State except when they had been 
so commanded by the chief ordained of God."^^ This objective was 
implicit in Richelieu's philosophy of government and was repeatedly 
reiterated by Louis and Richelieu in official documents and oral 
warnings to the court. Neither King nor Cardinal ever envisioned a 
substitution of the Council for the Parlement, or even a systematized 
interference in the Parlement's legal jurisdiction. Indeed, there 
is no recorded evidence to suggest a radical modification of the 
Parlement's historical legislative functions. Besides the necessity 
of registering edicts, ordinances, and declarations, the Parlement 
could be called on to lend its prestige to declarations against those 
in revolt, the grands of the kingdom and their accomplices, and even 
members of the royal family. On occasion the court might be 
commissioned to deal with some sensitive matters of State, such as 
the annullment of Gaston's marriage to Marguerite of Lorraine in 
1633f the conduct of an important criminal trial, legal or monetary
119ifol£, Memoires, I, 50.
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reform, or consultation over a treaty. But at all times Louis,
like his predecessors, maintained that the Parlement should act
only on his order.120
In 1632, just at the height of the struggle between the council
and the Parlement, Cardin Le Bret sought to justify the use of the
arret du Conseil in public matters by propounding soundly reasoned
doctrines of councilliar superiority. These were expressed in
fie la souverainete du roi, a treatise dedicated to Richelieu and
now recognized as the essential judicial expression of absolutism.
His argument was based on two points. Conventionally enough, Le
Bret thought that the king unquestionably possessed the dernier
ressort in matters of justice:
Since only God can redress deficiencies and remedy disorders 
which come into second causes. . . , it is only the king, who 
represents this divine majesty on earth, who has the right 
to correct the faults of officers and of magistrates that he 
has commissioned in his place to render justice to his subjects. 
The ancients called this sovereign right extremum judicium, 
or dernier ressort.-*-21
What was the nature and quality of this ultimate jurisdiction? For
Le Bret, the answer was quite conventional and in compliance with
current usages in councilliar cases:
It consists of the judgment of appeals, civil requests, proposi­
tions of error [at lawj, illegality of decisions, evocations, 
interdictions, and of regulation of judges.122
120lfousnier, "Le Conseil du Roi," p. 173.
121Le Bret, De la souverainit£ du roi, Bk. IV, Ch. II, pp. 
490-91.
^Ibid.
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Le Bret then went Into a lengthy dissertation on the application of
each of these questions, and in all cases concluded that the king
in council possessed sovereign authority over all the parlements.
Even in the nullification of sovereign court decisions, evocations,
and regulation of judges, which Le Bret termed "of the greatest
importance," there was no question of eouneilliar superiority. He
firmly declared that
We see that the king has reserved the hearing of them in his 
council, principally when he has been asked to nullify an 
arrgt which, it is maintained, has been given contrary to his 
ordinances, against the public utility, and against the rights
of the Crown. . . . When this comes about, there is no doubt
that the king can declare it null and override it, thus 
imitating the example of Roman emperors.123
Le Bret also wrestled with the dilemman of the real presence of
the king in council. In so doing he acknowledged that the Parlement
of Paris enjoyed a distinctly different status than that of the
other sovereign courts of France. The presence of the king was
expected, but not required, to override its decisions:
I observe that on these occasions a difference is set between 
the Parlement of Paris and other parlements and the sovereign 
courts. When it is a question of nullifying an arrgt of the 
Parlement of Paris, and when the presidents and conseillers 
making the decision have to be heard to give an account of 
their arret, this ought to be done in the presence of the king 
Lcela se doit faire en la presence du Roy] . . . .  But as to 
the arrets which have been given in other parlements and other 
companies, they are treated in the Conseil d'Estat or priv£, 
although the king might not be present there.^
123lbid., pp. 497-98.
12^ Ibid., pp. 496-97.
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The basis for this traditional observation was "that it is principally 
in this court that he jthe king] has established the bed of his 
justice with so much renown. "^5
The context of Le Bret's remarks in this chapter indicate that 
his conclusions were generally oriented towards matters of private 
law and administrative decisions. Yet it is clear that he intended 
that they were applicable to questions of public law as well, for he 
drew no distinction between private cases, administrative decisions, 
and questions of public law. In all cases, regardless of subject or 
consequence, the arrfets of the council were uniformly superior to 
those of any sovereign court, and only the Parlement of Paris could 
expect to be heard by the king in person. Even in these circumstances 
Le Bret was cautious, employing a conditional "ought to be done" 
rather than a positive "must be done" in the royal presence.
The Parlement saw this limitation in a different way. The judges 
were aware that their duty lay in reminding the Crown of the law and 
the rights of subjects and its obligation to respect both. The court 
maintained that this function was integral with an independent 
advisory capacity. In 1615 it had pretended to fulfill this role by 
convoking on its own authority the princes of the blood, the dukes 
and peers, and great Crown officers to deliberate on the conduct of 
the State. In this case the judges had even darkly hinted at the 
removal of Concini, the Queen's favorite. The same sort of independent
l^ Ibid.
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capacity for reform inspired the activities of the Chamh-re de St. Louis 
during the summer of 1648. Though opportunities for extremes of 
independent action were rare during Richelieu's ministry, the Parle­
ment found many occasions to interfer with governmental policy, to 
frustrate, obstruct, and to negate inport ant legal reform, the trial 
of a mar§sehal, prosecution of Richelieu's political enemies, 
fiscal edicts, and other aspects of the Cardinal's program.
Finding opportunities for spontaneous advice extremely limited, 
the Parlement usually found it had to offer its counsel through the 
mechanism of remonstrances on a given issue. The decision to present 
remonstrances took the form of a juridical arr£t made after deli­
beration en conseil, that is to say, with all chambers of the court 
assembled "in council." These deliberations were secret, limited to 
sworn members of the court, and the decision taken therein represented 
the will of the whole body. Obviously such deliberations were often 
contrary to royal wishes, and across the centuries a clumsy and 
protracted, but rather pragmatic, system of negotiation had arisen 
to mediate differences between the Parlement and the king.
The first move by the Parlement was usually moderate. The gens 
du roi communicated the court's opinion to the king, who then had 
the option of perseverance, moderation, or total concession in his 
original purpose. In case of perseverance, the king conventionally 
communicated his insistence through lettres de jussion, a form of the 
sealed lettre de cachet enjoining the court to obey and outlining 
reasons for it. Lettres de jussion always originated in the
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chancellery, not in council, though the king might have their 
dispatch debated there. Hence the lettre de jussion was essentially 
a personal communication of royal will, not a higher judicial 
decision.
The first known lettre de jussion was issued in 1392, and by 
the sixteenth century this instrument had lost most of its cutting 
edge. The Parlement felt free to ignore the letters until the 
threat of other action presented itself. If the jussion failed 
to carry the point, the Crown had a variety of choices. Prudent 
and diplomatic rulers like Henry IV usually attempted to negotiate 
with the Parlement by summoning a deputation, or by sending a 
representative to the court to explain the royal position. If the 
court persisted in its resistance, the Crown was reduced to two 
alternatives. In rare instances of great need, kings traditionally 
went to force registration of legislation or to annul the court's 
action in a lit de justice. This ceremony was rich in legal, 
symbolic, and psychological meaning. In form the lit de justice 
was a curious parody of the ancient curia regis. The king entered 
the court which had been prepared for his coming and, after exten­
sive ceremonials, spoke the royal will through the chancellor or 
garde des sceaux. The opinions of the assembled judges were then 
taken following a strict protocol. Since their magisterial functions 
ceased with the entry of the king, the status of the judges was 
transubstantiated into the ancient status of councillors entitled to 
express an independent formal opinion but ultimately required to 
bow before that of the king as primus inter pares.
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Even while expressing royal will, the lit de justice was 
clothed in dignity and public ceremonial. The King had symboli­
cally taken council, appearing personally before the judges to 
let his will be known among his advisors. During Louis XIII's 
reign, however, the lit de justice began to suffer indignities which 
eroded its meaning. Responsibility for the degradation must be laid 
at the door of both Crown and court. After the lit of January 15,
1629, registering the Code Michaud, the judges found excuses to 
continue their deliberations through the ensuing months. Distracted 
by military campaigning far from Paris, Louis was unable to force 
the court to acknowledge his will until eight months later. These 
prolonged discussions tended to subvert the finality of royal 
authority in the lit de justice. On the other hand, after Richelieu's 
victory on the Day of Dupes, the Crown resorted to lits de justice
so frequently that the measure was converted into a relatively 
common method of forcing the Parlement's hand. Between November,
1630, and the Cardinal1s death in December, 1642, there were no 
less than six lits de justice, or an average of one every two years. 
During the period 1631-35 when the bickering between the Crown and 
the Parlement waxed warmest, Louis held a lit de justice each year.12  ^
In addition, in 1637 Louis went to the Palais on a disciplinary 
mission to enjoin the acceptance of new conseillers.
•^These lits de justice were: on August 13, 1631, to register a 
decree against followers of Gaston d'Orleans; August 12, 1632, to 
register a second edict against Gaston d'Orleans; April 12, 1633, to 
register decrees concerning followers of Gaston; January 18, 1634, to 
announce governmental policies before the court; December 20, 1635, 
to register a large quantity of fiscal edicts.
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By way of contrast to these techniques, there were two lits de 
justice during Henry IV's rule. One of these had come in 1597 when 
the government was desperate for funds, the other was held in 1600 
when Henry came to the court with the Duke of Savoy to show him the 
majesty of his Parlement. What is even more striking, Henry had not 
had to resort to a lit de justice to compel registration of the 
Edict of Nantes, even though the articles were an anathema to the 
strongly Catholic court. On this occasion, as on others, Henry 
had been victorious by summoning the court to come to him at the 
Louvre rather than going himself to force the royal will on the 
court.
At best, however, the lit de justice had limitations as an 
instrument of compulsion. In abstract terms it satisfied the 
court's pretensions to the expression of council, but in reality 
lits often did nothing more than offend the judges and stiffen their 
resistance. Moreover, the king had to be present in person, and 
many times this was impossible or impractical. In these instances, 
the arrSt du conseil offered a potent second alternative. Assuming 
that the Parlement had already issued an arrgt of its own, an 
arrit du Conseil could judicially quash the Parlement1s ruling and 
substitute that of the council. The councilliar arret was legally 
unimpeachable if made in the king's presence, wherever he might be; 
absolutistic doctrine such as that of Le Bret went further and 
held that the council as a body held precedent over the court 
whether the king were present or not.
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Only after all legal maneuvres had been exhausted did relations 
between the Parlement and the Crown degenerate into an exercise in 
the application of force majeure. If a lit de justice or an arrlt 
du Conseil failed, the Crown was reduced to a single dramatic but 
unpalatable and rather ineffectual gesture: it could order the arrest 
or exile of those spearheading opposition in the court. A move like 
this, however, was a touchy operation fraught with hazardous 
consequences, for if matters were pressed to this point, the Parle­
ment actually had the upper hand. It usually had public opinion on 
its side, especially in financial controversies, and it could easily 
retaliate by calling a judicial strike and throwing a monkey wrench 
into the business of high justice. For any chance of success, the 
number of judges punished and their selection was a matter of 
considerable discretion. The group had to be large enough to 
symbollize royal intentions but small enough to minimize the 
antagonistic reaction within and without the court. The court could 
not be put out of business by a suspension en masse. Moreover, it 
was imperative to strike at the genuine ringleaders within the 
Parlement, and this was not always easy to do, since a rule of 
secrecy was presumed to prevail for discussions en conseil. In stun, 
the efficacy of force, however judicious, was always dubious.
It is significant that while Richelieu was willing to underline 
his determination by employing these kinds of measures, he was also 
aware of their limitations. The timing, extent, and severity of 
arbitrary measures was always characterized by moderation, selectivity, 
and a willingness to negotiate. No more than six judges were ever
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ordered out of Paris at any one time. No judge was ever humiliated—  
or given the chance to "become a martyr— by confinement in the 
Bastille or Vincennes. The usual circumstances of exile corresponded 
with those of house arrest today, since the magistrates were ordered 
to remove themselves to their country houses.
That the extreme of exile was reached six times during the 
decade 1631-1641 is a revealing indicator of the tensions playing 
between the Crown and its high court. Until Richelieu's ministry, 
any kind of coercion beyond the lit de justice or arrSt du Conseil 
had been extremely rare. Francis I had succeeded in breaking the 
Parlement's resistance to the Concordat of 1516 without carrying out 
threats to establish another parlement or to have the Parisian 
judges "scamper after him like the Grand Conseil." After Francis 
returned from captivity in 1526, he had disciplined the proeureur 
general and three other judges by suspending them from their 
official duties for six months, but the judges apparently suffered 
no other indignities. In any case, on this occasion the King's 
objective was a chastisement for past actions rather than an attempt 
to coerce the passage of legislation or to slam the door on a 
decision of the court. Other examples of interdiction could be 
found during the sixteenth century, notably in 1561 when First Presi­
dent Gilles le Maistre had been relieved of his duties. The first 
recorded example of the exile of a judge came in 1597 when Henry IV 
ordered Jacques Riviere outside the vicomte of Paris for six months 
for his opposition to the registration of fiscal edicts.127 Thus,
127See supra, Chapter II, p. 92.
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as with councilliar justice and the lit de justice, the repeated employ­
ment of purely arbitrary measures to control the Parlement indicates 
not a new technique of government but a new determination to limit the 
role of the Parlement in formulating public policy. The Parlement, 
on its side, showed itself willing to go to greater extremes of 
obstinacy than ever before to block the growth of royal power.
Richelieu's employment of commissaires and other forms of 
extraordinary justice also reflect a conventional and traditional 
solution to immediate administrative needs. As seen in Chapter IV, 
Richelieu saw in the charge of lSse-majeste an effective legal 
weapon against all kinds of real or suspected resistance to royal 
authority. The accusation was flexible. It would serve equally well 
against the conspiracies of les grands, religious rebels, pamphleteers, 
and, in general, all those deemed in opposition to the king. For 
prosecution and trial, however, the accusation required at least the 
formalities of judicial proceeding, and given the usual prerequisites 
in such cases— haste, surety, and political reliability— the simplest 
and most effective alternative to regular courts was to deliver them 
into the hands of commissioned judges. The magistrates were quick to 
see the implications in the extended use of commissaires, and 
after the Day of Dupes this quickly became one of the focal points 
of parlementaire politics.
The nuclear issue at stake in the creation of eornmissaires 
was closely related to the extension of the council's powers. Like 
the various forms of councilliar justice, the powers granted through
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a royal commission were an expression of justice retenue, the quality 
of sovereign justice retained in the king's hands. The exercise of 
justice retenue in this way had troubled the monarchy for centuries, 
and, in form, the problem under Richelieu was no different from the 
past. Expressed most simply, the Crown maintained the untrammeled 
right to institute or commission agents of justice as it pleased, and 
to invest them with the absolute authority of the king over regular 
officers.
The most articulate spokesman for the employment of commissaires 
in absolute government was Cardin Le Bret. In Book II of De la 
souverainetl du Roy, Le Bret developed a justification for their use 
which brought together several essential, perhaps one should say cru­
cial, arguments concerning this expression of royal authority. In 
Chapter I, Le Bret addressed himself to the question of the delegation 
or retention of judicial powers and the appointment of royal officers. 
In concert with his contemporaries, Le Bret acknowledged that
there are principally three kinds of officers which the king 
employs in the administration of his kingdom, to wit, those 
of judicature, of war, and of finances. I will treat separately 
their functions to show that they depend absolutely on his 
sovereign authority. But before going on, it seems to me that 
following this discourse I am obliged also to of
commissions extraordinaires, because it is a of
sovereignty, which takes its source from it, which gives kings 
the power to institute such officers as seems proper to them.128
In short, the right to create officers found expression in two ways,
through the creation of ordinary officers such as the magistrates of
128-Le Bret, De la souverainltl du Roy, Bk. II, Ch. I, pp. 148-49.
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the Parlement and through the granting of commissions. There was no
difference in the origin of the two types of agents; hoth had their
wellspring in the sovereign power of the king to appoint officials.
Up to this point Le Bret’s argument remained more or less
conventional and within recognized bounds of public law. When
defining the qualities, authority, institution, legality, and
relationship of commissaires to other officers, however, Le Bret
expounded an exceptionally absolutistic doctrine. A conseiller
d’Etat himself, Le Bret tied the question of independent eommissaires
to the authority of members of the council. There were, he maintained,
two sorts of commissions: one is perpetual and attributes to
commissaires to rank and dignity for all time. One sees it in 
the governors of provinces, conseillers, and secretaires d'Etat, 
who even have the right to qualify themselves as chevaliers.
The other is only temporary and for the expedition of certain 
affairs.129
Even if the commission were only a temporary one, however, perhaps 
as an intendant or as a trial judge, it "gives to commissaires a 
rank more elevated than that of the officers whose charges they 
exercise during their interdiction."1 0^ According to Le Bret’s 
reasoning, this is "because they represent more particularly the 
person of the prince, in whose name they act, and because it is a 
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What were the parameters for the delegation of power through
the commission? For Le Bret the process was quite simple:
It is necessary that they [any commissions] specifically 
delineate the power that the king gives to the commissaires, 
and no person of whatever quality that he might he can 
obstruct their execution, revoke them, or restrain them 
without injurying the royal authority. It is sufficient 
that they be published and signified.-*-32
Publication in a sovereign court was not required; the fact of 
documentation and royal seals alone was adequate to authenticate 
transmission of power. In brief, the delegation process was 
virtually unrestricted, and such commissions enjoyed sure superiority 
over any regular officers superceded (in Le Bret's words, "inter­
dicted") by the commission.
And what of the legal prohibitions against commissions and 
commissaires found in the royal ordinances? Le Bret acknowledged 
that the ordinances superficially prohibited the issuance of 
commissions. But most significantly, he argued that there was a 
difference between the provisions of the ordinances in cases of 
private law involving only individuals and the application of the 
law to public affairs. Once again Le Bret interpreted the legal 
limits to royal authority in a broad and absolutistic fashion:
I know that by the Edict of Blois, Article 98, that one 
could infer that the king tied his hands not to give such 
commissions, desiring that each case be returned to the 
officers who should naturally have eomptence over it. But 
he intended to prohibit them only for private affairs which 
go no further than the interest of individuals, because on
132jbid., p. i5o.
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these occasions it is unreasonable to change anything in the 
order which has been established by usage and the ordinances, 
and not when it is a question of public affairs which concern 
the State. There is no doubt that since he has reserved the 
hearing of these for himself, following the edict of Charles 
VIII, that he can. commission such persons as seems proper to 
him to hear them.-1-”
The legal basis for Le Bret's argument was grounded in the principles 
of Roman law which since the medieval period had been utilized to 
strengthen the sovereign principle. In this instance the seven­
teenth century jurisconsul argued that the difference between private 
and public affairs, and thus the difference between officers and 
commissaires,
had been introduced after the example of Roman law, which set 
up a difference between affairs which fall into ordinary 
jurisdiction and those which affect the public. The hearing 
of the former should belong to the officers, jure Magistratus, 
and the hearing of the latter, a lege tantum, vel a Principe"" 
dabatur, that is to say, by commission.1^
The argument was a perfect legal complement to Richelieu's philo­
sophy of reason of State. like the minister he served in the council, 
Le Bret posited the status of the State as distinct from, and superior 
to, the individual's place. The State's powers were embodied in the 
king's person, and he alone could determine the delegation of those 
powers.
Le Bret spoke in terms of royal authority and the prerogatives 
of that authority. The Parlement's business, on the other hand, 
was the rendering of justice. Limited in their arguments at law
133Ibid., p. 149. 
134Ibid., pp. 149-50.
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by the ultimate sovereignty of the king, the judges preferred to 
base their remonstrances about commissaires on the fundamental 
principles of moral justice and good kingship. Its major sentiments 
on the issue had been made known in the well-known remonstrances of 
1615, but surviving examples from the heated exchanges of the 1630's 
are rare, largely because remonstrances, while expressing the 
court's official stand, were not normally committed to the registers. 
Survival of the text of remonstrances was thus left to chance 
and became problematical. Nevertheless, some of the Parlement's 
chief premises emerge from a manuscript preserved in the private 
papers of Nicolas de Bellievre, son of Chancellor Pomponne de 
Belli&vre and a prgsident & mortier between 1614 and 1 6 4 2 . The 
piece is almost certainly the first remonstrance against the 
commissaires of the Chambre de 1'Arsenal, established by edict on 
June 14, 1631. Evidence in the form of Bellievre's letters to and 
from garde des sceaux Chateauneuf indicates that the judge prepared
•^Untitled piece in B.N. Ms. fr. 18415, "Memoires, discours, 
correspondence et papiers divers de Nicolas de Bellievre," fols. 
24-31v . While the exact date of preparation is uncertain, internal 
evidence in the piece and in following letters places its com­
position during the latter part of September or early October of 
1631. The official standing of the essay is somewhat difficult to 
describe. It represents the opinion of Bellievre and the Chambre 
des vacations, but neither the president A mortier nor the Chambre 
des vacations' could represent the entire Parlement on an issue of 
this importance. On the other hand, the ensuing action of the 
Parlement after November 11 certainly shows that Bellievre1s memoir 
accurately represents the sentiments of the whole court towards 
the Chambre de I1Arsenal.
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the memoir on behalf of the Chambre des vacations which was sitting
when the Chambre de 1*Arsenal became active.
Bellievre1s theme, couched in customary Baroque flourishes,
pursued a philosophical rather than strictly legal course. The
principles of justice and good kingship required an end to the
practice of commissaires, which was injurious to the Parlement and
to the monarchy. "Petty princes and conquerors are somewhat
excusable if they use them for a certain time, " Bellievre began,
but great king's, established by God, cherished and revered 
by the people, possessing their scepters in all assurance 
through a long contiguous series of successions, resembling 
the sun in its summer solstice . . . gladly leave their 
subjects the liberty and security which is most commonly 
found before ordinary justices. If this abuse [of commissaires] 
began to appear within their States, there is no doubt that 
they would immediately have it pulled out by the roots, since 
there is nothing which could more quickly destroy credit before 
their people . . . and which would most powerfully alienate 
the hearts of their subjects. 37
Henry III had acknowledged this principle in establishing the
Ordinance of Blois which had wiped out the "new abuse" of commissioned
justice and restored "the former law of the kingdom." Justice was
essential to the well-being of the State, but it was also necessary
that the justice be meted out by respected judges:
It is highly important to the reputation of Your Majesty that 
evildoers be punished. There is nothing more necessary in a 
State, but the intention [of justice] is not to eliminate their 
persons. Rather it is the example that the public receives 
from it. If judgment is rendered by commissaires, even should
136gee the five pieces of correspondence dated September 23 to 
October 4 at B.N. Ms. fr. 18415, fols. 32 through 40.
137B.N. Ms. fr. 18415, fol. 24v°.
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it be the most just in the world, the result would be entirely- 
lost because no one would be convinced that justice had been 
done.1?8
Commissioned justice could not possibly encourage the credit and 
credence that justice required from the king's subjects. "How 
could this credence of subjects be universally received by everyone," 
the remonstrance asked, "when an accused is given certain pliant 
judges?" Not only was he deprived of his "natural judges and not 
sent sent before another regular company," but "these commissaires 
might even be chosen from different places, to judge without appeal 
in a place where they had never assembled before and would never 
be seen again."^39
The remonstrance terminated with a standard article of 
parlementaire doctrine: no court or commissaires could serve the 
purposes of justice better than the Parlement. Moreover, the usage 
of "chosen judges" had sometimes been tolerated, "but it must be 
recognized that to soften the rigor in the eyes of the people, 
their commissions were addressed to the parlements, to be there 
verified."1^ 0 Verification in the Parlement satisfied two require­
ments. By making the commission known to the court, regular judges 
could ensure that it was used according to its intended purpose. It 
also served as an opportunity to examine the qualifications of the 
commissaire:
138b .n. Ms. fr. 18415, fol. 24v°.
139B.N. Ms . f r .  18415, f o l .  2 5 .
U °B.N. Ms. fr. 18415, fol. 26v°.
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Inasmuch as to honor an officer with a commission is to give him 
a new title and an approbation of his conduct, it is highly 
important that he pass this examination in his company, the 
which, seeing him named in the letters of the commission, can 
make known the difficulties which might be imported for His 
Majesty service and for the honor that should proceed out
The checks proposed by Bellievre would have in effect given the 
Parlement power to review and to delay the exhcution of royal 
commissions. The judges might also insist that members of their 
own body be entrusted with important commissions, particularly those 
of criminal trials. Medieval and Renaissance monarchs had sometimes 
agreed to this policy, yet often they had preferred to avoid selecting 
parlementaire judges. The latter tendency was firmly established as 
the Parlement more and more came to show itself independent of 
Crown policy under Richelieu's ministry.
The problem of commissioned justice was but one aspect of the 
complex problem of the institutional establishment of absolutism in 
the French monarchy. Closely, perhaps inseparably, associated with 
it were other manifestations of absolutism such as councilliar 
government, the intendants, extraordinary fiscal expedients, and 
vigorous measures to contain the independence of the Crown's high 
officials. Varied the techniques of absolute government were, and 
equally varied were the responses evoked by than from the diverse 
orders of seventeenth century society. No group, however, was 
more directly affected than the bureaucracy, and no group within
U 1 B.N. Ms. fr. 18415, fol. 26v°.
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the bureaucracy was more affected than the Parlement of Paris. For 
the judges, absolutistic government meant a gross distortion of the 
fundamental qualities of justice, good kingship, the rule of law, 
and respect for individual and corporate privilege; evocations, 
interdictions, arrgts du Conseil, lits de justice, arbitrary arrests 
and exile, commissaires, and finagling of the paulette represented 
particularly intolerable abuses of sovereignty. The Crown, conversely, 
took a different view. Richelieu’s philosophy of reason of State 
held the same practices to be justifiable, necessary, and legally 
defensible procedures to compell obedience, and thus to bring 
glory and grandeur to king and kingdom.
Since the principles of precedence dominated French public 
law, Crown and court were well aware of the roles each had played in 
the past, but neither could possibly see their struggle in the 1600’s 
as institutional historians can today. That view, longer by several 
centuries, properly puts the clash in the continuum of persistent 
historical dilemmas confounding the administration of justice in the 
monarchy since the fourteenth century. It is an intensification of 
this continuing dichotomy between the attractions of administrative 
justice and customary legality, rather than any ”administrative 
revolution” during the ministry of Richelieu, which perhaps best 
characterizes the play of constitutional tensions during the period 
1624-42.
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POLITICS AND THE PARLEMENT: I
On April 29, 1624, Armand Jean du Plessis, Cardinal de Richelieu, 
was introduced into a meeting of the royal council, then attending 
the King at the ancient chateau of Compiegne. Richelieu's entry 
was an unpleasant surprise for at least some of the councillors 
present, it being widely thought in court circles that the King was 
indifferent, even antagonistic, towards the Cardinal. In fact until 
recently this had been true. Louis had changed his mind in deepest 
secrecy, and the decision had only been made known to Richelieu 
during the preceding evening. Louis' reluctancy had been overcome 
primarily through the maternal influence of Marie de Medicis and in 
spite of the best efforts of La Vieuville, then directing the 
finances, and old Marshal Lesdiguieres, former favorite of Henry IV. 
The councilliar nomination was the culmination of a long and 
assiduous cultivation of the Queen Mother, who alone could persuade 
Louis that his initial distrust of Richelieu was without foundation. 
The most immediate reward for the Cardinal's diligence, ambition, 
and artful manipulation, however, was anticlimatical. This first 
council meeting was distinguished by nothing other than a squabble 
over precedence that would have been totally insignificant had it 
not resulted in Richelieu's assumption of the second place at the 
council table, next to that of Cardinal La Rochefoucauld.
La Rochefoucauld, afflicted with the burdens of old age, soon
355
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retired from the council and left the unofficial, but meaningful, 
place of first minister to Richelieu. With the disgrace and arrest 
of La Vieuville in August, Richelieu's primacy was virtually un­
challenged.*^
Richelieu's introduction into the ministry caused hardly a 
ripple on the then tranquil waters of parlementaire politics.
During the spring and simmer of 1624> the Parlement, then under the 
leadership of the placid and scholarly Nicolas de Verdun, was 
occupied with routine business, and it would be several years before 
the stirrings of royal power began to disturb the court's relations 
with the Crown. The domestic politics of the era were complex in 
the extreme, yet the initial serenity of the new ministry is fairly 
easy to account for. While Louis' authority was at a low ebb, and 
the government in serious financial need, Richelieu's alternatives 
in regard to the Parlement were really quite limited. His 
immediate concern was to protect and enlarge his foothold in 
Louis' confidence, an undertaking ineampatable with an aggressive, 
risfcy policy towards those in the Palais de Justice. Additionally 
the circumstances of 1624 and 1625 drew Richelieu's attention 
towards foreign affairs, notably the area of the Valtelline passes 
and the arrangement of an English marriage for Louis' sister 
Henrietta. Even if Richelieu had been willing to confront the 
court with controversial legislation, the state of the council 
would have made a coordinated policy difficult. The chancellors of
1Burckhardt, Richelieu, His Rise to Power, p. 158-60.
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the 1620's— Sillery until June, 1624, then D'Aligre— were not men of 
Richelieu's confidence. D'Aligre, a cipher, was inclined to avoid 
confrontation with the Parlement. Michel de Marillac, who could 
hold a tough line with the magistrates, was not made garde des 
sceaux with custody of the seals until in the summer of 1626. Lastly, 
the council as a whole favored a conservative, careful financial 
policy made possible by a lull in religious and noble civil war.
Until 1627 a line was held on taxes, the Parties casuelles, and 
extraordinary revenues, and instead of these measures a chambre de 
justice was instituted in October, 1624, to fill the royal coffers.2
The formation of the Chambre de justice and the Parlement's 
reaction to it were characteristic of the first two years of 
Richelieu's ministry. The Cardinal's MSmoires indicate that he 
conceived the notion of a proceeding against the Crown's creditors 
during the summer of 1624.^ An investigation of this nature was 
almost perfectly tailored to the needs of the moment. The 
financiers were uniformly disliked and distrusted throughout society, 
and any move against them would likely have popular approval. From 
the government's standpoint, too, the opportunity could not have 
been better. The Crown was in desperate need of money, yet its 
most pressing needs, those of the military, were temporarily in
2Ibid., pp. 160-91; Lublinskaya, French Absolutism, 1620-29, pp. 
272-325:
^Richelieu, Memolres, II, 345; Lettres, II, 178. The Memolres 
indicate that the decision was taken soon after La Vieuville's removal 
as surintendant des finances on August 12, 1624. The establishment 
was debated for several days in council, during which time 
Richelieu actively argued in favor of it. His views are exposed at 
length in the Mgmoires, II, 345-48.
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abeyance after the peace of Montpellier, signed with the Huguenots 
in 1622. At the same time, however, Richelieu's future plans for 
an excursion into the Valtelline area in 1625 hinged on finding 
new funds. The sources were limited. It was impossible to raise 
taxes, already at the breaking point, and additional extraordinary 
revenues were a delicate proposition, as was any tinkering with the 
paulette. The natural solution was a chambre de justice, an 
investigation into the business dealings of the Crown's chief 
financiers which amounted to a government-sponsored blackmail 
operation in the King's interest. From the beginning the Crown 
never intended to delve into the financier's bookkeeping but to 
threaten them with fines and exposure before the public eye. Rather 
than have their books audited and their personal reputations 
besmirched, most of the financiers would prefer to compound their 
obligations in secret negotiations which would net substantial sums 
for the royal treasury. In one expeditious operation the people 
would be pleased, a good moral example set, the treasury filled, and 
the rapaciousness of the financiers discouraged. So ran reasoning 
within the council in the summer and fall of 1625.^
R^ichelieu, M&noires, II, 345-48, has a long and detailed exposi­
tion on the advantages to be gained from the Chambre. Glasson main­
tained that Richelieu hoped to make the Chambre permanent and that the 
Parlement objected. Le Parlement de Paris, I, 13J! This thesis is 
not substantiated by tEe Mgmolres,~The Testament politique, Richelieu's 
papers, or by the registers of the Parlement. Glasson undoubtedly 
drew his conclusion from Richelieu's similar proposal to establish a 
Chambre de justice which would tour the provinces and receive complaints 
about abuses In the regular courts and parlements. See Lettres, II,
178, and supra, p. 160.
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Although it was a financial "bench, the Chambre de justice 
required the approval of the Parlement because it would make an 
important judicial inquiry in Paris with the King's sovereign 
authorization. For several reasons, however, the court was quite 
willing to accept the establishment. The judges loathed the 
financiers as leeches living off the King's tax farms, enjoying 
immunity from prosecution behind the council's skirts, and 
acquiring great wealth which they used to advance themselves 
socially.^ For these reasons and others, in the great remonstrance 
of 1615 the judges had asked Louis for "an exact and serious investi­
gation of malversations committed in his finances by those who have 
the management and disposition of them."6 This investigation had 
never taken place, and the thieving went on. Hence, in 1624 the 
magistrates regarded such an examination, even one undertaken by a 
specially constituted court, with favor. The judges, too, could 
console their legal consciences with the thought that the Chambre, 
while prostituting justice in a most inequitous way, did have 
several precedents. Similar ehambres de justice had been constituted 
several times in the sixteenth century and under Henry IV in 1597, 
1601, and 1607.7
5See Dent, Crisis in Finance, pp. 113-231, for the truth and 
the fiction surrounding the financiers in society.
^Mole, Mgmoires, I, 49.
7Richou, Histoire des conmissions extraordinaires, pp. 98-99.
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Thus when the judges received two royal declarations dated 
October 21, 1624, "erecting and establishing . . .  a chambre de 
justice composed of the officers of our sovereign courts," the magis­
trates were favorably disposed towards the letters.® The Crown's 
method of approach to the Parlement, the explicitness of its 
legislation, and its selection of the membership of the Chambre 
further insured that no objections would be forthcoming. The 
declarations meticulously detailed the purposes and objectives of the 
new bench in a way that made the King's intentions crystal clear, 
thereby soothing fears that the chamber might be perverted to other 
ends. The first edict set out that the chamber was to prosecute 
the officers to finance, their staffs, and those in charge of 
extraordinary levies made since 1607. This was extremely important, 
because the King wished "that the judgments which will be given by 
the said number a quorum of at least seven judges should be of 
parallel force and virtue as the decisions of our sovereign courts."* 
The Chambre de justice, in other words, would temporarily act as a 
sovereign court with the same binding quality as the ancient 
sovereign courts.
Perennial jealousies and anxieties could easily have been 
aroused by a jurisdiction like this had not the Crown further
®The declarations are Actes rpyaux, F.46949, nos. 23 and 24. 
Lettres de cachet and correspondence relating to the establishment 
of the chamber are in Mole, Memoires, I, 334-38.
^Aetes royaux, F.46949, no. 23, p. 7.
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allayed fears by sending the Chambre!s commission to be verified
in the Parlement. This second edict indicated that the commissaires
would uinvestigate civilly or criminally in first instance . . .  all
causes . . . concerning the said faults and malversations bom by
our [accompanying] letters."10 The judges were to work at the
chamber and not their regular duties; they were to pursue abuses
and malversations wherever found in the kingdom; they had permission
to travel as need be; they could sub-delegate their authority.
Cases of over 1500 livres could be appealed to the full chamber;
those under 1500 livres could be judged with an appeal to six of the
officers of the chamber. Full power was given over other
sovereign courts:
To do this we have given and give you full power, authority, 
commission, and special mandate: informing and ordering the 
staff of our courts of Parlement, Grand Conseil, Chambre 
de nos comptes, Cour de nos aydes . . . (and all other 
courts^ ] to which it appertains, that you should be obeyed 
in this; and to all their prevots, their lieutenants and 
archers . . .  to execute your decrees, ordinances’! 
judgments, and decisions.11
The commission listed twenty commissaires by name, fifteen of whom
came from the sovereign courts of the kingdom and five from the
maitres des requites. The Parlement would send two deputies: Henri
de Me sines, seventh president a mortier, and Pierre Gayant,
10Actes Royaux, F.46949, no. 24, p. 5.
11Ibid., p. 6.
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conseiller and president aux Enqu£tes. Presidency was entrusted to 
Chancellor D'Aligre with Rene de Maupeou, conseiller d'Etat, 
directing prosecution in the King's name.1^
Presentation of the Chambre1s creation and commission fully 
satisfied the Parlement. On October 23 the court ordered unrestricted 
registration of both letters "according to their form and tenor."
As a reference and precaution for the future, though, the judges wrote 
a complete summary of the legislation into their registers.13 
The chamber opened its meetings on October 30 and sat for more than 
six months, during which it judged numerous financiers. The 
court's registers and Moll's Memolres maintain a total silence 
on these operations, indicating that the commission maintained good 
relations with the Parlement. This held true even though the 
original membership of the commission was modified during the course 
of its investigations.-1^  These probes were successfully completed 
by the middle of April, 1625. On the 25th of that month Robert 
Aroauld d'Andilly, a former conseiller d'Etat with reliable 
governmental contacts, recorded the extent of the chamber's 
success in his journal:
12Ibid.
13B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fols. 24-25, October 23, 1624.
1^The seven judges from the provincial sovereign courts never 
attended, and their place was taken by Marillac and De Roissy, 
conseillers d'Etat, and Champigny, surlntendant des finances. Richou, 
Histoire des commissions extraordinaires, p. 102.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
363
The composition with the financiers comes to VII million IIII 
rsicl thousand livres, Mr De Beaumarchais, La Barre, D'Onon 
and Aubret (condemned) excepted. — Since [this time) IF 
Beaumarchais has made his agreement at 2 millions of livres, 
in payment of which sum he gave up his office of tresorier 
de l'espargne which the King in turn sold to IF IPaven for 
1 million livres.15
Having thus squeezed the King's creditors, the Chambre was dissolved
in May, 1625. The Parlement was notified by means of a lettre de
cachet on May 16, but it delayed registration of the lettre and
accompanying declaration until June 2.^
The court had been receptive to the Cbamh-pp de justice because
of its timeliness and public popularity, because it had been duly
submitted for examination, and because it increased revenues
without increasing taxes. The same receptivity, however, did not
always apply to other financial expedients such as rentes and
creations of office. In times of need the Crown leaned heavily on
these measures for extra income, but because of their wasteful and
burdensome nature, the Parlement usually subjected them to through
scrutiny. As a general rule, unless the legislation was
exceptionally controversial, the court eventually gave its approval.
Sometimes, however, the verification process was rather leisurely,
either because of the pressure of other business or through
fault-finding of the judges.
■^Robert Amauld d'Andilly, Journal inedit, 1620-1632, ed. 
Eugene and Jules Halphen (10 vols.j fcaris, 1888-1909), V, 17. 
Lublinskaya confirms the settlement of 10,000,000 livres in 
French Absolutism, 1620-29, p. 274-
^B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fols. 56, 58-61, May 16 and 
June 2, 1625; Actes royaux, F. 46952, no. 10.
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The court's hesitancy to approve additional rentes was evident 
in November, 1624, when the Crown presented an edict creating 
500,000 livres of rentes to be issued by the Hotel de Ville of 
Paris on the revenues of the gabelles. The Parlement delayed 
consideration until December 20, when it decided it would not 
proceed to the verification. By the 10th of January, though, the 
court had changed its mind. Then it decided to register, but 
only with the formula "at the very express commandment of the 
said seigneur King and after the said commandment was several 
times repeated," and under the condition that revenues coming from 
the sale would actually be used to defray expenses of war, 
government, and aimies, and none others. Trfes humbles remonstrances 
were also to be sent stating the reasons for these actions. These 
gestures were more or less standard procedure for the court, 
indicating that while displeased it was willing to concede to the 
Crown with a statement of its opinions.
The Parlement was more reluctant than usual to approve a 
creation of offices proposed during the spring of 1627, even though 
at this time a fresh Huguenot uprising centering on La Rochelle had 
been gathering headway for months. At this date, of course, no one 
could have envisioned the lengthy siege operations which were to 
come during the fall and winter of 1627, yet everyone knew that the 
King would need money for suppression of the rebellion. Accordingly,
17B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9775, fol. 298; Mole, Memoires, I,
33?, n. 1.
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In April, 1627, the Parlement was presented with a fat package of 
edicts creating a multitude of new offices. Among them was a 
scheme to double the staff of the presidiaux and private courts 
in the ressort of the parlement by putting them on a semestrial basis. 
Half of the officials in these courts would serve from January to 
June, the other half July through December. Another edict 
multiplied the staffs of the tresoriers de France and the g^neraux 
des finances; a third added a clerk to the clerical staff of al1 
courts and jurisdictions in the kingdom.1** Without explaining 
itself, the Parlement ordered on May 14 "that it should not and 
could not proceed to the verification of the said edicts."19 Two 
lettres de juasion in close succession failed to move the judges, who 
on June 7 decided once again to persist in their deliberations.
Two of the edicts, those concerning the financial bureaus and the 
clerks, were finally registered on June 28.^0 A final decision on 
the edict concerning the semestrial system in the lower courts 
cannot be found, and it was probably withdrawn at a later date.
1{*B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fols. 212-13, June 7, 1627. The 
registers for this date contain a synopsis of the April edicts, two 
of which can be found in printed form as Actes royaux, F. 46959, 
no. 2, and F.46960, no. 2.
19B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fol. 213, June 7, 1627.
20b.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fol. 213, June 7, 1627; Actes 
royaux, F.46950, no.2, and F.46960, no. 2.
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While primarily occupied with foreign affairs for the first 
two years of his ministry, Richelieu began to turn his attention to 
domestic affairs in earnest during 1626. Upon entering the ministry 
he had promised Louis, in the words of the Testament politique, 
to "humble the great nobility.1 The opening moves in the campaign to 
fulfill this promise were meant to instill respect for the King's 
law among those of the Second Estate by strengthening dueling 
laws and by ordering the leveling of strongpoints from which nobles 
could defy the government. The Parlement*s registration and 
enforcement would be necessary to put teeth into these laws, but 
since they would strengthen the efficacy of royal law and the king's 
authority without challenging any prerogatives of the magistrates, 
the judges were inclined to support them. Hence, in seeking the 
court's approval, the risks of a collision were low and the rewards 
of success high. Louis, especially sensitive to public violation of 
his authority and ever determined to have himself obeyed, was in 
full agreement with his chief minister.
Richelieu's impulse to combat the practice of duels was 
fundamental if the nobility were to be subjected to the king's will, 
for the problem was at the same time both symbolic and a very real 
manifestation of the nobility's insubordination. Antique custom 
permitted gentlemen to carry swords, and manners just as ancient 
encouraged their use in affairs of honor. In feudal times the 
sword had been essential to the feudal code of honor as well as the 
battlefield, but by the seventeenth century it had become largely
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symbolic of the past and thus of the honorable lineage of the 
bearer. Nevertheless, gentlemen continued to consider it their 
privilege to wield their weapons in the settlement of private 
quarrels, and thousands of noblemen so destroyed themselves each 
year. The net result was more than a senseless slaughter. The 
practice of dueling set nobleman above the law by allowing him the 
privilege of personal justice, which Inevitably became the right 
to murder on certain occasions. Cardinal Richelieu was aware of 
the problem in a painfully personal way, for his older brother had 
died at the hands of an unscrupulous duelist in 1619•21 As 
churchman, too, Richelieu was obliged to take an active stand against 
the custom, and he encouraged Louis to do the same. As he advised 
the King in 1629, "One could truthfully say that His Majesty and 
his council will answer for all the souls lost in this diabolical 
way if they do not prevent them by the rigor of the penalties due 
such a crime.1,22
Under these circumstances one of the Cardinal's first acts 
upon assuming office was to renew past injunctions against dueling.
By a declaration of June 25, 1624, Henry IV's law of 1609 against 
dueling was confirmed.^3 The declaration, however, went unheeded.
21The death.of Richelieu's brother is described in Burckhardt, 
Richelieu, His Rise to Power, pp. 130-31.
22Richelieu, Lettres, III, "Avis au Roy," 192-93; Richard Herr, 
"Honor Versus Absolutism: Richelieu's Fight against Dueling,"
Journal of Modem History, XXVII (1955), 281-85.
2 I^sambert, Anciermes lois franeaises, XVI, 146. This edict 
was registered in the Parlement on July 1, 1624. The edict of 1609 
is given in Isambert, anciennes lots franqaises, XV, 351-58.
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Affairs of honor continued unabated, and by 1626 the failure of 
past policy became evident. "Duels had become so common, so 
ordinary," Richelieu wrote of the period, "that the streets began 
to serve as fields of combat, and as if the day were not long 
enough to exercise their fury, they fought under the stars or by 
the light of torches which served them as a fatal sun.
Recognizing the failure of past legislation, Richelieu determined 
on a modified approach. Until this time the king1s law had 
automatically branded all duelists as criminals of lese-majest£ and 
uniformly required the death penalty for all participants, including 
seconds, even in engagements not resulting in a death. Richelieu 
reasoned that this severity was too rigorous because its inflexibility 
made enforcement difficult in cases where no loss of life had 
occurred, or where guilt was not clearly established. In these 
cases forfeiture of liberty, honors, charges, and social position 
would be much more effective.^
The declaration presented to the Parlement in March, 1626, 
closely conformed to these thoughts. The simplistic uniform death 
penalty was abandoned and all former offenders pardoned in virtue 
of the marriage of the King's sister. Having wiped the slate clean, 
the edict substituted a graduated scale of punishments which 
acknowledged the complexity of the offense; Henceforth, all duelists 
would be subject to loss of public office, royal pensions, and
^Richelieu, Memoires, III, 40.
^Ibid., 40-43; Herr, "Richelieu's Fight Against Dueling,"
p. 283.
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confiscation of a third of their property. "Principal authors of 
the crime" stood to lose more: confiscation of half of their 
property and a banishment from the kingdom for three years. Repeat 
offenders, those who killed an opponent, or those who "cowardly" 
urged their seconds to join the combat were liable to "irremissible" 
derogation and execution since they fought by intention. Judgment 
of dueling crimes was specifically confided to the parlements, 
which were solemnly promised that the Crown would refrain from 
issuing letters of grace nullifying their decisions. In the future 
all gentlemen were expected to peaceably submit insults and questions 
of honor to ad hoc courts of peers which would hear the issue 
and exact such satisfaction as they deemed appropriate. Those 
who refused amicable arbitration were to suffer imprisonment and the 
loss of the privileges of nobility. In these ways Louis made it 
clear that violation of his law would certainly result in the loss 
of dignity, honor, and office, and, in more extreme cases, one's 
life.26
The Parlement's reaction to these propositions was rather 
interesting. Historically the court was well aware of the problem 
of dueling and its prohibitions. In the remonstrance of 1615 
the judges had asked that
26Isambert, aneiennes lois franqaises, XVI, 175-83; Herr, 
Richelieu's Fight Against Dueling," p. 283.
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the edicts and decisions imposed against dueling should be 
observed and upheld, under which the guilty should have
no grace and abolition jjfrom the kingj, [itj being a
regrettable thing that so many edicts and declarations 
verified in your Parlement remain without execution and 
that the blood of your nobility, which should be 
conserved for your Majesty, is so often spilled for light 
and frivolous occasions.27
The court was particularly concerned about the frequency of royal
pardons for such serious crimes, and modem research in the criminal
registers of the Parlement seems to substantiate the judges'
argument that all too often royal pardons undermined the efficacy
of Henry's laws.^  Yet when the declaration of 1626 was presented
to the court, the magistrates balked at verification on the grounds
that the more realistic and enforceable penalties in it were too
mild. The judges were quite willing to accept the categorical
27lfole, M&aoires, I, 40.
^According to research recently published by Francois 
Billacois, the Parlement was fully justified in complaining about 
the frequency of royal letters of grace pardoning dueling offenders. 
After the edicts of 1602 and 1609, the duel was officially a 
crime liable to prosecution and carrying a capital penalty for 
guilty parties. Billacois surveyed the criminal registers of the 
Parlement between 1600 and 1624, finding fifteen trials for 
duels or similar crimes in which a man had been killed. Decisions 
could be found in nine of the cases. Two of the nine were 
condemnations. One cleared two brothers previously adjudged guilty 
in exchange for 80 livres "charity for the prisonner's bread" 
and court costs. The other, more severe, confirmed an earlier 
sentence of a six year banishment. The other seven decisions all 
confirm royal letters of remission accorded by the sovereign.
"Thus," says Billacois, "the dominant note of these verdicts for 
mortal duels is indulgence and even pardon." "Le Parlement de 
Paris et les duels au XVTIe siecle," in
Crimes et criminal ite en France sous l'ancien regime: 17e et 
I8f silcles, Cahiers des annales, no. 33 (Paris, 197*1), pp. 33-47.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
371
pardon for past offenses, but remonstrated that His Majesty should
not modify the rigor of preceding edicts. In short the court
preferred the austere inflexibility of tradition, however unworkable
that might have been, to any softening of sentences according to
circumstances. Upon hearing the magistrate's views, Richelieu
urged Louis to persist, saying
that the councils of prudence should come from few men, and 
that the great companies were only good for compelling 
the observation of a written rule. The reason was that 
since good spirits are much less in number than the mediocre 
or the poor, the multitude of those in the last two categories 
smothered the sentiments of the first in a great company.29
Louis followed Richelieu's advice and sent the Parlement a jussion,
in virtue of which the edict was verified without further debate
on March 24.30
The new edict, as well as the King's will in enforcing it, 
were put to an important test a year later. On May 12, 1627, 
Mbntmorency-Bouteville, young scion of one of the most notable 
houses in France who had already killed twenty-two men in duels, 
publicly fought in broad daylight an the Place Royale in the 
center of Paris. The affair was a flagrant contradiction of the new 
edict and an open defiance of Louis1 past warnings to Bouteville. 
Bouteville's youth and lineage provided a harsh test for the 
constancy of the King, who was petitioned from all sides to show 
leniency. Louis turned a deaf ear, and the case was duly dispatched 
to the Parlement, it being publicly whispered about in the antichamber
29Richelieu, Mtmoires, III, 46-47.
3°Ibid., 47.
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of the Queen "that the Parlement had made the King in 1610 , and
that if the execution of Bouteville took place the King would
make the Parlement."^ Louis had little need for concern. The
Parlement, which began its hearing on June 16, soon returned a
capital condemnation.32 Bouteville and his companion Des Chapelles
were beheaded before the H6tel de Ville at five o'clock in the
afternoon of June 22, 1627. The decision helped discourage dueling,
at least for the next few years, and dramatically demonstrated that
none of the nobility, whatever their stature, were beyond the reach
of the King's law.33
Curiously enough the Parlement's decision was not wholly
pleasing to Richelieu, who sourly commented in his Memoires that
it is necessary to point out that in the decision that the 
court gave against them, there were three unjust things 
which offended the king: one is that while condeming the two 
prisoners they dared acquit the dead man Baron Bussy 
d'Amboise, killed by Des Chapelles because his mother was 
the wife of president de Mesmesj another is that they 
confiscated only one-third of the property of the executed 
men instead of their whole fortune as required by law.
31Ibid., 303
^B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fol. 216, June 16, 1627, notes 
the beginning of the hearing only.
3%err, "Richelieu's Fight Against Dueling,” pp. 28-4-85;
Tapie, La France de Louis XIII et de Richelieu, pp. 157-59; Burckhardt, 
Richelieu, Assertion of Power and Cold War, pp. 62-70. Herr 
concludes that the edict of 1626 was not a success: "Despite the 
cardinal's memoirs," he says, "one should not fall into the error of 
classifying the edict of 1626 among his successful measures to 
establish royal authority over a turbulent aristocraev." The 
conclusion is based on the observation that dueling resumed during 
the 1630's and 1640's much as it had before the edict was issued.
The conventional view, assumed here, is that the edict served purposes 
as much symbolic as functional in reasserting royal authority over 
the Second Estate during the 1620's, and in the short run, at least, 
it was successful in exemplifying the resurgence of that authority.
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In so doing they let it he known that they did justice to 
them only gmdingly. In the third place, having given the 
decision for death, they delayed the execution until the 
next day, either to subject him [Louis] to hearing last 
minute supplications against his will, or to cast on him 
the nuisance and the hatred for their deaths.34
Richelieu went on to assert that the verdict was nothing other
than an arrogant expression of the court's independence and not
the processes of justice. By choosing to condemn the living and
not the dead, and by moderating the confiscation of property, the
Parlement was trying to usurp the King's authority. "They want,"
he said, "not only to have the execution of laws but the power
which alone belongs to the King of making and changing them as
he sees fit. "3  ^ Suspension of the sentence showed the same thing,
"that they wanted to share pardons with those who should give
them, or to libel him with hate if he did not do it."36
Those considering the reason, equity, and the good intentions of the
Parlement should also consider that the court had been faithless
to its own principle of severity. Richelieu reminded readers
that at first the court had made verification difficulties because
the edict had been too moderate. Later, when the time for
implementation came, the judges had not only moderated the penalties
but did what they could to annul -them. 37
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A few months after enacting the prohibition on duels, the 
Parlement received another royal measure aimed at limiting the 
potential for rebellion in the kingdom. A declaration drafted at 
Nantes, dated July 31 > 1626, ordered razing of all walls, fortresses, 
and chateaux that were not essential to the border defenses of 
the kingdom. In the seventeenth century there were many such 
places remaining from the medieval and Renaissance periods capable 
of defying any force short of a royal army; to level these 
would make contempt for the king's authority considerably more 
difficult. The Parlement agreed, and the edict was registered 
without trouble on September 7, 1626.3®
The decision to destroy the nobility's bases of operation was 
perhaps influenced by revelation of the Chalais Conspiracy during 
the summer of 1626. Since details of the plot are well know, only 
the outlines will be given here. Early in 1626 Richelieu had 
decided that for dynastic reasons Gaston d'Orleans, the King's 
younger brother and heir apparent, should marry the duchesse de 
Montpensier. Gaston had other ideas, and the decision sparked 
off a web of intrigue which eventually entangled Gaston; his 
tutor and confident, mar£schal d'Omano; Cesar and Alexandre 
Vendome, Louis' illegitimate half-brothers; the duchesse de 
Chevreuse; the prince de Conde and the comte de Soissons; and
38isambert, Anciennes lois frangaises, XVI, 192-94.
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Henri de Talleyrand, comte de Chalais, a young, immature, and 
irresponsible associate of Gaston's who believed himself in love with 
the duchesse de Ghevreuse. The plans of the conspirators were 
muddled and often changed but involved liaisons with England, Spain, 
and Savoy through the Duke of Buckingham, thoughts of putting Gaston 
on the throne, and the assassination of Richelieu. Whispers of these 
schemes began to reach the royal ears in the spring of 1626, and on 
May 4 Louis ordered D'Omano incarcerated in Vincennes. 39 Six 
days later, on May 10, the plot became much clearer when Chalais was 
prompted to confess its existence to Richelieu and the King. For the 
time being though, Chalais was allowed to go his way while the Crown 
sought out and bought off or arrested the genuinely dangerous 
plotters such as Conde and the Vendomes. Dealing with them took up 
the rest of June.
In the meanwhile Chalais, actually one of the smaller fish in 
the conspiracy, had been unable to avoid further compromise after 
his confession. Louis, then at Nantes for an assembly of the Breton 
estates, had Chalais watched for some days, then ordered his arrest. 
On July 8 a royal commission was delivered to garde des sceaux 
Marillac, his brother Louis, and conseiller d'Etat Le Beauclerc
^Louis was careful to notify- the Parlement of the reasons 
for this singular move. See B.N. Inprimes Lb36.2469, Deux lettres 
escrites par le Roy au Parlement de Paris, & aux Gouvemeurs des 
j>rovinces sur 1'arrest falct du Mareschal dT0mano (n.p., n.d ).
This is a printed panphlet of six pages containing two4letters of 
the King.
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"to secretly investigate all the facts and the above mentioned 
case, and to issue writs against all persons that needs be.
The proceedings that followed were the first of Richelieu’s infamous 
commissions so often employed during the 1630's against an sorts of 
political offenses. On July 9 Chalais was taken into custody and 
held at Nantes. Questioning began immediately and revealed several 
accomplices, including Gaston's friends Puylaurens, the comte de 
Soissons, the marquis de la Valette, and others. Depositions taken 
on the 10th and 29th of July connected Chalais with Gaston and 
marshal D'Omano; on the 17th one Sieur Lamont and several soldiers 
testified that Chalais had used blasphemy against God and King in 
their presence/1
By virtue of a royal commission dated August 10, Chalais' trial 
was confided to a chambre de justice to be held at Nantes. The
commission bared the reasons for this location but played down the
fact that the King's proximity was the primary consideration:
We have decided to conduct and complete the trial and to 
proceed to its judgment in this city of Nantes because of 
our visit, and because of the detention at the chateau here 
of many persons close to us, of our court and following, 
necessary to the investigation and testimony of the said 
trial, together with the diligence and secrecy requisite to a 
trial of this quality and punishment for crimes of lese-majeste 
.. .  in cansequnce of which is bom by our letters in the 
month . . . the creation of
^Ojean-Benjamin de Laborde, Recuell de pieces interessantes pour 
servir a l'histoire des regnes de Louis XTTl et de Louis XIV (London, 
1781, pT 18; Richelieu, Memoires, lit, 90-91.
^Laborde, Recuell des pieces interessantes, pp. 26-100. 
42Aetes royaux, F.46957, no. 6, pp. 11-12.
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The bench named In the commission was comprised of two presidents 
and nine conseillers of the Parlement of Rennes and three ma^tres 
des requites chosen, according to Richelieu, "for their great 
reputation of probity," but more probably because the Crown could 
rely on their opinions.43 Michel de Marillac presided, assisted 
by the proeureur general of the Rennes parlement.
Whatever their political tendencies, the judges had little 
problem with their consciences in the case, for the evidence 
presented against Chalais by his own confessions, his letters, and 
the testimony of witnesses was overwhelmingly damning. The 
hearings opened August 11 and closed on August 19 with the pro­
nouncement of a dishonorable death sentence. The execution, 
horribly botched because neither the executioner nor a proper 
sword could be found, took place in the Place de Bouffay of Nantes 
on the same day that the verdict was handed down.44
4%ichelieu, Memoires, III, 91. The complete commission is in 
Actes royaux, F.46957, no. 6. According to this printed version 
of the commission, the comnissaires were: Jean de Boumeuf, Sieur 
de Cusse, First President at Rennes; Isaac Loisel, Sieur de Brice, 
second president in the court; Joachin de Scartes (Descartes),
Simon Hay, Gilles du Lys, Laurent Pichart, Jean du Halgouet,
De Martigues, Audart, Huet, and Frangois D'Audiquier, conseillers; 
Christophe Fouquet, conseiller en conseil; unnamed procureur- 
general at Rennes; Francois Fouquet, Charles de Machault, and 
Criqueville, maitres des requites. The list was distinguished by 
the presence of Joachin Descartes, father of Rene Descartes, and 
Francois Fouquet, father of future surintendant des finances 
Nicolas Fouquet who faced a similar inquest in 16&1.
44Laborde, Recuell des pieces interessantes, pp. 181-34; Tapie, 
La France de Louis XIII et de Richelieu, pp. 155-56; Burckhardt, 
Richelieu, His Rise to Power, pp. 203-07.
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Most of the other conspirators escaped such severity. The 
Vendome brothers remained in prison; the duchesse de Chevreuse, 
whose part had remained shodowy and who was perhaps viewed with 
some affection by the Cardinal, escaped unpunished; mm»^achai 
D'Oroano died in prison on September 4> 1626, a few days after 
Chalais* demise. The chief instigator of the plot, Gaston 
d*Orleans, suffered only the indignity of an unwilling marriage 
to the duchesse de Montpensier. The ignominious trial and death 
of his friend, for which he was largely responsible, left him 
unmoved, unrepentant, and as unruly as ever.
Chalais* execution produced no notable reaction among the 
nobility, who quietly pondered the sobering lessons to be learned 
from the Comte’s example. In the government, however, the course 
of events brought one important change bearing on the Parlement. 
Chancellor D'Aligre, demonstrating a lack of resolution during the 
conspiracy, had been disgraced on June 1.45 Urged on by his 
mother, Louis handed the seals over to surintendant des finances 
Michel de Marillac. Richelieu, whose political objectives and 
philosophy clashed with Marillac*s in a number of ways, could not 
have welcomed the change but could do nothing about it.46
Marillac*s appointment did not bode well for the Crown's 
relationship with the Parlement. The judges knew him as sincerely 
pious, honest, intelligent, and a capable legist. They were aware,
45Griffet, Histolre de Louis XIII, I, 493; Everat, Michel de 
Marillac, p. 44.
46gverat, Michel de Marillac, p. 45. See supra, pp. 228-35.
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too, that his religious opinions leaned to Ultramontanism, and they 
soon came to find that he was also a determined advocate of royal 
rights, a stickler for the letter of the law, and that he frequently 
defended his convictions with a forthrightness that slid into 
tactless insensitivity. Something of these attitudes are suggested 
in letters to procureur general Mathieu Mole even as Marillac 
became garde des sceaux. One of his first acts was to write to 
Mole on behalf of his right to preside over the Parlement. This 
prerogative was customarily vested in the chancellor as the head of 
the kingdom’s justice, but Marillac insisted that tradition gave 
the right to gardes des sceaux as well. Mole responded that 
Marillac's letters of provision were modelled after those of 
Guillaume du Vair (garde des sceaux 1616-17) and warned that in 
Du Vair’s case the Parlement had delayed approving his rights to 
preside for some time. Mole also researched Marillac's claims 
in the archives of the Tresor des ehartes, and later wrote to him 
saying that he would "contribute all my care to try to see that 
you should receive the honor due your merit."47 The latent issue 
apparently never came to a head, however, for neither the court’s 
registers nor Mole's M^noires make any further mention of the 
registration of Marillac’s letters.
Among the judges of the Parlement the Chalais Affair came and 
went without contention. While the magistrates might have felt 
that the significance of the trial warranted its hearing before
47Mole, Mfiaolres, I, 366.
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the Parlement, they also had to acknowledge that Chalais was neither 
duke nor peer and thus had no inalienable claim to a trial by the 
court. Nor had Chalais1 friends or relatives made any effort to 
present an appeal to the Parlement during the course of the trial, 
choosing instead to direct their pleas to Louis and Richelieu.
Finally, the trial had been conducted by judges from a sovereign 
court and ample proofs had been presented that the Comte was 
guilty as charged. These factors, together with past precedents 
for such trials, probably tended to minimize grumbling from the 
Parisian judges.
This situation began to change when the trial of the due de 
Rohan was committed to the Parlement of Toulouse by a royal edict 
of October 14, 1627.4® Henri de Rohan, a duke and peer of the realm, 
had taken up leadership of the Huguenot cause during 1625 and raised 
the south up in arms against the King. Though Rohan was still at 
large, the Parlement of Toulouse had him tried in absentia and 
declared guilty of rebellion and lfese-majeste by decrees of 
January 22 and 29, 1628.49 irregular custom dictated that Rohan 
was entitled to a hearing before his peers in the Parlement of 
Paris. The royal administration, however, had found the needs of 
State more pressing and had ignored tradition in the interest of 
making an example of Rohan among the people he had led into rebellion.
4®Le Mercure frangois, XIV, 319-23-
49pbid., second pagination, 45-57.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
381
Lengthy arguments justifying this course can he found in
Richelieu’s Memoires, where the Cardinal maintained that Rohan had
lost his privilege by his ’notorious rebellion," and therefore
should not be considered as a peer but as a private person who
should be judged and punished in the place where his crime had been
committed. There was no privilege, Richelieu argued, that could
not be revoked, and everyone agreed that those who abused their
privileges should lose them. Judgment of this lay in the hands of
the king alone. It applied to royal officers and clerics, and it
certainly applied in cases concerning the authority of the State:
Kings, by the confession of all doctors of law . . . can 
never give a privilege contrary to themselves, so that no 
privilege can deny to kings the entire liberty of using 
their authority to punish the guilty, even of such crimes 
[of lese-majestel, and to have them judged in such place 
and by whatever judges it pleases them.50
Moreover, there were ample legal precedents, based on good usage, for
removing cases from the Parlement of Paris. In 1458 Charles VII
had asked the Parlement about judgment of the peers and had been
told that neither by institution nor ordinance was there any
observation of cases concerning the peers of France, but that it
was spoken of through usage and this varied. In 1463 the comte d'
Angouleme had been moved to ask for a confirmation of his privilege
by special letters from Louis XI. This would not have been necessary,
Richelieu reasoned, had the observance been regarded as binding law.
In 1474 the case of Jean d'Alen^on bad been referred to sixteen
^Richelieu, Mgmoires, III, 447.
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judges of the Parlement without calling the peers because he was 
accused of relapsing into lSse-majeste. As if these examples 
were not enough, Richelieu cited others as far back as 1311. For 
these reasons and by these examples, the Cardinal concluded, the 
King had been within his rights in sending a commission to the 
Parlement of Toulouse to judge Rohan, who "being stripped of the 
peerage, there is no reason to judge him other than in the province 
in which he committed so many crimes of lese-majest€. "51
At Paris the judges' reaction to the transference of Rohan's 
trial went unrecorded in the official registers of the Parlement.
This silence suggests that the court did not deliberate the issue 
en conseil as a matter of public concern. In contrast with the 
Chalais commission fourteen months before, however, there are some 
hints that not all the magistrates were pleased with the move.
Mathieu Mold's Memoires make some very curious revelations about 
the judges' discontent and why it never materialized into discussion 
of Rohan's trial. On the 20th of November, 1627, the procureur 
general wrote to Michel de Marillac at La Rochelle concerning news 
of the Rohan edict in Paris:
^Ibid., 4-51. Richelieu's exposition in the M&nolres should 
be compared with the reasoning given in a "Recueil Sommaire des 
Raisons de la Resolution prise par- le Roy d'envoyer au Parlement 
de Toloze la Commission pour faire le Procez au Due de Rohan, 
le declarant decheu du Privilege de Pairie," B.N. Ms. fr. 18429, fols. 
47-52. The arguments given and precedents cited here are identical 
to those in Richelieu's Memoires.
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Permit me, Ifanseigneur, to say to you that someone has 
published in this city a declaration, said to be verified 
at Toulouse, against the due de Rohan by which he is 
declared deprived, of the privilege of peerage. Being a 
printed copy [Etant imprimee sur une copie], I said that 
it could not be true in order to stop the clamor that some 
wanted to make about the insult that the Parlement had received, 
since it has been the sole judge of the peeps.52
Mold’s letter indicates that the first news of the edict did not
arrive in Paris until about a month after the original was
dispatched from La Rochelle, and that the judges first learned
of it through printed copies circulated around the city. Either
out of simple neglect, or anticipating resistance from the
Parlement, the royal administration had failed to notify the
Parisian court of its intention to shift Rohan's trial to Toulouse.
Mole, incredulous at this turn of events, had tried to reassure
the Parisian court by dismissing the printed declarations as
scurrilous fabrications. What followed at Paris during the next
few weeks is unknown, but on December 1 the garde des sceaux
replied to Mole. This letter, too, is significant. The wording
confirms that the council had, in fact, predicted grumbling from
the court and had deliberately avoided notifying it in advance of
the Toulouse trial:
As to the declaration sent to Toulouse authorizing the trial of 
M. de Rohan, it is authentic and was deliberated [elle est 
veritable et a ete considereej. I trust that those who could 
raise a racket about it will do nothing dishonorable nor
unreasonable.53
52ifoie, M&noires, I, 476. Mole's letter is undated, but 
Marillac's reply shows that it was penned on November 20. See 
Marillac to Moll, 486.
53ibid., 487.
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Marillac then proceeded to defend the Crown's action by using the 
same reason of State justification that Richelieu later presented in 
his Memoires:
It is founded on justice and ordinary practice. There are 
in the State various conditions of privileged persons 
who have their particular judges and bylaws because of their 
privileges. Nevertheless, there are some crimes by which, in 
committing them, they lose their privileges ipso facto, and 
never was it said that they should be sent before their 
customary judges for judgment of their crime, nor even 
if they should be deprived of their privilege. But they are 
sent by all right before the judge who is their natural _
Lor localj judge, suspending the privilege [of peer judgmentj 
as unworthy and forfeited, judging that they are deprived 
ipso facto, evidentia sceleris, non indiget clamore accusatoris. 
And the crime of which it is |here aj question is specially 
designated by the law among those where it is necessary 
[first] to punish and then to infoim Q..£-, crimes of state] 
as duces faetionum. 54- ”
The lesson that Marillac drew from Rohan's example could well have
been expressed by Richelieu in the Testament politique:
It is good that les grands realize that all that they have 
of favor, of dignities and of prerogatives from kings, will 
serve them nothing against kings, and will not render them 
[any more] important when they offend kings by disobedience and
by rebellion.*5
From this exchange of letters, therefore, the following picture 
emerges. Louis, Richelieu, and Marillac, engaged in the trying 
siege of La Rochelle, decided to have the due de Rohan condemned 
for his rebellion. Reasons of State demanded that this be done 
before the Parlement of Toulouse in Languedoc where the Protestant 
cause was strongest and where Rohan's condemnation would have the 
greatest impact. Legal precedent supported this transfer, but
^Ibid., 487-88. 
55ibid., 488.
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grumbles from Paris might also be expected. To obviate this 
possibility, the Parisian judges were not notified when the original 
commission was sent to Toulouse after October 14. The manoeuvre, 
was successful in as much as no discussion ensued, but the incident 
sensitized the judges to the attitudes of Louis' advisors towards 
their jurisdiction and customary rights and heightened their 
suspicions of Louis' councillors.
Suspicion and doubt engendered by Rohan's trial were accentuated 
by an ugly quarrel between the Parlement and the garde des sceaux 
that raged from the last months of 1627 throughout 1628. The 
heart of the dispute was not a political issue but stemmed 
directly from Marillac's insistence on the observance of the 
letter of the ordinances regarding the degree of kinship permitted 
within the chambers of the Parlement. In the interests of equity 
and justice, royal ordinances had long prohibited closely related 
judges from holding offices within the court. This principle of 
parente, or kinship, had been maintained in the Ordinance of Orleans, 
Article 32, and repeated in the Ordinance of Blois, Article 116, 
which read:
fre, Henry Ilf] desire that Article 32 contained in the 
Ordinance of Origans, bearing prohibition against receiving 
in the same parlement, chambre des comptes, and other sovereign 
courts, or in a similar seat, fathers, sons, brothers, uncles, 
and nephews, should be invioably kept in the future. 5°
56isambert, Aneiennes lois frangaises, XIV, 410.
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As with so many of the other provisions of the same ordinances, though,
this law had never been observed. Customary usage permitted free
entry to close kin, though usually the court attempted to restrict
them to separate chambers and prevent relatives from sitting together
in a trial situation. Any attempt to enforce the letter of the law
would have limited the possibilities of survivan.ce and was certain
to provoke an indignant response from judges accustomed to bringing
heirs or other relatives into their institution. Additionally
the judges might argue that while the law said one thing, another
legal principle, that of common usage, said quite another.
So matters stood in November, 1627, when Nicolas Meliand, a
conseiller in the Parlement, sought to introduce his brother-in-law,
Alexandre Petau, into the court. Marillac apparently refused to
set the royal seal on the lettres de provision for Petau because
of parent!, whereupon Mole wrote in his behalf that
M. Meliand, conseiller in this court, was promised that 
you would not make any difficulty about sealing the lettres 
de provision for his brother-in-law, the son of the late 
BT Petau. It is true that the law is not kept which prohibits 
receiving relatives to the degree of the ordinances, and that 
the clause inserted into the provisions "provided that 
they have no relatives to the said degree" is by-passed. One 
sees it observed for subordinate seats . . . but serving in 
different chambers [of the Parlement] it seems that this 
would be remedy to the evil that is feared, and that usage 
being such before the ordinance and since continued, that this 
would be an interpretation that has been introduced. It 
would only remain to prescribe an order when the chambers 
assemble in order that the spirit of the law should always 
prevail, and to order that near kin should not be found there 
together, and that the most recently received should retire.^
57lfcle, Memoires, I, 476-77.
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Marillac quickly conceded that the ordinances said nothing ahout
brothers-in-law in the same court but said he thought that in
another article, "where evocations are spoken of, one and the other
allied by blood or marriage are included; that is why I thought that
thaj; should be considered."58 He then consented to seal Petau's
letters without further objections, and the conseiller was received
on February 11, 1628.59
After acknowledging his mistaken notion in the Petau case,
however, Marillac staked out a legal position which would shortly
lead to further troubles with the Parlement. In the course of
communicating with Mole during December, 1627, the garde des sceaux
set out his views on parent^ with an unbending rigidity which
became ever more salted with a pious righteousness. On December 1
he wrote Mole that
in regard to the ordinance, I hold it to be in viridi 
observantia at law, if not in fact, and that it can no longer 
be held as abrogated by disuse. I avow that although the 
ordinances can be abrogated by lack of obervation and by 
contrary usage received and approved by the prince or by 
universal consent, this cannot be applied to ordinances 
which the prince has continuously proclaimed, the observation 
of which all assemblies have always demanded, so that this could 
be called nothing other than a pure lack of execution and 
real disobedience, seen even in the present clause and 
condition annuling the reception in all the propositions.80
58Ibid., 488-89.
59manchard, Catalogue de tous les conseillers du parlement, 
p. 123.
80Mole, M&noires, I, 489.
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Marillac then dismissed Mol!1 s earlier suggestion that internal 
arrangements might he made within the court to alleviate the 
difficulty as of "little efficacy and not bearing on the sense and 
intention of the ordinance. "61
Three weeks later Mole penned a warm rejoinder upholding the 
principles of traditional practice and the abrogation of law 
through disuse. Concerning the Ordinance of Blois, Moll tartly 
noted that
this law is from 1579, verified in the Parlement in 1580 
and never observed since that time. And you wish, in 1627, 
to have it rigorously kept? If that is the King's intention, 
it would be better to draft new letters patent in the form 
of a declaration, in order that this law being renewed and 
its justice recognized his subjects would render it full 
obedience in the future.62
In the past the clause "provided that there are no relatives to
the degree of the ordinances" had been ignored with the knowledge of
the prince and those charged with enforcing it. Would it then be
just, Moll asked, "to now give such force to this particular clause
as to a new law verified in all the parlements and published for all
of France?" To do so, the procureur glrieral thought, would be to
disrupt a workable and established practice preserving familial
continuity in the court:
6lIbld.
62Ibid., 496.
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In the future you will pity the condition of fathers who 
will he constrained to put their children out of their homes 
at their own risk, to send them into distant provinces, 
consuming themselves by the outlay of expenses necessary to 
maintain the dignity of the [provincial] office [of their 
sons], without mentioning either the excessive cost of offices 
or the infinite misfortunes which might follow. 63
Rather than bring such hardship into robe families, the procureur
general thought that when plaintiffs complained about parente, it
would be simple to grant them an evocation to another parlement and
thus avoid all together the problem of kin sitting on one bench. 64-
Marillac was not persuaded. On January 15, 1628, his
insistence grew sharper in offering Mbl£ a pointed reiteration of
his views:
You propose to me that he [the King] should make a new
declaration on it, and that being thus renewed, no one will
have an excuse not to observe it. If thLs remedy had served,
there could be some consideration [of it] . . . .  But it
has been made at Orleans and neglected, repeated at Mbulins 
and neglected, renewed at Blois in very express terms and 
nevertheless neglected once again; repeated and renewed 
in each provision and always neglected. Are we to hope 
that a new declaration would have more effect? I pray of 
you, Monsieur, to consider what can the prince do in so 
great hardness of continual resistance to the practice of a 
law so useful to his subjects?65
Shortly after committing these lines to paper, the garde des
sceaux answered his own questions by refusing to permit Nicolas de
Bellievre, the third president a mortier, to install his son,
Pomponne II de Bellievre, in the Parlement as a conseiller outside
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the court but violated the letter of the letter of the ordinances,
and Marillac refused to seal Bellievre's letters for the office.
Upon hearing of Marillac's refusal, Mole was nettled into composing
one of the sharpest letters extant in his correspondence. Clothed
in Baroque formality, the letter nevertheless plainly shows the
procureur general's wrath:
Whatever incident there has been in the affair of M. le 
president Bellievre, you will permit me to tell you that I 
have received from it a very lively displeasure, seeing you 
name and your actions (your name that it is particularly 
necessary to cherish and respect, and your actions which 
should serve as an example to each and should be without 
reproach), give subject to a public deliberation in an 
aggravated company, and all the more since your person alone has 
found it necessary to maintain this stonn. I write you 
nothing about it in particular, except that M. le president 
has had the letter sent to the King. And permit me to tell 
you that the more I consider the law and the reason for it, 
the less I find cause to observe it now for all kinds of 
public and individual considerations.66
Here the matter rested for some months while Bellievre took his 
appeal to Louis. Throughout the spring the King was silent, possibly 
because he was engaged with the siege of La Rochelle, and on June 1 
Bellievre wrote to Marillac once again. This request for a dispen­
sation was tartly rejected in Marillac*s response of June 26.^ 
Bellievre now sought the assistance of his colleagues, and on July 7 
the question was discussed before the assembled chambers of the 
Parlement. The next day the magistrates decided to write to Louis 
and to Marie on Bellievre*s behalf.88
66ibid., 510.
67bn Ms. fr. 16484, fols. 362-363v°, has copies of these letters.
68BN Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 261-62, July 7 and 8, 1628; 
a copy of the letter, signed "les gens tenant votre cour de 
Parlement," is in BN Ms. fr. 16484, fols. 358-60.
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A courier from the court was dispatched to La Rochelle, arriving 
there on July 24. Louis granted an immediate interview, and six 
days later sent a lettre de cachet back to Paris. His response, 
read in the parlement on August 9, was a total reversal for the 
judges:
We would like very much to he able to comply with your 
desires . . . but considering that this observation has been 
practiced many times in all our parlements, that it is of 
very great consequence to all our subjects who are extremely 
beset by evocations because of parenti, and that it is not 
a question of hiding the lack of observation but of revoking 
and abridging in effect an ordinance that many of our 
ancestors have carefully made and that all the orders of our 
kingdom have very incessantly and so wisely asked. We have 
decided to change nothing for the present, and we deem that the 
welfare of justice, the dignity of our sovereign courts, 
and the relief of our subjects requires that we do it thusly. 9
The magistrates, however, detected a certain temporizing in
Louis1 words and decided on September 1 to make oral remonstrances
with the King returned from La Rochelle. Louis did not come back
until late in December, but on the 30th of that month the court
elected to send a delegation to see him about the Bellievre case.
The registers of the Parlement do not mention the date of the
meeting, but the deputies must have reached some accommodation,
for on January 14, 1629, Louis issued lettres patente giving sons
and brothers the right to sit in the same seat, the Ordinance
of Blois not withstanding. Uncles and nephews were still excluded.70
These letters were evidently remitted to Marillac, who
69b .N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fols. 271-72, August 9, 1628.
70B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fols. 282-83, 306-07,
December 30, 1628, and February 9, 1929.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
392
chose to retain them until the first week in February. The Parlement 
registered them on February 9, Pomponne de Bellievre was duly 
sworn in as a conseiller on February 22, and the issue of parent^ 
did not arise again during Louis' reign.?1
The magistrates of the Parlement had due cause to rejoice over 
the outcome of the parente question. For them the victory meant 
a happy confirmation of past practices associated with office 
holding and survivance as it was then known. Sons, brothers, 
nephews, and other kin could continue to enter the court under the 
tutelage of relatives with all of the advantages of friendly personal 
contacts that established family ties could provide. For Michel de 
Marillac, however, the wrangle with the Parlement was the beginning 
of a disaster that steadily worsened until his fall in 1630. From 
the time the seals had been conferred on him, Marillac's religious 
views, personal history, and personality had made him suspect to 
the Parlement. The Crown's handling of Rohan's trial probably deepened 
this mistrust, and Marillac's stand on the parent^ issue discredited 
him even more thoroughly. The parlementaires would have liked 
nothing better than a chance to revenge themselves on the garde 
des sceaux, and as 1629 began, verification of the Code Michaud 
presented the judges with just such an opportunity.
Since the adjournment of the Notables in 1627, Marillac had been 
at work directing a comprehensive revision of French law based on
^Blanchard, Catalogue des tous les conseillers du Parlement, 
p. 123.
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the cahiers of the Estates General of 1614, the Assembly of 
Notables held at Rouen in 1617, and those of the Assembly of 1626-27. 
The project was completed by January, 1629, as a massive code 
embodying fifty years of progress in French law in 461 articles 
touching on ecclesiastical, educational, judicial, legislative, 
social, military, financial, commercial, and maritime affairs. The 
net result was, in the words of Marillac's biographer Edouard 
Everat, "more than an edict: never had the nation seen appear an 
ordinance as extensive, as complete, as thought out."72
Marillac, justly proud of his endeavors and those of his 
colleagues, determined to present the Code for presentation in a 
lit de justice planned to celebrate the fall of La Rochelle. 
Verification of the ordinance with such pomp and circumstance was 
motivated less out of egotism than anxiety for the future of his 
great work, for Marillac knew of his reputation in the Parlement.
He sensed that the court would object to certain articles, 
particularly to 1 and 53 which limited remonstrances; he was well 
aware, too, that the magistrates would subject the Code to a 
protracted and searching scrutiny which might run into years. The 
solution, it seemed, was to force the Parlement' s hand in a lit de 
justice. The counter was clever, perhaps too clever, since one 
of the Parlement's greatest sacred cows was its right to remonstrance, 
a right jealously exercised in verifying the most recent ordinances
72jfjchel de Marillac, p. 68. A thorough section-by-section 
analysis of the Code Michaud can be found on pp. 68-89; a less 
complete examination is in Amauld-Menardiere, Essai sur Michel 
de Marillac, pp. 24-44*
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of Orleans, Moulins, Roussillon, and Blois. Thus bom with the 
consent of the magistrature in 1626, by the time of its presentation 
in 1629 the Code Michaud was a suspicious document, tarred with 
Marillacfs reputation, questionable because of its reforms, and 
overshadowed by the look of timorous belligerence cast by presentation 
in a lit de justice advertised for another purpose.
The ceremony that was held in the Grand'Chambre on January 15, 
1629, with the King, Richelieu, Marillac, seven dukes, and four 
marshals in attendance followed traditional forms in every way.^3 
Louis opened the session with a short speech, followed by Nicolas 
Le Jay acting in the capacity of temporary First President. These 
were followed by the garde des sceaux, who delivered a long and 
elaborate discourse lauding Louis' accomplishments in subduing the 
Rochellois and glorifying his graciousness in extending a generous 
settlement to his rebellious subjects. Confident that the mechanism 
of the lit would successfully see the Code through any difficulty, 
Marillac then delivered a galling speech extolling the royal authority 
and disparaging the role of the Parlement in affairs of State. His 
words, reproduced for all to read in the Mercure franaois, drew 
heavily on principles expressed more fully in the "MSmoire contre le 
Parlement":
We are all in agreement that the King should do nothing unjust j
he knows it and believes it himself, and no matter how much he
^The official account is in B.N. Ms. fr. 9890, fols. 285-97, 
January 15, 1629. See also the less complete accounts in Le Mercure 
frangois, XV, second pagination, 1-28; Isambert, Aneiennes lois 
frangaises, XVI, 342-43; Everat, Michel de Marillac, pp. 90-96.
74lhe chair of the First President was vacant following the 
death of Jerome de Hacqueville on November 4, 1628.
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may be above the laws, he is nevertheless willing to subject 
himself to reason. But the core of the question is, who will 
be the judge of the King's actions, to say whether they be 
just or not? If we make the King's subjects or officers his 
judges, if it is up to them to qualify the King's actions and to 
declare them just or unjust, the King is no longer King but 
under the tutelage of his officers, and sovereignty is 
dependent on them. That would be to open the door to factions 
in the State, to give means to proponents of change who 
constantly criticize the King's actions, and to compromise his 
authority. It is therefore true that the King alone is the 
judge of justice and his actions. He renders account for them to 
God alone, and as each of us loves the State and the public 
peace, so too should he hold firm in this resolution.'5
The absolute authority of the King thus ruled out any possibility
that the Parlement might pursue an independent role in matters of
State and confined it to the administration of justice. Marillac
underscored this last point in unmistakable terms:
I know very well that on many occasions our Kings have wanted 
to take advice from this company, be it as an entire body, be 
it from some of it, in affairs very important to their State, 
when they have found it well to do so. They would still do it 
often were it not that some misgivings of these recent times 
have rendered communication more difficult. But as it is in 
the power and conduct of the Prince to take advice as he 
pleases from those that he wishes to call, so this in no way 
changes the condition of those he calls, and gives them no new 
right or new quality. The function of this company has always 
remained this first and principle part of all royal actions, 
nnd the most important in a State, which is the administration 
of justice.76
Thp garde des sceaux concluded that since the reign of justice was the 
most illustrious duty of kings, and since the parlementaires were 
the most worthy judges in the kingdom, the Parlement should pay the 
strictest attention to its judicial duties.
7 L^e Mercure frangois, XV, second pagination, 19-20.
76Ibid., 25-26.
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All formal preliminaires done, the articles of the Code were
brought forward for registration. In keeping with ancient custom,
a rigidly prescribed ritual was followed. The greffier read a
representative sample of the edict, then avocat general Qmer Talon,
speaking for Mole, gave his conclusions and required that it be
registered according to form and tenor. The garde des sceaux then in
turn consulted the presidents a mortier, the cardinals, dukes and
peers, eonseillers d'Etat, maitres des requites, and conseillers for
opinions and returned them to the King. This done, Marillac
pronounced the official registration:
The King, seated in his lit de justice, has ordered and orders
that on the back of the said letters in the form of a
declaration of the month of November and December last, and 
the said cahiers and articles of the present month of January, 
will be put: read, published, and registered, heard and
this requiring his procureur general, and that copies collated 
after the original will be sent into all the bailliages and 
seneehausees of this ressort to be there read, published and 
registered, kept and observed, according to their form and 
tenor. ^
He then added a postscript which would shortly become the focal 
point of a bitter dispute between the Crown and its court. The 
presidents, he said, had requested in their opinions that the King 
suspend sending the articles into the provinces until the court had 
had time to examine them in detail. The King had granted the 
request, with the proviso that registration would not be delayed and 
that the new law would immediately go into effect. No more than 
two months were to be spent in such discussions.*^ With verification
77B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fol. 296, January 15, 1629.
*^ B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fols. 296-97; Everat, Michel de 
Marillac, p. 96. The registers do not mention the two month limit 
on discussions.
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completed, the lit de justice was adjourned. Having suitably 
publicized his victory at La Rochelle and lent his presence to the 
verification of Marillac*s ordinance, Louis departed Paris the next 
day for Montferrat and a resumption of campaigning in the south of 
France, leaving the royal government north of the Loire in the 
hands of Marie de Medicis. Richelieu accompanied the King,, but 
Marillac remained behind in Paris.
The absence of the King offered an excellent opportunity for the 
judges to create trouble for the ordinance, and this they quickly 
proceeded to do. The struggle began with the judges' refusal to 
inscribe the formula of registration on the edict, in spite of the 
fact that the King had ordered them to do so in the lit de justice.
On January 19 acting First President Le Jay, a partisan of Richelieu 
and no friend of Marillac, reported to the assembled chambers that 
the day before the garde des sceaux had asked for the signed and 
verified copy of the ordinance. Le Jay urged the court to decide 
what course it wanted to take: to verify and surrender the edict
before discussing it, or to withhold the document from the garde des 
sceaux. It was decided with "all chambers assembled, that the said 
cahiers would be read, and that in the meantime their delivery 
would be suspended."79 Reading of the articles began the same day.
79b .N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fols. 297-98, 19 January, 1629; 
Richelieu, M&noires, IV, 286; Everat, Michel de Marillac, pp. 106-07. 
Everat stresses the influence of Le Jay in fomenting resistance to 
the Code Michaud in this way: "Unfortunately for the edict, the
Parlement was then directed by president Le Jay, a cunning man, 
violent, full of spite, the personal enemy of Marillac, a great 
adversary of judicial reforms. His past had necessitated lettres 
d* abolition and his advancement in the magistrature had only been due 
to the high protection of Richelieu. Resistance to the ordinance was
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Marillac, nervous about the discussions in the Palais and
believing that an early assertion of the King's authority might quash
the matter in the bud, resolved to write to Louis at once. By a
letter of January 23, he reminded the King of the circumstances
surrounding the ordinance in the lit de justice and asked that he
command La Ville-aux-Cleres, one of the secretaires d'Etat, to put 
the decision [of registration} on the ordinance, it being a thing 
appropriate to his charge and to the presence of His Majesty, by 
which means the publication of the ordinance, highly useful to his 
people, should no longer be deferred, and His Majesty's authority 
would neither remain impaired nor dependent on others.®0
Louis' response, a lettre de cachet enjoining obedience, was not sent
from Grenoble until February 15.81 While awaiting the royal response,
was for him a means of impeding the application of projected measures 
and at the same time of satisfying his hatred of the garde des sceaux. 
Endowed with a rare perspicacy, he had miraculously detected the still- 
latent conflict which already existed between him Marillac and the 
Cardinal. He thus thought it not displeasing to the minister in 
entering the struggle with Marillac. Then his relations with Richelieu 
permitted him to surmise that the Cardinal would not vigorously support 
the execution of the edict. Opposition then became not only possible, 
but even more, had some chance of success. It is this which he very 
perfidiously insinuated to his colleagues. These allowed themselves to 
be easily convinced." Everat's comments undoubtedly are plausible and 
have some merit. Le Jay did apparently maintain close contacts with 
Richelieu, but hard evidence of their exact relationship is lacking.
Le Jay left no papers, and those of Richelieu scarcely ever mention 
the First President in a revealing manner. In any case, as First 
President the opportunities for stirring up the court would have been 
fairly limited without a widespread animousity towards Marillac.
80Richelieu, Meinoires, IV, 288.
81B.N. Ms. fr. 3826, fol. 12. Everat ascribed the unusual delay 
in the dispatch to the influence of Richelieu on Louis:. "Richelieu, one 
may see by the tone of his M&noires, was not perturbed by the diffi­
culties instigated against the garde des sceaux.. On the one hand, he 
thereby satisfied his resentment for him; on the other, he regarded 
with indifference . . . the obstacles brought to the execution of the 
code. He did not then hurry to answer. It was, after Pere Griffet, 
only on February 16 fsicl that the King sent to the Parlement the 
letter patent requested by Marillac." Michel de Marillac, 108.
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the garde des sceaux also approached the Queen Mather, asking her to
summon Le Jay and stop the Parlement's debates. Marie acceded,
telling the president on January 25 that
she found it strange that the Parlement should assemble and 
refuse to make the verification and deliver the cahiers; that 
the King would be offended, since they had been verified in
his presence, and that it went contrary to the honor due the
seigneur King and his authority, the act of his entry having 
been published and the pronounciation made in his presence.®2
Le Jay answered simply that he would inform the court and withdrew.
hearing his version of the interview on the next day, the Parlement
decided on remonstrances. After hearing these on January 27, Marie,
thoroughly irritated, once again told the magistrates that
the King wished it, and that if the Parlement continued to 
insist, that would give him dissatisfaction; that since they 
had put the registration on paper they could put it on parch­
ment, and that would not hinder the Parlement from doing all 
that the King allowed. 3^
These prohibitions, like the earlier ones, were shrugged off. On
the last day of January the court decided to persist in its actions.
Pending the arrival of orders from the King himself, Marillac
and Marie could only look on with helpless frustration and repeat
their injunctions to a Parlement growing increasingly insolent. Just
before the King's departure, Marie had been endowed with full royal
powers north of the Loire, and on February 2 she used these powers,
addressing a lettre de cachet to the court enjoining publication of
the ordinance as her son had ordered.^ This document was no more
82B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fol. 299, January 26, 1629.
^B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fol. 304, January 31, 1629-
8i4B.N. Ms. Dupuy 94, fol. 123-
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persuasive than previous warnings. When the Queen Mother’s letter 
arrived in the Grand1Chambre, Le Jay refused to open and read it.
After the message was delivered orally, a tumult of jeers and cat-calls 
erupted within the court. One of the procurers openly labeled 
Marillac as being "of Spain, of the Inquisition, of intrigues," 
saying "that he would not live forever, that he had two children 
who might come into the Parlement, and that they would be reminded 
of it." Others muttered that under Henry IV things had been different 
but "at present one had to do what pleased the cardinal and the garde 
des sceaux." Here and there were murmurs that the Crown had been 
sold out, and that the princes and les grands should be assembled to 
hear about it. The row turned on Le Jay when some of the other 
presidents discovered that he had presumed to write "Le Jay, acting 
First President" on the court's decisions. Potier de Novion in 
particular had words with him "about their qualities and birth” and, 
among other insults, said "that the graft of the century had been put 
in the Parlement, and it would be justice to oust it."®^
When tempers had cooled and calm returned, the judges shifted 
their tactics'from active to passive procrastination. All 
discussions were stopped in deference to royal orders, but the 
registration was not made, the court awaiting, in Richelieu's words, 
the moment "to resume this affair when it could have it at its 
liking."^ Marillac, on the other hand, having failed with the
^Richelieu, Mgmoires, IV, 289-90; Everat, Michel de Marillac, 
p. 109.
®%ichelieu, Mgmoires, IV, 291.
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stick, now turned to the carrot. Swallowing his pride, he remitted
to the court the King's permission to allow sons, fathers, and
brothers in the court. The letters were promptly registered on
February 9.®7 Confident that the Parlement had been won over at
last, the garde des sceaux wrote to Richelieu on the 7th that
all that remained for the registration was the office of the 
greffier, who could not say that he had been prohibited, and 
thus could be forced to put it there. If there was need, the 
Queen could require him to put it on in her presence, or treat 
him as he deserved if he refused, there being an example that 
the chancellor, even in the Parlement, had made the greffier 
register without taking the opinion of the Parlement, and even 
contrary to the Parlement which resisted it.°°
Marillac's sanguine hopes were soon dashed. On February 8
deliberation on the ordinance resumed at the insistance of the
Enqultes and continued on the 9th. Once again the garde des sceaux
had no recourse but to have the Queen Mother summon deputies to
account for themselves. These representatives, headed by Le Jay,
appeared before the Queen at five o'clock on the afternoon of the 9th.
The Queen Mother, in company with Marillac and several attendants,
demanded to know why they planned to assemble the Parlement on the
morrow. Le Jay replied that it was to continue the deliberation at
the request of the EnquStes. Marie then told the delegation that she
had written them on February 2 so that they would not continue the
discussion, but they had not wanted to see her letters; that she
had sent for them in order to tell them personally that she had
written to them; that there should be no doubt about it, and that
^7B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fols. 306-07, February 9, 1629. 
^Richelieu, M&aoires, IV, 291.
\
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she prohibited them absolutely from discussing the affair any further, 
since the King was gravely offended. Le Jay answered that he would 
tell the court, then, relieved of the decorum required before Louis, 
launched into a vindication of himself and the authority of the 
Parlement, insinuating to Marillac that the court had at various times 
tried chancellors, constables, and even princes of the blood.
Marillac, he asserted, had violated the agreement made in the lit 
de justice by having the Code printed and sent to the provinces.
Marillac, temper inflamed, retorted that he had no reason to 
fear the Parlement because, unlike Le Jay, he had lived a life 
without need of lettres d1 abolition.8^  Furthermore, he added, the 
bitigain struck in the lit de justice had included immediate verifi­
cation, then the presentation of remonstrances within a limited time. 
It had said nothing about printing the ordinances.
Le Jay upheld the contrary view and demanded to see what the 
register had to say on the point. Marillac happened to have the leaf 
in his possession at the time and read it before the group, finding 
no evidence for what Le Jay had said. Abashed, the president could 
say no more. The interview concluded with a compromise agreement 
that for four months the edict would not be sent out, during which
^The reference is obscure. Griffet believed that it referred 
to Le Jay's arrest during the regency for consorting with the 
prince de Conde and attempting to stir up the Parlement on his 
behalf. Histoire de Louis XIII, I, 656. For the events of the 
incident in 1615 see dasson, Le Parlement de Paris, I, 128-29, 
and Mole, Mgmoires, I, 72-86.
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time the court would work on its remonstrances.90 In the meanwhile 
the ordinance was to have full effect and force.91
During the next few months both sides respected the agreement of 
February 9, but this was not necessarily out of good faith nor did 
it insure a quick resolution of the verification question. Marillac, 
content to let matters rest for the moment, departed Paris during the 
spring to join the King in Langued'oc. Now weighing heavily on his 
mind were considerations other than the ordinance: thoughts of the 
internal state of the kingdom, the possibility of a new war with 
Spain, and, inseparably from these, the problem Richelieu's growing 
influence over Louis at the expense of his own devot faction. In 
fact, the "Grand Orage" of the Day of Dupes was already beginning to 
gather.92
The Parlement, for its part, soon began the immense task of 
sorting through the ordinance. During March, April, and May the 
first ten articles were examined> discussed, and modified according 
to the judges' lights.9  ^ Of these ten paragraphs, only the 
remonstrance on the first is of any significance here. According to
9°There is no agreement on the length of time granted for 
remonstrances. The registers of the court give four months; Griffet 
indicates six months; Richelieu's Memoires say two months. B.N. Ms. 
fr. 9890, fol. 311, February 10, 1629; Histoire de Louis XIII, I,
656; Memoires, IV, 294.
91B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fols. 307-311, February 10, 1629; 
Richelieu, Memoires, IV, 292-94; Griffet, Histoire de Louis XIII, I, 
656; Everat, Michel de Marillac, pp. 110-12.
92Pages, "Richelieu et Marillac: deux politiques." pp. 63-79.
93B.N. nouv. acq. 9890, fols. 311-21, March 6-May 12, 1629; 
Isanibert, Aneiennes lois frangaises, XVI, 342-44.
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Article 1, all laws from past reigns and Louis' rule that had not been 
abridged, discarded, or modified, whether registered in sovereign 
courts or not, would be considered valid and in force. The judges were 
given six months to present their remontranees about any of these 
laws. Such restrictions were intolerable to the court, and on March 6 
it opted for remonstrances favoring a continuation of past practices. 94 
The Parlement made its usual criticisms of nine more articles by 
Miay 12, but after this date enthusiasm lagged and no more provisions 
were taken up.
This situation still prevailed in August when Louis, having
completed the pacification of Langued'oc, retraced his steps
towards the capital with Marillac accompanying him. Richelieu stayed
in the south to supervise the destruction of fortifications. With
the King approaching Paris, Mol£ warned the Parlement on August 11
that "on his return he wanted to have his ordinances with the
registrata just as he had pronounced in his presence." The judges
did nothing. Exactly a week later, with Louis now in the irmediate
vicinty of Paris, Mole again said that
the said seigneur King had told him to make known to my 
Parlement that I want the registrata to be put on my ordinances, 
and intend that they deliberate only as to whether they will 
do it or not, because it is a thing done. I intend that they 
should be brought to me if I am nearby, or if not, to the 
Queen Mother. When I or she has them, then I will return them 
at once to my Parlement to be deliberated.95
94b.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fol. 311, March 6, 1629.
95fi.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fols. 335-36, August 18, 1629.
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Mole then added that Louis would not receive any deputies from the
court until the ordinances had been presented to him. This meant the
judges could not see the King about any official business, could
not discuss other affairs, among them the paulette which would expire
at the end of the year. The Enquites, especially, were already
pressing for renewal of that cherished right.96 Even with the
pressure of these considerations, the Parlement still took no action.
In the meanwhile Louis took the road for Fountainbleau, and Marillac,
growing impatient, urged Marie to get authorization to force the
greffier into registration. On August 24 Louis did just that,
writing his mother from Ferte-Alais that
seeing the slowness of my court of Parlement to render me the 
act of obedience that they owe me concerning my ordinances,
I have deemed it most appropriate to command the greffier 
Du Tillet to do his duty and put on the edict containing the 
said ordinances the act customarily put in similar cases. For 
this I am writing Monsieur Des Landes to bring you the said 
edict that he has in his hands, and to the greffier to inscribe 
the act. I entreat you to have them do this, to command them 
and all others that need be as much as you will judge necessary, 
at which I desire that they obey.97
The arrival of these injunctions at last prompted the court to order
the Code Michaud registered on August 29, seven months after the
January lit de justice. Louis received the registered ordinance
on September 4 and promptly handed it back to Mole with permission
to present remonstrances. 9®
96b .N. Ms. fr- nouv. acq. 9890, fols. 33-34, July 6, 1629.
^B.N. Ms. fr. 3829, fol. 224, Louis to Marie de Medicis,
August 24, 1629.
9%.N. Ms . fr. nouv. acq. 9890, fol. 336, August 29, 1629.
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These remonstrances were never presented. Instead the Parlement 
turned to quite different tactics to disable the ordinance. Having 
been compelled to register what they were now derisively calling 
the "Code Michaud,” the judges could not be forced to put it into 
practice as they were sworn to do. During the remainder of 1629 and 
1630, lawyers who chose to argue from its principles were hooted 
down before the bar and faced the certain loss of their cases if 
they persisted. At best the Crown had few alternatives to counter 
such behavior, even had the will existed to force the issue, and a 
combination of circumstances conspired to insure that Louis did 
nothing to enforce his new law. One of these circumstances was the 
royal presence. During most of 1629 and 1630 Louis was busily 
engaged asserting the French presence in the Duchy of Mantua and 
had little time for judicial affairs in Paris. Just as these 
campaigns drew to a close, Louis suffered a nearly fatal breakdown of 
his health, and upon his recovery the Day of Dupes produced Marillac's 
disgrace, arrest, and imprisonment. After this time Richelieu had 
little interest in resuscitating a measure widely credited to his 
erstwhile rival, however worthy it may have been, and the Ordinance 
of 1629 remained in limbo, a monument to the high hopes, hard work, 
and poor political judgment of the foimer garde des sceaux.
Some of the same factors that spelled the doom of the Code 
Michaud also dampened Parlementaire politics during 1630. Louis was 
far from his capital for most of the year. Richelieu and Marillac 
were too pre-oecupied with the King's affairs in Mantua, the possi­
bility of European war, with Louis' failing health, or with fending
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off their rival's claims on the royal affections to chance a dis­
tracting encounter with those wearing the black robes of justice in 
the Palais.99 For their part the magistrates were also content 
to let sleeping dogs lie. The paulette agreement concluded in 
1621 expired at the end of 1629* and the Crown made no immediate 
effort to open negotiations with its magistrature. The King's 
initial offer came from Iyons only on June 21, 1630, in a declaration 
which included the outrageous demand that the judges pay an immediate 
loan of twenty-five percent.1^  As soon as these terms became 
known in Paris, the Parlement declined to pay them and forbade any 
member of the court from acceding to the June edict until better 
conditions were forthcoming.101 Nothing better, though, was 
offered until the very end of the year. In the meanwhile, the 
judges had to bide their time and hope for the royal grace. For 
these reasons the Parlement's record during 1630 was very routine. It 
was a year of suspense for both Crown and court, a hush before the 
storm that broke in the Palais Luxembourg on November 10, 1630.
997 For tensions in the innermost circles of government during 
1630 see the important article by Georges Pages, "Autour du 'Grand 
orage.'"
100B.N. Imprimes, Actes royaux, F.46968, no. 17.
101B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 34-35, July 1 and 5,
1630.
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CHAPTER VII
THE PARLEMENT AND THE DAY OF DUPES
Sometime during the mid-morning hours of November 10, 1630, a 
dramatic confrontation took place within the luxurious confines of 
Marie de Medieis1 Palais de Luxembourg in the faubourg St. Germain. 
Two of the principals in the tempestuous scene— Louis XIII and his 
mother— had come together to discuss a matter of the highest 
importance, the rendition of a royal promise to remove Richelieu 
from the government. Marie, now estranged from her one-time favorite 
and fiercely jealous of his influence over her son, had extracted, 
the promise from Louis as he lay recovering from a nearly fatal 
illness contracted during the Mantuan campaign. That had been in 
October. Now miraculously recovered, Louis had done nothing about 
his pledge, and that November morning Marie meant to persuade him. 
Just as their conversation waxed warmest, however, Richelieu had 
appeared as if by occult summons through an unlocked door, inter­
rupting this most private of meetings and bringing Marie to a fit 
of outrage which, in her son’s eyes, finally crystallized a long 
postponed decision. The details of what followed vary, but none of 
the results are open to speculation. During the afternoon and 
evening of the 10th, Richelieu's primacy in Louis' councils and 
confidence was solidly confirmed by long, intimate exchanges at the 
then secluded hunting lodge of Versailles. Never again would that 
primacy be seriously challenged.
408
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The dupes of the day, those who had wagered their all on the 
mother rather than the son, soon found themselves disappointed or, 
worse yet, disgraced. Michel de Marillac, center of the Queen 
Mother's faction, was stripped of the seals on November 11 and 
packed off to confinement at Chateaudun where he dies two years later. 
Orders for the arrest of his brother, mareschal Louis de Marillac, 
governor of the fortress of verdun, commander in Italy with La Force 
and Schomberg, went out on November 13. The margschal offered no 
resistance and was conducted under close guard to Ste. Menehould to 
undergo an investigation which would shortly involve the Parlement 
of Paris. Maris chal Bassompierre, compromised by letters to Louis 
de Marillac, was assigned a cell in the Bastille where he spent the 
next twelve years. Marie and Gaston d'Orllans, obstinate and 
unforgiving in their hatred of Richelieu, were beyond direct 
chastisement; Louis, indeed, would have preferred a peaceful 
reconciliation with them. This, as ensuing events would show, 
ultimately proved impossible.1
Reverberations from the Day of Dupes were felt almost immediately 
in the halls and chambers of the Palais de Justice as Richelieu moved 
to consolidate his victory. While the politics of the Parlement 
would be dominated by the consequences of the Day of Dupes for the 
next three years, the new order manifested itself first in two 
crucial appointments made shortly after November 10. With the
1Mongredien, La Joumee des dupes, passim; Tapie, la France de 
Louis XIII et de Richelieu, pp. 215-26; Burckhardt, Richelieu, His 
Rise to Power, pp. 370-4-02; Pag&s, "Autour du 'Grand Orage,'" passim.
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displacement of Michel de Marillac as garde des sceaux, the seals hud 
reverted to Louis' custody; Richelieu determined to entrust them to 
a reliable creature, some suitably qualified figure of dignity but, 
above all, one of straw. In Charles de l'Aubespine, marquis de 
Chateauneuf, Richelieu found such a m a n Chateauneuf, of one 
of the best Parisian families, son of a long-time ambassador to 
England and himself experienced in government, brought sufficient 
stature but little of Marillac1s native interest, ability, or 
independent obtrusiveness to the office. His role vis-2L-vis the 
Parlement during the next two years might best be described as that 
of the Crown's mouthpiece, personally inoffensive, except for an 
exasperating habit of whispering his speeches, and officially 
complaint with instructions from Louis and Richelieu. There is 
nothing to suggest that his relationship with the Parlement had any 
connection with the intrigues that led to his fall in February of 
1633.
Custody of the seals was not the only important judicial 
disposition made after the Day of Dupes. On November 18 Nicolas III 
Le Jay was sworn in as First President of the Parlement, filling a
^Charles de l'Aubespine, marquis de Chateauneuf, seigneur de 
PrSaux, was the son of Guillaume de l'Aubespine, dean of the king's 
council and Chancellor of the Order of the Holy Spirit. Chateauneuf 
became conseiller clere in the Parlement of Paris in 1603; ambassador 
to Holland, 1609; to (jermany, 1620; to Venice and the Grisons, 1626; 
to England, 1629; Chancellor of the Ordre du Saint Esprit in 1630. 
Chateauneuf was handed the seals on November 14, 1630, and retained 
them until February 25, 1633, when he was disgraced and exiled to 
Angoulfene. He returned to the court after the death of Louis XIII 
and played a significant role in council on several occasions 
thereafter.
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vacancy open since the death of Jean V Bochart de Champigny in 
April, 1630. In actuality, however, Le Jay had been First President 
in all hut name since the death of Jerome d'Hacqueville in November, 
1628, since Champigny had never presided over the court. The 
appointment of a First President should have given Richelieu long 
pause, for the charge was an important one and the selection of its 
bearer a delicate proposition.3 While the First President did not 
control his associates, he represented them on ceremonial occasions 
and played a large part in shaping their deliberations. These 
considerations made it imperative that the First President be a 
moderate or, if possible, a royalist. Yet the potential candidates 
for the position were limited, because to be reasonably acceptable to 
his brother judges the First President had to be of the robe and 
experienced in the Parlement. In effect this meant that the office 
had to be filled from among the presidents mortier or gens du roi 
and while there had been exceptions such as that of Champigny, there 
was great pressure within the court to promote the ranking prSsident 
to First President upon the death of his forebearer.
In November, 1630, a circumstances made Richelieu's decision 
easier, for the ranking president a mortier, Nicolas Le Jay, was
T^he First President's position was really a commission which 
could be revoked, although removal was quite rare. Since it was a 
dignity and not a purchaseable office, charge describes its nature 
better than office.
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also known and acceptable to him. As a First President, even as a 
president & mortier, Le Jay was strangely stypical. His family 
background showed no association with the Parlement and was not 
particularly distinguished in government service.4 Nicolas Le Jay 
had been a secretaire du roi and maftre des comptes under Francis I, 
titled as gcuyer (squire) by virtue of his lands at La Fouche 
Hersans. Nicolas I's only son Jean, grandfather of the First 
President, kept his father's office of secretaire, married Guillemette 
Hotman, and died in 1556. In October, 1559, Jean Le Jay was 
posthumously qualified as noble, probably through his office of 
secretaire. Noble homme Nicolas II inherited the family office of 
secretaire by survivance in 1552 and became a correeteur des comptes 
in 1571. Through inheritance, purchase, or his marriage to Madelaine 
Grotton de Gron, Nicolas II held the seigneuries of Bervilliers,
brief sketch of three other contemporary presidents A mortier 
will illustrate more typical patterns among them. Nicolas de Bellievre, 
received as president 5. mortier in 1614, was the eldest son of 
Chancellor Pomponne I de BelliSvre, who, in addition to several 
ambassadorships, had also been surintendant des finances and a 
president A mortier (1579-80). In 1605 Nicolas de Belli&vre married 
Claude BrGlart, the daughter of Nicolas BrGlart, Chancellor of France, 
and member of a parlementaire dynasty. Andre I Potier, sieur de 
Novion, became president A mortier in 1616 and remained in the office 
until his death in ld>35. His father, Nicolas III Potier, had been a 
president A mortier and his grandfather a conseiller in the court.
His mother was the daughter of a president 5 mortier and his wife was 
the daughter of conseiller Michel de Lauzon. Finally, Henri de Mesmes, 
received as president in 1621, was the eldest son of Jean-Jaeques de 
Mesmes, conseiller in the Parlement and later conseiller d'Etat, and 
grandson of a maftre des requites under Francis I. Henri de Mesmes 
marital alliances were somewhat exceptional, for both of his wives 
were of the noblesse d'gpge. See the entries in B.N. 7553-7555^i£, 
"Receuil alphabetique”ie notices et amoires des presidents, conseillers, 
etc., du Parlement de Paris," and B.N. Ms. fr. 11427, "Memoires 
sur les families du Parlement."
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Quinquempoix, La Grange, Tilly, and La Maisonrouge, leaving these 
to five sons in 1 5 8 6 .5
The eldest of these sons, Nicolas III Le Jay, pursued a 
strikingly successful career in the judiciary, beginning as a 
conseiller aux EnquStes in 1600 and moving to the Ch&telet as 
procureur au Roi in 1602. In 1609 he took a step up in the Parisian 
world, becoming lieutenant civil "by means of 50,000 geus that he 
paid to the son of M. [Francois] Miron, and 25,000 to Concini, 
marlschal d'Encre [sic], to get permission for i t . A s  lieutenant 
civil, Le Jay had earned something of a reputation for maintaining 
calm in the city after the assassination of Henry IV in 1610. Three 
years after this episode, Le Jay went back into the Parlement, se­
curing a presidency 1 mortier by resignation from Jacques-Auguste de 
Thou.
At the time of his appointment as First President, Le Jay had 
seventeen years of experience in the court and was at the top of the 
list of presidents. By this time, too, he had increased the extent 
and stature of the family lands, having raised the selgneuries of 
Tilly, La Maisonrouge, and Saint-Fargeau to baronies, and having added 
the seigneuries of Villiers, Les Salles, Saint Y, Bretigny-sur-Mont, 
Malabri, Paray, Conflans, and Les Carrieres. His marriage to 
Magdelaine Marehand, daughter of Charles Marchand, colonel of three
5b .N. Ms. fr. 29913 (dossiers bleus 368), "Le Jay"; Ms. fr. 7553, 
fol. 21; Ms. fr. 7555, fols. 505-06.
6b.N. Ms. fr. 29913 (dossiers bleus 368), "Le Jay," fol. 3.
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companies of soldiers attached to the HOtel de ville, was apparently 
not as successful as his acquisition of lands, she bringing him neither 
high connections nor children before her death in 1625.7
At the time of his appointment as First President in 1630,
Le Jay's public reputation was that of a "knowing fsavant!> honest 
man, although a philanderer; also his charge cost him a great deal."® 
In 1615 Le Jay had made a flirtation with the rebellous princes 
Condi and Soissons and had been briefly imprisoned for it.^ This 
escapade may have taught him a lesson, for by the late 1620's he had 
become a royalist, as his behavior during the verification of the 
Code Michaud testifies. During 1630 Le Jay acted as First President 
in the absence of Jean Bochart de Champigny. Undoubtedly, too, by 
this time he had developed some association with Richelieu, although 
the extent and nature of this relationship is shrouded in conjecture 
since Richelieu's papers, correspondence, and Mgmoires make only 
infrequent and fleeting references to him before November, 1630. 
Certainly if Le Jay was a creature of Richelieu in some way before 
this time, he retained these ties of loyalty after becoming First 
President, for within the rules of the court, he always diligently 
worked to further the royal cause.
7B.N. Ms. fr. 7553, fol. 21; Ms. fr. 7555, fols. 505-06.
8B.N. Ms. fr. 29913 (dossiers bleus 368), "Le Jay," fol. 3.
The Historiettes of Tallemant des Reaux make no meaningful comment on 
any aspect of Le Jay's life except his amorous adventures, from 
which he received some notoriety and several illegitimate children.
?Mol6, Mgmoires, I, 72-86.
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The beginning of Le Jay's presidency found the Parlement in a 
sullen mood brought on by the prolongation of the paulette renewal.
Since issuing its declaration of June 21, 1630, the Crown had held 
fast in its determination to negotiate the paulette in exchange for 
an extortionate loan of twenty-five percent from its judicial officers; 
by the opening of the 1631 session in November, 1630, the judges in 
the Parlement were anxious and angry at Louis' failure to come to 
terms. One of Le Jay's first tasks, therefore, was to lead a 
delegation to see the King about the droit annuel. On November 22 
Le Jay, BelliSvre, and Potier de Novion, in company with several 
conseillers, rode out to Saint-Germain-en-Laye to meet with the 
King. Louis promised them his good intentions, but the new offer 
that was issued on December 21 hardly pleased the magistrates. It 
called for the officers of all sovereign courts to pay a loan of 
twelve and one-half percent; the trSsoriers de France and the 
prSsidiaux, sixteen and two-thirds percent; and all others twenty 
percent.-*-0 Thoroughly dissatisfied, the judges refused to pay on 
these costly terms which took no account of their elite status by 
comparison with that of the provincial sovereign courts.
Before a protest could be mounted against the paulette, however, 
the magistrates' spirits were further irritated by an attempt to 
create offices within the Parlement, the first such effort since 
Henry IV's reign. By an edict presented December 30, the judges were 
asked to approve two new maitres des requites and a conseiller lalque
1®B.N. Imprimis, Actes royaux, F.46968, no. 20.
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in each of the five Chambres des enqufites and two of RequStes. The 
King regretted such means, but "the urgent necessity of our affairs" 
made them imperative, and the Parlement was ordered to register without 
delay, restriction, difficulty, or modification. This the court 
refused to do, opting instead to present remonstrances.
These remonstrances, together with the longstanding paulette 
grievances, were the central topics on the morning of January 20 
when a delegation headed by Le Jay met Louis and his advisors at the 
Louvre. From the standpoint of both parties, the session was fraught 
with potentially important consequences. For the Crown, desperately 
in need of funds after the Mantuan campaign of the preceding year, the 
most obvious considerations were financial: sale of the big judicial
- offices plus a plump paillette settlement could substantially ease 
the treasury's pains if the Parlement could be persuaded to accept 
them. Less perceptible, but at least as meaningful, were psychological 
factors surrounding the solidarity and credibility of Richelieu's newly 
confirmed ministry. The wily judges could not be allowed to dictate 
terms to the council; conversely, an impression of mutual trust and 
open-minded compromise were also desirable. Louis and Richelieu, 
therefore, resolved to put on a grand show. When the deputies from the 
court arrived late in the morning, they were received by the King and 
his entire council: Richelieu, the garde des sceaux, the
surintendant des finances, four margschaux de France, several
■^ B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. aeq. 9891, fols. 59-60, December 30, 1630, 
and January 2, 1631-
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secretaires d'Etat, conseillers d'Etat, mattres des requites, and
even the captain of the King's guards stood in reception.
For the judges, on the other hand, the dual issues of the
paulette and creations came to the same point: the Parlement, the
oldest and most honorable sovereign court, should not be treated in
connnon with other institutions. Both a principle and material interests
were at stake. A distinction for the sovereign courts had been made
when the paulette had been assessed in 1620, a distinction which in
1630 the Parlement hoped to further improve into an exclusive privilege;
in the same way the Parlement, long exempted from creations of office,
should continue to enjoy its immunity. Opposition on the latter point,
of course, could easily be defended in the name of legitimate public
concern, good government, and the welfare of the kingdom, because
everyone knew the sale of office was a notoriously wasteful and
injurious means of public finance. This seemed to be especially
true at the beginning of 1631, since the military activities of the
past year had largely been concluded and the need for extraordinary
financing much diminished.
These basic aspirations, therefore, were foremost in Le Jay's
mind as he argued the court's case. The First President began by
maintaining that just as the Crown's needs had slackened with the
coming of peace, so too should it relent in its demands:
While Your Majesty had war underway and armies within and 
without the kingdom, it was impossible for him to order 
anything for the relief of his subjects; that is why your
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officers remained silen-b by reserve and modesty. But at present 
it seems that necessity lias had its day, and that the serenity 
of peace has moderated in several ways the rigor and calamities 
that war customarily b r in g s . ^
Le Jay then went on to develop the Parlement*s refusal to pay the
forced loan associated with the droit annuel, intimating that its
rank entitled to special considerations:
Allow us, Sire, that on this occasion we should say that your 
Parlement, which is the first parlement of France and the 
Court of Peers, should believe itself to have prerogatives anH 
pre-eminences above the others. Nevertheless, we do not know 
by what misfortune it finds itself mingled in confusion and 
in rank with companies which are inferior to it.1^
The Parlement of Paris was especially deserving through its elite 
standing, but all the sovereign courts were deserving because they 
contributed by administering the King's justice at very low salaries, 
drawing less than 500 livres a year for the conseillers lalques and 
4-00 for the conseillers elercs. Furthermore, Le Jay continued, the 
Parlement had never asked for any increase in these humble wages 
and contributed 300 livres out of them for the privilege of the quar- 
ante jours. That left 200 livres remuneration, "a strange and 
pitiable thing which merits consideration."1^
After offering these considerations, the First President 
specified two deficiencies in the December declaration of the droit 
annuel, neither of which, oddly enough, referred to the forced loan. 
One was that there was no provision made for safeguarding and con­
serving offices for widows and orphans of those who had died during
^B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fol. 64, January 24, 1631.
^B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fol. 64, January 24, 1631.
^B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fol. 64, January 24, 1631.
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the rupture of the agreement. Because of this, a conseiller who had 
died six months before had lost his office, leaving behind ten 
children to subsist on 100 livr-es of rentes. Secondly, the recent 
edict had made a distinction among the prgsidiaux, royal judges, and 
lesser jurisdictions "who are poor and miserable, the highest of 
them having only fifty livres in salary." As for the creation of 
the maitres des requites and conseillers, the Parlement had 
deliberated on them for three consecutive mornings and decided on 
remonstrances. Le Jay though that "to represent all the reasons which 
were expressed against them [[the creations] would be to bore you," 
but the principal one was "that it had always been judged that the 
multiplicity of officers in France is very injurious, that they will 
be perpetual, and that in eight years we will be constrained to do 
the same or the equivalent, and so on to infinity." In summary, the 
judges hoped and believed that Louis, out of bounty and consideration 
for subjects, officers, and honor, would preserve the Parlement in 
its rights and privileges.15
Louis' response, given by Chateauneuf, was conciliatory in tone 
but made no compromise on the main issues. The garde des sceaux 
told the deputies that the King greatly regretted having been driven 
to such means in his hour of need; in the past he had been helped 
by the clergy and the nobility which had given property, blood, and 
lives in his service; the people, too, had bom several new imposts,
l^ B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 65-66, January 24> 1631.
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but "the war, the necessity, and the sterility of the seasons having 
saddled all alike, the King thought it possible only to draw 
help from the zeal and affections of his officers." He had, however, 
several propositions to make. In those eases where security of 
investment was threatened, the King would see to the conservation of 
office in the family; he had not wanted to augment the Parties 
casuelles by his first asking of twenty-five percent in June, 1630, 
and "not wanting to profit from his officers," had reduced it to 
the very moderate former taxes; these things considered, the Crown 
could find no other resource than the present and moderate one; 
that having sent his edict to the Parlement, the King wanted it 
verified, which the officers should do "by the zeal and affection 
that they bear for his service." With this not very promising 
dismissal, the deputies had to be content and retired to reflect on 
it.16
Even as Le Jay reported the interview of January 20 to his 
colleagues, however, consequences of the Day of Dupes were taking 
shape which would soon displace the paulette and December creation 
in the judges' attentions. These matters were never out of mind 
during the spring and summer, but they came to be mingled with 
issues of even greater importance surrounding the administration of 
high justice by commissaires and the fundamental right of the 
fundamental right of the Parlement to mingle in affairs of State.
^B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 67-68, January 24, 1631.
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Violent bickering over these matters would dominate the politics of 
the Parlement until February, 1632, making 1631 a year of crisis 
between the Crown and the court unequalled until the outbreak of the 
Fronde in 164-8. By February, 1632, Louis and Richelieu had secured 
a wobbly victory on several major points, but only by the repeated 
use of punitive measures which in themselves accentuated tensions 
playing between the council and the sovereign court.
The Parlement was first sucked into the turbulent wake of 
Richelieu’s ascendancy when, in the closing week of January, the 
court received a plea for justice from Catherine de Marillac, wife 
of the marlschal who had been arrested in Italy and returned to 
France for trial. Preparation of a case against him had been handed 
over to conseiller d1 Etat Moricq and mattre des requgtes Isaac de 
Laffemas, later notorious as "Richelieu’s hangman." Laffemas 
proceded according to his own methods, indiscriminately seizing 
boxes of the mareschal' s private papers without warning or explanation, 
breaking them open, and forwarding the contents to Mbricq for 
examination. The first reaction of the mareschal*s wife was to 
present a recusation against Laffemas; when this had no effect, she 
protested to the Parlement of Paris, sending a request for justice 
and an interdiction of Laffemas' activities.1^ Mole received the
17B.N. Imprimes Lb36.2839, Requestes presentees 1 la Cour de 
Parlement de Paris par le mareschal de Manllac et sa femme (n.p.,
1631), pp. 3-5. This pamphlet of twenty-seven pages contains the 
petitions of Marillac and his wife presented to the Parlement and 
the arrSts issued in their favor between January and September, 1631. 
Several of these documents are not to be found in other sources such 
as the registers of the Parlement.
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appeal on January 23 and gave his approval for its consideration
before the Parlement, writing across the bottom of the original: "In
consequence of preceding decisions of the court interposed on
eommissaires extraordinaires, I do not bar it from the King.1,18 The
reception of the Parlement encouraged Marillac to present a formal
appeal in his own name a few days later:
Louis de Marillac, mareschal de France, humbly pleas, saying that 
he has seen himself suddenly struck as if by thunder, and by and 
by closely imprisoned and carefully guarded as if he were a 
criminal of llse-majesti and could bring some terror to the 
State, without knowing why, at the request of whom, who the 
prosecuting party is, nor why they wish it.
Actually, the Marshal strongly suspected the origin of his troubles
and intimated it, even though Richelieu was not mentioned by name:
He has since learned and is advised that in order to substan­
tiate such unwonted extraordinary methods and to make M m  out a 
criminal in some way, they are examining all his life, imputing 
unknown crimes to him which were bom and came to light only 
during the night and day following Saint-Martin's Day last 
[November 11J, solely through malevolent intentions of those 
who desire and procure his ruin.
Marillac maintained his innocence could easily be shown before 
ordinary courts, but he had not had the chance because the investi­
gation was being made
l8"En consequence des precedents arrests de la Cour intervenus 
sur les eommissaires extraordinaires, je ne l'enrpesche pour le 
Roy." Ibid., p. 5. From the beginning of the Marillac Affair, Moli 
showed himself receptive to appeals from the mareschal, although 
he must have known that the case was extremely sensitive to the 
King and Richelieu. On the question of Mali's involvement in the 
Marillac Affair, see the important footnote in his Memoires, II,
68, n.3, where the editors have provided a valuable annotation 
to documents presented in the text.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
423
by way of eommissaires, chosen and named by deceit, am^ng 
others sieur de Laffemas, maitre des requites that the court 
knows well enough and how he came into the charge of mattre 
that he has, in which he is still not recognized by the 
court, and monsieur de Morieq, also a maftre des requites, 
in truth a personnage of honor, against whom he has nothing 
to say except that he could only be suspect, being chosen 
and influenced by unknown parties adverse to him.
These judges had proceded against him in unheard-of ways,
beginning by imprisonment, by seizure of property, titles, and 
papers of the plaintiff, then seeking out witnesses from all 
sides to inform on his life and to have them deposit all the 
wrongs that they imagine to have been committed, [in order] 
to make a case of it.
Beyond these injustices, the mareschal thought the court should
recognize the fact "that the commissions of the said sieurs de
Laffemas and de Iforicq had never been verified by the court, and
that their procedure is completely novel and unprecedented." Under
the extremity of these conditions, the mareschal hoped to receive
recourse and justice from the Parlement:
If it please your graces, receive the said plaintiff appellant 
from incompetent and recused judges as well as from the complete 
procedure done by them, holding him to be wholly relieved; order 
that on the said appeals the parties will have audience on such 
a day as it pleases the court to order; that until such day the 
pretended investigation and other procedures carried out by 
them against the said plaintiff, together with their commissions, 
in virtue of which they have worked, will be brought to the 
greffier of the court; that to do this the greffiers of the said 
commtssaires will be constrained by all due and reasonable means, 
even by imprisonment of their persons; permit the said plaintiff 
on the said appeal to summon those that he believes to be his 
secret parties and those it will seem proper to him, and until 
then, to prohibit the said sieurs de Moricq and De Laffemas and 
all other judges from proceding to the execution of the said 
commissions.
^B.N. Imprimis Lb^^.2839, Requestes presentees par de Marillac, 
6-8.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
424
Mathieu Mole inscribed, favorable conclusions on the petition on 
January 29, and it was taken up by the court some time within the next 
three days, though the registers do not indicate the exact date.^  
With the paulette pending, what provoked the court to take this action 
contrary to the King's will and contrary to its feelings towards the 
Marillac family? The answer probably lies with the Parlement's 
longstanding concern with eommissaires extraordinaires vested in 
mattres des requites or conseillers d'Etat. The granting of such com­
missions had persisted in spite of the court's repeated injunctions 
and remonstrances against them, and just before Marillac's case 
appeared the Parlement had recognized a similar appeal coming from 
Antoine Brillet, lawyer in the presidial of Angers.21 The Parlement 
had unanimously accepted his claim; having done so, it could hardly 
do less with a much more spectacular appeal coming from a Marshal of 
France. As Pierre de Vaissi&re, historian of Marillac's trial put it,
this eagerness of the Parlement to welcome the Marshal's 
complaint is explained by the uneasiness caused it for a long 
time by commissions extraordinaires confided to mutt-res des 
requites ordinaires de l'hfrtel du roi, and which threatened 
to dispoil the highest Jurisdiction of the kingdom of a part
of its prerogatives.22
20j4oie wrote, "Je ne l'empesehe pour le Roy.'1 B.N. Imprimis 
I2J36.2839, Requestes presentles par de Marillac," p. 8. See also 
Mole, Memoires, II, 68, n. 3.
2lSee supra, p. 176.
22pierre de Vaissi^re, L1Affaire du marlschal de Marillac (Paris, 
1924), p. 109. This is a very substantial and thoroughly documented 
work covering all aspects of Marillac's trial in detail.
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Additionally, of course, Marillac had the imponderable factors of 
justice and popular opinion on his side; in this instance, these 
also happened to coincide with the court’s interests of the moment.
The King's interests were diametrically opposed to those of his 
Parlement, and on February 3 Le Jay and three conseillers were 
summoned to the Louvre to account for their acceptance. There Louis 
told them in no uncertain terms that they had been called because 
of the Miarillac petition and that he "did not intend for them to 
consider the affair and that he wanted to be obeyed. "23 Le Jay said 
that he would tell the court and the deputation retired.
Having been apprised of the royal will, the next day Le Jay’s 
colleagues promptly decided to disregard it. On February 4 the 
Parlement gave a formal arr§t in Marillac‘s favor totally satisfying 
his request. The mareschal and his wife were held to be relieved of 
obedience to the eommissaires, permitted to summon any witnesses 
they chose in his defense, and granted a hearing before the 
Parlement as soon as possible ("audience au premier jour"). The 
investigations and papers of MDricq and Laffemas were to be deposited 
with the greffier of the Parlement for the procureur general *s 
examination. 24
An emphatic royal reply to this decision was soon forthcoming.
On February 6 an arr$t du Conseil quashed the Parlement’s decree and
23b.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891> fols. 70-71, February 4> 1631.
^B.N. Imprimes Lb36.2839, Requestes presentees par de Marillac, 
p. 9, gives the text of this arr^t. It is not found in the 
registers.
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and forbade the court to take any cognizance of eommissaires 
extraordinaires. Those on Marillac' s case continued their work,
Moricq leaving the next day, February 7, for Champagne with a new 
commission.25 The councilliar arrit set off a great commotion in 
the Palais, deputations, discussions, and meetings with Louis and 
the garde des sceaux coming thick and fast during the next three days.
On the 9th Chateauneuf, in Louis* presence, laid down the final
royal stand:
[in regard to 3 the affair pending in the Grand ’Chamhre by reason 
of the commission addressed to two mattres des requites con­
cerning the sieur de Marillac, [he] did not intend that the 
court should take cognizance of this affair; that the King was
going to CompiSgne for a few days and that he remanded the city
of Paris to them.26
These words and the arrit du Conseil did not deter the Parlement,
which now knew that the King would soon leave. On February 11 it
decided to make tr§s humble remonstrances on the arret du Conseil of
the 6th. In the meantime the gens du roi were instructed to ask for
a suspension of matters until the remonstrances could be presented.2?
Matters rested here for a few days, but on the 14th the court
received a second request from Marillac pointing out that the
eomnissaires were going about their inquest, the decision of February 4
notwithstanding. If the Parlement did not act quickly, the mareschal
25vaissi§re, L1 Affaire du mareschal de Marillac, pp. 110-11; 
Griffet, Histoire Te Louis xTTl, lit, 120; Richou, Histoire des 
commissions extraordinaires, p. 53- The text of the arrgt is not 
found in the registers or printed sources.
26B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fol. 74, February 10, 1631.
2?B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fol. 75, February 11, 1631.
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thought, "he will find himself guilty and will be judged, . . . [it] 
being considered that commi ssaires are chosen not so much to condemn 
the guilty as to see that the innocent perish." To prevent this 
Marillac asked for a renewal on enjoinders against Moricq 
Laffemas,
conforming to your arr|tQof February 4] that the charges and 
investigations and other procedures made by the said commis- 
saires . . . will be brought to the registry of the court, . . . 
and that the plaintiff will be led away and imprisoned in the 
Coneiergerie of the Palais, to be under the jurisdiction of
the court."28
Once again the Parlement was receptive, issuing a second arrit 
on February 22 which largely reiterated its earlier one of the 4th.29 
The eommissaires were prohibited from continuing work on Marillac1 s 
trial; remonstrances were to be made on the case; the huissiers of the 
Parlement were enjoined to deliver the arr£t when they were required 
so to do.30 As before, howevery such efforts remained a dead letter,
2®B.N. Imprimis Lb36.2839, Requestes prisenties par de Marillac, 
pp. 10-12.
^This time MolS inscribed more vigorous conclusions on the 
bottom of the request: "Vu 1'arrSt du Conseil du 6 fivrier dernier, 
avec la commission dudit jour, et autres pieces y attachles, je 
requiers pour le Roi trSs-humbles remonstrances Stre faites audit 
seigneur Roi, tant sur le sujet de l1 interdiction que des termes 
extraordinaires contenus audit arrit du Conseil, et cependant que, 
conformement 8 l'arrit de la Cour conni, les Chambres assemblies, le
2 fevrier dernier, les eommissaires ne passeront outre 8 1'instruction 
dudit proc8s, jusques 8 ce que les remonstrances ordonnees par ledit 
arr&t aient ite faites audit seigneur Roi." B.N. Imprimis Lb36.2839, 
Requestes presenties par de Marillac, p. 12.
30lhe text of the Parlement's arret is in Lb36.2839, Requestes 
presentees par de Marillac, pp. 13-14- Neither the debate nor the 
text of the ari^ Tt is preserved in the registers.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
428
for an arr&t du Conseil nullified the Parlement1s decision on the 
same day it was issued.^ Under these circumstances none of the 
Parlement1s huissiers dared risk delivering the decision, and the 
arrgt had to he carried to Moricq at the citadel of Verdun by an agent 
of the Marshal's family. The court’s huissiers had been right: upon 
his arrival on the 28th, the messenger was aribtrarily thrown into 
a fortress where he remained incommunicado and without trial for six 
or seven months.32
Help from the Parlement frustrated, the mareschale de Marillac 
appealed to Louis for an audience. This was turned down. She 
then went to Richelieu, who told her that he would not see her 
without Louis' permission. Some time after this the mareschal1s 
wife was conducted outside Paris; other members of his family were 
exiled from Paris or expelled from their positions.33 At the same 
time the mareschal drafted writs of recusation against the garde des 
sceaux, Moricq, and several other royal agents; during March these 
were summarily rejected by three arrgts du Conseil.
Having brushed aside the opposition of the Parlement and 
Marillac's personal appeals, the Crown pressed on with its prosecution 
of the hapless victim. Letters from Paris dated May 13, 1631, 
proclaimed the official version of charges against him, ordered
32Griffet, Histoire de Louis XIII, II, 121; VaissiSre, L'Affaire 
du mareschal de Marillac, pp. 112-13.
^VaissiSre, L1Affaire du mareschal de Marillac, pp. 112-13; 
Griffet, Histoire de Louis XIII, II, 122.
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Marillac moved from Ste. Menhould to Dijon, and commissioned a 
chambre de justice to carry out his trial. This bench was initially 
composed of Noel Brulart, Claude de Paris, and Paul Hay de Chastelet, 
maftres des requestes; Pierre des Barres and Jean Bouchu, presidents 
of the Parlement of Dijon; and ten conseillers drawn from the same 
court. As the trial progressed the garde des sceaux and others came 
to be added to the list. Moricq and Laffemas acted as rapporteurs 
with prosecution in the hands of Pierre Saintonge, procureur g£n£ral 
at Dijon. At least ten judges had to be present to return the 
verdict.34
Why had the government chosen to locate the commission at Dijon?
Marillac*s partisans saw in this royal intentions to have him
judged by those whose lands and buildings had suffered in the passage
of the mareschal1 s army from Champagne to Piedmont during the campaign
of 1630. But VaissiSre, Marillac* s historian, suggests that the
Crown had other more important, considerations connected with the
influence of the Parlement of Paris:
I believe, however, that the preoccupation of the government was 
especially to have the case judged outside the ressort of the 
Parlement of Paris. That which tends to prove it is that an 
epidemic having broken out in Burgundy, and another place of 
assembly having to be designated for the commission, they 
immediately accepted Laffemas and Moricq* s proposition to meet 
at Verdun, "place, said they, sufficiently prescribed by the 
investigation which is there continuing, and which is outside 
the jurisdiction of the Parlement of Paris."35
34The text of the commission of May 13 is in B.N. Imprimes Lb36 
.2839, Requestes presentees par de Marillac, pp. 15-17. Additional 
details-may be found in Vaissi^re, L*Affaire du mareschal de 
Marillac, pp. 113-14-
^^Vaissi^re, L*Affaire du mareschal de Marillac, p. 115.
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The transfer to Verdun took place on July 2; evidently even at this
late date the eommissaires had enough respect for the influence of
the Parlement in Marillac1s cause to avoid operations within its
jurisdiction. Finally, both Dijon and Verdun were close to the
Duchy of Lorraine where Gaston D1 Orleans had sought refuge after
fleeing the kingdom in pique and panic during March. Making an
example of the mareschal nearby might serve to remind his followers
of the treatment meted out to rebels and conspirators.
According to the commission of May 13, the comwri ssaires were
to try Marillac on the broad grounds that
he has very badly abused the authority that we {[Louis XIIl] 
gave him, and that he availed himself of it only to oppress 
our subjects and to impede the implementation of our good 
intentions, so that on the complaints Tof our subjects] . . . 
we have been constrained to assure ourselves of his person, 
and to investigate his actions and behavior that we have 
found so contrary to the expectations we had conceived in 
him. After seeing in our council the charges, investigations, 
and other procedures made against him by eommissaires we have 
deputed for this purpose, we have deemed ourselves unable, 
without wounding our conscience, to any longer conceal his 
evil actions nor excuse him of them without punishment, 
exemplary for the public interest rather than for our own. For 
these reasons, completely assured of your integrity and wisdom, 
we have commissioned, ordered, and deputed you . . .  to 
prosecute and extraordinarily try the said sieur de Marillac.3°
During the following months the Crown's prosecutors found that trans­
lating these vague assertions into legal torts of l3se-majest€ was 
impossible; unable to show that the mareschal had committed any crime 
of State, the judges then concentrated on his handling of State
36fi.N. Imprimes Lb#*.2839, Requestes presentees par de Marillac, 
pp. 15-16.
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funds involved in construction of the citadel of Verdun and the 
conduct of his troops, where, under accepted military practices of 
the times, it was easy to dredge up some misconduct. By mid-summer 
the semblance of a case had been built around three general categories 
of charges: peculation of funds dedicated to the army in Champagne 
during 1630; malversations committed in the course of construction 
at Verdun, which Marillac commanded; and excessive requisitions 
levied on civilians where the army had passed on its way from 
Champagne to Piedmont. Arraignment on these charges did not take 
place before late in the year, however, and long before that time 
the Parlement of Paris had become embroiled in a host of other 
difficulties with the Crown which it is now necessary to examine.3?
The thorniest problem that Louis XIII faced after the Day of 
Dupes was that of his immediate family, for despite large bribes, 
tearful promises, and solemn reassurances, a peaceful and trust­
worthy rapprochement between Louis, Richelieu, Gaston d'Orleans, and 
Marie proved impossible. At the end of January Gaston withdrew from 
court in a huff and retired to Orleans, thereby raising the possi­
bility of new cabals. Long discussions between Louis and his 
advisers then produced reluctant decisions: mother and brother must 
remain separated; the Queen Mother must be secretly deported to a 
close and certain supervision secure from Gaston's machinations and 
far from Paris. The place chosen was an ancient royal residence
VaissiSre, L'Affaire du marSschal de Marillac, p. 115.
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deep in the forest of CompiSgne, where the King, Queen, and an 
unsuspecting Queen Mother gathered in the middle of February.
Louis' stay, however, was short. Before morning broke on the 23rd, 
Louis and the court slipped silently into the dawn, leaving Marie 
and her entourage behind, for all intents isolated in the care of 
eight companies of royal guards. With his mother thus restricted, 
on March 11 Louis set out for Orleans to bring his younger brother 
to reason. Gaston, impetuous and foolish as ever, refused any 
contact and fled to Lorraine, all the while papering the countryside 
with vehement letters, tracts, and broadsides blaming his own and 
the kingdom's misfortunes on the scheming, ambitious, and hard­
hearted Cardinal. Louis followed, stopping in Dijon on March 30 to 
register a proclamation with the parlement in which his brother's 
supporters were declared guilty of l£se-majestg.
These events of the early months of 1631 presented the monarchy 
with a delicate situation, for Louis now had the embarrassing and 
dangerous public image of having hounded both his mother and brother 
into exile. If Marie was temporarily in hand, Gaston was free and 
quite capable of stirring up major troubles with the due de Lorraine 
or even with the Spanish in nearby Franche Comte. Within the kingdom, 
where popular discontent was running high because of economic hard­
ship and oppressive taxation, various elements could easily raise 
the standard of revolt in the name of the heir apparent against 
an unjust king and his tyrannical minister. The possibilities of a 
linkup between internal and external forces was thus very real and 
readily apparent to both sides during the spring.
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At the same time a powder keg was developing in Louis' capital 
where high elements of the royal administration were among those 
Frenchmen most disturbed by royal policies. To be sure, under 
normal conditions Louis' familial estrangement would have left his 
officials largely unmoved. But in this uneasy spring of 1631, all of 
Paris was depressed by unusually severe outbreaks of vagabondage, 
crime, and epidemic sickness which were compounded by rumors of 
royal intentions to impose an aide of twenty-five percent on the 
retail sale of wine. On February 3 these rumors brought a hundred and 
fifty wine merchants and four or five hundred tavern keepers, porters, 
lackeys, servants, and on-lookers to the front of the HStel de ville 
for a demonstration against the tax. The privSt des marchands was 
unable to give them any satisfaction, and soon the crowd was crying 
for blood. When the city guard was called up, the colonel de 
quartier in charge found that not a single one of his command would 
bestir themselves in support of law and order. The mob soon surged 
through the city streets seeking Jean Bryois, the local aides 
farmer, screaming that they would throw him into the Seine or flay 
him and set his house on fire. The rioters were finally dispersed 
by two companies of guards brought over from the Louvre who shot 
down several of the crowd and seized others; Bryois was personally 
rescued from hiding by the due de Montbazon, governor of Paris, 
and spirited off in his carriage for safekeeping.
38d <Avene1, Richelieu et la monarehie absolue, II, Appendix VII, 
"Emeute provoquSe par un drortf"3e detail sur le vin," pp. 434-35.
For the conditions of the spring of 1631, see supra, p.
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Encouraged "by these hardship conditions, a particularly potent
combination of annoyances had been building steadily among the
Parisian courts since the beginning of the new year. The interaction
of contemporary conditions with the politics of the sovereign courts
was noted by D'Andilly, who, with slight error in time frame,
observed that 'during the indecision of the CompiSgne j oumey
[February 11-23] there transpired three things which proved very
unsettling." The first of these was the departure of Gaston for
Orleans; the second, the emeute populaire in Paris over the new
imposition of aides; the third
was the protest of the soverign companies on edicts that the 
King wanted passed because, seeing that they those in the 
council did not want to give them the paulette, they would 
not verify any edict, which frustrated the King's chances for 
the revenues that he hoped to draw from the edicts.
Then, as a postscript, D'Andilly tellingly added, "the real cause was
the November stroke which continued the displeasure of Ms the brother
of the King with M8 the Cardinal."^9
D'Andilly was especially accurate in regard to the Parlement,
where dissatisfaction had been mounting since the Day of Dupes. Three
major reasons for the court's inquietude, the seizure of Marillac,
the accusation of Brillet, and the problem of commissaires in general,
have already been seen. Even in the midst of discussing these topics,
however, the Parlement could not forget that the paulette had been
suspended or that a creation of office was pending. On
^^Biblio. de l'Inst., Ms. Godefroy 285, "Journal de la cour sous 
Louis XIII," by Robert Amauld d'Andilly, fol. 28. This manuscript
includes material that is not found in the Journal inedit for the 
years 1630-32.
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February 17 the judges in plenary session decided that thereafter
there would he no deliberation on the provisions to any office in the
court and that the droit annuel would not be paid.40 The Crown did
not act to relieve any of these grievances, and near the end of
February the Palais was seething with anger, as witnessed by an
interesting letter from conseiller Pierre Berger, one of Richelieu's
informants in the Parlement, to the Cardinal. Berger very frankly
advised the minister on the 24th that
it appears that the spirits of the company are growing more and 
more irritated, and beyond that the enemies of your power, who 
are hardly more friendly to that of the King, are taking subject 
to render you odious and are everywhere making malicious accounts 
of you. I see by the gestures and by ways of acting and speaking 
of several that I have always known [to be] the friends of 
innovation, that they promise themselves a change soon . . . .
They are making an inventory of these ([complaints in] remon­
strances: on the last Briois riot; . . . that several quarters
of rente on the city have not been paid; that the poor folk 
of the country are dying of hunger, and that nevertheless 
instead of discharging they surcharge them; that all the notable 
people of the State are exposed by means of these extraordinary 
commissions to the danger of suffering anything one wishes at 
the court. . . .  I make no judgment on all that . . .  I will 
only say that one sees by these and by an infinite number of 
other circumstances . . . that public discontent grows from day 
to day, and that the particular remedies of driving away or 
putting in the Bastille those that it seems are accounted more 
bad than good give the King and you a hundred adversaries for 
[each] one so treated . . . .  It is thus necessary to find some 
universal remedies to put an end to these discontents. Discharge 
yourself of the spirit of all these little topical remedies which 
are not even pallatives in the [present] ill-disposition of 
spirits and which serve to sharpen and aggravate the evil rather 
than to tone it down. I have no need to tell you, indeed, that 
which you known better than I, that is more expedient to reign in 
hearts than with stick in hand.41
4°B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 77-78, February 17, 1631.
41yaissi5re, L 1Affaire du mareschal de Marillac, pp. 111-12, 
quoting an unci ted letter o f"~Eerger to kicFeiieu.
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Iouis, then at Compidgne, was well aware of the prevailing state 
of affairs in his capital and kingdom. Before setting off to deal 
with Gaston, he composed a long lettre de cachet to the Parlement 
explaining the woes of the kingdom, his reasons for the humiliating 
treatment of his mother, and his enduring support for Richelieu. The 
letter was carefully timed to arrive in Paris just after the King 
left Compi£gne, and between the lines the judges could read that it was 
a subtle warning not to further complicate the royal dilemma at this 
critical juncture.42
The judges of the Parlement understood the King's situation but 
tacitly chose to ignore it as the most serious crisis of the spring 
budded in the Palais de Justice during early March. The fresh turmoil 
had not originated with the Parlement, but with the Cour des aides 
which, in early February, had been asked to register an increase in 
the wine aides of Paris. There was great popular resistance to the 
tax, as the Bryois riot showed; the Cour des aides had refused 
registration, whereupon on February 27 the Crown ordered it inter­
dicted and transferred its functions to a commission of maitres des 
requites and conseillers from the Grand Conseil.43 The maftres
42b.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 78-81, February 26, 1631.
The text is also printed in Mold's Mgmoires, II, 35-37. The letter was, 
in effect, a press release to the public in the form of an open letter
to all the parlements. It was also printed in the Mereure frangois,
XVII, 130-33. The letter was dated from CompiSgne, February 23, 
though it was certainly postdated, for the King departed before dawn 
on the 23rd. It was presented in the Parlement on the 26th, by 
which time news of the Queen Mother's exile and the King's departure
would have reached the capital.
43D'Avenel, Richelieu et la mcnarchie absolue, II, Appendix VIII, 
"Refus d'enregistrement d'un £dit par la Cour des aides," pp. 435-42.
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were thrown into a quandry: should they accept a commission ousting
an entire corps of their fellow magistrates, or should they resist 
the King's orders? Normally there would have been little difficulty 
in deciding for the King whose councils they served, but the mnftres, 
like the other judicial officials, had not yet been granted the 
paulette; their corps, too, had been threatened with expansion in 
the edict pending before the Parlement. Therefore, in early March 
the maftres assembled as a body, refused the Crown's commission, 
and even made remonstrances to the garde des sceaux. The council 
retaliated with an arr&t of March 10 which annulled the decisions made 
in the mattres' assemblies "as made by incompetent judges and without 
power," ordered their acts stricken from the registers and replaced 
by the arr6t du Conseil, and proscribed any such assemblies in the 
future. Finally and most remarkably, three of the mafrtres were 
suspended from their duties and barred from participation in the 
Conseil p rive.44 On the same day the commissaires went to the Cour 
des aides, took their places, registered their commission, and 
promptly adjourned because the greffier, the registers, and necessary 
instructions could not be f o u n d . A t  this point the Crown was faced 
with the possibility of a general revolt among the most elite members 
of its magistrature, including those serving the council itself.
^MolS, Mgmoires, II, p. 38-39.
45d 'Avene1, Richelieu et la monarehie absolue, II, Appendix VIII, 
p. 440.
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This rebellion threatened to infect the Parlement just as Louis
was departing for Orleans when some judges proposed to take up the
interdiction of the Cour des aides and the 1 commission. 46
The prospect of parlementaire cooperation with the maitres and other
sovereign courts in the King’s absence presented a specter of the
first magnitude, and Louis hastened to avoid it. Before leaving his
capital on the 11th of March, Louis forbade any assembly in the
Parlement touching on the Cour des aides. After the King had departed,
however, some judges again suggested discussions, and on March 13
royal couriers pounded up the road from Etampes with a bundle of
lettres de cachet: one each to the Grand Conseil, the gens du roi
in the Parlement, the court as a whole, and one each to the
presidents £ mortier. The general tenor of each copy was the same,
the most interesting one to the presidents 3 mortier reading:
Monsieur le President, yesterday I was informed that an assembly 
of the chambers had been asked, there to put forward considerations 
on the establishment that I have made of some commissaires to 
attend to rendering justice to my subjects on the collection of 
Aides. I avow to you that this affair is sensitive to me, 
because those of my Parlement have no jurisdiction over matters 
which others have competence, and that it seems that having 
prohibited the undertaking of it on Monday [the lOtlj) that Wed­
nesday it was pursued. Seeing the different directions which 
that might take, learning the ones who injured my authority, and 
not wanting to be obliged to make an assertion of all extremity 
against my Parlement, I have resolved to prevent the evil, 
using new prohibitions, not only writing to the court, to the 
sieur Le Jay, First President, and to my attorneys as is 
accustomed, but to each of you, presidents in the Parlement, in 
order to explain to you my sentiment and to declare to you that
46The registers do not contain this initial consideration, 
which must be inferred from later references. See B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. 
acq. 9891, fols. 81-82, March H, 1631, and Ifoll, Mgmoires, II,
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I would be offended if, in the face of my intentions, it were to 
continue. I am counting on your fidelity and affection in case 
the affair is advanced so far that the dignity of your offices and 
the weight of your reasons cannot stop them, nor the force of 
my letter, nor that which will be said to them by our avocats 
and Procureur Ggn&ral, ([so] that you, with your colleagues, 
will adjourn yourselves at one time which will prevent the 
continuation of this deliberation. I am writing in these same 
terms to your colleagues, and have very precisely mandated my 
will to the said sieur Le Jay, whom I entreat you to support and 
follow. Relying on your fidelity and accustomed affection, I 
pray God that he will have you, Monsieur le President in his holy 
care. Written at Etampes the 13th day of March 1631.^
Despite these explicit instructions, the next day the Parlement
ordered tr8s humble remonstrances on the commissaires in the Aides'
seats as well as the interdiction of the three maftres. BelliSvre and
several conseillers were entrusted with the task of presenting them.48
At first glance these actions of the court appear to be daring
defiance of the royal wishes. The Crown took them to be so, and
rightly feared the consequences. Other pieces of evidence, however,
indicate that the court had proceded quite cautiously behind Louis'
back. Noting the Parlement's actions of the week, D'Andilly wrote
Although the King in leaving Paris had made prohibitions to the 
Parlement to assemble, it assembled nevertheless; but the 
action passed with great respect [l'action se passa avec grand 
respect] and only IF le_president de BelliSvre was deputed to go 
to make remonstrances to the King on the unpleasant impressions 
given to him by his Parlement.49
Assuming the veracity of D'Andilly's remarks, it seems likely that
the Parlement's involvement was intended more as a gesture of support
47Molg, M&noires, II, 41-42.
4%.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fol. 84, March 14, 1631.
49D«Andilly, Journal ingdit, X, 156-57.
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for the Com* des aides and the maftres than a determination to press 
matters to a confrontation and possible co-operation amnng the 
discontented magistrates. If the judges had wished to underscore 
deeply held feelings, a larger delegation would have been named under 
the direction of the First President. Finally, although the Crown 
made no conciliatory move to the Parlement, the matter disappeared 
from the court's registers after the entry of 15th. Undoubtedly the 
decision to drop the issue was encouraged by withdrawal of the 
twenty-five percent aide on March 17 and by increasing evidence that 
the commissaires would not be able to function, since they received 
no pleas and lawyers refused to argue before them.50 Nevertheless, 
for a time the ominous possibility of united action among the 
sovereign courts of the capital had presented itself, and at least 
partially because of pressure from officers, the Crown had been 
forced to compromise with them by withdrawing the wine tax. The 
commissaires, too, proved an experience in burlesque and were 
completely withdrawn on May 7.^
The affair of the Cour des aides had scarcely subsided when the 
Parlement was drawn into consideration of a matter of State of the 
utmost significance: the rebellion and flight of Gaston d'Orleans.
This momentuous issue, like so many others, was grounded in the Day 
of Dupes, but in gravity it far outstripped any the Parlement had 
considered up to that time. Indeed, this affair was not only the
5®D'Avenel, Richelieu et la monarchic absolue, II, Appendix VIII, 
440-43.
51Ibid., 444.
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climax of the spring crisis hut potentially became one of the most 
perilous periods of Louis' reign when, in the middle of April, Louis 
and Richelieu had to contend with a public overture to the Parlement 
submitted by Gaston. The court went on to discuss royal policies 
towards his followers, and the Crown's firm resolve had to be 
underscored in the strongest terms to that date, including a summons 
to meet the King en corps at the Louvre, public destruction of its 
records, and the exile of several magistrates.
The Gaston d1 Orleans Affair began innocuously enough. On 
March 30 Louis had had registered in the Parlement of Dijon a 
declaration against his brother which outlined his contrary behavior, 
ingratitude, and final flight from the kingdom. The King's brother, 
as Louis' heir-apparent, was invulnerable, but the edict declared his 
followers the eomte de Moret, the dues d'Elbeuf, De Bellegarde, and 
De Roannez, the president 5 mortier Jacques le Coigneux, the sieurs 
de Puylaurens, Montsigot, and Chanteloube, "and all other persons of 
whatever quality and condition that they should be" guilty and 
convicted of lSse-majest€ on the primae facia evidence of having fled 
the kingdom without permission.52 From Louis' view there was nothing 
unusual in the pronouncement, which was soundly grounded in the 
ordinances. The Parlement of Dijon had been presented with the 
document out of force of circumstance, because Louis had ended his 
pursuit there and because the court was close to Gaston's refuge.
2^Le Mercure fran^ ois, XVII, 1/+6-52.
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Likewise, as far as the Crown was concerned, Gaston's supporters had 
convicted themselves by their treasonous behavior in assisting and 
advising the King's brother against the known will of the King.
Their actions had included the raising of troops in Gaston's behalf, 
an offense plainly defined as l§se-majestg in Article 183 of the 
Ordinance of Blois.
Therefore when the Parlement of Paris received the declaration 
on April 4, there was no readily apparent reason why registration 
should not have followed immediately. Nevertheless, it did not, 
the court deciding "to deliberate on the said declaration and to see 
the registers."53 The reasons for this decision and the ensuing 
hearings were never formally expressed, but they were probably an 
amalgam of accumulated mistrust from earlier in the spring, institu­
tional pride, and legal reasoning. The Parlement received the 
declaration in a low humor, which was not improved by the news that 
it had first been presented in a provincial sovereign court and not 
the first court of the land. Upon examination the magistrates found 
that one of their own number, the president £_ mortier Jacques le 
Coigneux, had been condemned without being heard before the Parlement. 
Lastly, the court may have believed that Gaston's other supporters 
had been unfairly condemned because their offices required that they 
remain near his person, thus having been declared guilty of lSse- 
majestg for merely having followed their master.^
53b .N. Ms . fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fol. 85, April 4, 1631.
^Griffet, Histoire de Louis XIII, II, 144-45. Griffet added a
fourth reason that is more difficult to substantiate, that the judges
acted out of concern for Gaston, "whose interests had always been
dear to the company."
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Unhappily for those who would know the court's actions at this
time, the registers contain no entries between April 4 and April 24.
If the court followed its usual procedure, and there is no reason to
suppose that it did not, a committee was appointed to examine the
declaration and report on it. A few days later, perhaps on the 7th
or 8th, a report was presented and deliberations begun. However,
according to D'Andilly,
When it came to UF Pinon [dean of the conseillers of the Grand1 
Chanibre] he said that it seemed to him that they were going a 
little quickly in an affair of so great a consequence, and that 
he was of the opinion that they should see the registers as 
they customarily did on similar occasions.55
The proclamation was probably still under examination on April 12, 
when a new development cast the Parlement's consideration in a 
radically different light. On Saturday, the 12th, one sieur Michael 
Roger, Gaston's procurer general, delivered a request for justice 
from the prince to a conseiller of the Parlement. The petition was 
in two parts, the first a polemic against Richelieu, who "had under­
taken open force upon his person," driven him from the kingdom, and 
sent a declaration to the Parlement of Dijon "filled with various 
facts that he imagines contrary to the honor and reputation of the 
said seigneur due." Gaston then enlisted the aid of the Parlement 
through a legal appeal:
55D'Andilly, Journal inedit, X, 162-63- D'Andilly recorded this 
entry for April 24, then noted: "This {opinion] of UF Pinon came more
than fifteen days before, the first time that they had deliberated on 
the declaration, [and] upon which they re-deliberated from the begin­
ning on the said day the 24th." This note would then place the 
beginning of the deliberation around the 7th or 8th of April.
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This considered, Messieurs, [if] it please you [to] give writ to 
the said Due on that which he declares, that the enterprise and 
violent persecution of the said Cardinal against his person is 
the cause of his sortie from the kingdom, and that there is not 
one among those named in the said declaration, nor any other, 
which by counsel or otherwise has there contributed; give him 
writ as well as on the protestation which he makes so that the 
said above mentioned declaration cannot damage or prejudice 
those included in it, nor him, from that which he opposes; 
that it oppose the execution of the said declaration and the 
registration of all similar [ onesJ which might be presented 
on the same subject; to arrest the course of the pernicious 
designs of the said Jean Armand de Plessis, Cardinal de Richelieu, 
the said Due asks that it render itself a formal party against 
him, his abettors and abherents, to have them tried on the 
facts mentioned in the present request, circumstances, and 
dependencies; requiring to this effect permission to investigate, 
obtain monition, and the adjunction of the King's Procureur 
ggngral; to do yourselves justice.56
This was nothing less than an attempt to rally the Parlement to Gaston's
cause, and the conseiller, well aware of the significance of what was
happening, passed the petition to Le Jay, who remitted it to the King. 57
Does this mean that the request was not debated in the Parlement? The
question cannot be answered with certainty. The court's registers
and the memoirs of Mol£, Talon, and Richelieu make no mention of any
deliberation en conseil between April 4 and 24. That no debate on the
^Le Mercure francois, XVII, 178-82.
^According to Griffet's account, "The First President made 
clear to him [the conseiller] the consequences of such a step, and 
the request was sent to the court. Bernard [Charles Bernard, Histoire 
de Louis XIII eomposee par Messire Charles Bernard (Paris, 1646), 
258-59.] asserts that it was presented to the Parlement on April 12, 
but in the preamble of the arrgt du conseil returned on May 12, 1731 
[sic, 1631J, by which this request is suppressed as calumnious and 
contrary to the repose and security of the State, it is said that 
the conseiller comported himself in this affair according to his duty 
[Griffet’s italics]; this signifies in the style of the cardinal that 
the request had been remitted to the King." Griffet, Histoire de 
Louis XIII, II, 145-46. The arret du Conseil of suppression of 
May 12, 1631, may be found in iLe Mercure francois, XVII, 183-84.
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request took place, or that Le Jay attempted to stop it, is supported 
by Gaston's later accusation that the First President had "prevented 
f a empeschel that the said request should be presented to you." 
Equally, Le Jay might only have impeded presentation of the request 
by forwarding it to Louis. This view is supported by the testimony of 
Robert D'Andilly, which indicates that the Parlement did deliberate 
the request:
The Parlement of Paris assembled all the chambers to deliberate 
on the request presented to them by the procureur general of 
Monsieur D'Orleans and was concluded by voice illegible were 
of the advice to make tr&s humble remonstrances to the King and 
convoke the peers and the others to make an investigation*9
Probably Le Jay first took the request to the King, then, its presen­
tation being widely known, others demanded that it be deliberated en 
conseil as a matter of public concern. The appeal was, of course, 
closely tied to the subject matter of the March 30 declaration and 
could easily be insinuated into discussions on it. Whatever the 
nature of the discussions during the week of April 12-17, they 
produced no decision, for on April 17 the Crown addressed a lettre 
de cachet to the court requiring a prompt registration on the first 
day of audiences after Easter (April 20). The court refused to 
comply. Upon its return on April 24, it decided to continue its 
deliberations on the next Saturday, the 26th.60
58Le Mercure frangois, XVII, 201. This accusation against Le Jay 
is found in a second petition to the Parlement recusing Le Jay dated 
May 30, 1631.
59fiiblio. de l'Inst., Ms. Godefroy 285, fol. 35.
6oB.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 86-87, April 24, 1631.
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Happily for those who would understand the temper of the Parle­
ment at this time, the deliberations that took place on April 26 are
known in some detail. The final billet des opinions for this day
has survived in manuscript form; along with a detailed commentary in
D'Andilly1 s journal and a few remarks in Mbit's Memoires, this permits 
a reasonable accurate reconstruction of what transpired. On this 
notable Saturday there were only sixty-eight judges present because, 
according to D'Andilly, many were still away at their country homes 
after the Easter holidays. Perhaps, too, some of these were wary 
of returning to what the Crown could only regard as a contumacious 
assembly. Among those present, D'Andilly remarked, "some strange 
things were said" (II se dit des choses estranges).^ Amid the 
clamor of the day, a report on Gaston's request was not presented, 
but there were rumors circulating about it. No one spoke for verifi­
cation. After the report by rapporteur Boucher, debate organized 
itself according to four opinions. The first, moderate and temporizing, 
was to turn the issue over to the procureur g$n£ral for investigation. 
The second, presented by president des Enqugtes Jean-Jacques Barillon, 
was to make remonstrances to the King, not only on the declaration 
but also on the presentation of Gaston's request, for, as he said,
"if it were true, he was shocked that they [the judges} had not 
spoken of it, and if it were not, its publication [in Paris} would 
not have been allowed."^*2 President 5 mortier Nicolas le Bailleul
^D'Andilly, Journal inedit, X, 163-
62Ibid.
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offered a third course, that the King should he petitioned to send an 
envoy to Gaston "to exhort his return and to enjoin all those who had 
followed him and were for the King to return within the month."63 
Finally and most radically, president des Enqugtes Pierre Gayant 
recommended calling the peers. Very few favored either of the last 
two courses, and the opinions were reduced to the first two, an 
investigation and report on the declaration by the procureur general 
or, more drastically, to refuse verification and male remonstrances. 
The court could not decide between these, and the day ended with a 
split decision, thirty-four votes to thirty-four.^ Le Jay was 
infuriated at this turn of events, telling his colleagues that "the 
King will see to it."65
63Ibid. ^
64Ibid., 164. B.N. Ms. fr. 18413, fol. 127v°, "Act de delibera­
tion de la Cour de Parlement de Paris L'an 1631 le xx6er avril sur la 
declaration que dernier du mois de Mars," gives the votes on this 
decision. Those for an investigation and report were: presidents a 
mortier Le Jay, Bailleul, Siguier, and Bellievre; conseillers Bouehier, 
Bauyn, Pastoureau, Crespin, Damours, Durant, C. le Clerc, Viole, 
du Fautray, De la Barre, Le Ferron, Hatte, Ruelle, Rancher, Charlet, 
Jabin, Fayet, Pinon, De Pleure, Saunier, L'Alemand, Le Coq, Portail, 
Meliant, Magdelaine, Catinat, Sauarre, De Machaut, Halle, De Bretagne. 
Those for remonstrances were: Batillon, Tudert, Laisne, De Longueil, 
Lescalopier, De Coumont, Durant, De MontIon, Lefebvre, Amelot,
Du Tranehan, Saveuse, Bici, Ferrand, Viole, Broe, Parfait, Saumiere, 
Berrochel, Doujat, Baton, Le Roy, Benoise, N. Le Clerc, Perrot, Gayant, 
Du Tranchay, Luillier, Pithou, Brussel, Favier, Brisart, De Ligny, 
Courtin. Spelling of names, still highly variable at this time, is 
given as in the orginal.
^The original reads: '([After the decision was returned] 
Quelques'uns dirent qu'il se fauldroit rassembler la semaine 
prochaine, auquel temps tous Mrs seroient revenuz des champs. Mais 
le premier president, tout pique, leur dit: 'Le Roy y pourvoyera.1" 
D'Andilly, Journal inedit, X, 164-
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This Louis did, but with discretion and careful planning. On
April 29 Mole was instructed to immediately send an account of the
April 26 deliberations, which he did, providing Chateauneuf with a
copy of the opinions, along with the advice that
I know very well that this is not satisfactory to the King’s 
will, who has sent his letters to be published and registered, 
and this difficulty in his view could have the same effect as a 
refusal. In which case, it will be necessary to send lettres 
de jussion in order to oblige the company to return a certain 
resolution. °
But instead of sending a letter, Louis and Richelieu determined on
the toughest of measures to deal with the court. Sometime before
May 12 the King and his chief minister hashed these measures out,
then their decision was presented in a pro forma meeting of the council
attended by all the princes, dukes, peers, officers of the Crown,
and eonseillers d'Etat. The first opinion was delivered by the
senior conseiller, De Roissi, who presented the Crown's argument that
there was no reason why the Parlement should not be excluded from
considering matters of State, Francis I and Charles IX having created
precedents for such a ruling. This proposal carried easily because,
in Griffet's words,
the opinion of M. De Roissi was too much in conformity with the 
maxims and interests of the Cardinal not to be followed by all 
who voted in his presence. Everybody was of the opinion to tear 
up the deliberation of April 26, and to put in its place in the 
register an arret by which this act would be annulled as fool­
hardy before the laws and usages of the kingdom. ^7
^Mble, MSmoires, II, 48.
6?Griffet, Histoire de Louis XIII, II, 148; D'Andilly, Journal 
inedit, X, 166.
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Two arrgts du Conseil were then drafted, the first quashing the 
Parlement's deliberations and barring it from matters of State; the 
second suppressing Gaston d'Orleans request of April 12 as "calumnious, 
contrary to the wellbeing of his service, the repose of his subjects, 
and the security of his State. These arrtts were not immediately 
signified to the Parlement. Instead, lettres de cachet were sent 
notifying it to appear at the Louvre en masse the next day at 4:00.
The greffier was specifically ordered to bring the official minutes 
of the April 26 debate, but the reason was not given.^9
Mole presented the summons early on the morning of May 13, and 
after having hurriedly sent the gens du roi on a reconnaisance 
mission to the Louvre to try to find out what the King was up to, the 
Parlement finally resolved to obey the royal order to appear.
At 3:30 in the afternoon 140 of the assembled magistrates departed
6**Le Mercure francois, XVII, 183. The arrgt against Gaston's 
request was published in its entirety in the Mercure francois, XVII, 
182-83. ---------- ---
S^Mole, Mgmoires, II, 49.
^Robert D'Andilly's journal makes some very revealing comments 
about this expedition and the events of the morning of May 13. Upon 
receiving the lettres de cachet of May 12, the court assembled and 
called for the gens du Rol to ask their opinions. Avocat general 
Omer Talon, new to the court and perhaps a little overawed, "said that 
they had nothing to say." This riled the judges, who finally decided 
that they should send procureur general Mole and not Talon to find the 
King. Mole arrived at the Louvre at 11:30, just as the King was 
getting up, and found Louis "so irritated against the Parlement that 
he TMoleJ could never win anything, saying that he wanted to be 
entirely obeyed and, during this time, having sent to Mr the Cardinal, 
he received the following note: 'It is with kings as with gods who
never refuse to pardon and remit the faults of those who repent. If 
Messieurs of the Parlement, coming to find the King upon the letters 
C de cachetJ that His Majesty has sent to this effect, say to him that 
they have come to recognize the wrong they have had in the procedure 
that they followed [on April 26], the regret that they have for it, 
and the resolution that they have taken to correct themselves
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the Palais on foot in black robes and square bonnets, Tna-rnhing two by 
two, led by the huissiers, to one of the most memorable rendezvous in 
the court's history. The judges filed out through the Cour du mai 
at the front of the Palais, turned left, transvered the few hundred 
meters to the Pont au change, then turned left again at the Chatelet, 
passing along the Seine up to the church of St. Germain-l'Auxerrois 
facing the Louvre. There they were met by De Souvre, premier 
gentilhomme de la chambre, who conducted them into the Louvre, down 
Henry IV's Grande galerie, and into the Galerie des Peintures.
Before they saw the King, however, secretaire d'Etat La Ville-aux- 
Clercs came forward and asked if the First President had a satisfactory 
response to make regarding registration of the March 30 declaration.
Le Jay answered that the court did not, since each magistrate had 
voted his convictions and conscience following one side or the other
according to his Majesty's desires, and give him their word on it, I 
believe that His Majesty should use his extraordinary bounty, and 
dispense them of that which was resolved yesterday, Lit] being much 
better that men return to their duty of their own rather than by force, 
which is a remedy of which God and men should serve themselves only 
on default of the first.'" Louis handed the note to Mole, saying 
"You see how If? the Cardinal and I are of the same opinion. I never 
give away Mr the Cardinal's notes, but want to make you a copy of it" 
and at the same time sent for a secretary. One could not be found, 
but Mole understood the point and excused himself, saying he could 
well remember what the note had said and would make his report to the 
Parlement on it. This was done at 1:30. The procureur general was not 
specific about the words of the King but said "only that he was 
extremely indignant and absolutely wanted to be obeyed." The Parlement 
considered what to do, and it was decided to say nothing to the King 
at all, but only to make "grandes reverences." This resolution to 
remain silent, D'Andilly adds, was taken in the morning before sending 
the procureur general to the Louvre. Journal in£dit, X, 167-70. This 
account should be compared with the editorial comments in Richelieu, 
Lettres, IV, 149-50, and especially 150, n. 1, where the above note is 
published without knowledge of the circumstances of its presentation 
at the Louvre. The registers of the Parlement do not mention the 
interview.
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of the split decision. Neither opinion, he said, was given contrary 
to the service of the King. La Ville-aux-Clercs retired, reported to 
Louis, and returned to advise Le Jay that the King rejected his 
explanation and "prohibited him from speaking in his presence."7^
The court then shuffled up to within twenty feet of the King, seated 
on a dias at the end of the hall with the Cardinals Richelieu and La 
Valette, the comte de Soissons, Marshals Schomberg and D'Effiat, the 
garde des seeaus, the dues de Nemours, de Montmorency, d'Angouleme, de 
Chevreuse, de Longueville, and several others. Louis "said a few 
words to them, of which the word rebellion was one," then turned the 
proceedings over to Chateauneuf, who spoke forcefully and "extremely 
rudely," albeit softly, for about fifteen minutes.^ 2 The garde des 
sceaux's speech showed little originality; rather, it was a canned 
reiteration of the ancient royal position that the court was estab­
lished to render justice between individuals and not to meddle in 
affairs of State. It was certainly true, Chateauneuf admitted, that 
the court had been commissioned to participate in such affairs during 
the fifteenth century, but since the present declaration was a recog­
nition of lSse-majeste following Article 183 of the Ordinance of 
Blois, rather than a commission to try and to judge, the Parlement
7LGriffet, Historie de Louis Kill, II, 148.
72D'Andilly, Journal inSdit, X, 169-70.
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should register it without question. It had not done so, necessi­
tating the arrgt du Conseil of May 12.
La Ville-aux-Clercs then stepped forward and read the text of the 
arrgt du Conseil, the accusative portion of which held that the 
Parlement
instead of proceding to the pure and simple registration . . . 
had put the affair into deliberation and taken various opinions 
so that there was no resolution of it, to the great contempt 
of the King's authority and of his commandements, £ and toj 
the well-being and repose of France, where it is not permitted 
to courts of parlement, nor allowable to any other officers, 
to take knowledge of affairs of State, administration, and 
government of the kingdom.
This being the case,
the King being in his council, wishing to prevent and remedy 
improprieties which might in the future come from such abuses and 
undertakings against his authority and the public well-being, 
has voided and annulled, voids and annuls, the act of the deli­
beration made in his said court of the Parlement of Paris on April 
26, 1631, upon the said letters of declaration of March 30 last, 
as impertinent and made contrary to the laws and usages of the 
kingdom, and by private persons without power in this regard.
His Majesty makes very express proscription and prohibition to 
the said court of Parlement of in the future putting into deli­
beration such and similar declarations concerning the affairs of 
his State, administration, and government, at pain of inter­
diction from their charges, and greater if need be.
The irresolution of the Parlement thus overridden,
His Majesty orders that the said letters of declaration should be 
withdrawn from it [the Parlement] , very expressly forbiding them 
from taking any jurisdiction or cognizance of the contents of it, 
and that the act of the said deliberation will be withdrawn from 
the register of the registry of the said court and tom up, and 
the present arrgt put in its place, of which collated copies will
73B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 96-97, May 14, 1631; Griffet, 
Histoire de Louis XIII, II, 150-51. B.N. Ms. fr. 3834, fols. 34-34v°,
"Harangue de mons^ le garde des sceaux a la cour de Parlement," 
contains an incomplete version of the speech lacking the introductory 
remarks.
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be sent, together with^the said letters of declaration, into all 
the bailliages and slne-chaussees of the ressort of the said 
court, to be there read, published, and registered; His Majesty 
enjoining the officers of them to keep and exactly observe them; 
His Majesty reserving to commission such other of his courts of 
Parlement or other officers that it pleases him to procede against 
those denominated in the said declaration, to make and pursue 
their trials through definitive and sovereign judgment, notwith­
standing and without regard to their qualities and privileges 
that they might pretend in consequence of it, of which they are 
rendered unworthy. Done in the Conseil d'Etat of the King, His 
Majesty there sitting, held at Paris the 12th of May 1631.74-
After reading the arret, Louis told the greffier, Jean du Tillet, to 
bring him the register of April 26. The King took the page and tore 
it into pieces. The council's decision of May 12 was then given to 
be put in its place. These unmistakable gestures of authority com­
pleted, the assembly was adjourned and the magistrates retired to 
ponder the day's happenings.7 5
For three magistrates, though, the worse news was yet to come. 
Immediately after the meeting, Louis rode out to Versailles where that 
evening he ordered the radical ringleaders of the 26th out of Paris 
within twenty-four hours. Presidents des Enquetes Barillon and Gayant 
were to go to Bourges and Clermont; conseiller Jean Laisne was to take 
himself to Limoges.7^  These exiles, the first since 1597, were the
^Mole, Memoires, II, 50-52. A manuscript copy with very slight 
variations is found in the registers of the Parlement, B.N. Ms. fr. 
nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 90-92, May 13, 1631.
^^ The official record of the meeting of May 13 is in the registers, 
B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 88-98, May 13 and 14, 1631. Other 
information may be found in D'Andilly, Journal inldit, X, 169-70; Ifole, 
Mlmoires, II, 49-52; Biblio. de l'Inst., Ms. Godefroy 285, fol. 37; 
Griffet, Histoire de Louis XIII, II, 149-51.
76D'Andilly, Journal inldit, X, 170; Moll, Mlmoires, II, 52-53; 
Griffet, Histoire de Louis XIII, II, 152. The billet des opinions for 
April 26 confirms that all three exiled magistrates favored the more 
radical proposal to offer remonstrances to the King. B.N. Ms. fr.
18413, fol. 127v°.
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first signs that Louis, under Richelieu's guidance, would take the 
firmest steps to ensure that the Crown's will was obeyed. Later, 
the manner and timing of the exiles' return would also show the 
minister's finesse in managing the Parlement.
News of the exiles pereulated into the Parlement early on the 
morning of the 14-th, setting off rumors and murmurs as to what was 
afoot and what should be done. Some of the judges quietly slipped 
away until the uproar should die down, while others accepted what 
D'Andilly called the Crown's "coup."77 The rest of the 14th was spent 
verifying the banishments, and it was not until the 15th that the 
gens du roi were ordered to the Louvre to beg for the King's grace.7^ 
In the meanwhile Louis remained inaccessible at Versailles, hunting 
and doubtlessly savoring the hornet's nest stirred up in the Palais.
Out of the buzz of hearsay in Paris, though, came a rumor that some 
of the magistrates were considering a judicial strike and closing the 
Palais; upon hearing this, Louis rode back into Paris on the evening 
of the 15th. In parting he was overheard to jibe, "I am going to 
see if the Parlement will give me battle."7^
Cooler tempers prevailed on both sides, however, when the gens du 
roi finally saw Louis on the 16th. The King received the attorneys 
graciously, and sent them off with a promising concession: the
miscreants would be allowed to return to their country houses near 
Paris to await further word. After receiving the gens du roi's report,
77Journal inedit, X, 172.
78B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 92-99, May 14-15, 1631.
7^ D’Andilly, Journal inldit, X, 173.
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Le Jay subtly advised the court to accept this gesture of conciliation: 
"The court," he said, "has good reason to be content and satisfied 
with the action taken by them [the gens du rox| , which was full of 
courage, virtue, and ability."80 But the court was not satisfied with 
half the loaf. According to the registers the attorneys were sent 
back to ask Louis "very humbly to render the grace perfect," but 
D’Andilly candidly noted that they were also warned "not to return 
until they had obtained the re-establishment of these Messieurs."8-*-
The gens du roi, however, had to be content with promises from 
the garde des sceaux, because Louis had hidden himself away at 
Fountainbleau and made himself inaccessible to his attorneys. Unknown 
to the court, though, the royal grace was not long in coming. On 
May 22 conseiller d’Etat de Roissi carried secret permission for the 
exiles’ return back to Paris with instructions not to release the 
news until one week later.82 In the interim the Enquites continually 
pressured the First President to assemble the chambers for debate, but 
Le Jay refused, being assured, he said, of the King’s good intentions.83
Thq King's word was made good by way of de Roissi on Monday, May 30,
and the three absentees re-entered the court on June 2.8^
80B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fol. 101, May 17, 1631.
8lB.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fol. 102, May 17, 1631; Journal
ingdit, X, 173.
82Biblio. de l'Instit., Ms. Godefroy 285, fol. 38; Mole,
Ugmoires, II, 57-60.
8^D'Andilly, Journal ingdit.X, 178; Mole, Mgmoires, II, 57.
^Molg, Memoires, II, 60.
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The warning to Gayant, Barillon, and Laisne did not serve to hush 
their outspoken criticisms in the Palais, for no sooner had they 
rejoined their colleagues than "the next day, when the occasion 
presented itself, president Gayant spoke as freely as ever."®5 On 
the whole, though, the Parlement understood the lessons of May, for
during the next few months, at least, the court refused to be drawn
into Louis' very serious family troubles. Gaston d’Orleans, for one, 
continued to believe that he could charm the Parlement over to his 
cause. On June 6 one of his lackeys attempted to deliver some letters 
on his part, whereupon the First President told him to wait until 
the next day and went on with the audience. The messenger stayed 
until the hearing was adjourned, tried again, was refused a second 
time, and disappeared without coming baek.8^  Three weeks later 
Gaston tried again, this time sending a Provencal gentleman named 
Sanis into an audience of the Grand* Chambre. When the First President 
finished announcing a decision, Sanis stood up and said
85D'Andilly, Journal ingdit, X, 178.
^D'Andilly, Journal ingdit, X, 181. This incident is not men­
tioned in the memoirs of Talon or Moll. The agent was probably trying 
to deliver copies of the so-called "Gaston d'Orllans Manifesto," 
composed at Nancy and dated May 30, along with a recusation of Le Jay 
and an appeal to the Parlement. These documents were widely distri­
buted throughout Paris at the time and were reprinted in the Mercure 
frangois, XVII, 196-260. None of these tracts contained anything new 
in regard to the politics of the Parlement. The "Gaston Manifesto" 
is put into the context of the pamphlet warfare of the times by W. F. 
Church in Richelieu and Reason of State, pp. 207-11.
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Messieurs, this is a packet that Monsieur £ Gaston1s usual title], 
my master, has commanded me to bring to company and to present 
to you, Monsieur [Le Jay], who are its chief. He has sent a 
gentleman several times before who could not receive an audience.®*^
Having said this, Sanis threw a packet onto the greffier's desk.
Le Jay ordered the huissiers to take him to the gens du roi, who 
recommended that the unopened packet should go with the gentleman to 
the King. After fifteen minutes debate, the court agreed. Sanis 
ended up in the Bastille; his packet proved to be copies of material 
already widely circulating in printed form throughout the capital.
Louis was pleased with his judges' action and told them so through 
the gens du roi.^
Marie de Medicis also unsuccessfully attempted to woo the 
Parlement during the summer. During the session of July 21, one 
St. Affange, an Angevin page of the Queen Mother, appeared in the 
Parlement, announced his mission, and delivered a bundle of letters 
very similar to Gaston's earlier appeals. Marie asked the Parlement 
to give her justice against the "pernicious designs and violent 
actions of Jean Armand Cardinal de Richelieu," and requested a recusa­
tion of Le Jay and president des Enqufetes Lancroc. After brief
^D'Andilly, Journal ingdit, X, 183-
^%.H. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 105-06, July 1 and 3, 1631;
D'Andilly, Journal ingdit, X, 183-84; MblS, M&aoires, II, 61.
Imprimes 1*36.3571, Lettre de la Royne Tsic| mere du Roy
au Parlement (n.p., n.d.), pp. 1-2. This little pamphlet of four
urmiimhPT’Bd leaves contains two tracts, "Lettre de la Royne mere du 
Roy au Parlement" and "Requeste de la Royne mere du Roy au Parlement 
centre le Cardinal de Richelieu."
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debate the judges sent the tracts unopened to the King but set the
messenger at liberty, "which did not please Mr the First President at
90all." Undaunted by this rebuff, Marie tried again at the beginning 
of August, and again the Parlement refused to become involved.91
By the time these appeals reached Paris, however, the Queen 
Mother had already sought refuge in Flanders. On July 18 Marie had 
slipped secretly away from CompiSgne and fled north into Spanish 
territory, eventually settling in Brussels. Richelieu probably knew 
of the escape beforehand but allowed it to continue as the simplest 
disposition of a nagging problem.92 Louis was notified of his 
mother's flight during the night of July 19, and rumors of it probably 
reached the Parlement soon afterwards. Nevertheless, Louis was careful 
to officially inform his court of what had transpired. A large 
delegation from the Parlement was summoned to the Louvre after dinner 
on the evening of July 23, where Chateauneuf recounted what was 
known of the escape. Afterwards the King announced there had been 
some gossip about his death, but he was well, and his astrologers had 
predicted that he would fare well amidst the cabals of the Queen 
Mother and his brother. In closing Louis took Le Jay aside and told
9°D'Andilly, Journal Inedit, X, 190. This incident is also 
briefly recounted in the registers, B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, 
fols. 109-110, July 21, 1631.
91b .N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 117-118, August 4, 1631; 
D'Andilly, Journal ingdit, X, 195; La Gazette de France, August 7, 1631.
9^The opinion of -Burckhardt in Richelieu, His Rise to Power, 
pp. 398-99.
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M m  that "he would protect him against all and that this was a mark 
that he had served him well, seeing that he stood badly with the 
Queen Mother and with Monsieur. "^ 3
Marie de Medicis' decampment was an embarrassment for the royal 
position, but at the same time it also helped clarify and solidify 
it. As July faded into August, both Marie and Gaston had indicated 
to one and all that they could not be placated and would not be 
reconciled with Richelieu and his policies. Their demonstrated 
hostility and continued attempts to stir up sedition within the 
kingdom discouraged hopes for any kind of rapprochement and 
encouraged Louis and Richelieu to take up authoritative counter­
measures. One of these, the future Chambre de 1*Arsenal, was in 
gestation as an investigation of counterfeiters; September would see 
it taking steps against some of the followers of Marie and Gaston. 
Another move was made on July 22, when a royal ordinance was issued 
giving the followers of Marie and Gaston fifteen days' notice to 
adjure their allegiance and return to the kingdom at pain of being 
declared spies and disturbers of the public peace.^ As the 
prescribed fortnight came and went, it became evident that the line 
drawn in the sand would go unheeded, and early in August a declaration 
was drafted outlawing those who had left the kingdom and confiscating 
their fiefs, properties, and titles.^5 At the same time the Parlement
^^D'Andilly, Journal ingdit, X, 192-93. B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 
9891, fols. 110-15, July 26, 1631, contains a complete account of 
this meeting.
^The text is in Le Mercure frangois, XVII, 372-74.
95ihe -text is in Le Mercure frangois, XVII, 377-89.
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of Paris had, since the end of May, shown itself thoroughly aloof 
from any solicitations thrown out by the King's contumacious kin. 
Active interest in other grievances of the spring— the paulette, 
coamissaires, creations of office, Marillac's trial— had also been 
quietly shelved since the arrgt du Conseil of May 13. From the 
Crown's view the time had come to reward this diligence with a 
paulette settlement while extracting the last possible bit of 
leverage from its concession.
These modified political circumstances of the late simmer 
brought Louis into a lit de justice with his Parlement on August 12, 
a ceremony which would represent the final act in the spring crisis 
and settle several issues pending since early in the year. Accom­
panied by the usual ceremonies and formularies, Louis presented the 
declaration outlawing those supporting his mother and brother, along 
with a new edict cancelling the December, 1630, creation of offices 
and substituting a lesser one of two maitres des requites and four 
coaaeeillers.^  The edicts were duly registered, then in exchange
^During the ceremony the King spoke briefly, then Chateauneuf 
took the floor for fifteen minutes, but he talked "so low that there 
were not six persons who understood him. (It was laughingly said 
that he really had not spoken but only propped up Mr de St. Brisson, 
provost de Paris, who was beside him.)" D'Andilly, Journal ingdit, 
X, 1^ 9. "The declaration created three conseillers des Bnqugtes and 
one conseiller in the Chamhres des Requgtes, a reduction of one in 
the Requgtes from the December, 1630, edict. D'Andilly noted that 
the two maitres des requgtes were sold for 45,000 ecus each to Mrs 
de Thou and Behevre, the last being strongly criticized because he 
was but twenty-four. This was the third dispensation he had 
received, the first for serving as conseiller with his father and 
the second for not having served the necessary time to become a 
maftre des requgtes.
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for swallowing this bitter pill, the Parlement was granted the 
paulette on the favorable terms of the past.97
For better or for worse the lit de justice of August 12 resolved 
several issues that had disturbed the Parlement since the Day of Dupes. 
The Crown's employment of commissaires, however, was not affected by 
the settlement, and if Louis and Richelieu had any illusions that the 
Parlement had permanently abandoned its concern about these agents, 
those illusions were rudely dispelled early in September when the 
trial of mareschal Marillac was brought to the attention of the court 
once again. After learning of the men who would be his judges, in 
July the margschal addressed a third letter of protest to the 
Parlement asking nullification of their commissions and that the 
court send deputies to investigate "subordinations, violences, and 
practices which have been, are done every day, as it is said, by 
many false witnesses against the plaintiff." Marillac hoped that 
the Parlement would "name an advocat and procurer for him, to furnish 
and administer his counsel and to take care of his affairs in the
97r .N. Ms . fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 119-33; D'Andilly,
Journal inedit, X, 190-201; Biblio. de l'lnstit., Collection 
Gode^roy 285, fols. 49-50; MolS, Mgmoires, II, 63-65; Gazette de 
France, August 14, 1631. The other sovereign courts were granted 
the droit annuel on favorable terms over the next few months.
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meanshile."^ As before the court was sympathetic.*^ It received 
his appeal on September 4 and issued new injunctions that the 
decisions of February 4 and 22 should be obeyed, as well as ordered 
that "tres humble remonstrances will be made to the King on the 
execution of the said commission of May 13 last, and the prohibitions 
contained in the said deci si on s. Th e Crown's reaction was 
predictable and forthcoming. An arrlt du Conseil of September 12 
voided the Parlement's decision, but this time Mathieu Moll was 
suspended and summoned to Fountainbleau to account for his acceptance 
of the request, "where,” according to Omer Talon, "he was well
9®B.N. Imprimis Lb^.2839> Requestes presentees par de Marillae, 
pp. 20-25.
99on this occasion Mole wrote across the bottom of Marillae's 
request: "Vu 1'arrSt de la Cour du 22 fevrier dernier, et autres 
pieces y attachees, je requiers pour le Roi l'arrlt donnl, les 
Chambres assemblies, le 11 flvrier dernier, ensemble eelui du 22 
dudit mois, etre executes; et ce faisant, tres-humbles remonstrances 
Itre aussi faites sur 1'execution de la commission du 13 mai dernier, 
et les defenses y contenues Itre reiterees, et que les deux lettres 
missives signles FORTIN seront mises au greffe, paraphees et 
reconnues, pour, ce fait, prendre telle conclusion que de raison."
B.N. Imprimis Lb3°.2839, Requestes presenties par de Marillae, p. 25. 
See also Moll, Mlmolres, II, 6$, n. 3.
1C5®B.N. Imprimis Lb^.2839, Requestes presentees par de Marillae, 
p. 27.
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received; and without any further judicial procedure his bearing and 
natural gravity, which he bore up in this encounter, obtained for 
him an arret of discharge."101
Mole's suspension drove home the fundamental inability of the 
judges to influence the outcome of the Marillae Affair, making the 
councilliar decision of September 12 the final act in the Parlement's 
long involvement with the mareschal's trial. By this time three arrgts 
in Marillae's behalf had satisfied the honor of the court, while 
three nullifications made it evident that further efforts would be 
futile. Marillae, too, realized this and sent no more petitions to 
the Parlement, preferring instead to address his pleas to the King 
and to recuse his judges before the public eye. These recusations 
finally resulted in the resignation of one judge, Paul Hay du 
Chastelet, but did not alter the final decision of death which was 
handed down on May 8, 1632. In sum, though defeated in its inter­
ventions, the Parlement gone beyond the letter of its legal obligations 
by trying to preserve the mar£schal from condemnation at the hands of
1Q1Mgmoires, 6. The text of the arrgt is in Talon's Mgmoires, 5. 
There was no formal arret in the form of a judicial document pardoning 
Mole. The editors of Mold's Mgmoires were unable to uncover such a 
writ among the papers of the procureur general or those pertaining to 
the Marillae trial and believed "that there was no other administra­
tive act made against Mathieu Mol£, nor likewise an arret of discharge 
in his favor, as Omer Talon believed." Mol£, Mgiaoires, II, 68, n. 3. 
This opinion is verified by D'Andil y, who observed that Mole was 
well treated at Fountainbleau and was even asked to dinner twice by 
the garde des seeaux. D'Andilly continued that in a council meeting 
held on Sunday, October 12, "where only the ministers met," the King 
restored him to his charge without any arret. "The said Sr 
Procureur General conducted himself throughout this action with much 
prudence and courage." Journal inedit, X, 222-23.
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mincompetent judges and unjust process. The court's motives through­
out had been both honorable and self-serving but were overwhelmed 
by consideration of the needs of State arising out of the Day of 
Dupes, needs which, in the eyes of Louis and his advisers, outweighed 
all considerations of private morality and conventional law.
The Day of Dupes not only precipitated the condemnation of 
mar^schal Marillae, but it also produced procedings against many 
lesser-known figures hovering about Marie and Gaston, individuals who, 
in one way or another, contributed to their sedition or carried on 
criminal intelligences between them and figures remaining in the 
kingdom. A large proportion of these cases were handed over to an 
irregular body of commissaires sitting at the Arsenal, a munitions 
factory and storage facility on the edge of Paris built by Henry IV. 
The history of this Chambre de 1'Arsenal and its relationship to 
the Parlement is one of the most infamous, yet curious, episodes of . 
Richelieu's ministry. Initially presented to the court as a special 
investigation into counterfeiting, the Chambre went into operation as 
something much more, a kind of general clearing house for minor 
crimes of State which did not warrant the formation of individual 
benches. For a number of reasons the Parlement opposed the estab­
lishment of these commissaires even more vigorously than earlier 
ones, but the court could not restrain the creation and continuance of 
so useful an administrative instrument, and by February, 1632, the 
Crown had won a most significant victory over its high judicial 
The mastery of this question was most meaningful, for never again
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during Richelieu’s ministry would the Parlement challenge the
Crown's right to the free appointment of cnmmlssaires or the right
to exercise justice retenue.
The Chambre de 1'Arsenal had unique origins that were much
different from its ultimate functions as a court of political justice.
Its formation was ordained in lettres patentes sent to the Parlement
of Paris on June 14, 1631, in which the Crown announced its intentions
of investigating counterfeiters, money clippers, traffickers in
bullion, and "other persons of their cabals who are found to give cause
to false money, of which the substitution surpasses the providence of
lawB and ordinances that the kings or predecessors have made to
remedy such abuses." To carry out the investigation, the Crown had
of our full power and royal authority made, ordered, and estab­
lished, . . .  by these patents signed by our hand, a sovereign 
chamber which we want to be called a Chambre de justice for the 
punishment and correction of abuses and malversations committed 
in the making of monies over all our kingdom, pays, lands, and 
selgneuries in our obedience.^02
The composition of the Chambre was conventional by past standards:
two presidents and ten conseillers from the Parlement and four
canseillers d'Etat or mafrtres des requites. The procureur g^n^ral,
his alternate (substitut), the greffier, and the receveur des amendes
et confiscations were to be named by the King. No individuals were
specified in any of the commission's places. To a wrTnlimnn of ten of
these as yet unnamed judges was given power and authority "to know
and sovereignly judge in dernier ressort, at the expense of all other
102Le Mercure fransols, XVII, 714-16.
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judges, all crimes concerning our monies, in first instance as by- 
appeal from ordinary judges." These high powers were accompanied 
by the usual injunctions to other officers to obey and co-operate 
with the Chambre's jurisdictions.1*^ The Parlement duly registered 
the letters according to form and tenor on July 9 but appended two 
important limitations: the Parlement' s procureur g£n6ral would have
charge of investigations and a commission bearing the names of judges 
would be sent to the court for registration.1^
A list of coranissaires1 names was sent to the court on July 30, 
but this did not satisfy the court because nothing was said about 
nomination of the attorney who would direct the prosecution. Even 
after a lettre de jussion was sent on August 7, the Parlement held 
fast to the condition that Mole should be named to the commission.1*^
On September 6 the court agreed to accept a procureur general nominated 
outside the Parlement, but it renewed its enjoinders that his substitut 
and the greffier of the Ch«nbre should be taken from the Parlement.1^  
The Crown found this foot-dragging intolerable, particularly since by 
now it had been decided to use the Chambre de l1 Arsenal to prosecute 
those indicted by the lgse-majestg declaration of August 12. The 
council therefore decided to procede promptly, arbitrarily, and
1Q3lbid., 716-19.
10^ B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, July 9, 1631.
J-O^ Le Mercure frangois, XVII, 720-21.
106D'Andilly, Journal ingdit, X, 220; Griffet, Histoire de Louis 
XIII, II, 182-83. There is no register entry for September 6.
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totally without consulting the Parlement by withdrawing the letters
of June 14 already registered and issuing a new general commission
for the Chambre de l1 Arsenal on September 23. This asserted that
the Parlement had "greatly erred, from believing that it could
impose a new law on us, to laws that we had to take and chose officers
from it to make up and compose chambers of extraordinary commissions
for the good of our State." Then in a single sentence the Crown
proclaimed simple expeditiousness as the grounds for its action:
We have believed, being founded on the example of our prede­
cessors, who for less reason have composed chambers of judges 
and officers convoked from various bodies, that we should, 
to avoid new contentions, absolutely deny competence of it 
[the Chambre 1 to the Parlement in order to give it to other 
Judges.107
This commission was not sent to the Parlement but was registered
in the Chambre de 1'Arsenal by the same judges that would carry it
out. The issuance of the new commission was not the most arbitrary
aspect of the Chambre, however, because the commissaires simply
went into operation even before it was sent. On September 11,
nearly two weeks before any general enabling act was dispatched,
the Gazette de France announced the opening and composition of the
Chart)re de 1'Arsenal in this way:
On the 10th the sieurs Favier and Fouquet, cooselllers d'Etat;
De Criqueville. Deschamps, De Nesmond, Bariiion, Be lafFemas, 
and Du PrS, martres des requites; De la Bistrate, Charpentier,
Le Tomelier, De Mbntmagny, De Boucqueval, and Lanier, grand 
rapporteur, conseillers in the Grand Conseil, held their first 
sitting In the Arsenal for several affairs important to the
107Le Mercure frangois, XVII, 721. The text of the conmission 
of SeptenheF"2j"Is’ found on pp. 719-22.
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State, and among others for some prisoners of the Bastille.
The sieur d'Argenson, mafrtre des requites, is procureur g 6n6ral, 
and the sieur Du Jardin, secretaire du Roi, greffier in this 
commission.108
There is other evidence that the comm-? ssaires were named even before 
the time, for as early as September 1 the case of Charles Senelle, 
a royal doctor accused of various crimes, was committed to the 
coaaissaires listed above.10^ On September 7 another commission 
sent the trial of the Marquis de la Vieuville "to our respected and 
loyal judges by us ordered in the Chambre de justice established at 
our chateau the Arsenal of Paris."110 Furthermore, textual discre­
pancies in La Vieuville's commission indicate that a general enabling 
commission for the whole bench had not yet been sent.111 In all 
probability, therefore, the Chambre de 1'Arsenal was actually founded 
during late August, when the council simply selected some maltres des 
requites and began sending them cases on individual warrants without 
a general enabling commission, which was issued only later for 
form's sake.
lo8Gazette de France, September 11, 1631.
10^The commission for Senelle's trial is in B.N. Ms. Dupuy 94, 
fols. 319-20; another copy is in B.N. Ms. fr. 16537, fols. 24-25v°.
n 0 The commission for La Vieuville's trial is in B.N. Ms.
Dupuy 94, fol. 323; another copy is in B.N. Ms. fr. 16537, fols. 
16-17.
^ T h e  first few lines of this commission read as follows: 
"Louis par la grace de Dieu Roy de France et Navarre, a noz aimez- 
et feaux les juges par nous ordonnez en la Chambre de Justice 
establie de nostre chasteau de 1'arsenal a Paris, Salut. Depuis 
le pouvoir que nous vous avons dcnne par nostre lettres patentes 
du Jour de de faire le proces blanks in original
manuscript aux nomnez Sennelles, Duval, et Chavny et autre prison- 
nier d'estat qui sont en nostre chasteau de la Bastille, Nous
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The arbitrary methods of operation and the jurisdiction which 
characterized the Chambre de 1*Arsenal during its formative period 
persisted through its history. The Chancre was never organized as a 
regular court and kept no regular records, though it heard at 
least several dozen cases over the four year period.1^  Each of 
these trials, or at least the most significant ones, was warranted 
by an individual commission to the Chambre, which took depositions, 
heard evidence, and disposed of the case as it saw fit without 
benefit of appeal. The chamber was-purely an instrument of political 
justice, though some of the individuals brought before it were 
formally charged with very curious crimes of State, some of which 
seem amusing to modem ears but which were taken with great 
seriousness at the time. The case of two royal doctors, Senelle 
and Duval, were of this type. Senelle had been snapped up by royal 
agents while coming from Lorraine with letters from Madeleine de 
Silly, comtesse du Fargis, a former lady-in-waiting to Anne of 
Austria exiled because of her intrigues. These letters, addressed 
to Queen Anne and various persons at court, contained insults
avons eu advis que le Marquis de la Vieuville s'estoit tant oublie 
que de sortie de nostre royaume sans nostre conge pour aller trouver 
la reyne nostre tres-honnore dame et mere a Bruxelles. ..." The 
blanks in this manuscript show that when it was issued on September 7 
a general commission had not yet been sent for the entire bench.
B.N. Ms. Dupuy 94, fol. 323; B.N. Ms. fr. 16537, fol. 16.
■*-*^ The largest quantity of surviving documentary evidence is 
in the form of commissions and arrets in B.N. Ms. Dupuy 94, fols. 
319-333, and B.N. Ms. fr. 16537, fols. 15-35v°, 71-73.
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against Richelieu and prognostications on the death of Louis XIII 
hased on astrology. The investigation of Senelle was joined with that 
of Duval, another royal doctor arrested for having made a horoscope 
ending with the prediction Sol cancrum non peragrabit quin valedicat—  
the King would die before the sun left the sign of Cancer.11  ^ The 
two physician-astrologers were arraigned before the Chambre de 1_' 
Arsenal which made them its first victims by sentencing them to 
the galleys for life on October 17.^  Madame du Fargis was also 
tried in absentia for the composition of the seditious correspondence 
carried by Senelle. An arrSt of December 22 declared her guilty 
of lbse-majeste and ordered her decapitated in effigy.115 The 
same judgment was returned against La Vieuville on January 10, 1632, 
for having left the kingdom in spite of prohibitions of the King 
and for the murder of the sieur de Poitrincourt. 11 >^
News of the comnrf ssaires1 doings began to filter into the 
Parlement during the middle of September. The Chambre des vacations 
under the presidency of Nicolas de BelliSvre began an inquiry into 
the rumors. Procureur general Mole was then under suspension in 
connection with marAschal Marillae's last petition, but his 
substitute, Tranchot, was sent to determine exactly what was going
^^Richou, Histoire des commissions extraordinalres, p. 59; 
Griffet, Histoire “de louls XIII, II, 215-17; Marcus fropln, Louis XIII 
et Richelieu, 6tude historique accompagnee des lettres inedit du 
Rol au cardlnaT"de Richelieu (Paris, 1*75), pp. 152-53-
iiAGazette de France, October 24-, 1631-
i^B.N. Ms. fr. 16537, fols. 34-35v°.
i^B.N. Ms. fr. 16537, fols. l8-23v°.
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on. On September 20 he was able to confirm what most of the judges 
already suspected, that a bench of two conseillers d'Etat, six 
maitres des requites, and six conseillers from the Grand Conseil 
been holding several hearings at the Arsenal during the past fort­
night. On the basis of Tranchot's report, the magistrates decided 
to summon some of the commissaires for a personal hearing.117 Two 
days later, on September 22, mattres des requ&tes Favier, De 
Criqueville, and Laffemas appeared for the interview. Upon being 
questioned, they freely confessed that the King, "having had com­
plaints of several individuals who were now prisoners in the 
Bastille," had sent them to interrogate them; that they had per­
sonally reported the results to the King; and that a few days before, 
he had sent them a commission to carry out the trials. Bellibvre 
lectured them on the Parlement's stand towards commissaires, told 
than that the King would be informed, and that in the meantime 
they should cease their activities. Favier replied that he would 
tell his colleagues and that a decision would have to be reached 
among them.118
n 7 B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fol. 148, September 20, 1631;
Md16, Mfinolres, II, 70-71, where the date of September 27 is evi­
dently a misprinted error. Though the registers do not mention it, 
the court probably decided to present the remonstrances drafted by 
Bellievre some time after the 20th. See supra, p.
■^B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fol. 148-49, September 22,
1631; Ifclg, MSmoires, II, 71-72.
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After hearing the commissaires, Belli&vre wrote up a rather 
aoderate remonstrance on their employment and forwarded this 
memoranda, along with a personal plea, to Chateauneuf .H9 
Chateauneuf sent back an agreeable note which suggests that the 
garde des seeaux had been acting as Richelieu’s agent in the matter 
for some time:
[As] for the commission of Messrs. at the Arsenal, I want to 
tell you that it could be done by some chosen from the 
Parlement. You know how I have worked at the difficulties 
and the prohibitions [or, deferences?] which have been 
demonstrated at length over four months. There remain to me 
no more reasons to suspend the execution, unless some remedies 
agreeable to the King should be proposed to us.120
A few days later the president responded in a way showing that he,
too, had worked to resolve the problem from within the Parlement:
I am an irreproachable witness to the great desire and long 
patience, as you have heard, for the establishment of the 
Chambre de justice in the Parlement. If so little a thing 
has deprived us of this honor, why could we not reocver it by 
your authority and fine vigilance, since things are not yet 
much engaged otherwise? The Chambre des vacations could easily 
[be] entreated for all these little formalities to which it 
has held. Then I could write with assurance that you had 
judged expedient and more, that, for the King's service, that 
there should not be any Chambre other than that of the Parle­
ment employed in sovereignly judging private parties sent 
before these commissions. '
H^The remonstrances are in B.N. Ms. fr. 18415, fols. 24-31v°, 
and the letter, dated September 23, is at fol. 38. See supra, p.
120b .N. Ms. fr. 18415, fols. 36-36v°, Chateauneuf to Bellifevre, 
September 26, 1631.
m B.N. Ms. fr. 18415, fol. 34, BelliSvre to Chateauneuf, 
October 2, 1631.
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The garde des sceaui, of course, was unable to act without the
authority of the council, and this was lacking. On October 4 he
sent a final reply to Bellievre, notifying him that the King's mind
was made up and that
it is necessary to consider that the King . . . knows better 
than any one that which is good for his State, and that when 
he pronounces it thus he deems duty done and that simple 
remonstrances founded on the individual opinions of the interests 
of the Parlement are not going to change the course of public 
affairs, and Lwhich] for the conservation of his authority can 
only accept the submission and entreaties of your company.122
Chateauneuf's advice put a temporary quietus on the issue of the
Chambre, which, whether because of BelliSvre's hesitancy or because
of limitations on the Chambre des vacations' staff and authority,
was allowed to go its way undisturbed by further inquiries.
This tranquility evaporated soon after the session of 1632
opened late in November.The new Parlement discovered that in
its absence the Chambre de 1'Arsenal had been busily at work. On
November 28, the same day that it announced the Parlement's
resumption, the government-sponsored Gazette de France told its
readers that "the Chambre de justice established at the Arsenal is
122B.N. Ms. fr. 18415, fol. 32, Chateauneuf to BelliSvre,
October 4, 1631.
-*-2^The court should have opened after the solenm mass cele­
brated by the Archbishop of Toulouse in the Grande Salle of the 
Palais on the traditional November 12 date. The Gazette de France 
reported that the First President, BelliSvre, de Mesmes, Bailleui, 
and "a great number of conseillers" had attended, but the number that 
returned to plague-infected Paris was actually insufficient to fully 
resume the court's calendar. For nearly two weeks this situation 
prevailed, and not until November 24 did enough of the staff drift 
back for the court to conduct important public business. Gazette 
de France, November 14 and 28, 1631.
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is trying more than sixty persons without distinction of quality 
accused of the crime of counterfeiting."^^ Indeed, the Ch»Tnhre was 
trying counterfeiters, "but it was also reaching into many other 
areas as well, as the court heard on November 26. Jlrdme Bignon,
Advocat General, "spoke with great vehemence against the enter­
prises of the judges established at the Arsenal," telling the 
Grand'Chambre that during its absence the conmrfssaires had carried 
out an execution of two counterfeiters in the Place de Gr^ve at 
midnight, "violating by this means the royal authority, the order 
of justice, and the public security."125 This, however, was not the 
greatest affront to the Parlement. The commissaires had also inter­
fered with the jurisdiction of the bailliage du Palais, which was 
directly under the Parlement's supervision, by attempting to 
imprison its greffier and actually jailing sieur Jean Gillot, its 
lieutenant g&agral, "on pretended malversations in his charge.
The lieutenant g&n&ral had appealed to the Parlement for relief on 
the grounds that as one of its subalterns it alone should consider
^ ^Qazette de France, November 28, 1631.
^B.N. Us. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fol. 163, November 26, 1631; 
D'Andilly, Journal ingdit, X, 235.
^^B.N. Us. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fol. 163, November 26, 1631. 
According to the court's registers, the greffier of the bailliage 
had refused to give the commissaires his records on the counter­
feiting trial of Henry de Gresse, sieur de Vaugrenier. B.N. Ms. fr. 
nouv. acq. 9891, fol. 161, November 18, 1631. D'Andilly noted that 
Gillot had been put in the Bastille "because, to the prejudice of 
their evocation, he had freed a prisoner accused of counterfeiting 
in virtue of a sentence that they pretended was antedated."
Journal inedit, X, 235.
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his conduct. The gens du roi had agreed; Bignon recommended 
remonstrances about the Arsenal as well, both in writing and orally, 
for
this last action was so prejudicial to the repose of the King's 
subjects that it seemed that an action so indecent should 
reveal to the said seigneur King the disadvantages of the 
said extraordinary commissions and how contrary they were to
his service. ^ 7
The Grand* Chambre thought the matter was of such importance that it 
delayed a decision until all the chambers could be assembled the 
next day. This move was the beginning of the greatest crisis in 
the Parlement since the spring, a crisis which, before its ultimate 
resolution in March, would go through weeks of plenary debate, 
repeated royal injunctions of obedience, and culminate in the exile 
of several magistrates and the severest royal lecture to the court 
in decades. The Parlement, while certainly self-interested, was 
not making a mountain of a mole-hill. The nuclear issue was of 
considerable importance to both Crown and court, for tied to it 
were the basic constitutional questions of the delegation of royal 
power, the right to create officers, respect for the ordinances, and
127B.N. Mis. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fol. 164, November 26, 1631.
12®Md1£, M&aoires, II, 76-77. Of this decision Mole wrote, 
"This shows that it was not the Biquttes who demanded the assembly 
of chambers, but the Grand'Chambre which had thus decided itself.
It could have taken care of it by itself, since the complaint had 
been made only to the Grand* Chambre and not to the assembled 
chambers. This easily demonstrates that the impressions that one is 
given are not true, the first decision that of November 26 serving 
as the touchstone for all that followed afterwards. These is a 
case for blaming the spirit of those who assemble the chambers 
within the Parlement, and [then] manifest the contrary to the King, 
[then] look in vain for remedies, although it had caused the 
problem itself."
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the rights of subjects and officers alike— in brief, royal arbitraire 
versus customary law and the respect for rights associated with good 
kingship.
The debate on the comnrf ssaires began in plenary session on 
November 27 and continued through the 29th, becoming more complex 
angry as agitation over the Arsenal commission was blended with 
excitement about an arbitrary royal increase in the legal fees 
associated with sealing decisions from the Parlement.-^ 9 fa 
Thursday, November 27, the Parlement ordered a cease and desist on 
all action against Gillot, prohibited his imprisonment, and 
decreed that "on the conclusions of the procureur general of the 
King, that trls humble remonstrances would be made to the King and in 
writing on extraordinary commissions, and particularly on the Chambre 
de la Bastille fsicl1,130 In addition the two ranking maftres des
This was the so-called droit de petit sceau, which had to be 
paid by litigants for application ot the petit sceau to legal 
decisions issued by the Parlement or other courts ^or cases of 
private law. The petit sceau was held by the petit chancellerie 
of the Palais but was still under the supervision of the chancellor 
who controlled the grand sceau appended to public documents. The 
petit sceau of the Parlement bore the inscription Sigillum parvum 
pro absentia magni. By a declaration of October 16 not registered 
In the court the Crown had doubled the fees required for the use 
of the seal. The Parlement had decided to make remonstrances on 
Novenber 15, and the matter was still under consideration two
weeks later. B.N. Us. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 157-59; Marion,
Dictionaaire des institutions de la France, p. 84; Doueet, Les
InsiiTiuiions de la France, I, 159.
^OD'Andilly, Journal inldit, X, 236.
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requfites would be summoned before the Parlement for personal
Injunctions to their corps. The court went on to attempt to cripple
the Chambre de 1'Arsenal by forbidding any "minister of justice" to
obey its instructions, at pain of personal responsibility for all
claims, damages, and interests so inflicted. The next day
the Parlement accepted a second request for justice from Gillot and
granted him full relief from the prosecution of the commi ssaires. -^2
On Saturday, November 29, the court assembled all chambers and
continued its discussions about rights to the petit sceau in spite
of an arrlt du Conseil forbidding any consideration of matters
relating to the seal.^33 indeed, the court was now becoming imbued
with a frondeur spirit, as Mathieu Moll observed:
The design (of the court] was nothing other than, by mixing
several affairs together, to resolve none of them, making it 
seem that internally the Parlement was jealous of the honor 
of the company and, by contrary action underhand, giving the 
King notification to oppress it, and crossing the accustomed 
order, to do nothing for one or the other. That is very far 
from treating affairs in a virtuous spirit and, by the force 
of royal authority and by justice, conducting them to the 
necessary purpose, to represent the just causes that are there
to be advanced or retarded, and by the credence that one
acquires in a succession of worthy actions, to make the most 
of the royal name and oblige the company to follow its will 
with worthy intentions.
l^Ibid. There is no register entry for November 27.
132B.N. Ms. fr. 9891, fols. 166-67, November 28, 1631; Mole, 
MSmoires, II, 78-79.
-'■-^ The arrSt du Conseil was issued at Fountainbleau on November 
24 and was presented to the Parlement on November 28, though the 
registers make no mention of it. The text is in Moll, Mlmoires,
II, 80-82.
MSmoires, II, 82-83.
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The Crown, no less than the Parlement, was willing to press 
matters to extremes, but handicapped by Louis' absence from his 
capital, it was limited to sending expostulatory letters and arrgts 
du Conseil.1^  The first of several of these, a lettre de cachet, 
arrived on December 1. It summarily forbade any assemblies and 
ordered the court to send the first and second presidents & mortier 
> and six conseillers to the King at Chateau Theirry with any remon­
strances.1 ^  The Parlement never complied with the request to send 
deputies, but this royal order, plus Le Jay's maneuverings, managed 
to keep the situation under control until December 5, when the 
Enquetes demanded an assembly of all chambers to debate the commis­
saires 1 continuing prosecution of Gillot.1^  Once again Le Jay
^During the fall Louis was active in northeastern France, 
raising troops and securing the countryside against his younger 
brother.
^ S h e  text is in MolS, Mgmoires, II, 83, n. 1.
1^^Qn December 2, for example, Le Jay sought to frustrate the 
extreme anti-royalists by refusing to turn over the minutes for 
November 28 and saying that he would not sign them. "This," Mol? 
commented, "was a dodge of compliancy [lour de souplessel which was 
found out by those who had conducted the affair, for, seeing that the 
lettres de cachet could have no effect on that which had been passed 
on Friday, the 28th , since the letters being presented on Monday, 
the arrSt of Friday preceding would stand, they the Enqugtes 
thought that it would be easy to say there had been no decision at all. 
He that is obliged to keep order in the company [Le Jsyj, letting 
himself be persuaded that he could do this by himself and that it was 
a result of his power, took resolution not to turn over the leaf." 
Mol?, Mgmoires, II, 90.
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tried to put them off, while secretly writing to the King for 
assistance. New royal prohibitions duly arrived, along with an 
arrgt du conseil nullifying the Parlement's decision of November 28 
against the Chambre de l1 Arsenal.1^  Under pressure from the 
Kaqufrtes, the whole court refused to obey; on December 12 it renewed 
its attack on the commissaires by ordering three of them to appear 
before the bar along with those responsible for levying the new 
rights of the petit sceau. The commissaires were to be apprised 
of the seriousness of their pursuits, told that remonstrances were 
going to be made, and warned that they were to cease their hearings 
at once. The officers of the Paris watch and the lieutenant 
crlminel of the bailliage du Palais were also to be enjoined against 
carrying out orders from the Arsenal under pain of suspension.1^
This kind of resistance soon eroded the royal patience, and 
on December 16 the council moved definitively to put a stop to it.
A new arr&t du Conseil was issued which left no room to doubt the 
King's resolve. Parlementalre decisions of November 28, December 10, 
and December 12 were quashed as "given by incompetent judges and 
without power"; the Chambre de 1'Arsenal and lesser regular officers 
were enjoined to ignore the Parlement's decisions; levying of the 
droit du petit sceau would continue; the officers of the city watch,
^ T h e  King sent lettres patentee dated December 7 from 
Fountainbleau forbiding any assemblies and asking for remonstrances; 
the arret du Conseil was dated December 4 from Chateau Thierry and 
was presented in the court on December 10. Mole, Memoires, II,
91-93, 97-98.
139ifol§, Mgmoires, II, 103-04. This deliberation is not found 
in the registers.
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the Chfttelet, and the bailliage were instructed to obey the commis- 
saires at pain of 10,000 livres fine and deprivation of their offices. 
Injunctions like these had been made before, but the ones that 
followed had not been seen since the spring. Presidents & mortier 
Pierre Seguier and Bellievre, the oldest conseillers of each chamber, 
those conseillers who had signed the December 12 decision, and the 
ranking presidents from the second, third, fourth, and fifth cbamhres 
dee Enqugtes were ordered to appear before the King fifteen days after 
the delivery of the arrit with the minutes of the offensive delibera­
tions. Finally, presidents aux Enquetes Gayant and Barillon and 
conseillers Tudert, Thelis, and Laisne were ordered to account for 
themselves before the King's council.; in the meantime they were 
suspended from their charges. A l l  in all, the arrtt was a no- 
nonsense warning, and the Crown intended to make it stick. The 
co«te de Soissons, recently made lieutenant ggngral for Paris and the 
Ile-de-France during Louis' absence, was ordered to see that the 
Parlement obeyed. On December 24 he acknowledged the charge, saying 
"I will not lack if they make a mistake," and then significantly 
added, "they have received the arret fdu Conselll and nothing has 
surfaced but obedience and submission.”1^1
Soissons was correct in his assessment. The decision to obey 
the King had been taken on December 23, the day after reception of
^°The text is in Molg, Mgmoires. II, 118-21. It was signified 
to the Parlement on December 22.
■^B.N. Ms. fr. 3833, fol. 26, comte de Soissons to Louis, 
December 24, 1631. Louis' letter to Soissons is not available.
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the royal order, and on the morning of December 31 the procession of 
thirteen magistrates assembled in the Recolets convent in the 
faubourg St. Martin. After hearing mass the group-set out, talcing the 
muddy winter road northeast to Metz by way of Rheims and Ste. 
Menehould. The journey took eleven days, the judges arriving on 
January 10, but despite entreaties to the garde des seeaux and to the 
Cardinal, Louis kept them waiting three weeks for an audience.
Finally, on January 31 the judges were instructed to appear at 3:00 
in the afternoon, leaving behind the five suspended representatives 
from the Enquetes and the greffier with his records of the delibera­
tions . They found Louis assembled with Richelieu, the garde des 
seeaux, Schomberg, three secretaires d'Etat, and several others.
Louis told them that they had been summoned to hear his displeasure 
and what he wanted done in the future. Chateauneuf then began 
speaking without the formal courtesy of an introductory "Messieurs,1 
outlining the actions of the fall, emphasizing the King's discontent, 
and telling them that Louis would not hear their remonstrances.
In the future, he said, they were not to mix in his affairs, be they 
concerned with his mother, brother, or those of foreigners, because 
the King was determined to preserve the peace in his kingdom. They 
should therefore, return to the capital and remain within the 
limits of their duties.^
•^B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 180-84, February 16,
1632; Male, Memo!res, II, 140-42.
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Le Jay then mistakenly tried to defend the Parlement*s actions
with a badly worded and ill-timed speech:
Sire, the speech made to us by Your Majesty's commandment makes 
clear to us your wrath for your Parlement. This gives me pause, 
because your subjects are not permitted to justify themselves 
in the presence of their King irritated against them. We 
hope by an obedience to your commandments to life the bad 
impressions that we have given you, and that you will grant 
this grace, that the interdicted ones in this company should 
return to perform their duties, for the public has been 
scandalized at the procedure of the Chambre established at the 
Arsenal and by a new impost on the seal. The company hopes 
that His Majesty will, through his justice, revoke one and the 
other, for Louis XI had regrets from having mistreated his
Parlement.1^ '
The First President got no further. Louis, reddening with anger,
broke in and retorted that
I am not prepared to answer you, but I want to tell you that you 
are encroaching on my authority, you are dabbling in the relief 
of my people for whom I care more than you. You tell me that 
individuals learn in the company to obey me, yet nevertheless 
they themselves uphold that very poorly. You were established 
only to mete out justice between master Pierre and master Jean, 
and if you go., 99 with your enterprises; I will clip your nails 
to the quick.
The judges, though accustomed to this kind of outburst, could do 
nothing but make a "very humble reverence" and retire.
^B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fol. 184, February 16, 1631.
^B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 184-85, February 16, 1631.
^B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fol. 185, February 16, 1631. A
very similar account was sent to Mathieu Mol£ by an unknown witness
and is presented in his Mgmoires. Even in comparison with other exam­
ples of Louis' temper, this was by all accounts an exceptionally 
severe display. D'Andilly commented in his journal that "On Friday 
the 30th If 8 of the Parlement had [their] audience. M** le premier 
president delivered a speech which was good neither for the King 
nor f*or his own, having said to them nothing other than what has 
become known. He put the King in a rage. The King answered with 
words like 'Mister to one and the other,' an eloquence and energy 
shocking to all attending [eloquence et energie qui tous les
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After the humiliation of Januaiy 31, the magistrates futilely 
tried to prevail on Richelieu or Chateauneuf to lift the banishment 
of the five EnquStes. At last, being told that their presence and 
appeals only worked to their detriment, the judges departed Metz 
on February 4- They arrived in Paris on the 12th and recounted the 
dismal chronology of the journey to the Par..ement four days later. 
Then unknown, but soon to arrive, was news that the five absent 
judges had been sent to Meaux, about a day’s travel from Paris, and 
told to await the King's grace. Richelieu interceded on their 
behalf shortly thereafter, probably advising Louis to release them 
after allowing a few weeks for the disciplinary lesson to take 
effect.1^  Louis willingly agreed, and the exiled judges were given 
permission to seek out the King at St. Germain on March 3. Here 
Louis waggled a verbal finger at them, saying "I pardon the mistake 
you have made, on the condition that you do not let it happen again. 
It is the second time, but if you relapse a third time, there will 
be no more pardon for you." Gay ant is supposed to have answered 
"in general terms," while "Mr the Cardinal made great civilities 
to them. ^ 7
as8iatans en furent emerveillls]. M378 of the Parlement recognized 
very well that he understood his own affairs better than they had 
thought. Following this harangue they were dismissed and the five 
interdicted judges commanded to remain." Biblio. de l’lnstit.,
Ms. Godefroy 285, fols. 65v°-66.
146as can be judged from the letter Louis wrote to Richelieu on 
February 12 acknowledging that he would "willingly accord that which 
you have asked of me in regard to the five robes." B.N. Ms. fr. 
nouv. acq. 7223, fol. 53. See Supra, Chapter IV, pp. 220-21.
^ D ’Andilly, Journal inedit, X, 253.
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The dramatic interview at Metz was certainly one of the most 
famous episodes in the history of the Parlement. Many contemporaries 
marvelled at it, and nearly every later historian of the reign has 
found reason to mention what was said. This attention, while well- 
founded, usually leaves the impression that the interview was 
nothing more than a remarkable demonstration of royal tactlessness 
which had little long term affect on the court. The impression is
accurate only as far as it goes. Strong Louis' words certainly
had been, but he had spoke out of temper to the Parlement before
and would again; it is to be expected that while this royal temper
tantrum was neither forgiven nor forgotten, its lasting impression 
on the court would be slight indeed. Mich more meaningful than the 
royal lecture were the permanent effects of the meeting on the 
course of parlementaire politics over the next decade. While the 
interview did not exclude the Parlement from all future affairs of 
State, nor render it submissive to Louis' will, the meeting did have 
a very real significance in punctuating a royal victory on the issue 
of coamissaires. After January, 1632, the Parlement obeyed the 
Judicial directives of December, 1631, as they applied to the employ­
ment of commissioned agents, and though it was unrealized by either 
party, the Crown's ascendancy after this time was going to be 
complete: the Parlement never again raised objections to commis­
saires during Richelieu's ministry. The resultant thrust towards 
absolutism was substantial. The Chambre de 1'Arsenal continued its 
operations in Paris without further harassment from the Parlement
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until its dissolution in 1635, passing judgments on the famous 
oppositionist pamphleteers Mathieu de Margues and Pfcre Chanteloube 
as well as other types of offenders.^ Ultimately, too, the 
Crown's successful neutralization of the Paris Parlement furthered 
the breakdown of parlementaire resistance to all types of commis- 
saires over all the kingdom. The provincial parlements continued 
to bewail their intrusions, but deprived of the leadership of the 
greatest parlement in France, the chances for a united and 
co-ordinated resistance extending over the central provinces were
14%ere Jacques d'Apchon, seigneur de Chanteloube, an Oratorian 
priest, was one of Gaston's most capable polemicists. Having 
followed the prince into exile in 1631, he continued to support his 
cause with vitrolic attacks on Richelieu's policies which led to 
his condemnation by the Chambre de Arsenal. On May 5, 1632, that 
body ordered Chanteloube roulTbroken on the wheel) for having 
bribed Francois Alpheston to do away with Richelieu. B.N. Ms. fr. 
16537, fols. 78-78v°. A judgment against Mathieu de Morgues was 
produced by the commissaires in July, 1635, "for having written 
impious letters contrary to the glory of God [and] respect due the 
chief of his Church, for cabals against the King, and for fomenting 
enterprises on the life of Cardinal Richelieu." This decision is 
the last recorded verdict of the Chambre. B.N. Ms. fr. 16537, fols. 
70-73; Gazette de France, no. 105, July 28, 1635, p. 422. The 
Chambre de 1'Arsenal also continued to consider crimes other than 
those of""5tate. On April 15, 1634, the Gazette de France notified 
its readers that on the 11th the Chambre de 1'Arsenal had condemned 
"for crime of magic" two men named Bouchar? and Gargan to make an 
amende honorable before the Church of St. Pol. They were then 
hanged and their bodies burned along with their books and impliments 
(charactlres), which consisted of a black stole, two parchment books 
of magic, and a small pewter chalice. Gazette de France, no. 35, 
April 15, 1634; Richou, Les Commissions extraordlnaires, p. 59.
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considerably reduced. This situation would prevail until the Fronde 
of 1643 when the Parlement once again took the lead in attempting to 
restrict the employment of commissaires.
The meeting at Metz also served to mark the end of another 
phase of the Parlement's political history. With the return of the 
exiled judges and the continuance of the Chambre de 1'Arsenal, 
the Parlement's involvement with the most direct consequences of 
the Day of Dupes largely came to a close. During the course of 
1631 this involvement had drawn the Parlement into the trial of 
Louis de Marillae, the flight of Gaston d'Orleans and Marie de 
Medicis, and royal prosecution of their followers, but by the first 
months of 1632 the court had been excluded from active consideration 
of these matters. This exclusion, however, was not yet complete 
because the course of domestic politics continued to be heavily 
influenced by the doings of Gaston and Marie, and the Crown's efforts 
to deal with their supporters would result in a last disruption of 
the relationship between the Crown and its highest court.
During the summer of 1632 Gaston re-entered the kingdom at the 
head of an army and made for Langued'oc where he expected assistance 
from the due de Montmorency, governor of that province. Montmorency, 
disgruntled with the introduction of the elus into Langued'oc, 
was ready to be tempted into rebellion. The two chiefs met at 
Lunel and marched together on Nimes, which refused to open its gates 
to them. While Montmorency tried with indifferent success to rally 
the towns of his governorship to Gaston's cause, Louis withdrew frcan
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the area, turned the royal army over to margschal Schomberg, 
returned to Paris, and countered the rebels with a new blanket 
declaration outlawing all those giving direct or indirect support 
to Gaston as guilty of llse-majestg.^ 49
To publicize the declaration Louis had it registered in a lit 
de justice held on August 12. There was nothing unusual about 
either legislation or ceremony, except that the judges were insulted 
by several ceremonial usages which the Crown insisted upon. The 
King had notified his Parlement of the lit by lettres de cachet 
specially instructing the magistrates to rise upon the entry of the 
garde des sceaux, an honor, it was said, that was given all presidents 
and conseillers. Past custom, however, had required this courtesy 
only for the Chancellor. Louis took no chances that his instructions 
might be misunderstood; when he arrived at the Sainte Chapelle 
to hear mass before entering the Palais, all of the presidents 
were summoned and sharply warned to be on their best behavior. They 
did as they had been told, but the First President remarked to the 
garde des sceaux in passing that "this honor rendered him was not 
due to the dignity of garde des sceaux, that this was not the custom 
to use it in this way, but that the King having commanded it, they 
would obey the King's command, and that they would register a 
complaint of it."^0 Later, Le Jay confessed to Talon that he
Mercure frangois, XVIII, 530-36.
1-^ Talon, MSmoires, p. 16.
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had been so surprised when the King had demanded the gesture of M m  
at the Sainte Chapelle that he was on the point of asking Louis to 
relieve him of his charge and to per-it him to resign.-^1 This 
was not the least affront the court had to endure that day. When 
all the speeches were done, contrary to all custom and precedent 
the opinions were taken first from the princes of the blood, then 
from the cardinals, before consulting the presidents a mortier. 
After the ceremony Le Jay protested this order of precedence, but 
"M. le garde des sceaux answered that the King could do as he 
pleased."1 2^
Indeed, by now it must have seemed to the parlementaires that 
Louis could do as he pleased, at least in matters of high justice. 
Enforcement of the August 12 declaration was almost completely 
taken from the Parlement and put into the hands of provincial 
sovereign courts or commissaires, even though in the instance of 
Henri, due de Montmorency, it was very much a question of trying a 
duke and peer of the realm. Montmorency's efforts in Gaston's 
behalf had been brought to a quick and violent end by margschal 
Schomberg's forces in a thirty minute battle near Castelnaudary on 
September 1. The comte de Moret, one of Henry IV's bastards, was 
killed at the front of Gaston's forces; Montmorency, wounded
151Ibid., pp. 16-17.
^ 2Mol§, Mgmoires, II, 156; D'Andilly, Journal Inedit, X, 280.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
48 9
seventeen times, was captured, his forces dispersed, and his royal 
patron-ally reduced to negotiations.^3 in these, for once, the 
King’s brother made some remonstrances for the salvation of his 
ally. These availed for nothing; Richelieu and the King had deter­
mined to make an example of the duke, and Montmorency's trial was 
sent to the parlement of Toulouse which had refused to follow him 
in aiding Gaston's movement. The parlement had no trouble 
ascertaining the duke's guilt and returning a death sentence which 
was carried out at Toulouse on October 30.
The execution of the duke created a sensation throughout France 
but produced no noteworthy reaction among the benches of the 
Parlement of Paris. Bearing himself with the hauteur of his class 
to the end, the duke proudly accepted his fate, renounced his 
privilege, and made no appeals for justice to the Paris court, 
which, since the duke had been taken arms in hand, could hardly 
have altered his fate. Several months later, however, the Parlement 
did make a modest murmur of protest at the violation of its 
jurisdiction. Upon Montmorency's death the Crown had divided his 
lands and property among the prince de conde and the duchesses 
d’Angoulfcne and de Ventador; on March 9, 1633. the Parlement of
short-lived settlement was reached with Gaston on the 
end of September. The Parlement was duly informed on September 30 
in Lettre du Roy envosyge \ nosseigneurs de la cour de la Parlement, 
cantenant l'accomnedementTde Monsieur en la bonne grace du Roy;
Le lieu oil s'en va; avec ce que sa MajestF~a accord!? & ceup de 
sa maison. “Paris, 1^ 32. B.N. Imprimes lb ^*.2897.
15^Le Mercure francois, XVIII, 530-36; B.N. Imprimes, Actes 
royaux FTfo^ A, no. ll.
155Ibid., 836-36.
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Paris registered the settlement but "decided that the King will be 
humbly petitioned in due time and place to maintain and preserve 
the said court in its privileges in regard to that concerning the 
competence over dukes and peers and officers having seats in it."15^
This decision of March 9, however, was aimed at something more 
than the Montmorency Affair months before, as the inclusion of 
"officers having seats in it" suggests. This phrase had been written 
into the complaint because at the time it was voted the Parlement 
had become warmly engaged with the Crown over the final disposition 
of offices in the Parlement belonging to two of Gaston's associates. 
One of these, president H mortier Jacques le Coigneux, had been 
provided with his office by Richelieu at the beginning of 1630 as 
part of a package offer to placate Gaston and his followers. The 
bribe had failed and Le Coigneux followed the prince to Lorraine, 
for which he was tried and condemned by the parlement of Dijon 
during the fall of 1632. Then in December, 1632, the similar case 
of Pierre Payen, sieur des Landes, conseiller in the Parlement, was 
given over to his colleagues for judgment.157 "Because of the bad 
state of his affairs," as Talon put it, Payen had been obliged to
156B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq: 9891, fol. 230, March 9, 1633-
157pierre Payen was received as a conseiller clerc in the fifth 
Chaabre des enqueues on February 19, 1623"! lie was at the same time 
abboi of 5aint-Martin and prior of Cerqueux and De la Charite-sur- 
Loire. In 1645 he entered the Grand1 Chambre, where he remained 
until he sold this office in 1654! He died in 1669. His father 
was Pierre Payen, sieur des Landes and Montereau, secretaire du roi 
in 1607. B.N. Ms. fr. 7555^ 2., fol 100.
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seek refuge in Brussels, where he had sought out the Queen Mother 
and become one of her secretaries.^® Charged with having levied 
men-at-arms without permission, taken commissions from the German 
Bnperor, founded cannon, and fled the kingdom without royal leave,
Payen was found guilty "through ordinary means of contumace. "1'59 
In keeping with customary practice in such instances, he was 
banished from the kingdom in perpetuity, his property confiscated 
in the name of the King, and his office of conseiller in the Parle­
ment suppressed.
It was this last provision, the disposition of Payen's office, 
which stirred up a furor in the Parlement. According to Article 28 
of the Ordiname of Moulins (1566), all persons condemned for lgse- 
majeste by default and contumace were given five years to clear 
their names before the sentence could be carried out.1^0 unfor­
tunately, Article 183 of the Ordinance of Blois (1579) presented 
something of a contradiction, since it maintained that the penalties 
for lfese-majestl— confis cation of property and suppression of 
office among them— could never be remitted in the future.^ This 
implied, ofcourse, that the five year grace period of the Ordinance 
of lfoulins had been negated and that the King could immediately 
dispose of any offices held by traitors as he saw fit. But which
158Talon, MSmolres, p. 17.
159Ibid.
^-^Isambert, Anclexmes lols frangaises, XIV, 196-97.
l61Ibld., 424..
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ordinance was to apply in the case of Le Coigneux and Payen? The 
Crown held for immediate disposition, and on January 19, 1633, it 
sent a declaration to the Parlement setting out that the Ordinance 
of Ifoulins was limited by that of Blois and that the five year 
suspension of execution for sentences of lfese-majestg had no 
validity.1^ 2 This should have paved the way for the reversion of 
the offices to the Crown and their resale, but the Parlement 
refused to verify it, and a lettre de cachet of February 19 failed 
to budge the court from its stand.1^ 3
Further action on the edict was delayed for a few days by the 
removal of Chateauneuf as garde des sceaux and the appointment of 
Pierre V Seguier in his place. Seguier, former prgsident 21 mortier, 
brought no significant change to the policies of the charge, or to 
its function as intermediary between the council and the Parlement. 
One of the new garde des sceaux1s first endeavors was to attempt to 
persuade the Parlement to approve the suppression of Le Coigneux1s
^ B.N. Ms. fr. 23410, "Licts de justice des Rois au Parlement 
de Paris et aultres de ce royaume,” fols. 373-76. Another copy is 
in B.N. Ms. fr. 18424, fols. 2-4.
■^B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 224-28, January 31, 
February 19 and 21, 1633.
-^pierre V Seguier belonged to an ancient and distinguished 
robe dynasty which produced a chancellor of France, five presidents 
5 mortier, thirteen conseillers, and seven mattres des requites.
The rise of the family had taken place during the sixteenth century, 
from the time that Blaise Seguier, an aristocratic merchant of 
Paris, made a marriage alliance with the daughter of a maitre de la 
Ifarmaie of Paris. Blaise died in 1510, leaving five children to 
begin a classic ascent, first through the world of finances, then by 
judicial offices. Pierre I Seguier, grandson of Blaise, became 
prSsident & mortier in 1555 and considerably enlarged the family’s 
status and fortune. The succeeding generations of Seguiers sustained 
this elite position at the top of the governmental hierarchy. Pierre
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and Payen1 s offices, and -to carry this out two new declarations 
containing an elaboration on that of January 19 were sent to the 
court.165 The first of these set forth the principle that offices 
and charges were different and distinct from other property 
belonging to a subject, since charges were only an emanation of the 
royal authority which was bestowed on a private individual. When the 
individual lapsed into l&se-majeste or rebellion against the source 
of his public power, that power was cancelled and returned to the 
Grown. Thus, the Crown reasoned, offices and charges were immediately 
forfeited upon commission of the offense and did not require the 
five year waiting period as set out in the Ordinance of Moulins. Ey 
virtue of this interpretation, the offices of Le Coigneux and Payen
V Siguier, son of Jean Siguier d1Autry, was bom in Paris in 1588 
and became, in succession, conseiller of the Parlement and president 
%■ mortier by resignation from his uncle Antoine Siguier on April 17, 
T6^4. Seguier proved himself in the charge of garde des sceaux 
from 1633 and was made chancellor of France upon the death -oI 
Etienne d'Aligre in 1636. The Parlement of Paris and the council 
addressed him as "Monsieur1' as befitted only the princes of the 
blood, but the provincial parlements and all other bodies, corpora­
tions, and individuals gave him the title "Ifonseigneur." By the 
time of his death in 1672, his titles of nobility included due de 
Villemor and comte de Gien. There is no satisfactory biography of 
Seguier, that of Rene Kerviler, Le Chancelier Sgguier (Paris, 1874)» 
being superficial and hagiograhicaL. A limited amount of information 
may be found in Blanchard, Lea presidents a mortier du parlement de 
Paris, pp. 397-98, but the most satisfactory source IF presently 
Mousaier, Lettres et mSmoires adresses au chancelier Seguier, I, 
26-41.
l^Talon, Mfeaoires, p. 18. The text of these declarations has 
not come to light, but they were probably very similar to those 
registered in the lit de justice of April 12, 1633-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ksk
were suppressed and their disposition returned to the King. The 
second edict followed this up by creating and erecting two identical 
offices to be provided to capable and worthy p e rs o n s .1^
The Parlement took the new letters under consideration in 
plenary session on March 18, promptly provoking an outburst of 
rancor. Barillon, the radical president des EnquStes, proposed that 
the declaration could not and should not be registered, but support 
for his opinion dissolved when president a_mortier de Mesmes cleverly 
suggested that the court should follow the Ordinance of Moulins and 
sidetrack the letters by pigeon-holing them in the registry until 
the five year grace period had expired. This allowed the magistrates 
to hide behind a certain legality, and the Parlement adopted it.
Louis, annoyed as usual by this legal dodge, was quick to retaliate.
On Wednesday, March 23, in the middle of Holy Week, president de 
Mesmes received royal orders to retire to Blois within twenty-four 
hours. He departed the next day at ten o'clock.1^
Reaction to de Mesmes‘banishment was buffered for a few days 
by the Easter recess, but on the last day of March the assembled 
chambers ordered a large delegation to complain about his treatment 
and ask for his speedy return. A meeting was arranged for April 9, 
and on the appointed day three prlsidents, several conseillers, and 
the gens du roi rode out to St. Germain-en-Laye. There they were
1^Talon, Mgmoires, p. 18.
l67Ibid.; MalS, Mgmoires, II, 169-70. There is no register 
entry for this day.
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served dinner before being shown in to the King at two o’clock. Louis
was in a solemn and sober mood. Departing from usual practice he
addressed the magistrates himself and, even more extraordinarily,
kept his temper under control while making it plain that he expected
nothing but obedience:
When one judges someone at the Toumelle, this is not only to 
make him suffer the penalty of his crime but in order that 
others should be kept within their duty by his example. Thus, 
when president de Mesmes was commanded to go away, this was 
done not only by reason of his error, but also to ensure that 
in the future you should be wiser. When pr£sidial judges fall 
short in that which they owe you, you declare them criminals 
of l&se-majest£ before the Parlement, and you suspend them 
from their charges. You have to admit that the power that I 
have over you is much greater than that which you have over the. 
It is therefore for me to use my authority with respect to you 
when you forget what you owe me. If I send some affair to the 
Parlement which merits making remonstrances to me, I will 
always find them worthy; but likewise, after that, I intend to 
be punctually obeyed. As for your saying that this is no lack 
of good will if I am not content, I declare to you that I 
want effects other than good intentions from my Parlement.
Serve me better in the f u t u r e . ^
Louis then went on to announce a lit de justice to be held the
following Tuesday, April 12, a ceremony in which he expected the most
careful attention to due form as well as the substance of obedience:
Tuesday I am going to my Parlement and I desire that the former 
order be re-established: that four of the presidents should
come before me, with a number of conseillers; that the 
chambellan at my feet should be reclining and'not seated; that 
the garde des sceaux, coming to address me, should be on his 
knees as it has customarily b e e n . 9
l68Mol€, M&noires, II, 172-73.
l89lbid.; the same recitation, with some minor variations, is 
also given in Talon, MSmoires, p. 19.
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This short admonition delivered, the presidents and conseillers 
withdrew, leaving the gens du roi to receive a confidential reminder 
that Seguier was rendered all the honors due him.
In the event the lit de justice went smoothly. The King 
arrived at Sainte Chapelle at ten o'clock; Bellievre, Potier, Le 
Bailleul, and Tanneguy Seguier conducted him into the Grand 'Chambre 
where the magistrates duly stood when garde des sceaux Seguier 
entered. As in the lit de justice of the preceding year, however, 
the First President told him that this was an honor rendered at the 
express command of the King. Seguier then went to his knees before 
the King, delivered a short, unexceptional address outlining the 
reasons for the ceremony and finishing with some words of praise 
for his former colleagues in the Parlement. Le Jay then spoke, 
noting that
It was of great consequence to change the laws in a State which 
been long approved and observed; and that although there was 
some utility evident in new laws, nevertheless it was perilous 
to make new introductions in a State which very often ended in 
the subversion of monarchies and the ruin of States. But it 
was another thing when it was a case of absolutenecessity, 
for in these cases only the necessity made law. ^
Le Jay continued by recommending that Louis respect the ancient
integrity and splendor of his Parlement, which even foreigners had
recognized and had had recourse to, as had many kings in serious
affairs of State. Then he shrewdly added in conclusion, "’We pride
ourselves, Sire, boldly in this honor, for our glory is not ours,
^^Talon, M&noires, p. 21. The registers do not contain even a
synopsis of the First President1s speech in this lit de justice.
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it depends on you.1”171 With the completion of preliminary addresses, 
the important business of the day was brought forward in the form 
of edicts suppressing the offices held by Le Coigneux and Payen by 
virtue of the modification of the articles of Blois and Mbulins.
These were followed by letters substituting two new creations in 
lieu of the suppressed offices, the presidency li mortier being 
granted to Chretien de Lamoignon and the conseiller-ship to Jean 
de la Haye. The Crown took no chances that the Parlement might find 
an excuse to bar the newcomers: Lamoignon and de la Haye were
sworn in and took their places before the ceremony was adjourned.-^ -72
The April 12 lit de justice accomplished its purpose very well: 
the last sparks of parlementaire resistance to the Le Coigneux- 
Payen Affair were effectively snuffed out, and the court raised no 
more objections in the case. Though this issue turned about a legal 
interpretation of the ordinances rather than grave issues of State, 
the Crown had once again fallen back on the omnipotent mechanism of 
the lit de justice to override free discussion in the court. From 
the standpoint of the law, of course, there was little question that 
from initial accusation of lfese-majestg through debate over the 
ordinances the royalist argument had the greatest validity.
Le Coigneux and Payen had violated long established principles of 
lSse-aajestS, they had been duly judged, and the Crown’s legal
171Ibld.
172B.N. Ms . fr. nouv. acq. 9891, fols. 240-42, April 12, 1633-
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position in regard to their offices was impeccable. Beyond these 
strictly legal considerations, though, were deeper ones of the 
violation of the Parlement's historic right to freely weigh the 
lives, property, and fortunes of subjects without royal inter­
ference; in the Le Coigneux-Payen Affair, as in the most evident 
natters of State necessity, the King had been willing to use the 
most rigorous means to suspend an element essential to the traditional 
monarchy.
In addition to these considerations, the ceremony of April 12 
was also a milestone in the history of the Parlement marking the end 
of an era of conflict arising out of the Day of Dupes more than two 
years before. These two years had been important, perhaps critical, 
in shaping the relationship between the Crown and its high court 
for the remainder of Richelieu's ministry, for after November 10,
1630, the Parlement had been conclusively defeated on each of the 
several major affairs of State it had heard. The court had been 
unable to prevent the execution of margschal Marillac nor able to 
halt the procedings of the Chambre de 1'arsenal; after the interview 
at Mstz the question of commissaires, so vital to the establishment 
of absolute government, was totally barred from the court. The 
Parlement had been equally frustrated in bringing its interpretation 
of justice to Gaston, Marie de Medicis, and their followers. The 
remaining years of Richelieu's ministry would show that this 
succession of actions would go far towards restricting the Parlement's
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effectiveness in carrying out its political role: the free employ­
ment of judicial arbitraire had, by 1632, contributed to a
noticeable shift towards absolutism in the monarchy.
The Parlement had faired somewhat better in protecting its 
own privileges of office-holding. The paulette settlement of 1631, 
tardy though it was, upheld a cherished tradition that the sovereign 
courts were entitled to special treatment in assessment of office- 
holding taxes, and while the 1630 creation of offices in the court 
was not blocked, it was subjected to a compromise in which the 
initial establishment of conseillers was reduced by twenty percent. 
On the whole, however, the three years following the Day of Dupes
were hard ones for the Parlement. Its political role in the body
politic had been reduced, its members had been subjected to tough 
disciplinary measures and degrading gestures of submission, and 
its ressort had been violated. By way of compensation in this 
funereal picture of royal ascendancy, the Parlement could claim 
few moments of triumph or glory— a situation that would persist 
throughout the remainder of Richelieu's ministry.
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RESISTANCE AND RESTRAINT, 1635-1642
On May 19, 1635, Louis XIII issued a formal declaration of war 
against His Most Catholic Majesty Philip IV of Spain. In conformity 
with custom dating to time immemorial, the declaration was properly 
announced to the Cardinal-Infante Don Fernando, Spanish governor of 
the Netherlands, following the strict protocol accorded such matters. 
A herald in medieval costume, bearing the arms of France and 
accompanied by a trumpeter, presented himself in the Grande Place 
of Brussels and demanded an interview. Don Fernando, suspecting 
the mission of the French representatives, was reluctant to receive 
them. Learning of their news at the sound of trumpet's blare, his 
fears proved well-founded: a technical pretext for war between the
powers had been raked up in the Spanish seizure and imprisonment on 
March 26 of the Archbishop-Elector of Treves, Philip von SStern. 
Louis, having undertaken to guarantee the safety and territorial 
integrity of the Elector and other ecclesiastical princes along the 
Hhine, found the Spanish behavior to be an intolerable act of 
belligerency requiring the declaration of hostilities. French 
participation in the great German War was now an accomplished fact.
Actually, however, the archaic ruffles and flourishes displayed 
before the Cardinal-Infante were nothing more than a showy formality, 
for an under-the-counter kind of cold war between Bourbon and 
500
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Hapsburg had been going on for years. The French had been dabbling 
in German politics since 1631, when the Treaty of B&rwalde committed 
French monies in exchange for Swedish military activity against the 
Emperor. Richelieu had hestitated to do more until after the 
disaster at Nordlingen in 1634, when the Swedish cause virtually 
collapsed. That defeat had been so decisive for the anti-imperials 
that the French hand had been called— and Richelieu opted for war. 
French troops under French commanders acting in the interests of the 
Bourbons were now thrown into the field on a large scale for the 
first time in more than two decades. That commitment, begun in 1635 
with high hopes for the greater grandeur of France, would drag on 
for nearly twenty-five more years. In the end there would be no clear- 
cut victory, but the Hapsburg ascendancy in Europe would be over and 
a century of French predominance begun.
Warfare has always been one of the most costly of humankind’s 
endeavors, and the early seventeenth century was no exception. To 
be sure, the spiraling military expenses of the twentieth century 
provoked by the technological arms race had little place in the cost 
structure of seventeenth century warfare, since the military technology 
of the era remained about where it had been for the past fifty years.
At the same time, however, that limited technology, along with the 
shortcomings of the mercenary system of recruitment and command, was 
incapable of returning any decisive conclusions in the field. A 
peculiarly tragic paradox thus came to characterize the German War: 
armies came and went, appeared, occasionally fought, and then
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melted away, seemingly without lasting effects on the course of 
political events. Decision from the battlefield, like the fabled 
philosopher's stone of the alchemist, remained an elusive chimera 
ever hovering on the verge of realization. Governments on all - 
sides were unable to grasp this basic premise, and princes continued 
to pour enormous sums into yearly campaigns in the hope of some 
definitive result. For the great powers, at least, the war came to 
be as much a quest for funds as a military effort.
In France the government's search for resources followed the well- 
trodden paths of the "ordinary" and "extraordinary" revenues. The 
ordinary revenues were a melange of various funds, mostly dating 
from the Renaissance or earlier. The once formidable contribution 
taken from the royal domain had shrunk to a pitance by the 1600's, 
but the return from impositions like the taille, gabelle, aides, 
octrois, and traites amounted to a healthy two-thirds or more of 
royal income in peacetime. The great problem with these revenues 
was their restricted capacity for exploitation. All of them fell on 
the unprivileged and the least able to pay, and all were heavily 
mortgaged in advance to rapacious financiers. Even by disregarding 
the dictates of humanity and wise economic policy, therefore, Louis 
XIII could expect to make only limited expansion of the ordinary 
revenues because of the relatively inelastic economic structure of 
the kingdom. After increasing taxes to the point of rebellion, then 
pawning them for immediate credit, the Crown had to fall back on the
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greater potential of the extraordinary revenues and other irregular 
methods to meet its wartime obligations.
The euphemistic term "extraordinary revenues" covered a variety 
of schemes used to paper over the Crown's yawning deficit spending. 
Chief among them were the rentes, or State bonds, often issued on 
the superior credit of the Hotel de ville of Paris; the sale of 
offices; other income, principally loans and the droit annuel, from 
the Bureau des parties casuelles; and a "free gift" periodically 
given by the clergy. The last category can be dismissed as insignifi­
cant in comparison with the first three, which actually fueled the 
French war effort after 1635. In the typical wartime budget of 1639, 
for example, the government spent roughly 173,000,000 livres, of 
which 86,000,000 were destined for war.1 In the same year receipts 
also amounted to about 173,000,000. But this was on paper only, 
because the costs of tax collection and payment on previous rentes 
skimmed off 68,000,000 livres. In the actual fact, in this year 
Louis had an income good at the treasury of between 89,000,000 
and 105,000,000 livres, according to various ways of accounting.
Of this total, ordinary tax revenues amounted to 31,500,000 livres; 
the clergy's free gift came to about 2,000,000 livres; and income 
from the domain brought in about 2,000,000 livres. By way of 
contrast, no less than 57,000,000 livres, or well over fifty percent,
1From the figures supplied by D'Avenel, Richelieu et la 
monarchic absolue, II, Appendix X, "Budget de 1639," 447.
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of revenues in hand at the treasury came from expedients such as the
sale of offices, the droit annuel, and various kinds of loans from
both within and without the bureaucracy.2
These figures of royal income and expense were subject to
some annual variations, but certain general conclusions about them
are inescapable and held true from 1635 until the end of Richelieu's
ministry and beyond. The most outstanding fact of life that the
monarchy had to face during this period was a gaping deficit due to
the costs of war. These costs far exceeded receipts from taxation
and drove the King's ministers into a desperate search for any
source of ready money at whatever price. This insatiable need for
money in turn had its repercussions throughout the body politic.
In the lower levels of society, oppressive taxation evoked a
simmering resentment which sometimes boiled over into open rebellion.
Surintendant des finances Claude Bullion, a councillor in charge of
raising war revenues and thus well aware of the national situation
wrought by the war, wrote to Richelieu in 1639 that
expenditure in cash is up to at least 40 millions, the 
traitants are abandoning us, and the masses will not pay 
eiiKer the new or the old taxes. We are now scraping the 
bottom of the barrel . . . and I am afraid that our foreign 
war is degenerating into a civil war.3
2See D'Avenel and the tables prepared by Mallet in Comptes 
rendus de 1'artministration du royaume de France, pp. 198-228. There 
are some differences in the figures supplied by D'Avenel for the 
budget of 1639 and those of Mallet because of their methods of 
reckoning. Mallet accepted only sums good at the treasury but did 
not include gifts from the clergy in his estimates of royal income. 
D'Avenel, on the other hand, did not deduct the expense of collection 
from income but carried them as a separate line item of budgetary 
expenditure.
R^ichelieu, Lettres, VI, 608, Bullion to Richelieu, October 25,
1639.
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These problems would have been serious enough in themselves had 
not the Crown also found itself at loggerheads with its sovereign 
courts when attempting to levy new taxes, seeking approval for 
extraordinary funding, or trying to extract monies from the civil 
servants themselves. It is no exageration to say that financial 
needs associated with Richelieu's ambitious foreign policy almost 
completely absorbed the monarchy's energies after 1635 and provided 
the main theme of its domestic politics until the end of the Cardinal's 
ministry.
Nowhere was this more true than in the politics of the Parlement, 
where the Crown's fiscal policies consistently aroused the opposition 
of the court and violated the interests of its members. This tension 
over fiscal matters bore only a superficial resemblance to Charles 
I«s troubles with the English Parlement over taxation during the 
late 1620's. Unlike the English houses, the Parlement of Paris could 
not claim anything resembling an all-inclusive power of the purse 
with the potential to moderate the sovereign power. Moreover, the 
Parlement lacked the broad representative qualities of the Parliament. 
Howevermuch it may have wanted to believe otherwise, the court's 
breadth of vision was rigid, narrow, selfish, and class-oriented.
It could not escape the mold of its history and function, that of 
an elite legal body whose primary function was to judge, not to grant 
subsidies to the king. Moreover in exercising its advisory 
capacity, the court was handicapped by the negativity of its modus 
operand!. As Glasson has phrased it,
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the means proposed by the Crown in seeking out resources for 
itself might be of contestable value, but the Parlement could 
not imagine others and forgot to take account of the ends 
which it was proposed to attain, the grandeur and success of 
France in the memorable wars in which she was engaged.4
The net result of the Parlement's privileged social position and
its manner of working would be a consistent policy of obstructionism,
often assisted by legal technicalities but always without the
staying power to alter the course of Richelieu's foreign policy.
The Parlement's attitude towards the King's fiscal expedients
became evident as the war effort got into full swing. The buildup
of French forces during 1635 and 1636 was a costly operation, and
the Crown intended to finance a large part of it by the sale
of offices. The pressure for money was so great and resistance
from the sovereign courts so likely that normal preliminary parleys
with the Parlement were cut short. On December 20, 1635, Louis
went to the Parlement to hold a lit de justice for the registration
of several financial acts. The ceremony itself was undistinguished,
save for the absence of almost all the great nobility and the
first public appearance of Pierre Siguier as Chancellor.^
Following custom, Louis opened the session with a few words,
^Glasson, l£ Parlement de Paris, I, 150.
^Former Chancellor Etienne d'Aligre had died on December 11. 
SSguier took the oath as Chancellor on the evening of December 19. 
His lettres de provision were delivered to the Parlement the next 
morning and registered before the lit de justice of the 20th opened. 
The new honor changed nothing in Siguier's relations with the court, 
since as garde des sceaux he had enjoyed the full confidence of 
Louis and Richelieu.
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then the new Chancellor presented the official justification 
for the ceremony. His speech was straightforward and devoid of any 
novelties in its defense of royal foreign policy. Louis had, he 
said, sought to bring peace to his people and to Europe, but the 
designs of the enemy had led to war. To wage it, S€guier went on, 
70,(XX),000 livres were needed by spring, revenues would be applied 
towards the pay of 200,000 infantry and 3-4,000 horse. The King's 
fiscal exigencies had led to the decision to create several new 
offices, a decision which the country could easily tolerate because 
"there were not enough places in it to give or to occupy the 
virtuous and generous [^ persons] who sought service in all the noble 
exercises of justice and arms, if new ones were not made."6
At the conclusion of the Chancellor's official remarks, a 
huge package of at least sixteen edicts was produced for 
verification.7 All but one or two dealt with the creation of
6B.N. Ms. fr. 3838, fol. 138-138v°, Philippe de Marescot to 
the corate de Bethune, without date. The registers of the Parlement 
do not report SSguier's remarks, and Marescot's report was based 
on second-hand evidence, since he was not present at the ceremony.
7It is a curious fact that the sources do not agree on the 
number of edicts registered in this session. An "AbregS des Edicts 
et Ordonnances du Roy, verifiez en Parlement le Roy y seant, 
en la Chambre des Comtes et Cour des Aydes, le 20. December 1635" 
published in the Gazette de France, No. 35, 1635, 137-42, lists 
forty-two titles of edicts and ordinances. Griffet, probably fol­
lowing the Gazette, also lists forty-two titles. The Mfimoires of 
Mathieu Mol£, on the other hand, insist that there were' only thirteen 
acts presented to the Parlement, and Glasson accepted this figure. See 
UblM, MSnoires, II, 319, and Glasson, Le Parlement de Paris, I, 150.
I have taken the listing of sixteen titles in the registers of the 
Parlement as correct. The discrepancies might be explained by assuming 
that Molfi's Mgmoires erroneously records "treize" for "seize" and that 
twenty-six of the titles listed in the Gazette were registered in the 
Chambre des comptes and the Cour des aides only.
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of offices, and some of the individual titles were substantial 
creations in their own right. One edict, for example, confirmed the 
establishment of the Parlement of Metz two years before, while 
others provided for the resale of some of the rights to the royal 
domain, enlarged the bailliage courts, and increased the size of the 
Cour des monnaies. Still another act, one shortly to become the 
center of a storm within the Parlement, provided for the addition 
of a president 3 mortier,twenty conseillers in the Enquetes, four 
conseillers in the Requites, eight maitres des requetes, four 
huissiers, and two substitutes for the procureur ggngral. Among 
these pecuniary measures, an act p u n ish in g  military deserters 
stood in lone contrast. The great quantity of legislation precluded 
a complete textual reading of each edict, and apparently only the 
titles and perhaps a synopsis of each document was read out.®
Jerome Bignon, the finest orator among the gens du roi, delivered 
a scathing attack on royal financial procedures and their prejudice 
to the Parlement, but he concluded, as duty required, with a formal 
request for registration. SSguier then came forward, collected the 
opinions of les grands and the cardinals before those of the 
presidents, and delivered these votes to the King. With formalities 
completed, the edicts were considered registered and the session 
was adjouxned.9
®Mol€, Mgmoiree, II, 319, notes that the edicts were read, as 
do the MSmoires of Talon, 41. Griffet, however, maintains that 
only the titles were read because of the lengthy presentation.
^The registers of the Parlement are exceedingly brief in recording 
the events of this session. See B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9892, fols. 
392-403- The Mfiaoires of Qmer Talon, pp. 41-45, and those of MolS
II, 318-20, add very little to the account in the registers.
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Royal procedures in this lit de justice had been excessive in 
several ways, and a reaction against them was not long in developing. 
By presenting its legislation in the King’s presence, the Crown 
had abridged the Parlement’s traditional privilege of freely 
examining important enactments. This offense was deepened by the 
quantity of titles presented and by the fact that they had not been 
read before the verification had taken place. Finally, and most 
irritatingly, the Parlement was now confronted by a large increase 
in its membership. The judges could expect a reduction in their 
Spices commensurate with a reduced case load accruing to each 
member of the enlarged body, and correctly or incorrectly, they 
also feared that the new creation would deflate the value of their 
offices. Angered by these prospects, ten of the younger and more 
radical members of the Enquetes invaded the Grand'Chambre two days 
after the lit de justice to demand a general assembly of all 
chambers to discuss the edicts registered two days before. Their 
pretext was that the legislation had been registered without a 
hearing. The First President pointed out that this demand was a 
ticklish one, sure to offend the King if carried through. Despite 
this warning the Enquetes insisted and asked that the declaration 
not be executed until the chambers had been united. This proposal 
had no more success than the first, and no further action was taken 
for some days because of the Christmas festivities.10
10Md1§, MSmoires, II, 321; Talon, MSmoires, p. 45. The 
registers do not contain an entry for December 22.
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Though Le Jay had temporarily stalled the Enquites, Louis 
had gotten wind of what was afoot and determined to nip any opposition 
in the hud. On the day after Christinas, royal letters, described 
by Talon as "full of sharpness and indications of wrath on the part 
of the King," were addressed to Mathieu MblS and to the First 
President on behalf of the entire court. Delayed by sickness,
IfolS could not deliver these letters to the Grand'Cbflmhre until 
Saturday, December 29. After receiving the letter addressed to 
the Parlement, Le Jay called the Chambre de l1 Edit and the Toumelle 
together to deliberate. Some were of the opinion that the Enquetes 
should also be called, since the lettre de cachet was addressed to 
the entire court and concerned all the chambers, while others 
favored sending a deputation to the Chancellor. When this division 
in opinions could not be resolved, the gens du roi were solicited 
for their advice. Knowing the King's interest and instructions, 
the attorneys declined to take a stand. The three chambers finally 
took the more cautious path: a deputation consisting of Henri de
i;LTalon, MSmoires, p. 45. The text of these lettres de cachet 
is in MolS, MSmoires, II, 321-24, and B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 4392', 
fols. 412-14, December 29, 1635. The letter addressed to MolS was 
marked by the peculiarity that the procureur gSnSral was blamed for 
having permitted the assembly on December 2?. MolS conmented in 
his Mbaolres that he was quite surprised to see that this letter 
"imputed something to which it was impossible for me to give order, 
since the Saturday following the entry of the King [on December 20],
I had not been able to go to the Parlement because of a passing 
sickness from which I had had to excuse myself." Why the Crown 
should have made this error is not clear, because there is no 
evidence that Mole was at fault.
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Ms sines and four conseillers was dispatched to the Chancellor, while 
the First President summoned representatives from the Enquetes 
to appraise them of what had been done.
While awaiting the outcome of the meeting with the Chancellor, 
the Enquites went on badgering for a plenary assembly. When the 
Grand1 Chambriers came to take their places on Monday, December 31» 
they found all of the Enquetes already on their benches, ready to 
deliberate. Pierre Gayant, a radical Enquete leader, asked the 
First President to authorize the joint session, but Le Jay replied 
that the records of the lit de justice had already been made official 
and that he had amply explained the King's will to them. De Mesmes, 
head of the deputation to the Chancellor, then told the Enquetes 
off the record that he had seen the Chancellor, who had promised to 
mention their demands to Louis. This placated the prSsidents, but 
the younger and more hot-headed conseillers de Enquetes refused to 
leave their seats, forcing the Grand1Chambriers to suspend the 
morning's business.
Turmoil within the Parlement in defiance of the King's wishes 
continued to deepen as the new year began. On January 2nd the 
Bogus tes again entered the Grand'Cbamhre and occupied their places, 
and although no propositions were made, neither could normal business 
be carried on. The Touroelle conducted its work as usual, but the 
Chambre de 1'Edit had to suspend its sessions for want of solicitors
12B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9892, fols. <410-14; Talon, MSmoires, 
pp. 45-46; MolS, Mtooires, II, 324-27.
13MolS, MSmoires, II, 328-29; Talon, tfemoires, pp. 46-47.
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and barristers, a deficiency which Talon attributed to customary 
holiday arrangements rather than to the internecine feud among 
the chambers. These deteriorating circumstances only heightened 
royal discontent with the Parlement, and on January 4 a lettre de 
cachet was delivered to the court prescribing that it send a 
deputation of four presidents and four conseillers to St. Germain 
on January 5. Bignon delivered the letter before the Grand'Chambre, 
but immediately after its presentation, the Enqujtes filed in and 
took their seats without being summoned. Le Jay warned them "that 
it was extraordinary to assemble themselves without being summoned," 
then read them the King's latest instructions.1^ Reading of the 
letter completed, the Enquetes and Requetes were instructed to adjourn 
and select their deputies. This they refused to do, and Jean 
LaisnS, one of the more hot-headed Enquetes, stood up, doffed his 
bonnet, and told the court that he had a complaint to make about the 
First President. Le Jay ordered him to replace his headgear and 
> mind his manners, whereupon Laisne coarsely asserted he would do as 
he pleased, since he was speaking to the Parlement and not to the 
First President. The conseiller then recounted a bizarre, but 
highly revealing, incident which suggests how important negotiations 
concerning parleaantalre politics were carried on behind the scenes 
between the First President and the King's ministers.
Laisne related that on December 26 Le Jay and surintendant des 
finances Claude Bullion had secretly met in a hermit's cell on
^B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9892, fol. 418, January 4, 1636.
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Ifcsrt ValSrien, an isolated peak about halfway between Paris and 
St. Germain-en-Laye. There, in presumed security, they had discussed 
not only what had transpired in the court on the 22nd, the day the 
Enquetes had made their first demonstration, but had also discussed 
the means to suppress the dissension. Bullion and Le Jay had 
talked about the consequences of the financial edicts for some time, 
and the First President had named several Enquetes who had caused 
trouble. LaisnS's name was prominent among them. Le Jay then 
gave Bullion a memoranda on the subject, which the surintendant read 
and then tore up, throwing the pieces into a comer of the room.
LaisnS maintained that he had found out about the rendezvous from 
the hermit in whose hut the meeting had taken place. The recluse 
had evesdropped on the conversation, and after the officials 
departed, he had collected the pieces of Bullion's memoranda and 
brought them to Laisne, along with an account of what had been said.
The rendezvous had been a gross violation of the confidentiality of 
the Parlement's business; LaisnS, as well, had been implicated in 
politics contrary to the Crown's interest. Embarrassed and infuriated, 
the conseiller thought the matter should be brought to the attention 
of the court, since his honor as well as that of the company was at 
stake; having finished his tale, he threw a petition outlining his 
complaint onto the greffler's desk and withdrew.^
copy of the petition, which does not detail the incident, is 
in Hole, MSmoires, II, 328. The best account of the circumstances 
surrounding the iiont ValSrien conference is in Talon, MSmoires, p. 45. 
Additional information can be gleaned from B.N. Ms. fr. 3839, fols. 
4-4v°, a letter of Philippe de Marescot to the comte de Bethune on 
January 5 in which Marescot recounted Parisian gossip about the
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Laisng's story immediately provoked a lively buzz within the 
court. Lefevre d'Eaubonne, conseiller in the fourth chamber of 
Enquetes, wanted to read Laisne's request, but Le Jay refused 
permission. Upon this denial, confusion reigned in the court. Some 
Enquetes demanded that the petition be sent to the gens du roi, 
while others said that because Le Jay had been implicated, he should 
step down while the matter was deliberated. Amid a continuing 
clamor from the Enquetes, Le Jay finally abandoned the Grand1Chamhre, 
followed in turn by the other Grand * Chambriers. The Enquetes, 
however, would not leave and occupied the room until the normal 
hour for adjournment, when they sullenly retreated to their chambers. 
There they nominated the necessary representatives to meet the 
King the next day at St. Germain, as well as a deputation of their 
own to see the Chancellor about LaisnS's complaint.
Next day the King and representatives from the Parlement met 
at St. Germain at two o'clock. Siguier elaborated the King's 
displeasure, and although himself a former parlementaire, the 
Chancellor minced no words in supporting the royal position as mani­
fested in the lit de Justice of December 20 and in subsequent 
letters. The creation of offices was, he said, an outgrowth of
incident. The letter reveals that Laisrie had a country residence at 
Ruel, near the hermit's cell on Mont Val6rien. During the two 
month vacation of the Parlement, LaisnS stayed at his country house 
and during past sojourns had befriended the hermit, to whom he had 
given handouts of food.
1 T^he official account in the registers for January 4, B.N. Ms. fr. 
nouv. acq. 9892, fols. 417-18, is quite brief. Much more information 
can be found in Talon, l/Empires, pp. 45-46, and in B.N. Ms. fr. 3839, 
fols. 2v°-3v°, Marescot to the comte de Bethune, January 5, 1636.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
515
the needs of State, to which the clergy had contr5.buted money and
the nobility had given lives and blood. The creation of o-fices in
the Parlement had probably resulted in son® small diminuation of
their emoluments, but this was the least sacrifice that one should
expect from men of their standing. Then Seguier repeated injunctions
regarding the royal authority that all the judges had heard before:
"You have no authority other than that which he has given you, 
nor power outside that which he has communicated to you; 
nevertheless, you employ it to oppose his will; you would 
decry his counsel and his affairs, and likewise you seek to 
criticize the government of his State. Do not imagine that 
this which he has done bears the mark of his weakness and 
poor government, but rather that of his good conduct. For 
that reason the King forbides you to assemble, but orders 
that you execute his will punctually, to receive the officers 
who will be provided, and to demonstrate your obedience to 
him by your actions."17
Louis then took the floor. Having been thoroughly briefed by
Richelieu, he cleverly sought to exploit the schism within the
Parlement by praising the Grand1 Chambriers while disclaiming the
actions of the Enquetes. In Talon's words,
Louis said that he had ample grounds to be content with the 
messieurs of the Grand'Chambre, who on this occasion and others 
had served him well, but that he was not similarly pleased 
with the Enquetes, who .seemed to take pleasure in contradicting 
and interfering with all his Intentions; that he would make them 
obey and turn about, and that he would teach them to do their 
duty.18
17Talon, Memoires, p. 49.
18Ibid. The tactic of praising the Grand'Chambriers was part of 
a complete script written out for Louis by Richelieu before the 
meeting. This brief is in Richelieu, Lettres, V, 392-93*
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The King then assured Le Jay that he would stand behind him, saying 
"'if someone attacks you, I will be your second and will have every­
one know that I am pleased with your conduct and your actions.'"19 
The First President then mistakenly tried to cover the Pnqufetes' 
tracks by saying that they had failed in form rather than in function, 
but Louis would not hear him out. The royal will would be done, and 
the Parlement's complaints would be heard only after he had been 
obeyed and the new conseillers duly received.20
Louis' determination to have full submission from the Parlement 
was underlined the next day when the exile of five Enquetes was ordered. 
LaienS and conseiller Foucault were arrested and taken under guard to 
Angers; conseillers Sevin and Lefevre d'Eaubonne were sent to 
Clermont on their own recognizance, while Jean-Jacques Barillon,
President des Enqufetes, was sent to Saumur.21 Predictably enough, 
the disquieting news of the exiles infuriated the Chamibres des 
enquetes, and instead of restoring order, the punishment further
•^Ibid. Louis was still following Louis' brief.
20Ibid. The account in B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9892, fols. <420- 
23, rendered on January 9, 1636, is almost identical to Talon's 
version.
21B.N. Ms . fr. nouv. acq. 9892, fols. 420-26, January 9 and 
12, 1636; Talon, Mtooires, p. 50. .The dates given in Talon for the 
sessions of January 10, 11, and 12 are incorrect. Glasson, 
following Talon, also recorded these dates incorrectly.
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excited the judges. When all the Parlement’s chambers assembled 
on January 9 to hear Le Jay’s report on the visit to St. Germain, 
the Eaqt&tes tried to take advantage of the opportunity to bring up 
the banishment of their colleagues. The First President rejected 
the demand as patently contrary to royal will, but the Enquetes 
would not leave the Grand* Chambre and no judicial business could be 
conducted. During the next two days the Enquetes discussed their 
course of action without invading the Grand'Chamhre, but on 
Saturday morning, January 12, they quietly entered, seated themselves, 
and asked for a united front against the Crown’s arrest of their 
associates. Le Jay attempted to put them off until the following 
Tuesday, but the Enquetes insisted on immediate debate. Once again 
the issue became deadlocked, discipline broke down, and the 
remainder of the morning ticked away with the Grand * Cbamhriers and 
the Enquetes exchanging stares across their respective benches.
The lingering resistance among the Enquetes rapidly used up the 
Crown’s remaining disciplinary alternatives, but Louis and his 
advisers determined to make another effort at moderate persuasion.
On Tuesday, January 15, secretaire d'Etat La Ville-aux-Clercs, an 
honorary conseiller in the Parlement, was sent to the court to read 
a royal letter criticizing the Enqufetes * behavior and prohibiting all 
assemblies connected with the creation of offices. The letter was 
delivered to the (brand* Chambre alone, which presented something of 
a dilemma to the presidents a_mortier: how could the royal
instructions be disseminated among the other rebellious chambers 
without stirring up further disorder? After some discussion, Le Jay
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suggested that a president and a conselller from each chamber be 
called to the buvette, the court's refreshment bar, and there be 
Informed of La Ville-aux-Clerc1 s communication. But the Enquetes 
understandably declined to accept this rather roundabout means on 
the grounds that it was neither proper nor customary for them to 
receive the King's orders at the same place where they usually drank 
their wine. Next day the Enqugtes spontaneously invaded the 
Grand*Chambre to hold a general assembly but were again frustrated 
by Le Jay, who in anticipation of their manoeuvre began a closed 
door audience at an early hour.22
On the same day, however, unofficial negotiations were started 
which would eventually resolve the impasse between the Crown and 
the court. Without the official sanction of the Parlement, though 
probably with the First President's knowledge, Bellievre rode out 
to Ruel to see Richelieu. The Cardinal, anxious to settle matters 
that were holding up the sale of new offices, agreed to make some 
accommodation if a deputation would go to meet the King. Le Jay 
announced this proposition on the 18th. The Enquetes dragged their 
feet on the pretense that the Parlement should not send a deputation 
sintply on the advice of the First President, and only the fourth 
chamber was immediately willing to rise above this technicality. 
Nevertheless, the other chambers finally agreed on condition that 
Louis observe all formal proprieties and send them an official summons
22B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9892, fols. 426-28, January 15,
1636; Talon, Mgmoires, p. 50.
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in the form of a lettre de cachet. This was brought to the Parlement 
on the 21st. The King asked for a delegation of four presidents a 
raortier and six other Grand1Chambriers plus two representatives 
from each Chambre des enquetes and des requites. These duly presented 
themselves at the Louvre on Tuesday, January 22. Le Jay spoke 
first, picking his words carefully in asking the return of the 
banished judges without attempting to excuse the behavior of the 
court. To cast his request in the best light, Le Jay noted that 
earlier in the day the Parlement had undertaken to execute the 
edicts of December 20 by receiving Francois Le Gras into one of the 
new offices of maftres des requStes and by the reception of Francois- 
Jercoe Tambonneau into an old charge of conseiller. The latter 
action was an indirect recognition of the Parlement of Metz, 
registered on December 20, because Tambonneau had formerly served 
in that parlement and had been received at Paris without examination. 
Louis expressed satisfaction with the court's obedience and noted 
that if the Parlement continued to obey and smoothly received all 
the officers of the new creation, the judges might expect his 
clemency. Le Jay, insensitive to Louis1 state of mind, asked for the 
iaaediate return of the exiles, whereupon the King snapped back,
"I do not bargain with my subjects and my officers; I am the master 
and want to be obeyed."2^
23b .N. Ms . fr. nouv. acq. 9892, fols. 429-34, January 17-23,
1636; Talon, Maaolres, pp. 50-51.
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Full obedience from the Parlement was slow in coming because 
of Louis' insistence on compliance as a prior condition for 
restoration of the miscreant magistrates. On January 25 the First 
President rendered his official report of the Louvre meeting a few 
days before, repeating injunctions that obedience had to be forth­
coming before the royal grace could be expected. Three days later, 
on January 28, Chancellor Seguier summoned all the presidents des 
Bogufttes and warned them that Louis knew their assemblies were 
continuing. Louis was much angered at this, and to put an end to 
it, the presidents would in the future be responsible for maHng 
known to the King the names of those conseillers who remained on 
their benches after having received an order to adjourn. The 
presidents averred that there was no justice in being required to 
denounce their colleagues, since this not only violated their trust 
but obliged them to violate rules of the court as well. The Chancel­
lor's dismissal was absolute: there were no secrets in regard to
the King, who could and should be informed about what went on in 
the sovereign companies of the kingdom. As if any repetition of 
these arguments were needed, on January 30 the parquet visited 
each of the chambers in turn to underscore the Crown's stand.24
None of these warnings brought the EnquStes into line, and 
negotiations dragged on through February, punctuated by attempts to 
install conseillers in the new offices. The Parlement stalled these
*B.H. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9892, fols. 436-45; Talon, Memoires, 
pp. 51-52.
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receptions as best it could. On February 4, for example, the Crown
presented Claude Colombel, a distinguished Parisian professor and
tutor of law, as a candidate for one of the offices. It took the
best efforts of the prince de Conde to force Colombel's reception,
even though he was obviously and eminently qualified.25 During
February the EnquStes also persisted in holding deliberations within
their chambers. These discussions consumed the judges' time, brought
private judicial hearings to a halt, and negated the Enquetes1 public
service functions.
From the beginning of the dispute, these judges had argued that
they were being discriminated against, since they had to bear the
burden of absorbing the massive expansion within the Parlement. In
a semi-official conference with Chancellor Seguier on March 10,
this view was clearly enounced by Mac£ Boulanger, president in the
fourth Chambre des enqufetes. His associates, Boulanger said,
demanded a reduction in the number of conseillers in the creation,
together with a promotion of two Enquetes into the Grand'Chambre.
Boulanger reasoned that
while there had been twenty-six conseillers established in the 
Grand* Chambre, there had been only sixteen in each Chambre des 
enau&tes. 3ince that time, in various creations the EnqdBtes 
tad been enlarged so that at present, there being a number in 
each chamber equal to that of the Grand 'Ch«nfr>re, it was just 
that this new creation be divided equally, seeing principally 
that all affairs were founded in the (brand* Chambre, and that 
messieurs of the Grand'Chambre who served in the toumelle and 
in the Chambre de l'Edit were charged with the best c a s e s . ^
25ihe details are in Talon, M&aoires, pp. 52-53- The registers 
of the Parlement make nothing more than an official acknowledgement 
of Colombel*s reception.
26Talon, Memoires, p. 55.
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Claude Mallier, a president des Requites, argued the same way. The 
two Chambre3 des requites, he said, were being asked to accept only 
four new conseillers, the same as any one of the Jingulltes.27
Any settlement satisfactory to the Parlement would have to 
placate the Eaqu&tes, and the compromise that was reached at the 
conclusion of the March 10 meeting did just that. Originally the 
declaration of December 20 had provided for the creation of a 
prCsident S mortier, ten conseillers lalques and ten conseiiiers 
dercs in the Enquetes, and four conseillers in the Requites.
Now, Seguier told the delegates, the King had agreed to trim off 
three conseillers clercs and four conseillers laiques, along with 
the president a mortier, for an overall creation of seventeen new 
conseillers. Moreover, two of the ranking conseillers in the EnquStes 
would be promoted into the Grand'Chambre, bringing the number of 
coaaaillers lalques there to eighteen. To sweeten the deal, the 
droit annuel would be guaranteed for the next nine years, even 
though it was not yet up for renewal, and the absent judges would be 
allowed to return. A declaration containing these terms was 
seat to the Parlement on March 11; it was registered the next day. At 
the same time ranking Enqu&tes eonselllers Jean Le Nain and Michel 
Ferrand were installed in the Grand'Chambre. Louis and Richelieu 
respected their part of the bargain as well: a separate declaration
extending the droit annuel was published on March 15.2®
27B.N. Mb. fr. nouv. acq. 9892, fols. 460-63, March 12, 1636; 
Talon, Mtmoires, p. 55; Moll, Mlmoires, II, 336-37.
28fi.N. Imprimis, Actes Royaux, F.46989, no. 8.
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Cb Monday, March 17, a small delegation from the court officially 
requested the restoration of the banished judges. Louis acknowledged 
that the Parlement had given him satisfaction, albeit belatedly, 
and after having warned them against such disobedience in the future, 
agreed to the recall.^9
Thus was finally concluded what Omer Talon chose to call "this 
bickering” (cette brouillerie), the most serious derangement in 
parlementaire politics since the affair of the Chambre de ^ Arsenal 
in 1631-32.^ For the participants and public the consequences were 
veTy diverse, and only the First President of the Parlement emerged 
with some unencumbered gain. For his enduring loyalty under pressure 
from the Enqu&tes, Nicolas Le Jay was awarded the cordon bleu and 
made garde des seeaux of the Ordre du Saint Esprit on March 22. The 
public fared less well, for the press of public business had squeezed 
out most private hearings within the Parlement between January 15 and 
March 9, a period of more than six weeks. Nor was the compromise 
settlement an unmitigated success for the King. The Crown had 
succeeded in winning the registration of seventeen new offices within 
the court, a substantial boast to its shaky fiscal!ty, but this 
victory was more superficial than real. The Parlement had forced 
a compromise and reduced the original creation by one-third. 
Furthermore, future events would show that reaping the expected 
rewards from the new offices was no sure thing. As in, the past,
29fi.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9892, fols. 463-71, March 14-18, 1636; 
Talon, M&poires, pp. 56-57; Molg, Mgfoolres, II, 338-43. The test of 
the modified declaration is in Md16, ifenoTres, II, 338-41.
3°Mgmoires, p. 57.
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after giving their official approval, the judges fell hack on a 
second line of defense: they tenaciously delayed receptions into
the new offices, and after their installation, new men were likely 
to find themselves denied a rightful share of cases to he reported. 
Protests and recriminations from this harassment were to he sporadically 
exchanged throughout the remainder of Richelieu's ministry, as was 
resistance to the execution of several other edicts registered in the 
lit de justice.
Moreover, neither Crown nor court emerged with any decisive 
political advantage, despite the fact that the comportment of hoth 
sides had been marked hy excesses. Throughout the Crown had denied 
the Par lenient's right to assemble and thus also denied its right to 
present remonstrances. This was particularly offensive since no 
preliminary examination had been allowed before the edicts were 
presented in the lit de justice and since a full reading of them had 
not been made during that ceremony. The court had thus been 
required to act without prior knowledge and without being officially 
appraised of the details of what-it was being asked to approve. On 
the other hand, the disciplinary measures which followed the session 
of December 20, however ill-advised, fell well within the recognized 
limits of royal authority. The arrest and exile of judges from 
the sovereign courts had not, as Glasson asserts, "born affront to 
a fundamental law of the kingdom, to the principle of irremovability 
by removing several magistrates."^1 The Parlement, conversely,
^ •Le Parlement de Paris, I, 159.
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showed little sense of sacrifice for the cause of the war, even 
though the absorption of seventeen new positions would not have 
seriously affected either the long-term value of parlementaire 
offices or their emoluments. The magistrates chose to believe that 
the creations were detrimental to their investments, however, and 
refused to make concessions to the King’s needs. As long as the 
Crown continued to respect the Parlement's right of veri ication and 
registration, this kind of resistance would present a serious obstacle 
to the King's extraordinary finances.
Parlementaire interference in State finance took a different 
twist as French fortunes of war sank to their nadir during the sumner 
of 1636. During June and July Spanish armies massed in Flanders 
launched a major offensive into northern France, a drive which 
threatened the fortress of Corbie near Amiens by the first of August. 
Corbie guarded the road to Paris, the Spanish onrush seemed irre­
sistible, and the kingdom was thrown into near-panic. During the 
crisis of this so-called "Corbie Year," the Parlement showed that 
when the King's needs became demonstratably dire, it might make 
contributions to ease the national emergency. Even while doing so, 
though, the judges wanted to express their opinion on the defense 
of Paris. Under the circumstances this was an intrusion into the 
royal power, as well as a slap in the face to Louis* exertions in 
defense of his capital, and it called the King's wrath down on the 
Parlement.
On August 4 Louis appraised the court of the military situation 
and asked that deputies meet with him at the Louvre to discuss
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remedies. The court immediately agreed and went further. In the 
same session it voted on emergency arrit ordering any tardy noblemen 
to join the army at once. On the afternoon of the 4-th, Le Jay 
and several judges appeared at the Louvre as requested, where Louis 
told them that the enemy was on the frontiers and the army was in 
grave need of reinforcement. The city of Paris had already offered 
to raise two thousand men, the personnel of the royal council had 
agreed to the same number, and the King hoped for the same from 
his Parlement. The levy would only he for two months, he said, and 
the contribution should be assessed by the court's chambers without 
assembling them in plenary session. Richelieu added that haste was 
essential, that the Parlement should consider the matter on the morrow 
rather delay another day.^2
The Parlement, however, showed no great haste to comply with the 
Cardinal's admonition to hurry the matter. On the 5th it was 
decided that the levy had to be made with all chambers assembled, in 
spite of Louis' wish, and this was done only the next day, when the 
judges agreed to contribute two thousand men to the war effort.
The cost of the gesture was about 100,000 livres, and deputies from 
the various chambers set to work to divide the assessment. The 
finished apportionment is not completely known, because the figures 
for the presidents des chambres and the conseillers are wanting, 
but the presidents 4 mortier were asked for 675 livres each, as 
were the gens du roi. At the other end of the scale, the huissiers
^B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9775, fol. 290, August 5, 1636; IfalS, 
V&noireB, II, 351-53.
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of the Grand1Chambre gave 300 each, while the clerks in the registry 
were also asked for 300 livres apiece.33
While asking for monetary contributions from the city ariH from 
the Palais de justice, the government moved in other ways to 
strengthen the kingdom's defense. On August 8 the King published an 
ordinance enjoing the inhabitants of bourgs villages surrounding 
Paris to turn out and work on the capital's fortifications. Several 
other measures were promulgated to ensure the city's food supplies, 
gentlemen were directed to the front, and the price of arms was 
controlled. At the same time those who owned a carriage were asked to 
give one horse for military use.34 These and similar measures worked 
on raw nerves in the city, touching off rumors which inevitably 
seeped into the halls and anti chambers of the Palais. On August 9 
alarming reports concerning the confiscation of horses were brought 
up in the court, it having been rumored all over the city that Louis 
intended to requisition a horse from every carriage owner. Spreading 
from this point the session became a forum for a general discussion 
of the state of the city's defenses. Le Jay denied that the King 
had demanded a horse from each carriage owner; Louis had, he 
maintained, merely hoped that those with three or more animals might 
graciously volunteer one for service. The Parlement gave the city 
government permission to float a 100,000 livres loan for the pay and
33ihe complete list of assessments, in which figures for the 
presidents and conseillers are lacking, is in Mol£, Mfinoires, II, 355. 
The iota! of 100,000 livres for two thousand men is based on the loan 
asked by the city of Paris to raise a similar number of men. The Parle­
ment approved the loan on August 8. See Mole, MSnoires, II, 352, n. 1.
34ihe government's emergency directives are thoroughly detailed 
in Richelieu, Memoires, IX, 221-25.
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equipment of its complement of two thousand, but sane magistrates 
wanted to go further and send a committee of twelve to the Hfttel de 
ville to oversee the expenditure of emergency sums. Again Le Jay 
warned that the King would not approve such a resolution, which could 
only be construed as an insult to his authority. De Mesines then rose 
and delivered a wide-ranging criticism of Richelieu and his policies. 
It was, he said, up to the Parlement to bring some order into the 
affairs of State, since the first minister had directed them so 
poorly. There followed several accusations of mismanagement or 
worse, including depletion of the finances, leveling of the city's 
ramperts, nepotism, and the removal to Le Harve of a quantity of 
munitions and immense sums of money. De Mesmes then turned his pity 
comments on the First President, who was accused of basely cowing 
to the Cardinal and of sacrificing the public interest to his own.
Le Jay, sensing that Le Jay was winning the day, got up to leave, 
followed by Nicolhs de BelliSvre, the second president & mortier. 
After some further recriminations both were persuaded to stay, but 
time had run out and the deliberation was scheduled to be continued 
an the morrow.^
Before the discussions could be resumed, however, Louis .called 
Le Jay and De Mesmes to the Louvre. The King, indisposed in body 
as well as spirit, got out of bed to warn the First President that
^This session is missing from the registers. Ifole gives 
only a brief mention of it, and nothing at all is found in Talon's 
M&oires. The best description is given by Griffet, Histoire de 
IS ttC n g ll, I I ,  747-49.
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he would clearly show that he was the master; that he was 
satisfied with the company, but that there were two or three 
who seemed to be his servants but whose conduct was Spanish.
The deliberation commenced was to be discontinued, and if 
it were not, he knew very well how to demonstrate his power; 
he wanted to be obeyed and they should not be found wanting 
there.36
Da Mesmes spoke out that the reports concerning his position in the 
Parlement were malicious and false, and he asked Louis to place no 
credence in them. Louis was apparently convinced, because the 
president and others suspected of seditious inclinations escaped 
with a reprimand from Richelieu.3*7
The Corbie Year crisis crested in the middle of August. On the 
14th Corbie fell into Spanish hands, but they were unable to hold 
it and were soon expelled. Towards the end of September the enemy 
thrust bogged down in irresolution; as winter approached it died 
out altogether. Hostilities went on, however, and as the Corbie 
Year ebbed into history, the Parlement began to revive its objections 
to the edicts registered in 1635. Throughout 1637, for example, the 
court continually bickered with the Crown over the reception of 
conseillers into the newly created positions.38 Though both sides 
had submitted to the compromise of March, 1636, the Perlement took 
every opportunity to put off receptions into the new positions.
After a conseiller was finally received, it then harassed the 
arriviste by refusing to assign him any cases or by denying him a
36jfcl£, Mgmolres, II, 354-
37Ibid., 354-55.
38There were no new creations of conseillers during 1637, as 
one might believe from Glasson, Le Parlement de Paris, I, 161.
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fair share of the epices. The Crown could do little about this vinri
of sniping except to renew injunctions against it. On March 4 Louis
told some deputies from the court that
I want to be obeyed, I have given my Parlement some grace, and 
it has not kept its solemnly given word. The conseillers 
received are not officers, do not participate in the §plees, 
and no one distributes anything to them. That is a bad example 
for my subjects and officers of other parlements, which gives 
me cause to make a journey to Normandy. 39
After some observations by the First President, Louis told them again, 
"I want to be obeyed. Obedience is worth more than sacrifice." 
Richelieu added, "You should await the grace of the King who wants 
to be obeyed."^ These admonitions proved futile, however, and the 
problem dragged on into 1638, with consequent delays in the dis­
position of the offices. As late as May, 1637, there were still 
eight new conseillers who had not been received.41
1637 was also distinguished by a wrangle over two minor edicts 
dating to the lit de justice of 1635. One of these created several 
hundred positions for solicitors (procureurs tiers) practicing 
before the Parlement, the other established additional assistants to 
the greffiers called controlleurs des consignations. Even though 
the solicitors were not properly members of the court, but were 
only lawyers entitled to practice before it, and despite the petty 
nature of the greffiers1 assistants, the Parlement found reason to
39b.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9893, fols. 50-51, March 4, 1637.
4°b.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9893, fol. 51, March 4, 1637.
41as Louis told deputies from the Parlement at the Louvre on 
May 27, 1637. B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9893, fol. 101, May 27, 1637.
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object to both edicts. This resistance took traditional forms in
which the magistrates obstinately dragged their feet in executing
legislation duly enacted in the King's presence. On January 2, 1637,
for instance, representatives from the Parlement were called to the
Louvre where Louis told them that he absolutely wished to be obeyed
in regard to all his edicts, because he stood to gain fifteen millions
from them. 42 This lecture did not faze the court, and on May 11 a
letter of warning was sent. The admonition was followed by a meeting
at Versailles on May 27, at which Louis again demanded compliance:
Messieurs, I find the delays that you bring to the execution 
of my edicts very strange. . . . The money that I ask is not 
for gambling, nor for foolish expenses. It is not myself 
who speaks, it is my State, the need is there. Those who 
contradict my will do me more harm than the Spanish.*3
By invoking the needs of State, Louis had presented a persuasive
argument. Nevertheless, it was not powerful enough to change the
Judges' attitudes towards the edicts. A permanent resolution of the
problem of the solicitors and greffiers' assistants came only slowly
after July, when the Crown substantially reduced the number of new
offices.
In spite of expedients such as the wholesale traffic in offices, 
the royal finances remained chaotic. In the belief that a livre 
saved was a livre earned, the government tried very hard to cut 
expenditures. Frivolities and court pensions suffered under a 
regime of utmost economy but so did some disbursements which the
42The figure of fifteen millions undoubtedly referred to the 
total expected from all the creations of 1635.
43B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9893, fol. 101, May 28, 1637.
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government felt could be safely postponed. Among the government's
principal fiscal obligations were rentes issued on the credit of the
Hfttel de ville of Paris. These bands required regular quarterly
payments to their holders, but even in times of peace the payments
were always behind. Now, as expenditures for war rose, the payments
of interest on the rentes lagged several quarters behind. Parisians
became unhappy, then truculent, about the situation. As watchdog
over the city's finances, the Parlement lent a ready ear to any
complaints concerning the administration of the rentes. It is not
surprising, therefore, to find that on April 24, 1637, the prlvftt
dee marchands and the £chevins were hailed into court to explain’ why
the rentes were not being paid o f f T h e  city officials, however,
could do nothing about a shortage of funds which originated with the
royal treasury, and the problem persisted. By March, 1638, the
government's failure to pay its obligations produced demonstrations
and riots in the capital. On the 26th the lieutenants civil and
criminal reported that two days before,
a quantity of persons had gathered and committed several 
insolences following assemblies made concerning payment of the 
rentes of the city. This tended to sedition and riot, for 
which they ([the lieutenants 1 had come to render account to 
the court, and in order to prevent the course of which they 
had jailed three persons whom they said had given consent and 
cause to such actions.45
The court decided that the three rioters should be tried, along with
any others found fuilty of the same behavior. Prohibitions were also
44B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9893, fol. 77, April 24, 1637.
*5B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9893, fols. 340-41, March 26, 1638.
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issued against public gatherings to discuss the payment of rentes 
at pain of being declared disturbers of the public peace.
Non-payment of the rentes was a serious problem to the 
Parisians who sought to collect their interest, but it was not 
really an issue of the most vital concern to the Parlement. Normally, 
a riot provoked by mal-admi nistration of the rentes would have 
passed with a cursory examination and reprimand to the city officers. 
But in March, 1638, the situation within the Parlement was not quite 
normal, because of the war and because just at this time the 
Enquetes were again seething over the reception of the new conseillers. 
A few days before the rentes riot an arrlt du Conseil had demanded 
that the Enquftes stop their harassment of new arrivals, so the 
matter of the rentes furnished a ready excuse for them to retaliate 
by demanding plenary assemblies embarassing to the Crown. On 
March 27 the third chamber of Enqultes took the rentes under considera­
tion, calling for the entire Parlement to launch a full investigation 
into the payment of the bonds. This investigation should, the 
Enqultes thought, take place at the Bfttel de ville in conjunction 
with officials from the city of other sovereign courts. In the 
meantime the rioters should be transferred from the Bastille to an 
ordinary prison and given a hearing by two members from the court.
When deputies from the Enquetes approached the First President with
^B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9893> fol. 341, March 26, 1638.
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their proposition, however, they met a chilly reception. The King,
Le Jay told them, would take a dim view of any such proceeding.47
The First President was, as usual, correct in predicting the 
royal displeasure. On March 29 a lettre de cachet notified the 
Parlement that the business of the rentes was "of consequence," 
and that "cognizance is forbidden to our Parlement anc reserved to 
our council, and the we alone desire to regulate it." By virtue 
of the council's sole competence, any consideration of the rentes 
in the Parlement's assemblies was denied.48 After presentation 
in the Grand'Chambre the letter and the earlier arret du conseil 
were taken to the five individual Chambres des enqugtes by 
conaeiller Samuel La Nauve. The ~ Enqu&tes gave him a rough reception.
In the first chamber, president Barillon asked if the arrSt du Conseil 
had been read in the Grand'Chambre, and if so, if it had been recorded 
in the registers of the court. If not, he said, the Enquetes were 
not bound to receive it. La Nauve responded that he was not respon­
sible for answering for the Grand1 Chambre, whereupon Barillon 
answered that he held the arret to be invalid. The third Chambre 
des enqu&tes, led on this particular day by conseillers Charton 
and Bitaud, was even more brusque. It refused to receive the arrSt 
or the lettre de cachet and Implied that La Nauve was nothing more 
than a huissier acting for the royal council. No sooner had these 
refusals been rendered than the Enquttes filed into the Grand'Chambre
^Talon, Mfeaolres, p. 60; IfolS, M&noires, II, 395-96.
4®The text Is in B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9893* fols. 343-345,
March 29, 1638
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to demand a plenary assembly. Spokesmen Gay ant and Barillon denounced 
the Grand * Chambriers for their lack of interest in public affairs, 
for failure to uphold the honor of the Parlement, and for their 
miserable example before younger colleagues in the Enquetes. Tfra 
First President, however, remained unmoved and the rest of the 
morning was wasted when the EnquStes refused to abandon their places.49
Next day, March 30, the war of nerves was resumed when the 
Enqufttes returned to the Grand1Chambre, took their seats, and would 
not budge from them. This behavior was closely observed by the 
King's ministers, and on the last day of March a council meeting was 
held at Ruel, where it was determined that tougher measures were 
called for to break the impediment to royal justice. Shortly after 
the conference, ringleaders Barillon, Charton, Salo, Sc/in, and 
Tubeuf were told to leave Paris for Tours, a country house, Loches, 
Riom, and Caen respectively. These suspensions represented a stem 
warning, but it was a warning that had been sounded before, and the 
Crown undoubtedly realized its shock value had diminished. Ac­
cordingly, the exile of five individuals was underlined by the 
stiffest retribution yet meted out: on April 8, as the Parlement
returned from the Easter recess, word was received that the entire 
third Chambre des enqultes had been interdicted from attendance at 
the Palais. All the new conseillers were exempted from the order, 
and no indication was given as to the duration of the suspension. $0
49fi.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9893, fol. 345, March 29, 1638; Talon,
‘ M&noires, pp. 60-61; Moll, Mimoires, II, 397-98.
50B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9893, fol. 348, March 30, 1638; ]fcl£, 
Memoires, II, 398-401. The text of the letter of interdiction is in 
lioll's Memoires and those of Talon, p. 61, n. 1.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
536
The effects of the mass ban were catatrophic for the processes 
of justice within the Parlement, for no sooner had the order been 
announced than the Enqugtes in the other four chambers went out on 
a sympathy strike. They would not attend their own chambers and 
absented themselves from the Chamhrp de l1 Edit and the Toumelle 
as well. Such tactics were embarassing to the Crown, but inherent 
weaknesses kept them from being sustained for very long. The 
strike was patently illegal, because the officers were not performing 
their public duties and it also denied the Enqugtes an important slice 
of their income from epices while cases piled up. Too, the stoppage 
of judicial services gradually brought an alienation of public 
opinion, which in the beginning had lauded parlementaire investigation 
of the rentes. Consequently, on April 24 the Enqugtes sullenly 
submitted to the second of two lettres de cachet reminding them of 
the duties under the ordinances.51 The suspension on the third 
Chambre des enqultes, though, remained in force. Despite periodic 
protests it would not be lifted until April 20, 1640, more than two 
years after the rentes affair begun.52
As the war continued through 1638 and 1639, the monarchy's 
desperate search for funds went an. The normal tax base of the 
kingdom— the rural peasantry— was squeezed beyond the point of 
rebellion during these years, as the Croquant and Va-nu-pied revolts 
show. Increasingly, therefore, the Crown turned to its civil
51Mdle, Memoires, II, 401-03; Talon, M&noires, p. 62.
52Mol£, Mgmolres, II, 481.
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servants to make up the difference between conventional tax revenues 
and soaring expenditures. As a privileged group the bureaucracy 
was especially vulnerable to extortionate techniques. Taken as a 
whole the officials were fairly well off, their social pretensions 
were more recent and less well-founded than either nobility or 
clergy, and threats to abrogate the paulette provided a ready means 
of extracting money from them. Late in 1636, therefore, the 
Crown nullifed the paulette agreement of 1630-31 and successfully 
negotiated a new one for six years in exchange for a large loan.53 
The Parlement of Paris escaped this levy because of the special 
settlement concession granted on March 15, 1636.54 This was not 
to be the case two and a half years later when the Crown again 
broke all paulette arrangements and asked for loans from its 
officials. Under the terms of a declaration promulgated on October 6, 
1638, the evaluated price of all royal offices was boosted by a 
factor of twenty-five percent and the droit annuel increased 
proportionately. Officers of the sovereign courts were additionally 
expected to make an immediate loan of twelve and one-half percent; 
lesser officials were to contribute correspondingly larger 
percentages.55 These conditions represented a serious threat to what 
had now become an established privilege for the Parlement; negotiations
53The conditions are given in Mouenier, In Vgnalitg des offices, 
pp. 296-97.
54see supra, p.
55b.N. Imprimet, Actes royaux, F.46996, no. 3.
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for their reduction or elimination soon ensued. On January 4. and 
again on April 4. the court decided to send deputies to ask Louis 
or Richelieu to grant the droit annuel under former terms and to 
plea for the restoration of the third Chambre des enqultes. Even 
though the Parlement apparently had little bargaining power in 
this round of parleys, the issue was satisfactorily resolved on 
May 12, 1639, when the Parlement and the Chambre des comptes were 
granted the paulette according to past custom.56
The relative smoothness with which the paulette was transacted 
did not extend to other matters brought before the Parlement in 
1639 and 1640. If the court almost always abstained from great 
matters of State, it also remained ready to stand in opposition when 
its lective interests were challenged or when the dignity of justice 
was in question. The Crown's irregular financial schemes in 
particular continued to annoy the magistrates. The Parlement per se 
escaped any further enlargement, but in December, 1639, it was 
asked to approve an edict creating sixteen maftres des requStes, 
proceeds from the sale of which were destined for the army.5?
56fi.N. Imprimis, Actes royaux, F.23611, no. 325. The relative 
ease with which agreement was reached in 1639 is difficult to 
explain. Roland Ifousnier chose to believe that "the necessity to 
have creations of office registered rendered the government accom­
modating." La Vlhalitg des offices, p. 302. However Ifousnier did 
not substantTate thisclaim, and other sources suggest that there 
were not substantial creations pending before the Parlement at 
the time the droit annuel was negotiated.
57B.N. Imprimis, Actes royaux, F.23611, no. 373.
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These offices were technically parlementaire, many being held by parle- 
maataire families, and the judges put up a resistance reminiscent 
of 1636. The first jussion arrived on January 30; the next day the 
Parlement ignored it and refused to verify. The Crown promptly 
countered by conducting maftre des requites Boivin to the Bastille 
and by ordering conseillers Laisne and Scarron out of Paris. A 
second lettre de jussion sent on February U failed to produce acquie- 
sence, and on the 13th the four representative mafrtres in the 
Parlement tried to have the original edict reread because they had not 
attended its first hearing. Le Jay prevented this, but the mrittreR 
stalked out of the assembly, followed by all the EnquStes. No 
action could be taken that day. On the 15th the King interdicted the 
maftres from attendance at the Parlement; on the same day the 
court registered the creation, but only for eight offices. A third 
lettre de jussion was read to the court on February 29. This 
proved no more effectual than previous ones; rather, it made the 
situation worse, because the court found itself deadlocked in a 
division of opinions. The King’s ministers now opted for a 
compromise: Mole was called to a conference with Richelieu, Bullion, 
and the Chancellor where it was resolved that the creation would be 
reduced from sixteen to an even dozen. Possibly, too, the ministers 
held out the promise that the third Chambre des enquStes, suspended 
since March, 1638, would be restored if the Parlement capitulated.
In any case Mole appeared on April 20 armed with the modified declara­
tion, along with a fourth lettre de jussion enjoining its immediate
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verification. The declaration was read, Mole concluded that a 
division in opinions was no longer possible, and the Parlement 
finally registered the modified edict. Four months had elapsed 
since its initial presentation. On the same day the suspension of 
the third Chambre des EnquStes was lifted and restitution of its 
wages was made.^
The ma?tre des requfites edict was by no means the only one 
delayed during the first months of 1640. During the spring of the 
year, the court rejected diverse minor creations: receveurs and 
controlleurs des consignations aux saisies reeles, alternatives and 
triannual offices in the greffes of various royal jurisdictions, and 
gardes du petit sceau. Enjoinders, letters, deputations, harsh 
words, and protests on both sides steadily mounted. At about this 
time, however, the Crown’s hand vis-a-vis its opponent was gradually 
growing stronger by virtue of events far removed from parlementaire 
politics. Louis’ position as well as that of the dynasty had been 
strengthened by the birth of a dauphin in September, 1638. This 
cut the last prop from under Gaston's pretensions. By the spring 
of 1640, too, the revolt of the Va-nu-pieds in Normandy had been 
dealt with, and the monarchy's military situation showed some signs 
of progress as well. Casale fell in May, 1640; on Friday, May 18, 
the members of the Parlement attended a solemn Te Deum sung in 
celebration of the victory. French armies sustained the push
^B.N. Ms. fr„ nouv. acq. 9894, fols. 50-73; Moll, Mlmoires,
II, 475-81.
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into northern Italy, and Turin was taken in October. These positive 
considerations were overshadowed by one major negative one: the
King’s health was visibly deteriorating, and the likelihood of a 
regency grew more probable with each passing day.
Under these circumstances Richelieu began to think in terms of 
permanently curtaining the Parlement's capacity to obstruct the 
exercise of royal authority. Precisely how these thoughts matured 
in the minister's mind during 1639 and 1640 is unknown, but the 
general philosophy inspiring his forthcoming actions was clearly 
elucidated in the Testament politique. ^  Briefly, the Parlement .was 
to be excluded from consideration of any matter of State without 
the King's solicitation, and its capacity to delay important 
legislation was to be restricted. The Cardinal's ultimate objective 
was not to eliminate the court from public affairs but to more 
closely delineate its political prerogatives, neutralize its 
independence, and render it submissive before royal authority. The 
Parlement's workaday jurisdiction and its role in Parisian adminis­
tration would hardly be affected, inasmuch as these seldom clashed 
with the principles of centralized absolute government. With the 
Parlement's niche in the body politic defined, a more reasoned 
order would prevail, since the King's power would be given a freer 
rein.
These objectives were achieved in two steps during 1640 and 
1641. Richelieu's first measure was characteristically pragmatic,
5'See Supra, p.
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probably bom out of irritation over impediments to the 
creation in 164-0. Aware that it was above all the young, irrepressible 
radicals in the Enqu&tes, rather than the Grand1nbamhriers, who 
usually stirred up tunnoil and footdragging, Richelieu determined to 
exclude them from participation in public affairs. Conveniently 
for the minister, there already existed a forgotten edict that 
suited his purpose exactly. In a fit of pique with his Parlement, 
Henry IV had issued lettres patentee on May 20, 1597, which shut 
the EnauStes and Requites out of deliberations on public business.
These matters were to be taken up by the members of the Grand1 Cbamhre 
plus the ranking president and the dean of each of the other chambers, 
a total of about fifty of the most conservative senior judges in 
the Parlement.^ The net effect would have been to severely 
reduce debate time and to place public affairs squarely in the 
hands of those men most inclined to see the royal side of things.
The letters had been duly verified and registered, but since the 
Enqufrtes and Requfites had promised to behave, Henry had allowed the 
edict to lapse. It remained in abeyance until Richelieu resurrected 
it in lettres patentee dated April 20, 1640.^  These new letters 
reviewed the background of Henry’s act and pointed out that since 
1597 the Enqu&tes and Requites "had continued to bring the same 
difficulties to public affairs, which have oftentimes halted
60See supra, pp. 93 A copy of the edict is in B.N. Ms. fr. 18413> 
fols. 134-35.
63-The date is exactly coincident with the settlement of the 
malftres edict, which suggests that this incident convinced the 
minister to make some lasting policy changes in regard to the 
Parlement.
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3the execution of our principal affairs." For this reason, the 
letters went on,
we enjoin and order you that hereafter it £the ParlementJ should 
proceed to deliberations on all edicts, declarations, and 
lettres patentee that we hereafter will have dispatched and 
addressed to our said court the Parlement, on public affairs 
important to our service, with the presidents and conseillers 
of the said Grand’Chambre, without calling the conseillers in 
the Enquetes and Requgtes of our said Parlement, other than 
those mentioned in the said letters of our said seigneur and 
father of the month of May, 1597.62
The Parlement was informed by means of a lettre de cachet on May 8,
1640; because it was a revival of previously approved legislation
rather than a new act, the letter was not registered.63
The politics of the Parlement remained very quiet for the
remainder of 1640, the only noteworthy event being the death of
Nicolas Le Jay in December. Despite the relative tranquillity,
Richelieu remained determined to permanently regulate the Parlement.
The second blow fell on February 21, 1641, when Louis went to the
Parlement to hold the last lit de justice of his reign. The
ceremony was held exclusively to present a strong edict restricting
the Parlement's right to mix in affairs of State and to remonstrate
on legislation. The Crown shrewdly prepared its coup in secret and
executed it with surprise. Five days before the lit, on Saturday,
February 15, Oraer Talon and acting First President Bellilvre were
asked to meet with Chancellor Siguier. Siguier told them that the
King planned to came to the Parlement on Thursday, the 21st,
62The complete text is in Moll, Mlmoires, II, 476, n. 1.
63b .N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9894, fols. 76-78, May 8, 1640.
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bringing an edict regulating justice and suppressing several offices. 
Talon and BelliSvre tried to extract more information, but Siguier 
would add little, except to broadly hint that Louis "wanted to 
establish the order that he wished [to be] kept in his Parlement for 
public affairs, in which he intended that the Parlement should not 
mix except when requested."64 The offices to be suppressed, the 
Chancellor conceded, were to be those of exiled judges. The president 
and the King's attorney were even denied a copy of the legislation, 
which SSguier maintained had not yet been drawn up in writing. As 
events transpired, neither the Parlement nor the gens du roi had 
an opportunity to see the text of the act before it was read on 
the 21st.65
Louis came to the Palais at seven o'clock on the morning of 
the 21st, an hour so early that the Chancellor arrived before some 
of the judges had a chance to don their red robes.66 The course of 
the lit de justice was unremarkable, save for the untimely arrival of 
Gaston d'Orleans and his entourage in the middle of Siguier's 
opening words. The interruption produced such a racket that the 
Chancellor, who went on speaking through it all, could not be heard 
above the uproar. Since a successor to First President Le Jay had 
not yet been named, Nicolas de BelliSvre welcomed the King in the
^Talon, M&noires, p. 73.-
65rbis is clear from remarks in Talon's Memoires, p. 73, and 
from the short, ad hoc speech that the advocaiTg§n?ral delivered 
during the ceremony.
66The official record is in B.N. Ms. fr. nouv. acq. 9894, fols. 
179-85, February 21, 1641.
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name of the Parlement. Before an audience stunned into silence,
S£guier then read Louis' lettres patentes, letters which prohibited the
Parlement of Paris from mixing in affairs of State, restricted the
court to the rendering of justice, and strictly delineated its
right of remonstrances.
The edict, the single most important piece of royal legislation
affecting the Parlement during the reign of Louis XIII, was a model
legal act of the ancien regime.^  There were two parts: an
extensive preamble, in which the act's legal precedents and raison
d'etre were recited, and a body of ten provisions. No better
description of the whole can be found than Fayard's, who termed it
"very much a constitution of royal power in its relations with the
Parlement."68 The essential theme throughout was the proper
distribution and exercise of la puissance publique, or the public
power of the sovereign. The preamble began by enrphazing the nature
and importance of this power to the monarchical principle:
There is nothing which conserves and sustains empires like the 
power of the sovereign uniformly recognized by his subjects. It 
rallies and unites all parties in the State so happily that there 
is born of this union a force which assures its grandeur and 
its harmony. It seems that the establishment of monarchies 
being founded on the government of one alone, this order is 
like the soul which animates them and which inspires force and 
vigor as well as perfection; but as this absolute authority 
bears States to the highest point of their glory, so too when 
it is weakened does one find them very quickly deprived of 
the dignity.
6?Texts can be found in Isambert, Anciennes lois franqaises, 
XVI, 529-35, and in Mole, Mgmoires, II, 500-10.
^Aperqu historique, II, 126.
^Isambert, Anciennes lois franqaises, XVI, 529.
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The declaration went on to associate the ups and downs that the State 
had experienced in its recent history with the integrity of the 
royal authority. The disorders of the League, for example, had 
taken their root and growth from contempt for royal authority.
Henry TV had succeeded in restoring grandeur and glory to the 
monarchy, making it "the perfect model of the most finished 
monarchies," but upon his death a regency had brought "dangerous 
shocks." Among these was the action of the Parlement in 1615, when 
"our court of the Parlement of Paris, although inspired by a good 
impulse, undertook, by an action which had no precedent and which 
injured the fundamental laws of this monarchy, to order the govern­
ment of our kingdom and of our person." At this time
this company, believing that after having disposed of the 
government of the State it could censure its administration and 
demand an account of the management of public affairs, resolved 
by an arr£t that the princes, dukes, peers, and officers of the 
Crown who had seats and deliberative voices in our court should 
be invited to take themselves there to advise on that which 
might be proposed for the good of our service.^
These "factions" were dissolved, the declaration continued, only 
after Louis had "restored to the royal authority the force and 
majesty that it should have in a monarchical State." This revitali­
zation was insufficient in itself, however; with a regency looming 
on the horizon, it had to be preserved for all time:
Because it is not sufficient to have raised this State to so 
high a degree of power if we do not affirm it for the person 
of our successors, we desire to establish it by such good
70Ibid., 530.
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laws "that the heir with whom it has pleased God to honor our 
union should have a reign so happy and a throne so assured 
that nothing could "bring any change there.71
The good administration of justice was essential to the security
of the royal power; this in turn necessitated a regulation of the
sovereign courts to prevent their encroachment on the prerogatives
of the sovereign. Here, concealed in the middle of the preamble, the
essential purpose of the edict was finally revealed:
Now, since the royal authority is never so well affirmed as 
when all the orders of a State are regulated in the functions 
which are prescribed to them by the prince and when they act 
in a perfect dependence on his power, we have resolved to bring 
a general resolution there; . . .  we have esteemed it necessary 
to begin by regulating the functions and by making known to 
our parlements the legitimate usages of their authority that 
the kings our predecessors and we have disposed to them, in 
order that a thing which is established for the good of people 
should not produce contrary effects, as might happen if officers, 
instead of contenting themselves with the power which makes 
them judges of the life, honor, and fortunes of our subjects, 
should want to encroach on the government of the State, which 
belongs only to the prince.72
There had been any number of precedents for such regulation, and the
Crown was careful to cite several of them in justifying the new edict.
As early as the reign of John II (1350-1364), it had been ordered
"that there should not be treated in our court of Parlement any
matter of State, if it is not by special commission." Francis I had
renewed this injunction, as had Charles IX, who,
after having entertained the remonstrances of the court of 
Parlement, nullified and revoked all that had been done by 
the said court on the subject, and declared it null as done 
by judges to whom knowledge of State affairs never belonged,
71Ibid., 531. 
72ibid.
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with prohibitions in the future of putting into dispute or 
otherwise deliberating on edicts and ordinances sent to them, 
and on things which pertained to the State.73
Louis XIII, too, had had cause to renew the enjoinders of his
forebearers. In 1615 an arret du Conseil had negated the Parlement1s
efforts to assemble the greats of the land; a similar arr&t had
been issued when the Parlement had sought to prohibit payment of the
droit annuel and order an investigation into the royal finances.
Finally, the edict recalled the circumstances surrounding the arrSt
du Conseil relative to the due d1Orleans in 1631.^
Each of these preceding decisions had had a common denominator
in excluding the Parlement from considerations of matters of State,
and the first three articles of the 1641 edict were concerned with a
very positive reassertion of this principle:
Our said court of the Parlement of Paris and all our other 
courts, having been established only to render justice to our 
subjects, we make very express proscriptions and prohibitions 
to them, not only against talcing competence in the future 
of any affairs similar to those which are enounced above, but 
generally of all those which concern the State, administration, 
and government, which we reserve to our person and succeeding 
kings alone, if we do not give them the power and special 
commandement by our lettres patentes, reserving [ttie right] 
to take the advice of1 our court of Parlement on public affairs 
when we judge it appropriate for the good of our service.75
The Parlement had also found ways to defy the King when seated in
his lit de justice. This, too, was strictly forbidden: "We wish
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verified in this form should he wholeheartedly executed according to 
their form and tenor." The Parlement or any other sovereign court 
was prohibited from "bringing any hindrance to them," except through 
"such remonstrances as they will advise . . . for the good of our 
service." After the presentation of such remonstrances, "we wish and 
intend that they should obey our will," even if the remonstrances were 
rejected.7^
The matter of remonstrances was a complex and sensitive issue 
unto itself, and the Crown’s treatment of it correspondingly reflected 
sophistication. Louis and Richelieu realized that the right to 
remonstrate was the most cherished of parlementaire prerogatives, 
one so deeply ingrained in the traditions of the court that it could 
never be wholly eradicated. Furthermore, the legality of legislation, 
and hence its acceptability by the public at large, depended on the 
court's right to search out faults in the King's acts. Sometimes 
this scrutiny could result in useful criticism if the legislation 
were not sensitive or pressing. For these reasons the right to 
remonstrate was totally abolished only for acts "concerning the 
government and administration of the State." Remonstrances on 
financial edicts were specifically permitted, but the judges could 
not, "on their own authority, bring any modifications or changes to 
them, nor sue the words we should not and cannot {nous ne devons ni 
pouvons,- italics Isambert's] which are injurious to the authority of
76Ibid., 533-34.
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the prince." Second remonstrances might "be permitted under unspecified 
conditions, hut after their presentation registration had to take 
place "without any delay."77 Two specialized provisions completed the 
edict. Having witnessed the unabated resistance of the Parlement to 
the conseillers created in 1635, the Crown had decided to suppress the 
offices held by five of the most outspoken opposition figures. The 
charges of president des Enqugtes Barillon and conseillers Scarron, 
Bitaut, Sevin, and Salo were abolished, the King reserving the right 
to compensate them as he deemed appropriate.7® Finally, because 
"discipline had been much slackened in our courts of parlement," 
mercuriales, or sessions devoted to self-examination and criticism, 
were to be held every three months until a more general regulation of 
justice could be drafted. The records of these sessions were to be 
forwarded to the Chancellor.79
The severity of these provisions rocked the court. Avocat 
glnSral Talon, required to give the conclusion on this occasion, 
could only make veiled references to the Parlement's dismayed outrage. 
The court had, he ventured, been subjected to r,a notable prejudice." 
Nevertheless, considering the time, place and the King's temper,
Talon recognized that little more could be said:
We cannot speak to you, Sire, either of innocence or of justi­
fication, for on these occasions we omit all sorts of excuses
77Ibid., 554.
7®The offices remained suppressed until after Richelieu's death. 
They were uniformly restored by a royal declaration of April 20, 1643, 
a few weeks before Louis' death.
79isambert, Anciennes lois franaaises, XVT, 535.
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and ordinary remonstrances. These terms would offend the spirit 
of an irate prince: we have no defense other than submission; 
the misery of our colleagues confounds us, and the extremity 
of our sadness gives us hope that Your Majesty will not suffer 
that it be longlasting.80
The avocat glneral1s conclusions in favor of verification were
followed by the customary taking of opinions, in which the presidents
were once more sollicited last. Without reporting the votes to the
King, Seguier nervously pronounced the declaration duly registered.
The Parlement once again bowed to the royal will, as it was
compelled to do, and the edict passed into law. Its provisions went
into effect immediately and had all their desired effect as long as
Richelieu lived. Indeed, until the end of the reign, the Parlement
was, to use Glasson's expression, "definitively vanquished. "8l
Throughout the next twenty-seven months, until Louis XIII's death
in May, 1643, the court dared not interfere in any matter of State
without the King's invitation. Nor did it attempt to breach the
conventions fixed for the presentation of remonstrances.
The government of the ancien rlgime was a government of men as
well as of laws, however, and Louis' chief minister was too familiar
with human nature to believe that the obstinate judges could be
restrained by law alone. Accordingly, the clauses of the 1641 edict
were complemented a few months later when Mathieu Moll was selected
°^Talon, M&noires, pp. 74-75.
81Le Parlement de Paris, I, 171.
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to fill the vacant office of First President.82 The choice of Mole 
was a prudent one, for in more than Twenty-five years of public 
service the procureur ggn&ral had demonstrated dignity, intelligence, 
capacity, and moderation in his political inclinations. Mold's 
attitude had also kept him out of the same certain royalism that had 
characterized Le Jay, and Richelieu intended to see that royal 
interests were well protected. Before accepting the office, Mole 
had to give his solemn promise in writing that he would never allow 
the Parlement to assemble in plenary session.8  ^ This requirement 
was not, in fact, as startling as it may appear, for it was in 
complete conformity with the parameters laid down in Henry's letters 
of 1597 as renewed in May, 1640.
The political history of the Parlement following Richelieu's 
restrictive measures was merely a postscript to the tumultuous 
years that had gone before. The Cardinal's ministry closed as it 
had opened eighteen years before, with tranquillity reigning over 
the Parisian court. The Cardinal's death on December 4, 1642, made 
no impression on this peace, which Louis enjoyed until his own 
passing six months later. To the end of the reign, however, this 
Bourbon treated his Parlement as contradietarily as had a dozen 
French kings before him. Having many times humiliated the court's
82Mole was sworn in on November 19, 1641, probably during the 
seance de rentree of the Parlement of 1642. The procureur ggnlral's 
ftfemolres and theregisters shed little light on installation, and 
copies of his lettres de provision are not available. See Mole,
Mgmoires, II, 52^ -29, and especially 528, n. 1.
8%lasson, Le Parlement de Paris, I, 171.
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pretensions, Louis found its prestige and authority indispensable in 
grappling with future unknowns. In April, 164-3, less than a month 
before his death, the King asked the Parlement to register a declara­
tion leaving Anne of Austria as the head of a regency government 
including his brother, the prince de Conde, Cardinal Mazarin, and 
Seguier. At the same time, perhaps in a fit of conscience, Louis 
pardoned the five judges punished in 164-1 and restored their offices 
to them.
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When Cardinal Richelieu died in December, 1642, an historic era 
in the relations between the Crown and the Parlement of Paris came to 
an end. Eighteen years before, when Richelieu secured a permanent 
seat in the council, the relationship between the Crown and the 
Parlement was generally one of balance, harmony, and cooperation.
Upset by the glorification of royal authority under Richelieu and 
Marillac, then under Richelieu alone, this tranquillity slowly 
evaporated during the 1620’s and disappeared entirely after 1630.
The twelve years between 1630 and 1642 were marked by wrangling 
unprecedented in the history of the court, discord wrought over the 
use of onmmlssaires. trials of State, royal finances, familial travail 
within the Bourbon household, and several less important projects of 
the Cardinal. All of these contentions stemmed from the growth of 
absolutism, centralization, and the emergence of the modem State, 
but many of the more fundamental issues underlying the conflict could 
be traced to an historic interplay between Crown arbitraire and 
limited monarchy. The Parlement, faithful to its traditions and 
concept of customary legality, as well as its own interests, stead­
fastly refused to reconcile itself to the limited judicial role 
that Cardinal Richelieu wanted it to play.
In the battles of the 1630's, the Crown always emerged
554
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victorious, though occasionally the Parlement was able to "bow out with 
a compromise. This was true, for example, when the court won 
reductions in offices created in 1635 and 1639* Never, though, was 
the court able to generate enough sustained resistance to bring sub­
stantial changes in royal policies. The judicial powers of the council 
continued to expand after 1630, the use of commissaires and lntendants 
went on without effective interference from Paris after 1631, and the 
Parlement*s delay of fiscal acts hardly affected French involvement in 
the Thirty Years’ War.
In the short view it is the intensity of the conflict of the 
1630’s that is most characteristic of the Cardinal’s ministry. Never 
before had the Crown seen fit--or found it necessary--to hold six lits 
de justice, to exile multiple judges on six occasions, to interdict an 
entire chamber, or to send innumerable lettres de jussion within the 
space of a dozen years. Neither the amplitude of the conflict, the 
issues at stake, nor the Crown's repeated reliance on tough disci­
plinary measures, however, vindicates the belief Richelieu was 
carrying out an administrative revolution in regard to Louis XIII's 
Parlement.
The continuum of the Parlement's history, indeed, tends to sub­
stantiate the opposite conclusion. By the 1620*s the Parlement had en­
joyed 300 years of independent history, and throughout these three cen­
turies it had acted as first guardian of the kingdom's law by offering 
judicial services, administrative surveillance, and legal counsel to a 
succession of monarchs. Trained in the law and armed with the right to 
remonstrate, the judges were in a unique position to remind kings of
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their obligations to rule justly. While doing so the political history 
of the court had been written around its attempts to define the 
rightful exercise of sovereignty.
Throughout the court's history certain issues related to the 
expression of royal power had recurred time and time again. The royal 
council's judicial activities, for example, had interferred with those 
of the Parlement ever since the inception of the court early in the 
fourteenth century. The nomination of commlssaires extraordinaires. 
smother manifestation of judicial arbltralre. had also troubled the 
monarchy for centuries. Lesser judicial problems such as evocations, 
committlmus. and the trial of peers before the Parlement had likwise 
proved to be insoluable points of contention. Finally, since the 
fifteenth century the Parlement had been interested in the king's 
finances, the proliferation of bureaucratic offices, and the adminis­
tration of the rentes. During Richelieu's ministry -paulette nego­
tiations were a significant issue of comparatively recent origin, but 
only once, in 1630-1631* did friction from these negotiations heavily 
influence the politics of the Parlement.
Essentially, then, the issues at stake during the l630's were no 
different from, and no more reconcilable than those of the past, or 
those that would appear in 16^ 8. The nexus of the conflict between 
the Crown and the court turned about the legitimate usages of sover­
eignty and not the nature of sovereignty itself. The Parlement had 
never questioned the principle that all public power was vested in the 
king, but the court had always insisted that royalty respect the 
customary rights, privileges, and immunities of its subjects; that it
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observe the forms of justice; that it conform to what would today be 
called the due process of law. On the other hand, the crisis con­
ditions of Louis’ reign, together with the Cardinal's ambitious 
objectives for the kingdom, required sure, swift, and expedient 
answers to administrative problems. Intendants. criminal commissalres, 
a specialized and efficient council, extraordinary financing, and other 
institutional expressions of absolutism then resulted. These solutions 
were not always comptable with the Parlement's ideas of justice, of 
legality, or of prudent kingship, and when they clashed the most 
fundamental principle of the monarchy required that the King's 
interests, rather than those of the court, should prevail. The 
political acumen and leadership of Richelieu ensured'that in the 
long run, the Crown did prevail. Thus by 1642 the Cardinal's ministry 
had produced a distinctly stronger royal power and the exclusion of 
the Parlement from affairs of State, both important characteristics 
of the age of absolutism.
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REVENUES OF THE FRENCH CROWN, 1600-1642*
YEAR DIRECT TAXES 
( ta l l ie s ,  
ia ilT an )
INDIRECT TAXES 













1600 11,433,782 3,097,344 33,651 4,333,994d 1,644,046 8.00* 20,542,817
1601 11,769,213 2,554,368 166,880 1,003,059 625,006 3-7536 16,118,526
1602 11,140,828 3,297,656 241,730 3,370,903 1,314,312 7.20* 19,365,429
1603 11,433,627 3,940,379 223,285 3,566,519 1,967,530 9.50* 21,041,340
1604 11,569,331 3,446,918 108,550 4,897,987 1,551,674 7.20* 21,574,460
1605 11,683,851 4,818,065 160,115 7,892,643 2,324,394 8.52* 26,879,068
1606 11,604,326 6,105,678 162,600 8,587,688 1,918,067 6.80* 28,378,359
1607 11,305,283 5,589,711 447,955 10,656,470 1,842,638 6.33* 29,842,057
1608 10,875,301 6,088,102 278,636 12,065,665 3,479,592 10.60* 32,787,296
1609 10,692,161 6,138,391 282,271 13,086,864 2,263,751 7.00* 32,463,438
1610 10,364,489 5,524,198 267,533 15,515,008 1,668,108 5.00* 33,339,336
1611 10,112,643 6,469,741 308,144 8,877,398 1,868,082 7.00* 27,636,008
1612 11,269,129 6,464,492 402,717 7,188,716 2,421,746 9.25* 29,746,800
1613 11,396,888 6,623,975 342,414 6,023,934 4,797,286 17.80* 29,184,497
1614 10,656,733 7,054,379 335,209 7,641,693 3,766,285 12.65* 29,454,299
1615 10,850,718 7,268,213 615,963 3,380,865 2,183,795 9.09* 24,299,554
1616 11,388,551 6,676,535 277,130 4,013,579 10,717,400 31.50* 33,073,195
1617 10,492,527 7,655,110 403,476 9,465,552 6,067,975 17.66* 34,084,640
1618 10,544,545 6,726,948 342,064 7,455,239 2,569,016 9.00* 27,637,812
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aThe figures for Table 1 are derived from those of J.-R. Mallet, Comptes rendus de l1admin 
istration des finances du royautne de France pendant les onze demiSres Annies du Rfegne de Henri 
TV, le R§gne de Lou1b~XIII, & soixante-clnq Annies de celui de Louis XIV (fraris, 1789)) pp. 183-228. 
TKe accuracy oF llallet's figures have been verified by £)avid“5uisseret In Sully (New York, 1968), 
pp. 74-80, and Appendix 1, "Re-establishment of the Budgets," 207-08, and by Mousnier in La V6nalit6 
des offices (1st ed.; Rouen, 1945), pp. 391-98.
^Mallet included in the revenues of the deniers extraordinaires some income derived from 
the sales of office which should properly be Included in the Parties casuelles, although these 
revenues were in no way different from those of the Parties casuelles and were often handled 
by the officials of that bureau. See note d.
cThe deniers extraordinaires for the reign of Henry IV and the administration of Sully 
included any surplus income as clear revenue for the following year. This accounts for the 
steady increase in the deniers extraordinaires after 1602-03• By 1610 Sully had accumulated 
a surplus of about 1$,000,000 livres which should be subtracted from the actual totals indicated 
in the table. Marie de Medici's expenditure of this surplus is indicated by the abrupt fall in the 
deniers extraordinaire after 1610. See Buisseret, Sully, p. 80.
dSee note b. Through information provided in Roland Mousnier, La Vinalite des offices,
1st ed., pp. 392-94) it is possible to correct Mallet's figures for the Parties casuelles for the 
years 1630, 1632, 1633, 1636, 1639, and 1642. The table from which the corrective figures have 













REVENUES OF THE PARTIES CASUELLES IN LIVRES6
1630 1632 1633 1636 1639 1642
Ordinary revenue*3....... . 1,375,835 1,091,723 695,953 451,982 150,079
droit annuel ........... . . 5,115,469 1,727,642 1,481,234 2,105,906 2,975,462 nothing
Creations and sales of
office ............... ,. . 9,196,483 12,122,174 16,414,841 21,143,731 12,406,634 5,495,455
Taxes on the officers of
droits and gages0. . . . ,. . 4,208,066 14,385,960 17,436,235 11,178,385 19,705,058 3,222,257
Miscellaneous .........  , nothing 570,498 445,841 289,983 8,000
Total .................. . . 19,270,542 28,935,913 37,293,731 33,193,556 33,829,Il9 8,875,791
aFrom figures supplied by Mousnier, La y£nalit§ des offices, 1st ed., p. 394. All revenues are those 
bon 11epargne, that is to say, accounted for on the books of the central trgsorler de 11epargne. 
Revenues collected and spent in the provinces are not included. The figures are corrected to include 
revenues in the deniers extraordinaires which properly belong with the Parties casuelles.
^Ordinary revenues of the Parties casuelles included the product of resignations and vacances by 
death.
cTaxes on the royal officers resulted when the king demanded a forced loan in exchange for increases 
in droits (rights of office) and gages (salaries). The officers were not permitted to refuse the 













VARIOUS RECEIPTS OF THE PARTIES CASUELLES AS PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL CROWN INCOME8,
16^0
Ordinary revenue............ 1.8 #
droit annuel...............  12.0 %
Creations and sales of office . 20.0 %
Taxes on the officers for
droits and gages..........  10.0 %
Total for Parties casuelles . . 44.0 %
1632 1633 1636 1639 1642
2.35 % 1.5 % 0.6 % 0.4 % 0.17#
3.33 % 2.2 % 1.8 % 3.0 % 0
20.00 % 25.0 % 19.0 % 13.0 % 6.33#
20.00 % 23.0 % 9.0 % 22.0 % 4-0 %
50.00 % 51.0 % 30.0 % 38.0 % 10.5 %
aFrom figures supplied by Mousnier, La Vgnalite des offices, 1st ed., 394. All 




James Hosea Kitchens, III, was horn in Austin, Texas, on November 
16, 19^ 2, the eldest son of Mr. and Mrs. James H. Kitchens, Jr. He 
attended public schools in Baton Rouge and Alexandria, Louisiana, and 
graduated from Ruston High School in June, i960. Upon completion of 
secondary education, he entered Louisiana Polytechnic Institute, 
receiving the Bachelor of Arts in History from that institution in 
June, 1965. In September, 1965, he began graduate study in the 
Department of History at Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge, 
completing the requirements for the Master of Arts in August, 1967. 
Prom September, 1970, until August, 1971, he served as Temporary 
Instructor in History at the University of Alabama in Huntsville. In 
September, 1971» Kitchens returned to the campus of L.S.U. to assume 
a Teaching Assistantship in the Department of History. Between June 
and October, 1972, he was resident chez Mme. and M. le gSnSral RenS 
Genty, 30, rue Gay-Lussac, Paris V8, while engaged in doctoral re­
search at the Bibliotheque Nationale, Archives Nationale, Biblio­
theque de 1’Arsenal, and Bibliotheque de 1*Institute. In the fall 
of 1972 he returned to Baton Rouge to complete the dissertation, 
becoming a candidate for the Doctorate in Philosophy in December,
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